Vertical externalities and control of politicians

A major role of (repeated) elections is to create incentives for politicians to act in the interests of voters. This paper considers the disciplining role of elections in countries with either one or two levels of government. Simple retrospective voting strategies which are based on cut-off levels with respect to expenditure and tax rates are considered. It is shown that the power of voters is weakened if a second independent level of government is added. However, voters can partially reinforce their power by making politicians not only liable for their own policy, but also for the policy carried out at each other level of government. Received: June 30, 2000 / Accepted: April 4, 2001     

Eurozone

Following the sharp fall in GDP in Q1, monthly figures show that economic activity collapsed further in April, coinciding with the peak of lockdown measures in most European countries. But more recent data indicates that activity was starting to recover before the end of Q2. After collapsing in March and April, the PMIs rose strongly for a second consecutive month in June, suggesting that economic conditions may be returning towards normal. Meanwhile, sentiment indicators continue to improve, driven by a rise in forward-looking expectations as investors anticipate a deep but shortlived recession.     

Testing the Political Replacement Effect: A Panel Data Analysis*

This article tests for the existence of the political replacement effect, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson: [American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, pp. 115–131]. They argue that the implementation of market‐oriented reform is crucially driven by the political calculus of incumbent governments: they implement economic policy change if such a choice is not expected to reduce their chances to retain power. This implies a non‐monotonic relationship between the level of political competition and the extent of economic reform. We test this hypothesis using data for 102 countries over the period 1980 to 2005. Our results strongly support the theory.     

A political-economy perspective on social expenditures: corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers

This paper presents a novel political-economy perspective on the composition of social expenditures. We take into account the possibility that institutions are weak, i.e. there is corruption, and analyze how this affects the government’s choice between cash and in-kind transfers. Our results show that the share of in-kind transfers (e.g. basic health care, public housing or food stamps), whose appropriation by corrupt politicians is more easily observed than in the case of cash transfers, increases with corruption. This positive relationship exists, however, only in highly democratic countries. We argue that voters use their political influence in democratic countries to ensure that a higher share of transfers is provided in kind thereby shielding transfers from appropriation by corrupt politicians.     

The demand for judicial sanctions: voter information and the election of judges

We examine 20 partisan judicial elections over an 8-year period to determine whether judge specific information shows in election results. We find demand for judicial sanctions looks much like other voting processes. Among voters, Democratic incumbent judges, who tend to be lenient, are rewarded for being harsh, while Republican incumbent judges, who generally are harsh, are rewarded for being lenient. Voters are not found to be a random sample of the population, and we find that straight ticket votes obscure information from selective voters. This paper benefitted from comments received by participants at the Public Choice Meetings, and from useful comments from Aimee Chin, Janet Kohlhase, an anonymous referee and the editor.     

Is the emperor wearing new clothes? A social assessment of the European Union 2007–2013 financial framework

ABSTRACT

Over the years, European leaders have proudly waved a social flag as one of the European Union’s (EU) constituent and differentiating elements. This commitment is assessed here through the social footprint of the European 2007–2013 multiannual financial framework among the EU countries and, worldwide, using an extended multiregional input–output model. The focus is on the quantity and the quality of income and jobs generated. We find that well-known differences among its northern, southern and eastern regions threaten the EU’s intentions for high social standards, enabling first- and second-class winners. Core EU countries account for the most of the Funds and, thus, most of the positive economic and social impacts, mainly through spillovers from peripheral regions. Beyond the EU borders, Funds expenditures induce capital compensation boosts in emerging countries not balanced by a similar labor compensation impulse. Indeed, China captures the bulk of low-skilled and temporary employment.     

The impact of fiscal positions on government bond yields in CEE countries

This paper investigates the influence of government debt and primary balance on long-term government bond yields in 10 Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries in the period 2000–2013. The results indicate that a one percentage point increase in the stock of government debt is associated with an increase in government bond yields of 2.7–4 basis points, while a one percentage point increase in the primary deficit to GDP ratio is associated with an increase in government bond yields of 12.9–24.3 basis points. We also find evidence of non-linearities in the debt-interest rate relationship, whereby the threshold after which the impact of debt turns from negative to positive is significantly lower than in advanced economies.     

Corruption in transition economies: Effects of government size, country size and economic reforms

This paper uses annual pooled data over 1998–2002 for transition countries to examine whether government size or country size matters more in its impact on corruption; and whether piecemeal reforms or comprehensive transition reforms are desirable for corruption reduction. Our results show that greater economic prosperity leads to lower corruption, and contrary to findings for other nations, a bigger government size seems toreduce corruption in transition nations. The geographic size of a country is positive and significant, suggesting that more spread out countries would have a harder time controlling corruption. Comprehensive transition reforms might work best at corruption reduction. A version of this paper was presented at the Sixth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting of the Mediterranean Programme of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute, Montecatini Terme, March 2005. Comments of participants at the Mediterranean meetings, especially Utku Teksoz, and two anonymous referees are appreciated. Insightful comments by Prof. Vojmir Franicevic on an earlier version and research assistance of Richard Connelly are also appreciated. Remaining errors are our own.     

