Bank Competition with Financing and Savings Substitutes

This paper models the banking competition in loan and deposit markets on two levels. We measure the competition among different banks and among banks and non-bank financing and saving alternatives. We estimate a model of demand, cost, and market equilibrium equations for differentiated products by using data from the confidential reports that Spanish banks provide to the Bank of Spain during the period from 1988 to 2003. This database contains information on the effective interest rates on new loans and deposits, and the expected loan losses obtained from the Spanish Credit Register. The estimated price elasticities show that the products offered by different banks are close substitutes, which puts pressure on the banks’ profits margins. However, the substitutability between bank and non-bank products is much lower than the substitutability among products offered by different banks. The results also show that Spain’s entrance into the Eurozone did not cause a structural change in the demand and cost conditions of Spanish banks. The banks financed most of the imbalances between bank loans and domestic deposits before the crisis through the interbank market.     

Interbank competition and information production: Evidence from the interest rate difference

In this paper, using firm-level cross-sectional data in the US, we report that interest rates on loans extended by inside banks are significantly lower than those on loans extended by outside banks for younger firms in concentrated loan markets, while such loan rate differences are not clearly observed in competitive loan markets. The analytical model presented in this paper predicts that an inside bank is more likely to quote rates lower than those of outside banks to capture a customer in order to gain time to establish exclusive access to the customer’s private information, counting on the consequent future rent from informational advantages over rival banks, if the inside bank intends to acquire private information about the borrower’s creditworthiness. In light of this prediction, we conclude that the above empirical finding is consistent with the hypothesis that increased competition discourages banks from collecting borrower-specific private information.     

Harming Depositors and Helping Borrowers: The Disparate Impact of Bank Consolidation

A model of multimarket spatial competition is developed wheresmall, single-market banks compete with large, multimarket banks(LMBs) for retail loans and deposits. Consistent with empiricalevidence, LMBs are assumed to set retail interest rates uniformlyacross markets, have different operating costs, and have accessto wholesale funding. If LMBs have significant funding advantagesthat offset potential loan operating cost disadvantages, thenmarket-extension mergers by LMBs promote loan competition, especiallyin concentrated markets. However, such mergers reduce retaildeposit competition, especially in less concentrated markets.Prior empirical research and our own analysis of retail depositrates support the model's predictions.     

Securitization,competition and monitoring

We analyze the impact of loan securitization on competition in the loan market. Using a dynamic loan market competition model where borrowers face both exogenous and endogenous costs to switch between banks, we uncover a competition softening effect of securitization that allows banks to extract rents in the primary loan market. By reducing monitoring incentives, securitization mitigates winner’s curse effects in future stages of competition thereby decreasing ex ante competition for initial market share. Due to this competition softening effect, securitization can adversely affect loan market efficiency while leading to higher equilibrium profits for banks. This effect is driven by primary loan market competition, not by the exploitation of informational asymmetries in the secondary market for loans. We also argue that banks can use securitization as a strategic response to an increase in competition, as a tool to signal a reduction in monitoring intensity for the sole purpose of softening ex ante competition. Our result suggests that securitization reforms focusing exclusively on informational asymmetries in markets for securitized products may overlook competitive conditions in the primary market.     

银行高层更替与不良贷款恶性增资——基于不良贷款拨备与剥离视角的分析

本文分析了银行处理不良贷款背后的心理动因,并以不良贷款拨备与剥离作为银行放弃对不良贷款恶性增资概率的替代指标,实证检验了银行高层的更替与其对不良贷款的处理方式有显著的相关关系.通过对2005年前股份制商业银行的面板数据分析,发现股份制商业银行高层的更替与其对不良贷款的处理方式有显著的相关关系:对银行董事长、行长的更替带来不良贷款拔备与剥离的增加,并且一定程度上可以促使银行放弃不良贷款或对贷款质量有更稳健的认识,从而降低不良贷款恶性增资产生的概率.此外,退出董事的资历影响贷款呆账准备的计提,且为正向关系.     

关于我国利率和利率传导关系的思考

当前我国银行体系利率大致可分为货币市场利率和信贷市场利率,其中由央行指定的利率主要有存贷款基准利率、再贴现率等。在货币市场上,隔夜同业拆借利率具有基准利率的地位。在信贷市场上,在特定时期,保持适当的存贷款利差具有积极意义。由于一些阻碍信贷市场与货币市场统一的制度安排的存在,这两个市场间的利率传导呈现出一定的不对称性。为推进利率市场化,进一步完善我国利率体系,下一步应逐步弥合市场分割,加强货币市场基准利率建设,培育商业银行利率定价能力。     

The competitive implications of multimarket bank branching

Retail banking markets have traditionally been viewed as locally limited. However, recent studies have found evidence that large multimarket banking organizations tend to offer uniform interest rates for retail deposit accounts throughout the area that they serve, at least within a given state. This uniform pricing phenomenon raises questions about the continued relevance of the concept of local banking markets for both research and antitrust purposes.We address this issue by employing a model designed to explain the pricing behavior of single-market banks that face competition from multimarket banks. Empirical results are found to be consistent with the many implications of the model. We find that even with multimarket banks present in the market, local market concentration influences the pricing behavior of single-market banks; however, this relationship weakens as the market share of multimarket banks grows. We also find that, on average, multimarket banks offer lower deposit interest rates than do single-market banks operating in the same market, and, in most cases, greater multimarket bank presence is associated with lower deposit interest rates offered by single-market banks.     

