The interest rate pass-through in the euro area during the sovereign debt crisis

We investigate the pass-through of monetary policy to bank lending rates in the euro area during the sovereign debt crisis, in comparison to the pre-crisis period. We make the following contributions. First, we use a factor-augmented vector autoregression, which allows us to assess the responses of a large number of country-specific interest rates and spreads. Second, we analyze the effects of monetary policy on the components of the interest rate pass-through, which reflect banks' funding risk (including sovereign risk) and markups charged by banks over funding costs. Third, we not only consider conventional but also unconventional monetary policy. We find that while the transmission of conventional monetary policy to bank lending rates has not changed with the crisis, the composition of the pass-through has changed. Specifically, expansionary conventional monetary policy lowered sovereign risk in peripheral countries and longer-term bank funding risk in peripheral and core countries during the crisis, but has been unable to lower banks' markups. This was not, or not as much, the case prior to the crisis. Unconventional monetary policy helped decreasing lending rates, mainly due to large shocks rather than a strong propagation.     

The impact of the sovereign debt crisis on the activity of Italian banks

We examine the implications of the sovereign debt tensions on the Italian credit market by estimating the effect of the 10-year BTP-Bund spread on a wide array of bank interest rates, categories of loans and income statement variables. We exploit the heterogeneity between large and small intermediaries to assess to what extent the transmission of sovereign risk differed in relation with different banks’ balance-sheet characteristics and business strategies. Regarding the cost of funding, we find that changes in the BTP-Bund spread have a sizeable effect on the interest rates on term deposits and newly issued bonds but virtually no effect on overnight deposits. Furthermore, the sovereign spread significantly affects the cost of credit for firms and households and exerts a negative effect on loan growth. All these results are magnified when considering alone the five largest banks, which are typically less capitalized, have a larger funding gap and incidence of bad loans and rely more on non-traditional banking activities. Sovereign tensions also affect the main items of banks’ income statement.     

Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?

We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.     

The real effects of relationship lending✰

This paper studies the real effects of relationship lending on firm activity in Italy following Lehman Brothers’ default shock and Europe's sovereign debt crisis, two different crisis situations where in the latter, bank solvency was at the centre of the economic shock while being more peripheral in the former. We use a large data set that merges the comprehensive Italian Credit and Firm Registers. We find that following Lehman's default, banks offered more favourable continuation lending terms to firms with which they had stronger relationships. Such favourable conditions enabled firms to maintain higher levels of investment and employment. The insulation effects of tighter bank-firm relationships were still present during the European sovereign debt crisis, especially for firms tied to well capitalised banks.     

Does the source of debt financing affect default risk?

We examine whether the source of debt financing is important for assessments of firms’ default risk. This study reveals that during the 2007–2010 financial crisis, firms that depend mainly on financing from banks suffer higher increases in default risk than do firms with no such dependence. Conversely, firms that rely solely on financing from public debt markets do not experience significant increases in default risk. These findings suggest that the bank supply shock theory explains the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy. Finally, firms that depend on bank financing cannot offset the adverse impacts of bank lending shocks by substituting bank loans with publicly traded debt.     

Liquidity crisis,relationship lending and corporate finance

This paper investigates the consequences of the liquidity shocks in wholesale funding markets during the 2007–2009 financial crisis on bank lending and corporate financing. We show that banks that relied more heavily on wholesale funding contracted lending more severely than banks that relied more on insured deposits. We then examine the effects of loan contraction on the financial positions of publicly traded firms. We find that both during and after the crisis, the change in leverage of bank-dependent firms is less than that of firms with access to public debt markets. In addition, bank-dependent firms rely more on cash than net equity issuance to finance operations. We also find that firms with established bank lending relationships weather the crisis better. Such firms are able to attain higher levels of leverage during the crisis, add to their cash holdings, secure new bank credit, and achieve higher profitability as a result.     

