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欧元区银行业联盟作用有限9月12日,欧盟根据6月份的峰会协议,提出建立银行业联盟的三步骤规划:首先赋予欧洲央行对欧元区所有银行的监管权,欧元区外的欧盟国家银行可以自主选择是否加入这一监管体系;其次,由银行出资设立一个银行破产清算基金以有序关闭问题银行;最后,建立一个欧元区统一的存款保险机制,在银行破产时保护储户利益。新设立的欧元区统一银行业监管机构将成为欧洲央行的下属机构,于2013年7月开始统一监管欧元区系统重要银行,2014年1月开始监管欧元区6000家银行和同意接受监管的非欧元区银行。该监管机构有权批准和撤销银行牌照,对银行提出资本充足要求,监管银行资产买卖,以及对银     

银行监管和股东属性对银行风险的影响——基于新兴经济体的监管数据分析

银行监管按世界银行的标准划分为总体监管和12类分项监管;银行大股东属性包括政府类、金融企业类、外资类等.总体监管可以有效地降低银行风险;大股东为工业类、金融类企业的银行能够更好地控制风险,而家族类银行的风险程度较高;通过对分项监管进行研究可以发现,加强对所有权、资本要求、经营活动限制、外部审计要求、流动性、存款保险制度、退出及监管效率八个方面的监管可降低银行总体风险,而加强准入、内部管理、资产分类配置、信息披露这四类监管反而会增加银行总体风险.     

政府监管对单体银行稳健性的影响有多大——来自中国上市商业银行的经验证据

本文以2000²012年16家上市银行为样本,实证分析了特许权价值、资本监管、隐性保险对银行稳健性的影响。研究结果表明:特许权价值、资本监管和隐性保险能够降低银行风险,提高银行安全性;特许权价值、隐性保险可以部分提高绩效,而资本监管对绩效的影响不显著;特许权价值、资本监管不能显著改善银行流动性,政府的隐性保险却可以提高银行流动性;资本杠杆和经营杠杆对银行稳健性的影响很小;次贷危机对银行风险影响较大,却没有显著影响银行盈利性和流动性。     

内部监督、监管替代与银行价值

本文以银行内部监督为例,通过建立一个简单模型并进行实证检验,深入研究了监管对内部治理机制的替代关系及其对银行价值的影响。研究结果表明,监管确实改变了银行内部监督机制,产生了监管替代。监管对内部监督进而对银行价值的影响较为复杂,不同监管措施的影响存在差异。事前严格的监管降低了内部监督强度,对银行价值产生负面影响;事中监管监督的影响取决于对内部监督的替代程度,当替代效应大时会降低银行价值,反之,当替代效应小时则会提高银行价值。监管替代的存在表明良好的银行公司治理有赖于恰当的监管政策。为减少监管过度替代带来的问题,我国现行由监管部门主导银行改革的监管政策需要作出调整。     

银行监管对银行发展的影响

本文以银行发展为因变量,银行监管系列措施为自变量,影响银行发展的其他重要因素为控制变量,构建了银行发展与银行监管的关系模型,利用数十个国家的数据实证检验了银行发展与银行监管的关系.结果表明:银行业外部治理和监管部门独立性均能够显著促进银行发展;资本监管和官方监管对银行发展的作用不明显,银行业务活动的过高限制不利于银行长...     

加强银行监管亟待解决的若干问题

当前银行监管存在八大基本态势 ,即重行为监管 ,审慎监管不足 ;重运作监管 ,准入监管不足 ;重合规监管 ,风险监管不足 ;重现场监管 ,非现场监管不足 ;重外部监管 ,自律监管不足 ;重严查重处 ,促进发展不足 ;重监管模式变革 ,游戏规则修订不及时 ;重监管收益增长 ,监管成本核算不到位。基于此 ,作者提出了改进我国银行监管的战略措施。     

