Bank earnings and regulatory capital management using available for sale securities

Based on a large sample of publicly listed and non-listed US commercial banks from 1996 to 2011, we find robust evidence consistent with banks using realized available for sale (AFS) securities gains and losses to smooth earnings and increase low regulatory capital. We also find that (i) banks with positive earnings smooth earnings, and banks with negative earnings generally take big baths; (ii) regulatory capital constrains big baths; (iii) banks with more negative earnings and more unrealized beginning-of-quarter losses (gains) take big baths (smooth earnings); and (iv) banks with low regulatory capital and more unrealized gains realize more gains. Also, banks with negative earnings take big baths (avoid or reduce the earnings loss) if their unrealized gains are insufficient (sufficient) to offset the negative earnings. Our inferences apply to listed and non-listed banks, which indicates that the earnings management incentives do not derive solely from public capital markets. Our findings reveal that the accounting for AFS securities gains and losses enables banks to manage regulatory capital and earnings in a variety of ways.     

Preserving amortized costs within a fair-value-accounting framework: reclassification of gains and losses on available-for-sale securities upon realization

SFAS No. 115 requires firms to recognize available-for-sale (AFS) securities at fair value with accumulated unrealized gains and losses (AUGL) recorded in accumulated other comprehensive income. Firms reclassify AUGL to net income when they realize gains and losses. We refer to the amount reclassified each period by “RECLASS.” As of 1998, SFAS No. 130 requires firms to present RECLASS prominently in their financial statements. We investigate the incremental explanatory power of RECLASS for banks’ market values and market-adjusted returns. In the market value analysis, we control for AUGL, other components of book value of equity, net income before extraordinary items and RECLASS (NIBEX^other), and other components of comprehensive income. In the returns analysis, we control for ΔAUGL, ΔNIBEX^other, and extraordinary items. We find high positive coefficients on RECLASS in both analyses, consistent with investors pricing RECLASS as a relatively permanent component of net income. Exploring possible explanations for these pricing implications, we find no evidence that they are attributable to RECLASS remedying unreliable fair value measurement of AUGL. We provide three distinct analyses indicating that RECLASS’s pricing implications are explained in significant part by it helping investors predict banks’ future performance. Our results illustrate that an important type of amortized cost accounting information, realized gains and losses, remains highly useful to investors despite the overall fair-value-accounting framework for AFS securities.     

Bank earnings management and performance reporting of comprehensive income

FASB’s ASU 2011-05 mandated that comprehensive income (CI) and other comprehensive income (OCI) be reported in performance statements (a single income statement or a separate statement of CI) rather than equity statements. Employing a difference-in-differences research design with ASU 2011-05 as the treatment, I find that presenting accounting information in different statements affects bank earnings management, specifically, presenting CI and OCI in performance statements (especially in single-statements with net income) reduces earnings management through selective sales of available-for-sale (AFS) securities in the banking industry. I also find that the influence of ASU 2011-05 is primarily on banks with high equity incentives in the CEO’s compensation package or less CEO job security. Additional analyses suggest that performance reporting of CI and OCI increases the predictive ability of realized gains and losses of AFS securities; however, banks may manage loan loss provision as a substitute strategy when they have to decrease selective sales of AFS securities.     

The Effects of Taxes,Agency Costs and Information Asymmetry on Earnings Management: A Comparison of Public and Private Firms

The realization of securities gains and losses to manage earnings in publicly-traded bank holding companies has been documented in a large number of studies, but very little is known about why managers engage in this behavior. Two possible explanations for earnings management put forth by Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) are that managers engage in this behavior either to circumvent accounting-based contracts designed to mitigate agency problems, or to reduce information asymmetry.We compare public and private banks' realizations of securities gains and losses to determine how their earnings management differs. We find that public banks consistently engage in more earnings management than private banks, and that the portion of their current period securities gains and losses attributable to earnings management is more positively associated with next period's earnings before securities gains and losses. These findings are consistent with earnings management occurring due to greater information asymmetry in public firms, and suggest that earnings management may not necessarily lead to the erosion in the quality of earnings suggested by Levitt (1998).     