Evaluating the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on unemployment,income distribution and poverty in Turkey

In the recent World Economic Outlook, the IMF indicates that world output shrank by 3.5% in 2020. Despite all pessimistic expectations, the Turkish economy was one of the few countries to have a positive, albeit low, economic growth rate in 2020. This was, however, achieved at the expense of high social and economic costs. The present research examines the distributional costs of this economic growth during the pandemic and suggests economic measures required to control them. The empirical examination is based on generating unavailable income and living conditions for 2020 by using the results available in TurkStat’s 2017 Income and Living Conditions Survey. The actual changes in sectoral output and employment, which are available as of March 2021, are used to generate changes in the income levels of households in TurkStat’s 2017 survey. The research empirically shows that adequate fiscal support with a large scope for households and businesses is necessary to compensate for economic losses caused by the pandemic. The short-run working allowance policy appears to have been very important to improve income distribution, which might have deteriorated due to the pandemic. Direct cash support to households is considered another essential policy measure that is required to mitigate the severity of increased poverty.     

Fostering product innovation: Differences between new ventures and established firms

This study combines insights from the entrepreneurship, competency-based view and innovation policy literature to analyze the relationships among different types of public incentives designed to foster innovation and product innovation at both new ventures and incumbent firms. To test our hypotheses, we ran a system of regression models on a cross-national sample comprised of 5238 firms from 29 European countries and found a different pattern for new ventures and incumbents. Our results suggest that support for attendance or participation in trade fairs and networking with other companies are the most effective methods of promoting product innovation for new ventures. However, for incumbent firms, we found that the most effective policies consisted of tax reduction for R&D expenditures and subsidies for acquiring buildings or other infrastructure(s) for innovation activities. This distinction prompts interesting insights related to theory development in research on entrepreneurship and innovation policy.     

政府债务对经济增长的影响及作用渠道

基于1960～2010年113个国家的面板数据集,运用系统广义矩动态面板方法和稳健性分析,比较发达国家和发展中国家政府债务经济增长效应的差异,并尝试分析政府债务影响经济增长的渠道。研究结果显示,政府债务对经济增长有非线性影响;发达国家政府债务对经济增长、投资以及全要素生产率均无显著影响;发展中国家对政府债务的直接承受力更弱,但在一个宽松的临界点内,政府债务的增加可以提高投资率。     

ARE THE OUTPUT EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY ASYMMETRIC? EVIDENCE FROM A SAMPLE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

ABSTRACT This paper examines whether the effects of monetary policy on output in Europe are asymmetric. Data from the 1953–90 period are used to identify money-supply shocks and their effects on output for a panel of 18 European countries. Many different specifications and estimation methods strongly support asymmetry: negative money-supply shocks are shown to have a statistically significant effect on output, whereas the effect of positive shocks is statistically insignificant. A similar asymmetry governs the output effects of interest rate changes. The sources of these asymmetries are traced to similar behavior for consumption and investment. These findings imply that positive money-supply shocks may be an ineffective anti-recession policy, and more generally, that the monetary component of the optimal stabilization policy should be less activist than generally thought.     

Corporate Social Responsibility, Public Policy, and NGO Activism in Europe and the United States: An Institutional-Stakeholder Perspective

abstract    Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an increasingly pervasive phenomenon on the European and North American economic and political landscape. In this paper, we extend neo-institutional and stakeholder theory to show how differences in the institutional environments of Europe and the United States affect expectations about corporate responsibilities to society. We focus on how these differences are manifested in government policy, corporate strategy, and non-governmental organization (NGO) activism towards specific issues involving the social responsibilities of corporations. Drawing from recent theoretical and empirical research, and analysis of three case studies (global warming, trade in genetically modified organisms, and pricing of anti-viral pharmaceuticals in developing countries), we find that different institutional structures and political legacies in the US and EU are important factors in explaining how governments, NGOs, and the broader polity determine and implement preferences regarding CSR in these two important world regions.     

