Decentralization with externalities

In this paper, we examine in a systematic way the problem of decentralization in an economy with all types of externalities. We show that decentralization with artificial markets requires strong convexity assumptions which are typically not fulfilled for negative externalities on producers. A milder form of decentralization with taxation is shown to obtain under weaker convexity assumptions. A new example is given to explain the role of a non-interiority assumption. Finally, new types of non-convexities are described and the problem of rights to externalities is clearly defined in the framework of this general theory.     

“Fair marriages”: An impossibility

For marriage markets [Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S., 1962, College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.] so-called fair matchings do not always exist. We show that restoring fairness by using monetary transfers is not always possible: there are marriage markets where no amount of money can guarantee the existence of a fair allocation.     

Revisiting Externalities

For economies with one-sided externalities between firms, four types of results are presented and discussed: (i) the impossibility of decentralized finite-dimensional mechanisms guaranteeing Pareto optimality; (ii) the possibilities for Pigou taxes in situations where Arrovian markets cannot function; (iii) that mergers may be able to internalize "weak" externalities but not "strong" ones; and (iv) that "parallelism" of indifference curves (quasi-linear utilities, absence of income effects) is necessary, and not merely sufficient, for the validity of the Coase Invariance Theorem (asserting that alternative institutional arrangements do not change the level of externality). The paper builds on the seminal contributions of Starrett, Calsamiglia, Baumol, Bradford, Oates, Boyd, and Conley.     

Tax Rate Variability and Public Spending as Sources of Indeterminacy

We consider a constant returns to scale, one sector economy with segmented asset markets of the Woodford type. We analyze the role of public spending, financed by labor income and consumption taxation, on the emergence of indeterminacy. We find that what is relevant for indeterminacy is the variability of the distortion introduced by government intervention. We show that the degree of public spending externalities in preferences affects the combinations between the tax rate and its variability under which indeterminacy occurs. Moreover, we find that consumption taxes can lead to local indeterminacy when asset markets are segmented.     

EFFICIENT POLICY IN A PREDATORY ECONOMY: TO HIM WHO HATH SHALL BE GIVEN?*

Trade subject to predation generates externalities within and between markets. Efficient tax, infrastructure, and enforcement policies internalize the net externality—more trade implies fewer predators but drawn to trade at rising cost. The balance is positive (negative) as enforcement is weak (strong). Dual economies pair weak Periphery and strong Core enforcement markets. Efficient taxation and infrastructure promote the Core at the expense of the Periphery. Efficient enforcement promotes both. Tolerance (intolerance) of smuggling is efficient when Core enforcement is weak (strong). Tolerance of informal market Mafias that provide enforcement and infrastructure is efficient when Core enforcement is strong.     

Epsilon Cores of Games with Limited Side Payments: Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment

We introduce the concept of a parameterized collection of games with limited side payments, ruling out large transfers of utility, and demonstrate conditions ensuring that a game with limited side payments has a nonempty -core. Our main result is that, when some degree of side-paymentness within nearly-effective small groups is assumed and large transfers are prohibited, then all payoffs in the -core treat similar players similarly. A bound on the distance between -core payoffs of any two similar players is given in terms of the parameters describing the game. These results add to the literature showing that games with many players and small effective groups have the properties of competitive markets. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D71.     

Optimal renewable-energy promotion: Capacity subsidies vs. generation subsidies

We derive optimal subsidization of renewable energies in electricity markets. The analysis takes into account that capacity investment must be chosen under uncertainty about demand conditions and capacity availability, and that capacity as well as electricity generation may be sources of externalities. The main result is that generation subsidies should correspond to externalities of electricity generation (e.g., greenhouse gas reductions), and investment subsidies should correspond to externalities of capacity (e.g., learning spillovers). If only capacity externalities exist, then electricity generation should not be subsidized at all. Our results suggest that some of the most popular promotion instruments cause welfare losses. We demonstrate such welfare losses with data from the German electricity market.     

Politics with(out) Coase

Political markets may be curative of political externalities, yet they are often unviable due to the presence of bargaining externalities. In this paper, we study the extent to which the choice of voting dimensions may affect the viability of Coasian bargaining in a political context. The results suggest that bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space, although desirable in an ideal world of zero-transaction costs, is almost unavoidably affected by bargaining externalities. Disaggregating the policy choices and voting in a one-dimensional policy space can reduce bargaining externalities and lead to median voter outcomes. Bargaining by a limited number of players in a median voter situation can achieve a social first-best. We show the equivalence between the outcomes of multiple independent voting in one-dimensional space and the hypothetical outcome of Coasian bargaining in a multi-dimensional policy space.     

Market Failures in Real-Time Metering

Policies to promote real-time metering (RTM) require more than showing benefits from more timely responses to variations in cost. They require positive externalities to imply that too few meters would be installed through private transactions. RTM presents no systematic externalities when utilities must serve peak period users, and may present negative externalities under some conditions. Positive externalities are likely when electricity is rationed through blackouts. RTM may or may not increase welfare when peak period wholesale markets are not competitive; a prohibition on RTM might be appropriate in such situations even if metering itself were costless.     

Consumption Externalities,Coordination, and Advertising*

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that advertising can have an important function in markets with consumption externalities apart from its persuasive and informative roles. We show that advertising may function as a device to coordinate consumer expectations of the purchasing decisions of other consumers in markets with consumption externalities. The implications of advertising as a coordinating device are examined in the pricing and advertising decisions of firms interacting strategically. Although, at times, the one‐period advertising expense can exceed the one‐period monopoly profit, in equilibrium, consumers will pay a premium for the more heavily advertised brand.     

