Should bank capital regulation be risk sensitive?

We present a screening model of the risk sensitivity of bank capital regulation. A banker funds a project with uninsured deposits and costly capital. Capital resolves a moral hazard problem in the choice of the probability of default (PD). The project’s loss given default (LGD) is the banker’s private information. The regulator receives a noisy signal about the LGD and imposes a minimum capital requirement. We show that the optimal sensitivity of capital regulation is non-monotonic in the accuracy of risk assessment. If the signal is inaccurate, the regulator should use risk-insensitive capital requirements. Given sufficient accuracy, the regulator should separate types via risk-sensitive capital requirements, reducing the risk-sensitivity of bank capital as accuracy improves.     

Cyclical adjustment of capital requirements: A simple framework

We present a model of an economy with heterogeneous banks that may be funded with uninsured deposits and equity capital. Capital serves to ameliorate a moral hazard problem in the choice of risk. There is a fixed aggregate supply of bank capital, so the cost of capital is endogenous. A regulator sets risk-sensitive capital requirements in order to maximize a social welfare function that incorporates a social cost of bank failure. We consider the effect of a negative shock to the supply of bank capital and show that optimal capital requirements should be lowered. Failure to do so would keep banks safer but produce a large reduction in aggregate investment. The result provides a rationale for the cyclical adjustment of risk-sensitive capital requirements.     

Bank capital and equity investment regulations

This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' minimum required capital–asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms. There are two sources of moral hazard in the model: one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance, and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project. Among other things, the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank's stability and can also be Pareto-improving. Equity regulation is never Pareto-improving and does not increase the bank's stability.     

货币政策操作需要考虑银行资本监管吗

持续宽松的货币政策与巴塞尔协议下银行资本监管的共同作用,可能是本次美国次贷危机产生和经济持续波动的主因之一。巴塞尔协议下的银行资本监管,较大地改变了信贷资金的流向和经济运行规律,从而必然影响到货币政策发挥作用的基础条件与传导途径。本文结合经济周期对银行资本约束下的IS-LM模型进行了扩展分析,发现银行资本约束会通过影响银行信贷渠道使货币政策产生非对称性效果,从理论上论证了货币政策的操作必须考虑银行资本监管。本文还运用随机前沿分析(SFA)方法检验了2000～2009年我国货币政策与银行资本监管联合效率,表明在引入银行资本监管后货币政策实现经济目标的联合效率下降。因此,为了达到稳定物价与产出的总体目标,在货币政策反应函数中必须考虑银行资本及其监管状况。     

On Cost Tradeoffs Between Conservative and Market Value Accounting

We identify a cost tradeoff relevant to the comparison of alternative accounting regimes. We compare equilibrium deadweight losses, due to transacting and auditing, across the historical cost, lower-of-cost-or-market, and market value regimes. We provide conditions for each of the regimes to dominate the other two. We show that while market-value accounting is likely to prevail in an inflationary setting, it may also be optimal under deflation. Similarly, lower-of-cost-or-market is likely to prevail in a deflationary setting, though it may also be optimal under inflation. Last, historical cost prevails only if the variation in asset prices is sufficiently high.     

Minimum capital requirements,bank supervision and special resolution schemes. Consequences for bank risk-taking

This paper analyzes the incentive effects of special bank resolution schemes which were introduced during the recent financial crisis. These schemes allow regulators to take control over a systemically important financial institution before bankruptcy. We ask how special resolution schemes influence banks’ risk-taking and whether regulators should combine them with minimum capital requirements. We model a single bank which is supervised by a regulator who receives an imperfect signal about the bank's probability of success. We find that capital requirements are better than resolution from a welfare point of view if the quality of the signal is low, if it is difficult for the bank to attract deposits, or if the project return is low.     

Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable: Bank Capital as a Substitute for Prudential Regulation

The Financial CHOICE Act recently passed by the House proposes to create an “off‐ramp” that would allow banks to escape burdensome prudential regulation if the ratio of their equity capital to their total assets is 10% or more. The Financial Economists Roundtable supports this idea as a means of reducing regulatory costs, but believes some additional safeguards are needed. A capital ratio of 10% may not be high enough to discourage banks from excessive risk taking. A solution is to have two capital requirements for banks choosing the off‐ramp: one absolute (as proposed in the act) and one risk‐based. The FER believes that many banks will prefer this regime to the current burdensome prudential regulation, especially if regulators simplify the setting of risk weights and make them more rule‐based. Regulators setting minimum capital requirements should consider not only a bank’s stand‐alone risk, but also the systemic risk posed by banks, as well as the tendency of accounting measures of income and assets to overstate the economic value of banks’ equity capital. The Financial Choice Act would also eliminate useful elements of ongoing supervision and regulation, not all of which can be addressed by higher capital alone. Furthermore, to facilitate regulatory learning about risks, off‐ramped banks should continue to report the data that regulators use for stress tests, even if they are no longer subjected to the discipline of stress tests. Finally, the act is viewed as too permissive in its treatment of off‐ramped banks that get into trouble. To prevent gaming of regulation, FERC recommends that off‐ramped banks that subsequently fall below the minimum requirements should be required to raise new capital immediately.     

利率政策环境与央行货币政策选择

央行的货币政策实施受货币政策环境制约,特别是实施价格型货币政策时,在不同的利率环境下央行可能选择不同的利率调控模式。为此,通过构建门限回归模型对货币政策调控模式与利率区制的相依性进行实证检验,结果发现：在不同的利率区制内中央银行的政策偏好和利率调控模式存在显著差异。在高利率区制,中央银行存在针对产出缺口调整名义利率的政策偏好;在低利率区制,中央银行则不存在这种政策偏好,低利率环境下货币政策效应弱化甚至失效是导致此区制中央银行不针对产出缺口调整利率的主要原因。     

银行信贷、资本监管双重顺周期性与逆周期金融监管

商业银行信贷和资本监管具有顺周期性.银行信贷顺周期性导致经济繁荣时期的贷款扩张和经济衰退时的贷款紧缩.<巴塞尔资本协议Ⅱ>下的资本监管约束,在经济衰退时会促使银行形成信贷萎缩效应,影响和制约货币政策有效性的发挥,次贷危机为<巴塞尔资本协议Ⅱ>下的银行风险管理和监管的创新带来了新的要求和挑战.要减轻顺周期的影响,增强金融...     

Politics,credit allocation and bank capital requirements

I develop a normative theory of political influence on bank lending and capital structure. Legislators want banks to make politically-favored loans that reduce bank profits but generate social or political benefits. The regulator uses asset-choice regulation and capital requirements to induce the lending desired by legislators. There are four main results. First, if regulators dislike bank fragility, then credit-allocation regulation should be accompanied by higher capital requirements. Second, banks will resist higher capital requirements, which will be lower when banks have more bargaining power. Third, when politics matters more in bank regulation, the banking sector is larger and more competitive, with higher capital requirements. Fourth, the optimal reporting mechanism, in which banks report their privately-known profitability and the regulator endogenously determines capital requirements and stringency of credit-allocation regulation in response, shows that political influence is stronger when banks are more profitable.     

The dark side of liquidity creation: Leverage and systemic risk

We consider a model in which the threat of bank liquidations by creditors as well as equity-based compensation incentives both discipline bankers, but with different consequences. Greater use of equity leads to lower ex-ante bank liquidity, whereas greater use of debt leads to a higher probability of inefficient bank liquidation. The bank's privately-optimal capital structure trades off these two costs. With uncertainty about aggregate risk, bank creditors learn from other banks’ liquidation decisions. Such inference can lead to contagious liquidations, some of which are inefficient; this is a negative externality that is ignored in privately-optimal bank capital structures. Thus, under plausible conditions, banks choose excessive leverage relative to the socially optimal level, providing a rationale for bank capital regulation. While a blanket regulatory forbearance policy can eliminate contagion, it also eliminates all market discipline. However, a regulator generating its own information about aggregate risk, rather than relying on market signals, can restore efficiency and market discipline by intervening selectively.     