Voting on road congestion policy

This paper studies the political economy of urban traffic policy. A city council and a regional government (representing city and suburbs) decide respectively on parking fees and a road toll. Both charges are below the optimum when median voters in city and suburbs prefer cars to public transport sufficiently more than the average. Even if the city government would set an optimal road toll, the regional government blocks it when the median suburban voter prefers cars strongly enough. Letting the city control parking and road pricing may therefore increase chances of adoption of the latter. However, if the city controls parking and the region road pricing, the combined charges are higher than if the city controlled them both. Hence, when voters want all charges below the optimum, the involvement of two governments may be desirable. We also find that earmarking road pricing revenues for public transport is welfare-enhancing, compared to lump-sum redistribution, only if they are topped up by extra funds granted to the city by a higher level of government.     

Competitiveness and entrepreneurship rate in Europe during the economic recovery phase, 2012–2016

Entrepreneurship is key for regional economic development. Regions can offer conditions that promote or limit business innovation activity. As the World Economic Forum points out, promotion and entrepreneurship support have been key factors for European countries to recover lost competitiveness. This study analyzes countries’ competitiveness level during the economic recovery phase using data from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) and the Word Economic Forum Report for the 2012–2016 period. The sample comprises 19 countries of the European Union. The independent variable is Total Entrepreneurship Activity rate (TEA) and the dependent variables are the 12 pillars that measure competitiveness in the GEC Index. The results show that, over time, the macroeconomic environment conditions necessity entrepreneurship but, when the economy recovers, innovation determines the appearance of opportunity entrepreneurship. Differences between countries are less significant regarding entrepreneurial activity and competitiveness; however, patterns for northern and southern Europe still differ.

     

Happiness in transition: An empirical study on Eastern Europe

This paper analyzes the determinants of life satisfaction in a pooled data set of representative individual survey data from seven East European countries collected during the early phase of economic and political transformation using ordered logit models. Those core socio-demographic and economic variables relevant in the US and West European countries have a similar impact on happiness in Eastern Europe under conditions of dramatic economic, political, and social change. The individual effects of variables across countries are not statistically different from the results obtained from the pooled data set. Cross-country differences in aggregate happiness can be explained well by variations in the unemployment rates, the degree of political freedom and the human development index.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A REJOINDER

In our 2011 survey of the literature in the Journal of Economic Surveys on the effect of government size on economic growth in wealthy countries we find a relatively consistent pattern: An increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5–1 percentage point lower annual growth rate. This conclusion is questioned by Colombier. In this rejoinder we present a rebuttal of Colombier's argument based on a detailed scrutiny of his own statistical evidence and regression results. Furthermore, we note that several new papers that have appeared since our original paper was published give support to our main conclusion.     

Symposium: Youth labour market and the “Great Recession”

The financial crisis of 2007–2008, followed by the “Great Recession” and the additional sovereign debt crisis in some peripheral countries of the Eurozone, resulted in huge and persistent effects on European youth labour markets. Theoretical and empirical investigations on this topic are still scarce compared with the importance of the topic and the consequent economic, social and policy implications. This paper consists of a very short introduction to a symposium that contributes to filling that gap. A multifaceted picture emerges with major policy implications for the three levels of government (European, national and regional/local) in order to reduce youth unemployment and the NEET phenomenon.     

Economic Integration and Regional Business Cycles: Evidence from the Iberian Regions*

This paper provides evidence of the positive impact of economic integration on EU regions’ business cycles convergence by focusing on two neighbouring countries: Spain and Portugal. We show that while a rise in cross‐country business cycle correlation has also been experienced by other European countries, it has been relatively more pronounced for Iberian regions. Econometric evidence suggests that the existence of an administrative border, the economic size of regions and their industrial structures can explain a substantial proportion of regional cycles.     

Trust and corruption: The influence of positive and negative social capital on the economic development in the European Union

Why are the Scandinavian countries in the European Union significantly richer than Southern/Eastern European countries? We try to answer this question from an empirical social capital perspective. In particular, we are interested in the interplay of social trust as a positive and corruption as a negative manifestation of social capital. The opportunities to provide answers by multivariate modelling are, however, limited by several problems related to small sample size and low degrees of freedom. Regarding these problems, we test the interrelating influences between positive and negative social capital by applying a path model that accounts for Granger-like causal effects. Our empirical results, referring to a sample of up to 25 EU countries, show that corruption might harm poor European countries but is not able to affect social trust. However, corruption in itself means that resources end up in the wrong places and not in socioeconomically optimal investments. There is, therefore, a direct damaging effect of corruption on wealth. This implies that economic actors have to invest higher transaction and control costs which will bind resources to non-productive purposes and thus destroy economic wealth. Most remarkable is that the augmentation of positive social capital could work as an effective counterforce to corruption, even if it does not compensate for the economic loss caused by corruption. Thus, adding the social capital perspective may contribute to understanding present day variation in the wealth of European nations by the damaging effect of corrupt activities and/or the positive force of social trust.