Usefulness of fair values for predicting banks’ future earnings: evidence from other comprehensive income and its components

This paper examines whether fair value adjustments included in other comprehensive income (OCI) predict future bank performance. It also examines whether the reliability of these estimates affects their predictive value. Using a sample of bank holding companies, we find that fair value adjustments included in OCI can predict earnings both 1 and 2 years ahead. However, not all fair value-related unrealized gains and losses included in OCI have similar implications. While net unrealized gains and losses on available-for-sale securities are positively associated with future earnings, net unrealized gains and losses on derivative contracts classified as cash flow hedges are negatively associated with future earnings. We also find that reliable measurement of fair values enhances predictive value. Finally, we show that fair value adjustments recorded in OCI during the 2007–2009 financial crisis predicted future profitability, contradicting criticism that fair value accounting forced banks to record excessive downward adjustments.     

Usefulness of comprehensive income reporting in Canada

In January 2005 the Canadian Accounting Standards Board (AcSB) issued three new accounting standards that require Canadian firms to mark-to-market certain financial assets and liabilities and recognize the holding gains and losses related to these items as other comprehensive income or as part of net income. The Board’s objectives for issuing the new standards are (i) to harmonize Canadian GAAP with US and International GAAP, (ii) to enhance the transparency and usefulness of financial statements, and (iii) to keep pace with changes in accounting standards in other countries that are moving towards fair value accounting. This paper investigates empirically whether requiring Canadian companies to report comprehensive income and its components provides the securities market with incremental value-relevant information over the traditional historical-cost earnings approach.Previous empirical studies provide mixed evidence on the value relevance of other comprehensive income and its components. This mixed evidence may be attributed partially to the use of as if methodology to construct an ex-ante measure of other comprehensive income prior to the implementation of SFAS 130, which introduces measurement error. In contrast, this study uses actual data on other comprehensive income for a sample of Canadian firms cross-listed in the US in the period 1998–2003. We find evidence that available-for-sale and cash flow hedges components are significantly associated with price and market returns. We also find that aggregate comprehensive income is more strongly associated (in terms of explanatory power) with both stock price and returns compared to net income. However, we find that net income is a better predictor of future net income relative to comprehensive income. Our findings suggest that mandating all Canadian firms to adopt the new accounting standards is expected to enhance the usefulness of financial statements. Our findings, therefore, should be of interest to Canadian accounting policy makers as they provide ex-ante evidence on the potential usefulness of mandating firms to report comprehensive income and the components of other comprehensive income in their financial statements.     

The effect of non-recurring items on analysts’ earnings forecasts

This article discusses the effects of non-recurring profits and losses on statement users’ decision-making processes from the perspective of securities analysts. We examine the relationship between analysts’ forecast revisions and firms’ non-recurring earnings. We find that 1) non-recurring gains and losses can influence analysts’ earnings forecast revision; 2) compared with non-recurring items resulting from policy changes, analysts are more concerned about those attributed to changes in business scope; 3) if listed companies use non-recurring items to turn losses into gains during earnings management, it will weaken the effects of non-recurring items on analysts’ earnings forecast revision. The results suggest that non-recurring items that result from changes in business scope incorporate information that users need for the future operation of the business. This article verifies the information relevance of non-recurring items and provides evidence for the necessity of non-recurring item disclosure.     

The Sale of Assets to Manage Earnings in Japan

In this article we investigate Japanese managers' use of income from the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities to manage earnings. The earnings management target examined is Japanese managers' forecasts of current–year earnings. We find a negative relation between income from asset sales and management forecast error. When current reported operating income is below (above) management's forecast of operating income, firms increase (decrease) earnings through the sale of fixed assets and marketable securities. The results hold after controlling for expected future performance, debt–to–equity ratio, size, growth, and last year's income from asset sales.     

Where do firms manage earnings?