Why do bank-dependent firms bear interest-rate risk?

I document that floating-rate loans from banks, particularly important for bank-dependent firms, drive most variation in firms’ exposure to interest rates. I argue that banks prefer to supply floating-rate loans, due to their finite ability to transform short-duration deposit liabilities into long duration assets. Three key findings support this argument: banks with more floating-rate liabilities make more floating-rate loans, hold more floating-rate securities, and quote lower prices for floating-rate loans. Intermediary funding structures therefore help determine what types of contracts non-financial firms use. Banks transmit rising policy rates to firms by contractually raising interest rates on existing loans, not just by reducing the supply of new loans.     

The expansion of services in European banking: Implications for loan pricing and interest margins

Our study of 602 European banks over 1996–2002 investigates how the banks’ expansion into fee-based services has affected their interest margins and loan pricing. We find that higher income share from commissions and fees is associated with lower margins and loan spreads. The higher the commission and fee income share, moreover, the weaker the link between bank loan spreads and loan risk. The latter result is consistent with the conjecture that banks price (or misprice) loans to increase sales of other services. That loss leader (or cross selling) hypothesis has implications for bank regulation and competition with (non-bank) lenders.     

UK bank services for small business: How competitive is the market?

This study is the first to employ an econometric model to examine the pricing behaviour of British financial institutions with respect to key bank products/services offered to small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) including current accounts, investment accounts, business loans, and mortgages. A mean group approach is used on a panel of monthly data to gauge individual banks’ reactions to identify factors influencing the setting of deposit and loan rates, and to assess the competitive structure that best describes the UKs SME banking market. Though the results should be interpreted with caution, the empirical evidence is suggestive of a complex oligopoly. Policies directed at improving information and making it easier for small businesses to change banks/accounts would reduce inertia and improve competition among financial institutions.     

银行理财产品收益率市场化演进机制研究——基于修正Hotelling模型的理论分析与实证检验

本文利用修正的Hotelling模型对我国银行理财产品收益率的市场化演进机制进行了理论分析,并使用2005至2019年的银行理财产品历史数据进行了实证检验,得到了一系列结论。第一,收益率落后的“输家”银行下期将以更大的相对幅度提高其收益率,呈现出“输家”追赶“赢家”的锦标赛竞争机制。第二,上述竞争机制受到“输家”银行排名、不同银行之间收益率差距和监管政策的影响。“输家”银行排名越靠后、不同银行之间的收益率差距越大,那么,下期“输家”银行提高其理财产品收益率的相对幅度就越大,不同银行之间的竞争行为就越强烈;与之相对的,监管政策越严,则不同银行之间的竞争强度越弱。本文的研究结论对进一步深入理解我国存款市场化利率的形成机制、加强对商业银行的监管和引导有一定的借鉴和启示意义。     

Credit unions vs. commercial banks,who takes more risk?

A unique feature of the financial services industry is that both shareholder-owned banks and member-owned credit unions coexist and compete against each other. In this study, we investigate two research questions. First, we compare risk-taking by banks and credit unions, with an additional consideration as to how regulatory oversight (state or federal) relates to such risk-taking. Second, we examine how competition affects the difference in risk-taking between these two types of financial institutions. To answer both questions, we rely on a matched sample (by loan type, size, and county) of commercial banks and credit unions, covering the period between 2010 and 2017. We use three empirical proxies for risk-taking, the Z-score, measuring an institution’s insolvency risk, as well as the ratios of non-performing loans to total loans and loan charge-offs to total loans, measuring the credit risk. Our results suggest that banks tend to engage in more risk-taking than credit unions; however, state regulatory oversight reduces the risk-taking gap, especially in terms of the Z-score. We further find that competition induces different risk-taking behaviors in banks and credit unions. Our results are robust to several alternative specifications.     

Competition,financial innovation and commercial bank loan portfolios

I examine how US commercial bank loan portfolios change in response to the rise of securitization markets and banking market deregulations over 1976–2003. Banks increasingly tilt their portfolios toward real-estate-backed loans. However, there are significant differences across banks. Larger banks and younger banks disproportionately shift their lending toward real-estate-backed loans, particularly commercial real-estate-backed loans, whereas smaller banks and older banks maintain greater shares of their loan portfolios in commercial and personal loans. When larger banks make more real-estate-backed loans, they charge lower interest rates, consistent with these banks lowering the costs of lending and expanding credit for borrowers. In contrast, smaller banks charge higher interest rates, consistent with these banks restricting lending to a select group of borrowers.     