Does a goodwill impairment regime better reflect the underlying economic attributes of goodwill?

IFRS adoption transformed the accounting treatment for goodwill in many countries. Instead of amortizing goodwill, firms now test for its impairment and write off impairment losses against income. Accounting standard‐setting bodies claim that an impairment regime better reflects the underlying economic value of goodwill than systematic amortization. We investigate this claim by comparing the association between goodwill accounting charges against income and firms’ economic investment opportunities in amortization and impairment regimes. We find that the association between firms’ goodwill charges against income and the firms’ investment opportunities is stronger during the IFRS regime than the AGAAP regime. This indicates that, as claimed, impairment charges better reflect the underlying economic attributes of goodwill than do amortization charges.     

How accounting and auditing systems can counteract risk-shifting of safety-nets in banking: Some international evidence

This paper suggests that accounting and auditing systems can be effective devices to counteract tendencies for firm risk-taking associated with bank safety nets. Results are obtained from an international sample of publicly traded banks after controlling for other regulatory control devices for bank risk such as restrictions on banking activities, minimum regulatory capital requirements and official discipline. The efficacy of accounting and auditing systems in controlling bank risk diminishes with bank charter value and increases with moral hazard stemming from a country's deposit insurance. The results also indicate that accounting and auditing systems are complements for minimum capital requirements, but substitutes for restrictions on bank activities and official discipline.     

资本支出、公司规模与账面市值比效应——基于A股上市公司的研究

基于成熟资本市场的理论及实证研究表明,在不确定的环境下,公司最优资本支出提高了市场价值,降低了账面市值比,账面市值比对收益率的预测作用可以通过公司的最优投资行为来解释。基于这一机制,本文对我国上市公司规模、资本支出及账面市值比效应进行了研究。我们发现,第一,按照Fama-French(1992,1993)方法构建投资组合的潜在条件同样是公司前期的资本支出,本期资本支出在提高公司市场价值的同时,非但没有降低反而提高了小规模组公司期末账面市值比;第二,控制规模的情况下,资本支出较显著降低了公司的预期收益,在大规模公司中表现最明显;第三,本期资本支出对规模效应具有一定解释力,但对账面市值比效应并不具有显著解释力;第四,我国上市公司股票价格变动更多由会计业绩变动决定而非风险变动所决定,据此对上述发现作出了尝试性的解释。     

Do loan loss reserves behave like capital? Evidence from recent bank failures

Regulatory capital guidelines allow for loan loss reserves to be added back as capital. Our evidence suggests that the influence of loan loss reserves added back as regulatory capital (hereafter referred to as “add-backs”) on bank risk cannot be explained by either economic principles underlying the notion of capital or accounting principles underlying the recording of reserves. Specifically, we observe that, in sharp contrast to the economic notion of capital as a buffer against bank failure risk, add-backs are positively associated with the risk of bank failure during the recent economic crisis. Furthermore, the positive association of add-backs with bank failure risk is concentrated among cases in which the add-backs are highly likely to increase a bank’s total regulatory capital. The evidence cannot thus be fully explained by accounting principles either, since the role of loan loss reserves according to those principles does not depend on whether the reserves generate a regulatory capital increase. Additional analysis suggests that the observed influence of loan loss reserves on bank failure risk may be an unintended consequence of their regulatory treatment as capital.     

A NEW APPROACH TO CAPITAL BUDGETING FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The classic approach to capital budgeting based on the standard Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) says that the hurdle rate (or cost of capital) for any new project or investment should depend only on the riskiness of that investment. Thus, the hurdle rate, and hence the expected value of the investment, should not be affected by the financial policy of the company evaluating the project. Nor should the hurdle rate be influenced by the company's risk management policy, or by the kind of assets it already has on the balance sheet. This article argues that such a “singlefactor” model may be inappropriate for banks and other financial institutions for two main reasons:

• ? it is especially costly for banks to raise new external funds on short notice;
• ? it is costly for banks to hold a buffer stock of equity capital on the balance sheet, even if this equity is accumulated over time through retained earnings.