对完善我国金融监管机制的几点新思考

强化预防性监管与保护性监管措施 ,保持监管体制的开放性 ,能实现风险预警与提高监管效率 ;完善银行经营管理体制与稽核监督机制 ,重视对银行新增贷款及新兴表外业务的风险监管 ,能实现银行经营效益的全面提高。     

影子银行体系的监管问题——基于最优资本监管模型的分析

本文结合当前影子银行的国际监管现状及我国的实际情况,对Plantin(2012)构建的最优资本监管模型进行拓展。模型分析表明,引入影子银行后,对传统银行更加严格的监管会导致影子银行的活动更加活跃,并降低社会总体福利。因此,为提高社会福利,应避免对传统银行过于严格的管制。对影子银行的活动,在传统银行受监管较严时实行部分监管,而在传统银行受监管较松时实行全面的监管。考虑到我国影子银行体系发展的特殊性,继续推进利率市场化改革,营造更为宽松的金融信贷环境,有助于减少监管套利;正确引导和规范影子银行要优于对其严格的管制。     

欧美银行监管改革进程、主要困境及前景研究

2008年金融危机以来,欧美国家普遍加强银行监管,更新监管框架,构建相对完备且成体系的银行监管体系,提升银行监管效力和金融稳健性。但是欧美国家的银行监管并非无懈可击,不仅存在短板和缺陷,面临复杂多变的宏观环境,而且银行经营生态和模式的变化将对银行监管提出更多的现实挑战,迫切需要启动新一轮银行监管改革。本文认为,过去十余年欧美国家的银行监管整体上成效显著,监管制度日益健全,监管工具更加丰富。面对新的内外部形势,以及潜在的银行风险上升趋势,银行监管难度加大,治理成本也大幅提高。本文提出进一步深化银行监管改革,维护银行监管独立性,提升银行监管覆盖面,提高银行监管前瞻性,增强国际银行监管协调等。欧美国家的银行监管机构既要持续提高银行监管的效力和效用,也要加快探索推进防范银行潜在风险、处置化解银行危机等监管机制建设。     

中国商业银行资本监管:制度变迁和效果评价

资本监管是审慎银行监管的核心。上个世纪90年代以来,我国监管当局开始建立并逐步改进资本监管制度。本文分银行体制商业化转型初期、市场化银行体制形成时期、银行体系日益国际化时期三个阶段,对我国商业银行资本监管制度变迁过程进行系统性考察,全面评估不同时期资本监管的效果。本文认为,国有银行改革、银行体系开放、增强银行体系稳健性和资本监管制度与国际标准接轨四个方面因素的相互作用,为资本监管制度变迁注入的动力,决定了资本监管制度演进的方向;资本监管制度的变革既反映监管当局风险监管理念的进步,也体现了监管当局为增强银行体系稳健性、推动银行业改革和促进经济增长等多目标同时实现所做的持续努力和必要妥协。     

Do Banks Provide Financial Slack?

We study the decision to choose bank debt rather than public securities in a firm's marginal financing choice. Using a sample of 500 firms over the 1980 to 1993 time period, we find that firms are relatively more likely to choose bank loans when variables that measure asymmetric information problems are elevated. The sensitivity of the likelihood of choosing bank debt to information problems is greater for firms with no public debt outstanding. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that banks help alleviate asymmetric information problems and that firms weigh these information benefits against a wide range of contracting costs when choosing bank financing.     

伊斯兰银行的内部风险管理

风险是银行经营管理的核心。伊斯兰银行在业务种类及业务流程上与商业银行存在显著区别,在构建风险管理体系时,也应有别于商业银行。由于各国伊斯兰银行的管理标准及风险数据不统一,再加之风险模型构建复杂,伊斯兰银行风险管理框架还很不成熟。本文对伊斯兰银行内部风险管理存在的问题进行了分析,并对今后努力方向做了进一步展望。     

Incentive problems in bank insider borrowing

Although bank insider abuses have been one of the most frequently cited causes of recent bank problems, the existing literature is surprisingly sparse in this area. The purpose of this article is to examine one element of insider abuse—the case of bank insider borrowing. In the context of the theory of financial intermediation, we propose a hypothesis that excessive insider borrowing creates substantial incentive problems and leads the bank to inferior performance. Our empirical analysis provides results consistent with this hypothesis. The policy implication of this article is that the regulatory agencies and especially the FDIC should carefully monitor banks with excessive insider borrowing to prevent an arbitrage against the insurance fund.     