Correcting Market Failure Due to Interdependent Preferences: When Is Piecemeal Policy Possible?

Allowing for general utility interdependence and agent heterogeneity, we characterize taxes that will generate first best solutions in markets. We show the equivalence of tax corrections derived from the Marshallian and compensated demand approaches. Next we analyze the conditions that are required for the market failure to be corrected by: (1) specific indirect ad valorem taxes on commodities, (2) the same proportional tax rate on every commodity, and (3) a proportional income tax rate on each individual. The conditions are related to the restrictions necessary to have H synthetic consumers without externalities who replicate behavior of individuals with externalities.     

Rational expectations equilibria of economies with local interactions

We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior.     

A Comparison of Emission Taxes and Permit Markets for Controlling Correlated Externalities

This paper provides an answer to the question: Are emission taxes an efficient and self-enforcing mechanism to control correlated externality problems? By “correlated externalities” we mean multiple pollutants that are jointly produced by a single source but cause differentiated regional and global externalities. By “self-enforcing” we mean a mechanism that accounts for the endogeneity that exists between competing jurisdictions in the setting of environmental policy within a federation of regions. This mechanism incorporates sequential decision making among the jurisdictions and therefore determines an equilibrium based on the concept of subgame perfection. We find that, unlike joint domestic and international tradable permit markets, joint emission taxes and a hybrid scheme of permits and taxes are neither efficient nor self-enforcing.     

Insurance,self-protection,and the economics of terrorism

This paper investigates the rationale for public intervention in the terrorism insurance market. It argues that government subsidies for terror insurance have the effect of discouraging self-protection and limiting the negative externalities associated with self-protection. Cautious self-protective behavior by a target can hurt public goods like national prestige if it is seen as “giving in” to the terrorists, and may increase the loss probabilities faced by others by encouraging terrorists to substitute toward more vulnerable targets. We argue that these externalities in protection are essential for normative analysis of government intervention in insurance markets and may also explain why availability problems in this market have engendered much stronger government responses than similar problems in other catastrophe insurance markets.     

Transplants and Implants: The Economics of Self‐Improvement

This article examines equilibrium self‐improvement and marriage proposal strategies in a two‐sided search model with nontransferable utility. Singles are vertically differentiated—some make better marriage partners than others. A complete characterization of equilibrium is provided. It is shown there are two externalities to self‐improvement decisions. Further, these externalities may support multiple Pareto rankable equilibria. By encouraging everybody to self‐improve, society can create a situation where everybody is forced to improve to remain “acceptable.” But a preferred equilibrium may exist where there is less (costly) self‐improvement.     

Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations

We develop a transferable utility model of the household in which the marriage market is characterized by (negative or positive) assortative matching, and spousal allocations are determined by premarital investments. We demonstrate that all sharing rules along the assortative order support efficient outcomes both in terms of premarital investments and intra-household allocations. The efficiency of premarital choices and household allocations then enables us to show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of premarital endowments and the sex ratios in the market. According to our results, transfers among spouses occur on two margins: premarital investments and intra-marital spousal allocations. Asymmetries in the sex ratios in the marriage markets produce gender differences in premarital investments and consumption that are larger for individuals with small premarital endowments than those with larger endowments. A corollary of these findings is that, when men are in short supply in the marriage markets, women can invest more than men even when the returns to investment are lower or the costs are higher for women.     

Influence Of Over‐ And Underconfidence On A Marriage Market*

This paper examines misconfidence (over‐ or underconfidence) and marriage proposal strategies in a two‐sided search model with non‐transferable utility. Single agents are vertically heterogeneous—there exists a ranking of marital charm (types). It is shown that there are two externalities to over‐ or underconfident behaviour: someone's over‐ or underconfidence affects: (i) the duration of search for others who directly meet over‐ or underconfident agents; and (ii) the marriage decision of others who directly or indirectly meet over‐ or underconfident agents. Furthermore, these externalities prevent the lowest‐type agents from marrying in an equilibrium.     

展览产品定价模型及价格影响因素研究——基于双边市场理论视角

本文借鉴近年来兴起的双边市场理论对展览产品的定价模型及影响因素进行了理论研究。本文指出,展览市场是典型的双边市场,具有明显的网络外部性。本文通过建立垄断和竞争两种模型研究了展览产品的定价,并指出参展商和观众的需求价格弹性、一方消费者给另一方消费者带来的网络外部性、展览市场的竞争以及产品差异化都是影响展览产品定价的主要因素。     

BEAUTY PREMIUM AND MARRIAGE PREMIUM IN SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM: THEORY AND EMPIRICAL TEST

We propose a theoretical explanation for the so‐called beauty premium. Our approach relies entirely on search frictions and the fact that physical appearance plays an important role in attracting a marriage partner. We analyze the interaction between frictional labor and marriage markets, making use of what we label constrained job search. The optimal strategy entails different reservation wages for different men, and we establish the existence of a search equilibrium characterized by a beauty premium and/or marriage premium. Predicted profiles of premia allow for potential falsification tests and point to relevant empirical evidence in support of our theory.     

The Simple Welfare Economics of Network Externalities and the Uneasy Case for Subscribership Subsidies

The goal of universal service has dominated the telecommunications policy landscape for at least the past half century. This policy objective has been promoted with cross subsidies from long-distance telecommunications services to subscribers to local telecommunications service. The economic rationale for these cross subsidies is network externalities. In this paper, we show that: (1) the presence of network externalities, even if substantial in overall magnitude, does not generally justify a subscribership subsidy, even a well-designed one; and (2) the empirical realities of telecommunications markets make it unlikely that subscribership subsidies of any kind will increase social welfare.