我国向通货膨胀目标制过渡的政策建议

通货膨胀目标制作为我国缓解通货膨胀问题的有效手段，为稳定我国金融市场发挥着至关重要的作用。现阶段，我国尚未完全实行通货膨胀目标制，究其原因在于我国现行金融市场中还存在着一系列制约实行通货膨胀目标制的因素，即货币币值、中央银行的独立性、价格指数、货币政策工具以及金融体系。基于此本文提出了相关政策建议用来抑制通货膨胀。     

通货膨胀目标制及其在我国的可行性分析

本文在阐述了通货膨胀目标制的含义及优缺点的基础上,分析了实行通货膨胀目标制的必要条件,结合当前我国实际情况分析得出,我国暂不宜实行通货膨胀目标制。     

我国通货膨胀与中央银行独立性的问题研究

2011年以来,中国人民银行连续七次调高存款准备金率,似乎又把我们引入历史的车轮,让我们不能不重新关注起通货膨胀.西方理论界认为,通货膨胀同中央银行的独立性存在负相关关系.我国通货膨胀的一个关键原因即是中央银行独立性的缺乏.所以应通过有效途径来提高我国中央银行的独立性.     

中央银行独立牲分析——转型国家的经验与教训

本文从“时间非一致”的假定出发证明，在经济全面衰退的现实危机面前，转型国家往往更有动机偏向滥用货币扩张手段，而央行的非独立性将进一步加剧引发恶性通胀的风险．为了避免“通胀偏向”政策所导致的社会福利恶化，需要一种机制来保证政府承诺得以履行。检验表明，转型国家大多存在央行法定独立先于实质独立的情况，即央行法定独立性很高，但事实上货币政策还是由政府控制而难以完全独立有效抑制通胀。跨期声誉模型表明，仅仅实现央行的法定独立可能在长期产生负的社会福利效应。为此，建议确定合适的名义政策目标以强化央行的预承诺能力，同时要加强企业治理，财政机制方面的配套改革，使各项调控措施相互协调。     

中央银行独立性测度及其与通胀的关系——基于文献研究视角

央行独立性是经济政策研究的重要问题,长期以来备受关注,而独立性的度量问题又是重中之重,由于中央银行测度中会牵涉到众多因素,导致度量方法的选取存在不同的观点;围绕着央行独立性与通货膨胀之间的关系,也存在着诸多争论。文章基于文献研究的视角研究以下两个问题:中央银行独立性的测度方法;独立性与通胀的关系。结论认为目前在我国通货膨胀与央行独立性之间的关系尚不明确;LS测度更符合我国的实际情况。     

信息不完全、通货膨胀目标制与货币政策声誉:跨国经验

20世纪90年代以来通行的通货膨胀目标制被认为是极具透明性、灵活性的货币政策框架，受到很多国家的推崇。本文验证通货膨胀目标制是否有助于建立货币政策声誉，构建一个基于信息不完全基础上的动态预期形成模型，通过对通货膨胀目标制能否引起结构性变化的七个发达国家的实证研究，发现政策声誉的建立是一个学习过程。通货膨胀目标制实行的时间越长，该政策对降低通货膨胀率，实现经济稳定增长越有效。     

论提高我国中央银行的独立性

加强中央银行独立性是世界性的潮流，也是各国银行立法的大趋势。改革开放以来，我国中央银行的独立性是不断增强的，但也存在许多问题，银监会的成立将改变这一状况。当前应以此为契机，采取措施提高我国中央银行独立性。     

关于通货膨胀目标制标准的研究

通货膨胀目标制虽然在过去的18年里取得很大成功,但尚未接近其本质,还有发展与改进的空间。文章就最优通货膨胀目标制的3条标准(损失函数、最优工具利率设计、透明度与交流及信誉度)进行深入分析,并总结值得我国中央银行借鉴的启示。     

通货膨胀目标制的实证研究

通货膨胀目标制作为一个货币政策框架已经在很多国家得到实施,总体而言是比较成功的,国外不少学者对通货膨胀目标制的实施状况进行了实证研究,本文从影响一国通货膨胀目标制决策的因素以及支持和反对通货膨胀目标制3个角度对目前的实证研究状况进行概括。     

Monetary Policy Uncertainty and Inflation: The Role of Central Bank Accountability

We analyse the issue of central bank accountability with the aid of a simple monetary policy game with uncertainty about the agent's inflation stabilisation preferences. We find that there may be an important economic role for accountability in addition to its political function of making the central bank answerable to voters through its accountability to the executive. The model suggests that for countries with relatively little central bank independence, or perhaps a poor inflationary track record, significant reductions in inflation can be achieved by lowering monetary policy uncertainty. These reductions are much smaller for inflation-averse central banks, when monetary policy uncertainty is reduced by the same absolute amount. Thus, the effectiveness of accountability – as a means of lowering both inflation and inflation uncertainty – is higher the lower the degree of central bank conservativeness.     

