Ethnic Minority Analysts’ Participation in Public Earnings Conference Calls

We investigate ethnic minority and nonminority sell-side analysts’ participation in public earnings conference calls. We find that minority analysts are underrepresented in conference call Q&A sessions, and minority analysts who do participate on the calls experience lower levels of prioritization than do nonminority analysts. Minority analysts’ lower participation rates are partially but not fully mediated by characteristics such as experience, work environment, and stock rating favorability. Additionally, firm and conference call fixed effects mediate approximately half the magnitude of lower minority participation rates. Extroverted minority analysts participate at higher rates, but the negative association between minority status and conference call participation is exacerbated when calls are more time constrained, when executive teams are less diverse, and when analysts are from less prestigious brokerage houses. Overall, we document the underrepresentation of minority analysts on earnings conference calls and provide evidence suggesting both analysts’ and managers’ choices influence minority analysts’ participation rates.     

A comparison of the dominant meta programme patterns in accounting undergraduate students and accounting lecturers at a UK business school

Meta programmes are a means of describing the behavioural traits that a person exhibits when interacting with other people. An understanding of meta programmes can improve communication between individuals and this may have implications for teaching. The purposes of this study are first to identify the dominant meta programme patterns of first year accounting undergraduates at a UK business school. An earlier pilot study validated use of the Motivation Profile Questionnaire (MPQ) to elicit the dominant meta programmes of accounting lecturers at the same Business School (Brown, 2002). Secondly, the students' meta programmes are compared with those of their accounting teachers to identify whether there are any differences or similarities between the two groups. The matching of the meta programmes of the teachers and students would enhance communication whilst major differences in meta programmes would make communication more difficult. A sample of 62 first year accounting undergraduates and 20 accountancy teachers completed the MPQ. The results indicate that, on average, the accounting students have similar dominant meta programme patterns to their accounting teachers. The implications of the findings for improving communication and therefore teaching are discussed, along with the scope for further research.     

投资者特征与盈余公告后的漂移现象

本文以1999～2004年的上市公司为样本，研究了不同类型投资者对盈余公告后漂移（PEAD）的影响。研究发现，对于好消息，盈余公告后基金重仓持有股票的漂移小于非基金重仓持有的股票；但对于坏消息，基金重仓持有股票的漂移要大于非重仓持有股票的漂移。可能的解释是，基金重仓持有的股票如果公布的是好消息，说明与基金预期一致，所以这类股票的漂移比散户投资的利好股票漂移小；如果公布的是坏消息，则说明基金预期错误，此时基金等机构投资者会积极卖出，由于资金量大引起散户投资者跟着卖出相应股票，从而漂移比非基金重仓持有的利坏股票的漂移大。     

On the Market Reaction to Revenue and Earnings Surprises

Abstract:  This study extends Ertimur et al. (2003) and Jegadeesh and Livnat (2006a) by providing a contextual framework for the information content of revenue and earnings surprises. I find that the influence of earnings surprises (revenue surprises) on stock returns is lower (higher) in R&D intensive companies. Also, market reaction to earnings surprises is lower in the fourth quarter, and to revenue surprises it is higher in industries with oligopolistic competition. A comprehensive analysis indicates that, in contrast to previous studies for the full sample, in several contexts market reaction to earnings surprises is not higher than to revenue surprises.     

Are CEOs incentivized to shelter good information?

Prior theoretical studies on the agency problem hold different opinions from the empirical literature on two questions: (a) Are CEOs incentivized to shelter good information? (b) Are CEOs incentivized to evenly shelter good and bad information? This paper demonstrates that CEOs with high pay‐performance incentives tend to successfully shelter good information rather than bad information. Furthermore, CEOs with high pay‐performance incentives shelter good information by using real earnings management and textual manipulation but not accrual‐based earnings management. These asymmetric information manipulation behaviors help to decrease corporate cash flow volatility as well as the jump and crash risk on the stock market.     

Objective estimation versus subjective perceptions of earnings patterns and post‐earnings‐announcement drift

We investigate how the market's subjective estimates of autocorrelation in quarterly earnings vary with objective time‐series estimates. Our results suggest that investors increasingly underestimate the correlation as the autocorrelation level increases, and as a result, the post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) increases with the level of autocorrelation. We further show that the ability of autocorrelation to explain variation in the PEAD is robust to alternative explanations based on risk and institutional factors. Additional analysis indicates that the market's inefficiency in assessing the existence and magnitude of autocorrelation (and the related impact on PEAD) is inversely related to the richness of the information environment.     

On the Rationality of the Post-Announcement Drift

This paper demonstrates that a post-announcement earnings drift, which is often advanced as an example of market irrationality, can arise even if traders act rationally on their information. Specifically, we show that in the presence of share supply variations which are unrelated to information, there is a positive correlation between the unexpected component of current public signals and future price changes. Such a correlation arises from the fact that while prices reveal private information that cannot be found in public signals, non-information based trading distorts the information content of prices relative to the implications of both private and public information. Under these circumstances, markets may appear semi-strong inefficient and slow to respond to earnings announcements even though information is processed in a timely and efficient manner. Our findings correspond well with previously documented empirical evidence and suggest that the robustness of earnings-based anomalies may be rational outcomes of varying uncertain share supply.     

To Be or Not Be …'Too Late': The Case of the Belgian Semi-annual Earnings Announcements

In this study, we demonstrate that the average reporting lag of Belgian interim reports is large but has decreased slightly over the years 1991–1998. Contrary to US findings, we show that the disclosure of interim reports containing bad (good) news is not systematically delayed (speeded up). Interim reports are value relevant since good (bad) news, according to a naïve earnings expectations model, induces positive (negative) abnormal returns. The 'short term' timeliness of the information disclosure, however, seems not to matter at all.     

Improving Experienced Auditors’ Detection of Deception in CEO Narratives

We experimentally study the deception detection capabilities of experienced auditors, using CEO narratives from earnings conference calls as case materials. We randomly assign narratives of fraud and nonfraud companies to auditors as well as the presence versus absence of an instruction explaining that cognitive dissonance in speech is helpful for detecting deception. We predict this instruction will weaken auditors’ learned tendency to overlook fraud cues. We find that auditors’ deception judgments are less accurate for fraud companies than for nonfraud companies, unless they receive this instruction. We also find that instructed auditors more extensively describe red flags for fraud companies and more accurately identify specific sentences in narratives that pertain to underlying frauds. These findings indicate that instructing experienced auditors to be alert for cognitive dissonance in CEO narratives can activate deception detection capabilities.