Credit derivatives and loan pricing

This paper examines the relation between the new markets for credit default swaps (CDS) and banks’ pricing of syndicated loans to US corporates. We find that changes in CDS spreads have a significantly positive coefficient and explain about 25% of subsequent monthly changes in aggregate loan spreads during 2000–2005. Moreover, when compared to traditional explanatory factors, they turn out to be the dominant determinant of loan spreads. In particular, they explain loan rates much better than same rated bonds. This suggests that CDS prices contain, beyond general credit risk, to a substantial extent information relevant for bank lending. We also find that, over time, new information from CDS markets is faster incorporated into loans, but information from other markets is not. Overall, our results indicate that the markets for CDS have gained an important role for banks.     

银行理财产品收益率市场化演进机制研究——基于修正Hotelling模型的理论分析与实证检验

本文利用修正的Hotelling模型对我国银行理财产品收益率的市场化演进机制进行了理论分析,并使用2005至2019年的银行理财产品历史数据进行了实证检验,得到了一系列结论。第一,收益率落后的“输家”银行下期将以更大的相对幅度提高其收益率,呈现出“输家”追赶“赢家”的锦标赛竞争机制。第二,上述竞争机制受到“输家”银行排名、不同银行之间收益率差距和监管政策的影响。“输家”银行排名越靠后、不同银行之间的收益率差距越大,那么,下期“输家”银行提高其理财产品收益率的相对幅度就越大,不同银行之间的竞争行为就越强烈;与之相对的,监管政策越严,则不同银行之间的竞争强度越弱。本文的研究结论对进一步深入理解我国存款市场化利率的形成机制、加强对商业银行的监管和引导有一定的借鉴和启示意义。     

Bank portfolio choice with private information about loan quality: Theory and implications for regulation

This paper models bank asset choice when shareholders know more about loan quality than do outsiders. Because of this informational asymmetry, the price of loans in the secondary market is the price for poor quality loans. Banks desire to hold marketable securities in order to avoid liquidating good quality loans at the ‘lemons’ price, but also have a countervailing desire to hold risky loans in order to maximize the value of deposit insurance. In this context, portfolio composition and bank safety is examined as a function of the market distribution of loan quality, and the distribution of deposits. The model suggests that off-balance sheet commitments have little effect on bankruptcy risk, and induce banks to hold more securities. We also show that an increase in the bank equity requirement will unambiguously increase bank safety in the long run. In the short run, banks are unambiguously riskier on-balance sheet, although the effect on bank safety is ambiguous.     

Bank Mergers,REIT Loan Pricing and Takeover Likelihood

The impact of bank mergers on Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) loan pricing and takeover likelihood is assessed. REITs that lose their primary banking relationship due to bank mergers pay higher interest rates on future borrowings. Bank consolidation reduces bank competition for REIT loans which affects loan pricing. Moreover, based on randomly matched samples of REITs, the results imply that firms losing their agent banks due to bank mergers and those with limited access to bank debt are more likely to be acquired while REITs associated with acquiring banks are more likely to acquire other firms. Additional analysis of the 92 merged REITs reveals that 33% of the target REITs’ banks are merged with their REIT acquirers’ banks prior to the REIT mergers while 67% of the target REITs share at least one major bank with their acquirer.     

存贷相联与银行的本质——基于KRS模型的扩展

作为集吸收公众存款和发放贷款于一身的金融中介,银行在整个金融体系中始终处于关键地位.既有文献对银行特质性问题进行了深入探讨,本文在KRS模型的基础上,进一步从理论上研究了活期存款、贷款承诺和定期贷款这三者之间的协同效应,认为金融功能的一体化是银行的本质所在,并结合20世纪90年代以来美国银行业转型的事实进行了初步实证考察,由此提出银行制度边界的命题.     

Bank concentration and retail interest rates

The recent wave of mergers in the euro area raises the question whether the increase in concentration has offset the increase in competition in European banking through deregulation. We test this question by estimating a simple Cournot model of bank pricing. We construct country and product specific measures of bank concentration and find that for loans and demand deposits increasing concentration may have resulted in less competitive pricing by banks, whereas for savings and time deposits, the model is rejected, suggesting increases in contestability and/or efficiency in these markets. Finally, the paper discusses some implications for tests of the effect of concentration on monetary policy transmission.     

The arbitrage-free valuation and hedging of demand deposits and credit card loans

Using a market segmentation argument, this paper uses the interest rate derivative's arbitrage-free methodology to value both demand deposit liabilities and credit card loan balances in markets where deposits/loan rates may be determined under imperfect competition. In this context, these financial instruments are shown to be equivalent to a particular interest rate swap, where the principal depends on the past history of market rates. Solutions are obtained which are independent of any particular model for the evolution of the term structure of interest rates.