The single-factor CAPM ignores such costs and, in so doing, understates the true economic costs of “illiquid” bank investments. Illiquid investments require special treatment because they impose risks that, although “diversifiable” by shareholders, cannot be readily hedged by the bank and therefore require it to hold more equity capital. The authors accordingly propose a “two-factor” model for capital budgeting— one in which banks' investment decisions are linked to their capital structure and risk management decisions. One of the key implications of the two-factor model is that a bank should evaluate new investments according to both their correlation with the market portfolio and their correlation with the bank's existing portfolio of unhedgeable risks. The authors describe several potential applications of their model, including the evaluation of proprietary trading operations and the pricing of unhedgeable derivatives positions. They also compare their approach to the RAROC methodology that has been adopted by a number of banks.     

An Experimental Analysis of Contingent Capital with Market‐Price Triggers

We report an experiment that evaluates three market‐based regimes for triggering the conversion of contingent capital bonds into equity: a “fixed‐trigger” regime, where a price threshold triggers mandatory conversion; a “regulator” regime, where regulators make conversion decisions based on prices; and a “prediction market” regime, where regulators also observe a market that predicts conversion. Consistent with theory, we observe inefficiencies and conversion errors in the fixed‐trigger and regulator regimes. The prediction market somewhat improves the regulator's performance, but inefficiencies and conversion errors persist. The regulator regime has conversion errors over the widest range of shocks.     

Regime-switching analysis of ADR home market pass-through

We model and estimate ADRs’ home market pass-through and pricing-to-market using a regime-switching approach, which nests the two regimes in a conditional capital asset pricing model and treats any changes in these two regimes probabilistically. Our results from the 1998 to 2006 data show that the pricing-to-market regime dominates ADRs from China and Japan, whereas the home market pass-through regime dominates ADRs from Argentina and Germany when their respective home markets are volatile.     

投资项目风险、外部性与投资资本内部定价

从业绩评价角度,以委托代理理论作为分析工具,研究投资项目风险、外部性对投资资本内部定价的影响。研究结论表明:投资资本的最优内部"价格"与用于决策的企业资本成本一般不同,投资项目风险、外部性对其有重要影响;当平均投资收益率等于边际投资收益率时,只有投资项目风险对投资资本内部定价有影响;投资失败的赔偿制相比有限责任制,会减弱投资项目风险和外部性对投资资本"定价"的影响。这一研究为正确地制定投资资本的内部价格和合理地评价投资业绩提供了理论基础。     

Measuring systemic risk: A risk management approach

This paper proposes a new method to measure and monitor the risk in a banking system. Standard tools that regulators require banks to use for their internal risk management are applied at the level of the banking system to measure the risk of a regulator’s portfolio. Using a sample of international banks from 1988 until 2002, I estimate the dynamics and correlations between bank asset portfolios. To obtain measures for the risk of a regulator’s portfolio, I model the individual liabilities that the regulator has to each bank as contingent claims on the bank’s assets. The portfolio aspect of the regulator’s liability is explicitly considered and the methodology allows a comparison of sub-samples from different countries. Correlations, bank asset volatility, and bank capitalization increase for North American and somewhat for European banks, while Japanese banks face deteriorating capital levels. In the sample period, the North American banking system gains stability while the Japanese banking sector becomes more fragile. The expected future liability of the regulator varies substantially over time and is especially high during the Asian crisis starting in 1997. Further analysis shows that the Japanese banks contribute most to the volatility of the regulator’s liability at that time. Larger and more profitable banks have lower systemic risk and additional equity capital reduces systemic risk only for banks that are constrained by regulatory capital requirements.