A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks

We examine differences in underwriting costs between commercial‐bank‐Section‐20‐underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) and investment‐bank‐underwritten IPOs. Our results suggest that total underwriting costs (gross margin plus underpricing) are significantly lower for commercial bank IPOs. The lower cost for commercial bank IPOs is attributable to less severe underpricing for these issues. Gross margin costs generally do not differ between commercial bank and investment bank issues. Furthermore, we find that the long‐run stock price performance for commercial bank issues is superior to that of investment bank issues. That is, lower underpricing for Section 20 issues may not be a short‐run phenomenon. Rather, there appears to be a favorable outcome for investors in the long run for holding IPOs underwritten by Section 20 commercial banks. These results are inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis often associated with merging commercial and investment bank functions in one organization.     

Conflict of Interest in Commercial Bank Equity Underwriting

This paper examines the pricing characteristics of initial public offerings underwritten by commercial banks. Assuming IPO underpricing is directly related to ex ante uncertainty, if the market rationally perceives these commercial banks to have a conflict of interest, these securities should have more underpricing than non-commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings (all else being equal). On the other hand, if the market believes that commercial bank involvement signals firm quality, less underpricing should be observed. This topic has recently gained in importance with the passage of the Financial Services Reform Act in November 1999. We find that the underpricing of commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings in which the firm had a previous banking relationship with the underwriter is significantly less than those underwritten by investment banks.     

The Role and Impact of Financial Advisors in the Market for Municipal Bonds

Significantly more and more issuers of municipal bonds use the services of financial advisors during the bond issuance process. We investigate the benefits to issuers and market participants arising from the role of financial advisors in the issuance of municipal bonds. Using a large sample of 9,493 tax-exempt municipal bonds, we show that financial advisors have significant impact on borrowing costs, reoffering yields and underwriter gross spreads. Our results are more pronounced for revenue bonds, particularly for negotiated revenue issues. In addition, our results show significant advantages to using a financial advisor for refunding issues supporting the view that financial advisors play important roles for more complex issues. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that financial advisors provide important and useful services resulting in monitoring and information asymmetry reduction benefits accruing to issuers and market participants.      

Bank underwriting of debt securities: modern evidence

This article examines debt securities underwritten by Section20 subsidiaries of bank holding companies relative to thoseunderwritten by investment houses. Consistent with a net certificationeffect for banks, bank underwriting of lower credit rated firmsto whom the bank lends results in relatively higher prices (loweryields). We find no evidence of conflicts of interest even whenan issue is used to repay bank debt. Further, banks bring arelatively larger proportion of small issues to the market.Contrary to the contention that universal banking stunts availabilityof finance to small firms, bank underwritings appear to benefitsmall firms.     

Distance Still Matters: Evidence from Municipal Bond Underwriting

Using a sample of municipal bond offerings, I find that "local"investment banks have substantial comparative and absolute advantagesover nonlocal counterparts-–locals charge lower fees andsell bonds at lower yields. Local investment banks’ strongestcomparative advantage is at underwriting bonds with higher creditrisk and bonds not rated by rating agencies. These findingssuggest that high-risk bonds and nonrated bonds are more difficultto evaluate and market, and that investment banks with a localpresence are better able to assess "soft" information and placedifficult bond issues.     

Breaking down the barriers: Competition,syndicate structure,and underwriting incentives

We argue that the entry of commercial banks into bond underwriting led to the evolution of co-led underwriting arrangements and lowered the screening incentives of underwriters. Lead underwriters in co-led syndicates faced weaker incentives to screen issuer quality. In boom markets, issues underwritten by co-led syndicates were more likely to be involved in financial misrepresentation events. Underwriter incentives in co-led syndicates were particularly weak in industries where commercial banks stole substantial market share. Similar patterns do not hold in bust markets where investors are likely to engage in their own information collection efforts. Our results suggest that competition may have an adverse effect on the incentives of financial intermediaries in market environments where their information production is more valuable to investors.     

The Behavior of the Interest Rate Differential Between Tax-exempt Revenue and General Obligation Bonds: A Test of Risk Preferences and Market Segmentation

This paper presents evidence that the yield differential between revenue bonds and similar general obligation bonds varies contracyclically with the level of economic activity. The evidence also indicates that significant investor-borrower induced market segmentation exists in the municipal bond market. An increase in the relative demand by commercial banks for tax-exempt securities and/or an increase in the supply of revenue bonds relative to the supply of general obligation bonds increase the yield spread between the two classes of debt. These findings were the result of a series of empirical tests with both macroeconomic and microeconomic data.     