Sovereign stress and SMEs’ access to finance: Evidence from the ECB's SAFE survey

We study the effect of sovereign stress on SMEs’ capital structure using restricted-access data from the European Central Bank. We find that during the sovereign debt crisis, and controlling for borrowers’ quality, firms in stressed countries became more likely to be denied credit, to be credit rationed, and to face higher loan rates. Less creditworthy firms were not more likely to become credit constrained, suggesting no flight to quality in lending. We also find that in order to make up for the decline in bank credit firms in stressed countries began relying considerably more on retained earnings and government subsidies.     

非标意见与债务融资——基于银行借款和债务期限结构的经验证据

理论上,年报被出具非标意见会降低企业的债务融资能力。但本文发现非标意见对企业新增银行借款和债务期限结构没有显著负面影响,不支持理论预期。我们认为,在中国,银行是一个并非完全以利润最大化为目标的独立市场主体,他们会为了地方社会稳定和经济发展向企业提供贷款;另外,企业有政府的隐性支持,银行不需要太关注企业的偿债风险。因此,虽然非标意见传递出会计信息质量低或未来经营风险高等问题,但它对银行借款的影响相当有限。本文的研究有助于我们理解中国上市公司会计造假盛行、非标意见比例过高的现象。     

Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis

We present a DSGE model where firms optimally choose among alternative instruments of external finance. The model is used to explain the evolving composition of corporate debt during the financial crisis of 2008–09, namely, the observed shift from bank finance to bond finance, at a time when the cost of market debt rose above the cost of bank loans. We show that the flexibility offered by banks on the terms of their loans and firms' ability to substitute among alternative instruments of debt finance are important to shield the economy from adverse real effects of a financial crisis.     

Is small beautiful? The resilience of small banks during the European debt crisis

We examine the lending behaviour of small and large banks in the Eurozone during the sovereign debt crisis. Relative to large banks, small banks are less pro-cyclical in that they exhibit more stable lending growth across credit expansion and contraction periods. In peripheral countries, the portfolio rebalancing of small banks towards higher public debt (substitution effect) does not appear to cause a reduction of their lending to the private sector. Instead, the level of public debt seems to provide a liquidity buffer that influences bank-specific loan growth positively (complementarity effect), particularly during market-wide lending contractions. Our findings show that for small peripheral banks the substitution effect found in the literature can coexist with a complementarity effect when public debt grows faster than private loans. Our analysis contributes to the ongoing debate on the regulatory treatment of public debt in banks and supports incentives embedded in new banking regulation that penalise bank size.     

Does banks’ dual holding affect bank lending and firms’ investment decisions? Evidence from China

This study investigates the effect of banks’ dual holding on bank lending and firms’ investment decisions using a sample of listed firms in China. We find that dual holding leads to easier access to bank loans, a result that is more pronounced for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than SOEs. We also find that dual holding distorts banks’ lending decisions and harms the investment efficiency for SOEs, while resulting in optimal lending decisions and enhanced investment efficiency for non-SOEs. For non-SOEs, further analysis suggests that optimal lending decisions and efficient investment can be achieved for firms with higher ownership concentration, and firms in which the family and foreign investors are the controlling shareholders. We argue that, in emerging markets, whether a bank plays a monitoring role by directly holding the debt and equity claims of companies relies heavily on whether the potential collusion between firm executives and bank managers can be averted, which in turn is determined by the firms’ governance framework and ownership structure.     

The impact of monetary policy on the financing behaviour of firms in the Euro area and the UK

Abstract

According to the ‘broad credit view’ bank-dependent firms are more strongly affected by monetary contractions than firms with access to non-bank forms of external finance. Within the credit view the bank lending channel focuses on the special role of bank loans, and predicts that monetary contractions reduce loan supply to firms facing information problems. However, the ‘relationship lending channel’ argues that, especially in bank-based economies, bank-dependent firms have close ties with banks, which may reduce the sensitivity of their use of bank debt to monetary shocks. The sensitivity of corporate debt structures to changes in the monetary policy stance is analysed using a sample of 22,000 firms in the Euro area and the UK. Evidence is found for the credit view, the relationship lending channel, but not for the bank lending channel.     