Central Bank Behavior and Statutory Independence

This paper integrates the Taylor reaction function literature with the literature on central bank independence (CBI). The central bank??s policy reaction function describes its behaviors, which measures the practical CBI, as opposed to the legal CBI measured by CBI indices. By analyzing the relationship between various legal CBI indices and the central banks?? reactions to inflation for 18 OECD countries, we find that the difference of behaviors among central banks is consistent with the economic measure of independence, which measures how easy it is for the government to finance its deficits by direct access to credit from the central bank.     

Central Bank Independence,Speed of Disinflation and the Sacrifice Ratio

Using a theoretical model in which the degree of central bank independence affects the degree of inflation persistence and therefore the speed of disinflation, this paper suggests that sacrifice ratios are lower when central bank independence is higher. Empirical tests, using estimates of sacrifice ratios based on disinflation episodes for 18 OECD countries during the 1960–90 period, show that this result also holds empirically. This finding seems to be consistent with the credibility hypothesis by pointing out that an independent central bank may produce a credibility bonus.     

Central Bank Balance Sheet Policies and Inflation Expectations

We analyse the empirical effects of credit easing and quantitative easing on inflation expectations and exchange rates. Both monetary policy strategies are summarised in measures for composition and size of the central bank balance sheet and are included in a VAR model. The results show that changes in balance sheet size had positive, albeit weak effects on inflation expectations in Japan, while the effects were negligible in the euro area. By contrast, an increasing balance sheet size is associated with reduced short-term inflation expectations in the US and UK, pointing at negative signalling effects. Shocks to balance sheet size or composition have no substantial effects on long-term inflation expectations in the euro area, US and UK. An expanding balance sheet size is associated with a depreciation of the euro, pound sterling and Japanese yen.     

The Sacrifice Ratio and Central Bank Independence Revisited

Several recent studies make use of cross-country data to examine the relationship between a country's sacrifice ratio and the extent to which its central bank is insulated from political influence. These studies report a positive correlation between these two variables. However, these studies employ econometric methodologies that do not account for the measurement error which contaminates their proxies for central bank independence. This paper makes use of an alternative econometric methodology, one that does account for this measurement error, and finds a strong negative relationship between the sacrifice ratio and Central Bank independence.     

加强中央银行独立性的重要意义--以日本为实例的分析

以日本为实例的分析表明,如果一国的中央银行缺乏应有的独立性,一般说来并不会像“时间非一致性”理论所分析的那样,会促使政府反反复复地背弃维护物价稳定的承诺,去有意制造通货膨胀,也不会像政治商业周期理论所分析的那样,会引发政府为谋求连任而周期性地运用货币政策愚弄选民。部分西方学者以通货膨胀率的讷氏来分析是否应该加强中央银行独立性的观点是极其片面的。为了使货币政策选择免受个别政治家或某届政府不合理的干预,避免国际压力对货币政策运营产生错误影响,使货币政策真正起到稳定经济运行的作用,必须赋予中央银行以充分的独立性。     

转轨经济中中央银行的独立性

中央银行独立性包括法定独立性和真实独立性两个方面的内容，还存在若干其他的分类。中央银行独立性和通货膨胀之间关系的研究一直是中央银行独立性研究的核心内容之一。实证研究表明，转轨经济中中央银行独立性与通货膨胀之间并不存在显著的相关性。但增强中央银行独立性对于转轨中国家而言，仍具有十分重要的意义。     

出其不意的央行货币政策

2006年8月18日,央行出其不意地上调了金融机构人民币存贷款基准利率。金融机构一年期存贷款基准利率上调0．27个百分点,其他各档次存贷款基准利率也相应调整,长期利率上调幅度大于短期利率上调幅度。同时,也规定对个人消费信贷利率有所优惠。