Despite decades of research on how, why, and when companies manage earnings, there is a paucity of evidence about the geographic location of earnings management within multinational firms. In this study, we examine where companies manage earnings using a sample of 2,067 U.S. multinational firms from 1994 to 2009. We predict and find that firms with extensive foreign operations in weak rule of law countries have more foreign earnings management than companies with subsidiaries in locations where the rule of law is strong. We also find some evidence that profitable firms with extensive tax haven subsidiaries manage earnings more than other firms and that the earnings management is concentrated in foreign income. Apart from these results, we find that most earnings management takes place in domestic income, not foreign income.     

The use of earnings and operations management to avoid credit rating downgrades

Firms placed on negative credit watch face the threat of a credit rating downgrade. At the same time, they are given the opportunity to put recovery efforts in place to retain their current credit rating. In this paper, we test to what extent firms use earnings management as a short-term recovery strategy. We find that both accruals-based and real earnings management are associated with firms avoiding credit rating downgrades, and that these alternative earnings management strategies tend to be complements rather than substitutes. However, following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, only real earnings management is significantly associated with the credit watch outcome. We find evidence that firms which maintain their rating via earnings management are better able to afford the inevitable earnings reversals, and that in the year following the credit watch period, the credit rating performance of these firms is significantly better than firms which undergo a downgrade, with fewer downgrades and more upgrades in this period. Our results also imply that credit rating agencies are not misled by earnings management but rather allow for some discretion in reporting earnings that facilitates the dissemination of private information about future firm performance.     

When to go abroad: economic policy uncertainty and Chinese firms’ overseas investment

We study how economic policy uncertainty (EPU) influences firms’ overseas investments for Chinese listed companies. We find a significant negative relationship between EPU and firms’ overseas investments after controlling for firm characteristics and macroeconomic variables. Chinese firms seem to reduce their overseas investments on fixed income securities when facing domestic policy uncertainty. The negative relationship is pronounced for financially constrained firms, firms relying on government subsidies and with low overseas revenues, and SOEs. Firms operating in high marketisation regions can mitigate the negative effect of EPU on firms’ overseas investments. Our results remain significant when considering endogeneity problems.     

Accruals Management to Avoid Losses

This study examines whether firms engage in accruals management to beat the zero earnings benchmark from the perspective of earnings per share (EPS). Based on net income scaled by lagged market value of equity (E/MV) to define just‐miss and just‐beat test bins, previous studies provide no or inconclusive evidence of accruals management to beat the zero earnings benchmark. I conjecture that because managers focus on shares scaled earnings performance rather than market value scaled earnings performance, forming test bins based on EPS instead of E/MV is a better approach to detect accruals management. As expected, I find evidence of accruals management to beat the zero EPS benchmark. I also find that firms are more likely to manipulate accruals when managers have stronger incentives to beat the zero EPS benchmark. In addition, accruals of firms just beating the zero EPS benchmark are more likely to reverse the next year, resulting in relatively lower future earnings for firms just beating the benchmark compared with firms just missing the benchmark.     

The Value Relevance of Multiple Occurrences of Nonrecurring Items

Discontinued operations, special items, or extraordinary items typically are nonrecurring items in firms' income statements. As such, prior research has theorized that these items are of minimal relevance to market valuation of the firm, since they are transitory in nature. Moreover, anecdotal evidence in the financial press is supportive of this notion. We examine firms that report either single or multiple occurrences of such items over a rolling six-year period between 1977 and 1996 and find in both cases that such items are value-relevant. When multiple occurrences are not partitioned by type (discontinued operations, special items, or extraordinary items), the more recent such event in the series has a negative effect upon market value of equity, whether it has had a positive or negative effect upon net income.This is consistent with at least two possible explanations, multiple occurrences of such items indicate firms in financial difficulty, or multiple occurrences indicate firms whose managers have engaged in repeated attempts at earnings management, and that the most recent attempt is being devalued by the market. We find patterns of discretionary accruals consistent with managers engaging in upward earnings management prior to multiple write-downs using special items. We also find that firms with multiple write-downs are more likely to go into liquidation or bankruptcy within the next five years. We find that single occurrences also are value-relevant and are positively correlated with market values. Tests on the sample when partitioned by type lead to similar results, though signs of the effects upon net income change in some instances.     