吉林省银行保险发展中的问题、成因及对策

吉林省银行保险发展中存在着合作层次低、恶性竞争、误导销售、信息化建设滞后等突出问题,不利于银行保险业务的健康、有序发展。做大做强吉林省的银行保险,应从提高银行保险的合作层次、共同开展人员培训、联合开发银行保险产品、共同打造高效的电子操作平台,以及建立和完善银行保险激励机制和利益分配体系等方面入手。     

关于商业银行金融市场业务风险管理的研究

商业银行是我国金融系统中的重要组成部分,为地区的经济建设做出了很大的贡献,但是商业银行的发展也受到了种种因素的制约,尤其是在金融市场领域,风险巨大,管理起来问题较多。本文对这些风险所产生的原因进行了简要总结,并提出了一些促进商业银行金融市场业务开展的办法,希望能为相关单位提供参考。     

The impact of divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt

This paper examines the debt ownership structure of firms with corporate governance problems associated with the divergence in the controlling shareholders' voting and cash-flow rights. Previous studies suggest that debt can play an important role in mitigating corporate governance problems. However, not all debt can effectively manage the corporate governance problems associated with the financing of poorly governed firms. In this study, we find that firms with higher divergence in voting and cash-flow rights use significantly more bank debt financing. Moreover, the effect of the divergence in voting and cash-flow rights on the use of bank debt is greater in countries with weaker legal protection for investors. Overall, our findings suggest that bank debt has a comparative advantage in financing poorly governed firms.     

基层央行依法履职中存在的问题及政策建议

随着经济金融形势和宏观调控政策发生变化,基层人民银行依法行政面临着新的形势和政策环境。本文深入分析基层央行在依法履行职责中存在的主要问题,进而提出相应的政策建议。     

Financial effects of an uncertain change in VAT rates in the EU

The paper analyses how close relationships to banks influence a firm’s choice of financing its debt through publicly marketed bonds or bank loans. It is shown that large Japanese firms use less bank debt, if banks own shares in the firm or bank employees are members of the firm’s board. This result supports a theoretical framework, where banks are able to control agency problems associated with debt. Firms use bank loans in order to be monitored, which enables them to access cheaper bond finance. Closer bank–firm relationships facilitate monitoring for the bank and reduce therefore the need for bank finance.     

The Determinants of Financial Structure: New Insights from Business Start‐ups

Business start‐ups lack prior history and reputation, face high failure risk, and have highly concentrated ownership. The resulting information and incentive problems, combined with entrepreneurial private benefits of control, affect initial financing decisions. This paper examines simultaneously the impact of these issues on leverage, debt mix and maturity. We find that start‐ups with high adverse selection and risk shifting problems contract less bank debt but compensate with other debt sources. Start‐ups in growing industries have lower leverage, but raise more bank debt. Entrepreneurs with large private control benefits contract less but longer term bank loans to lower the default probability.     

Bank Relationships and Firms' Financial Performance: The Italian Experience

We examine the connection between the number of bank relationships and firms' performance using a unique data set on Italian small firms for which banks are a major source of financing. Our evidence indicates that return on equity and return on assets decrease as the number of bank relationships increases with a stronger effect on small firms than large firms. We also find that interest expense over assets increases as the number of relationships increases. Particularly for small firms, these results are consistent with analyses suggesting that fewer bank relationships reduce information asymmetries and agency problems and outweigh hold‐up problems.