The impact of bank entry in the Japanese corporate bond underwriting market

The 1993 Japanese financial system reform allowed banks to enter the underwriting market for corporate bonds through bank-owned security subsidiaries. This paper examines empirically whether underwriting commissions and yield spreads on corporate straight bonds issued domestically fell as a result of this bank entry. The empirical results show that bank entry significantly lowers both underwriting commissions and yield spreads. Commissions charged by banks are significantly lower than those charged by investment houses. Lending and shareholding relationships between the issuer and underwriter are not important in determining commissions or yield spreads.     

Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets

We examine the spillover wealth effects of the Orange County, California bankruptcy announcement in December 1994 on municipal bonds, municipal bond funds, and bank stocks. This bankruptcy is prominent because of unprecedented losses and because it was caused by a highly leveraged derivatives strategy rather than a shortage of tax revenues and excess spending. We find contagion in the bond market with significantly negative abnormal returns for municipal bond funds without direct exposure to Orange County and for non‐Orange County municipal bonds. In addition, our findings suggest the contagion spills over to the common stocks of investment and commercial banks that deal in or use derivatives; however, the equities of banks unexposed to derivatives are not affected.     

Municipal Bond Demand Premiums and Bond Price Volatility: A Note

The behavior of different components of municipal bond yields may have a significant impact upon bond price behavior. Specifically, demand premiums created by banks may stabilize bond yields in some maturity ranges but not in others; for example, short-term municipals may be stabilized but not long-term. This research implies that bank demand behavior may create demand premiums that stabilize prices of short-term municipal bonds relative to those of Treasury bonds of like maturity. While this implication is inconsistent with the residual theory of bank demand, it is consistent with the tax-shield theory attributed to Hendershott and Koch [3, 4].     

On the income diversification and bank market power nexus in the MENA countries: Evidence from a GMM panel-VAR approach

This paper investigates the dynamic causal relationship between revenue diversification and bank market power using a broad sample of commercial banks from 17 Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries over the period 1993–2014. To do so, we employ the panel vector autoregression (PVAR) approach in a generalized method of moments (GMM) framework. Moreover, we use the impulse response functions (IRFs) tool to better understand the reaction of bank market power aftershocks on revenue diversification and vice-versa. Finally, we supplement our analysis by the forecast error variance decompositions (FEVds) of our variables. Overall, the results show that the level of bank market power declines in response to positive revenue diversification shocks. Conversely, banks with a higher level of market power get more involved in non-traditional activities.     

The market structure effects of commercial bank entry into underwriting: Evidence from the league tables

This study investigates the market structure effects of the deregulation of the US underwriting industry that allowed commercial banks to expand into investment banking activities. Specifically, it analyses the gains of commercial banks in market rankings and market share, the market position of the traditional top-ranked firms and changes in market concentration. The overall evidence suggests that (a) commercial banks were successful in gaining market share in underwriting, especially in debt offerings; (b) the commercial bank entry into underwriting eroded the dominance of bulge-bracket firms in debt underwriting, but not in equity offerings, where their dominance intensified; and (c) the commercial bank entry helped reduce market concentration in debt but not in equity underwriting. Finally, the study finds that the market share of commercial banks in equity offerings increases when equity underwriting volume rises, whereas market concentration in debt offerings increases when debt underwriting volume falls.     

Conflict of interest in commercial bank security underwritings: Canadian evidence

The recent repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act in the US has cleared the way for commercial banks to enter the securities underwriting business. Many of the concerns that resulted in the original passage of the Glass–Steagall Act, however, still exist. One of these is the possible conflict of interest a universal bank faces. This paper provides evidence on this issue from the experience of Canada following its removal of restrictions on chartered bank ownership of investment dealers. Both ex ante bond yield comparisons between commercial and investment bank underwritten issues and equity price reactions to bond issue announcements provide no evidence of a conflict of interest.     

Investment Bank Reputation,Information Production,and Financial Intermediation

We model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market. Entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market, either directly, or using an investment bank. Investment banks, who interact repeatedly with the equity market, evaluate entrepreneurs' projects and report to investors, in return for a fee. Setting strict evaluation standards (unobservable to investors) is costly for investment banks, inducing moral hazard. Investment banks' credibility therefore depends on their equity-marketing history. Investment banks' evaluation standards, their reputations, underwriter compensation, the market value of equity sold, and entrepreneurs' choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously.     