Type of earnings management and the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) conduct efficient or opportunistic earnings management and to examine the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on it.Using multiple regressions, we find evidence that the type of earnings management selected by JSE listed firms tends toward efficient earnings management. This evidence is inconsistent with the common view that earnings management in Indonesia is opportunistic. Family ownership has a significant influence on the type of earnings management selected. Firms with a high proportion of family ownership and non-business groups are more inclined to choose efficient earnings management than other types of firms. We find inconsistent evidence with regard to the impact of institutional ownership, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on type of earnings management.     

Impact of proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management

We examine the impact of differential incentives arising from proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management. We reason that firms with loans close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants have a stronger incentive to engage in earnings management than firms that are far from violating their debt covenants. We find results consistent with this expectation. Firms close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants engage in higher levels of accounting earnings management, real earnings management, and total earnings management than far-from-violation firms. In additional analysis, we find that firms with a stronger incentive to avoid covenant violation switched from using more accounting earnings management before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act to using more real earnings management and more total earnings management afterwards. We also document that the earnings management implications of debt covenant violation are observed primarily for firms with poor credit ratings and for firms that do not meet analyst forecasts.     

The Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts,Conservatism, and Earnings Management

We study the interrelation between conservatism and earnings management by examining the allowance for uncollectible accounts and its income statement counterpart, bad debt expense. We find that the allowance is conservative and that it has become more conservative over time. Conservatism may, however, facilitate earnings management. We find that firms manage bad debt expense downward (and even record income‐increasing bad debt expense) to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts and that conservatism accentuates the extent to which firms manage bad debt expense. Further, we find that firms manage bad debt expense downward by drawing down previously recorded over‐accruals of bad debt expense that have accumulated on the balance sheet. An implication of our study is that tighter limits on the amount by which firms are permitted to understate net assets may reduce their ability to manage earnings.     

Does an item change trigger earnings management? Evidence from asset disposal income in China

We explore a unique regulatory change in 2017 in China that requires firms to move the non-current assets disposal income in the income statement from below the line of operating income to above it. We find that firms that have incentives to avoid losses conduct upward earnings management using the non-current assets disposal income after the regulatory change. We also find that this earnings management behaviour is more pronounced for firms in the growth and decline stages, and for firms with weak market competition power. In addition, such behaviour damages firm’s operating performance and innovation in the next year.     

Getting compensation right - The choice of performance measures in CEO bonus contracts and earnings management

This paper examines whether the choice of performance measures in CEO bonus compensation contracts is associated with earnings management. From a sample of FTSE350 Index firms over the period of 2005–2014, we investigate the relationship between earnings management, through discretionary accruals and real activities management, and (1) the use of and extent of reliance on financial and non-financial performance measures in CEO bonus contracts; and (2) the use of long-term and short-term measures in CEO bonus contracts. We find less income-increasing manipulation through discretionary accruals and expenses when non-financial performance measures (NFPMs) are used alongside financial performance measures (FPMs) and when the NFPMs are used to a larger extent than FPMs. Furthermore, we find less discretionary accruals when long-term performance measures are used. This implies that non-financial and long-term measures encourage executives to work towards the long-term success of the company rather than their own short-term reward.     

Misvaluation and Insider Trading Incentives for Accrual‐based and Real Earnings Management

We investigate the incentives that misvaluation creates for: (1) insider trading; and (2) concurrent earnings management through both accruals and real activities. Managers of overvalued firms have an incentive to sustain overvaluation through income increasing earnings management and, at the same time, to sell their shares (Jensen, 2005 ). Managers of undervalued firms benefit from buying their firm's shares, however the negative effects of downward earnings management may offset incentives to enhance trading advantages. The results indicate that managers of both over‐ and under‐valued firms act opportunistically, managing earnings upward (downward) with accruals while selling (buying) shares. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has been largely ineffective in eliminating trading motivated earnings management. Finally, we do not find evidence of a relationship between managerial trading and real earnings management.