How the euro-area sovereign-debt crisis led to a collapse in bank equity prices

We quantify the linkages among banks’ equity performance and indicators of sovereign stress by using panel GMM to estimate a three-equation system that examines the impact of sovereign stress, as reflected in both sovereign spreads and sovereign ratings, on bank share prices. We use data for a panel of five euro-area stressed countries. Our findings indicate that a recursive relationship between sovereigns and banks operated during the euro-area crisis. Specifically, for the five crisis countries considered shocks to sovereign spreads fed-through to sovereign ratings, which affected commercial banks’ equity-prices. Our results also point to the importance of using levels of equity prices – rather than rates of return – in measuring banks’ performance. The use of levels allows us to derive the determinants of long-run equity prices.     

Domestic Banks As Lightning Rods? Home Bias and Information during the Eurozone Crisis

European banks have been criticized for holding excessive domestic government debt during the recent Eurozone crisis, which may have intensified the diabolic loop between sovereign and bank credit risks. By using a novel bank-level data set covering the entire timeline of the Eurozone crisis, I first reconfirm that the crisis led to the reallocation of sovereign debt from foreign to domestic banks. In contrast to the recent literature focusing only on sovereign debt, I show that the banks' private-sector exposures were (at least) equally affected by the rise in home bias. Consistent with this pattern, I propose a new debt reallocation channel based on informational frictions and show that the informationally closer foreign banks increase their relative exposures when the sovereign risk rises. The effect of informational closeness is economically meaningful and robust to the use of different information measures and controls for alternative channels of sovereign debt reallocation.     

Bank loans during the 2008 quantitative easing

We examine the effect of quantitative easing on the supply of bank loans. During the Fed’s quantitative easing programs, lending banks reduced relatively more loan spreads, offered longer loan maturities, provided larger loans, and loosened more covenants for firms whose long-term bond ratings were below BBB and were lower than those with investment-grade bond ratings. Furthermore, we find that new bank loans in this period were associated with a reduction in a firm’s value and an increase in default risk. These results indicate that banks took greater risk during the 2008 quantitative easing by relaxing lending standards to relatively riskier borrowers.     

Asymmetric information and price competition in small business lending

This paper examines the relationship between bank lending rates and their cost of funds in New Zealand. Our results show that on average mortgage rates respond more quickly to changes in the cost of funds than base business lending rates. We also find an asymmetry in the initial (short-run) response of banks to changes in funding costs; in particular, our results show banks adjust mortgage rates downwards faster than upwards. The speed to which lending rates revert back to their equilibrium relationship with funding costs varies across the lending markets. We find the adjustment speed is faster when mortgage rates are below equilibrium, whereas it is slower when business lending rates are above long-run levels in relation to funding costs. Our analysis suggests that banks prefer the plain-vanilla type of lending such as mortgages in comparison to small business lending consistent with asymmetric information associated with business loans.     

On the exposure of insurance companies to sovereign risk—Portfolio investments and market forces

A sovereign debt crisis can have significant knock-on effects in the financial markets and put financial stability at risk. This paper focuses on the transmission of sovereign risk to insurance companies as some of the largest institutional investors in the sovereign bond market. We use a firm level panel dataset that covers large insurance companies, banks and non-financial firms from nine countries over the time period from 1 January 2008–1 May 2013. We find significant and robust transmission effects from sovereign risk to domestic insurers. The impact on insurers is not significantly different from that on banks but larger than for non-financial firms. We find that systemically important insurers are more closely linked to the domestic sovereign. Based on European data, we show that risks in sovereign bond portfolios are an important driver of insurer risk, which is not reflected in current insurance regulation (incl. Solvency II in Europe).     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Does judicial efficiency lower the cost of credit?

We investigate the effect of judicial efficiency on banks’ lending spreads for a large cross-section of countries. We measure bank interest rate spreads for 106 countries at the country level and for 32 countries at the level of individual banks. We find that judicial efficiency and inflation rates are the main drivers of interest rate spreads across countries. Our results suggest that improvements in judicial efficiency and judicial enforcement of debt contracts are critical to lowering the cost of financial intermediation for households and firms.