Banks and sovereign risk: A granular view

We investigate the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of German banks and the implications of such holdings for bank risk. We use granular information on all German banks and all sovereign debt exposures in the years 2005–2013. As regards the determinants of sovereign bond holdings of banks, we find that these are larger for weakly capitalized banks, banks that are active on capital markets, and for large banks. Yet, only around two thirds of all German banks hold sovereign bonds. Macroeconomic fundamentals were significant drivers of sovereign bond holdings only after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. With the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis, German banks reallocated their portfolios toward sovereigns with lower debt ratios and bonds with lower yields. With regard to the implications for bank risk, we find that low-risk government bonds decreased the risk of German banks, especially for savings and cooperative banks. Holdings of high-risk government bonds, in turn, increased the risk of commercial banks during the sovereign debt crisis.     

Bond underwriting by banks and conflicts of interest: Evidence from Japan during the pre-war period

Article 65 of the Securities and Exchange Law of Japan, which was carried into effect in 1948, prohibited banks from underwriting corporate securities partially because of the concern that combining the banking and securities businesses might result in a potential conflict of interest. This paper studies the pricing and long-term default performance of industrial bonds underwritten by commercial banks, the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), and trust firms as compared to those underwritten by investment houses during the pre-war period in Japan when banks were allowed to underwrite industrial bonds. The evidence rejects the concern about the conflicts of interest.     

Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with Chinese state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms have a greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks. These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer bank discrimination for political reasons, they tend to address their financing disadvantages by building economic bonds with banks. We also find that among non-state-owned firms, those that hold significant bank ownership have lower interest expenses, and are less likely to increase cash holdings but more likely to obtain short-term loans when the government monetary policy is tight. These results suggest that the firms building economic bonds with banks can enjoy benefits such as lower financial expenses and better lending terms during difficult times. Finally, we find that non-state-owned firms with significant bank ownership have better operating performance. Overall, we find that firms can reduce discrimination through holding bank ownership.     

The economic effects of foreign bank presence: Evidence from the Philippines

This study examines the economic effects of the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines from 1990 to 2006. The findings provide strong evidence on the dominance of competition effects from foreign bank presence which lead to the reduction in the profitability and overhead costs of domestic commercial banks. These findings, which reveal that both the actual market penetration and mere presence of foreign banks seem to exert competitive pressure to domestic banks, imply that foreign banks may serve as an effective competitive force, reducing the excess profits earned by domestic banks and compelling domestic banks to update their production technologies and techniques to improve their cost efficiency.From a policy perspective, the findings on competition effects of foreign banks in the domestic banking system justify the liberalization of foreign bank entry in the Philippines. The main findings demonstrate that the goal of banking liberalization in transforming domestic banks to be more competitive and efficient works considerably well in the case of the Philippines. Aside from the policy of easing the entry of foreign banks, bank-specific conditions can have significant impact on the performance of domestic banks. Therefore, a sustained improvement in the efficiency of domestic commercial banks requires not only liberalizing the entry of foreign banks, but also on continued strengthening of domestic prudential regulation and supervision on the commercial banking system.     

The impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings: A cross-country analysis

We use country level data and bank level data from 71 countries and 857 banks to investigate the impact of bank regulations, supervision, market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings. The results indicate that less cost efficient banks, with higher than average levels of provisions relatively to their income, and lower liquidity tend to have lower ratings. Larger and more profitable banks tend to obtain higher ratings. Higher equity to assets ratio results in higher ratings only when we do not control for bank supervision and regulations. Capital requirements, restrictions on bank activities, official disciplinary power, explicit deposit insurance scheme, higher deposit insurer power, liquidity and diversification guidelines, entry requirements, fraction of entries denied, and economic freedom have a significant impact on ratings in all of our specifications. Disclosure requirements and foreign banks entry have a significant impact on ratings only when we simultaneously control for the regulatory environment and the market structure, while auditing requirements have a significant impact only when we control for the regulatory environment alone. Finally, banks in developed countries are assigned higher ratings. However, this impact disappears when we include the regulatory and supervision variables in the models.     

On the Value of Municipal Bond Insurance: An Empirical Analysis

Using a large sample of municipal bond data from 2001 to 2010 in the U.S., this paper documents the time variation of the value of municipal bond insurance, estimated from the insured and uninsured bonds yield at issue differentials. We find that insured municipal bonds carry significant lower yields at issue compared to those of the equivalent uninsured bonds before 2008. However, this cost saving disappeared with the aftermath of the subprime credit crisis. We find that the supply of bonds and the level of market interest rates to have significant positive impacts on the time‐varying value of bond insurance. We also detect asymmetric response of these yield differentials to rises and declines of market interest rates. Economic intuition suggests that the value of municipal bond insurance is a function of business cycles but our tests support the contrary, which may be explained by the habitat preference of municipal bonds issues.