On Licensing Under Bertrand Competition

This paper considers licensing by an innovating firm to its competitor in a differentiated duopoly with Bertrand competition. A principal finding is that royalty licensing may be superior to fee licensing for the innovating firm both when the innovation is drastic and when the innovation is non-drastic.     

Patent Licensing in the Presence of Trade Barriers

We develop a two‐country duopoly model to explore the optimal licensing contract for an outsider licensor in terms of fixed‐fee and royalty licensing by taking into account trade barriers when firms produce a homogeneous product and engage in Bertrand competition in each market. The present paper focuses on the interaction between licensing and trade barriers in two international markets. We show that both royalty and non‐exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal. Furthermore, exclusive fixed‐fee licensing can be optimal, which is a result that is not discussed in the existing literature.     

竞争政策与跨国最优技术授权策略

本文探讨当前中国在知识产权领域实施(宽松)竞争政策的理论基础。基于本国国有企业和私营企业与具有成本优势的外国企业进行古诺竞争的寡头模型,分析生产型外国企业如何将降低成本的专利技术分别授权给本国的两家企业。我们的研究表明:当不能歧视性授权时,外国企业总是偏好特许权收费方式;当能够歧视性授权时,外国企业在技术创新程度较大时会偏好固定收费方式。由于在歧视性授权下,外国企业将更多的利润转移到母国,因此本国福利在不允许歧视性授权下更高,但全球福利却相反。因此,本国政府从本国福利极大化的角度往往会强化竞争政策,限制歧视性授权;尽管从全球角度看,不限制歧视性授权的宽松竞争政策能够提升全球福利。     

全球基因工程技术领域的专利竞争

利用世界专利数据定量考察全球基因工程技术领域专利竞争情况,对我国基因工程技术研发具有重要指导意义.研究结果显示,全球基因工程专利主要分布在美国、欧盟、日本和中国大陆等国家和地区;全球基因工程专利前10强机构则全部集中于美国、欧盟和日本;中国大陆的基因工程技术研发接近世界前沿,但急需解决的是中国高校基因工程技术专利产业化的问题.     

On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information

Consider a research lab that owns a patent on a new technology but cannot develop a marketable final product based on the new technology. There are two downstream firms that might successfully develop the new product. If the downstream firms' benefits from being the sole supplier of the new product are private information, the research lab will sometimes sell two licenses, even though under complete information it would have sold one exclusive license. This is in contrast to the standard result that a monopolist will sometimes serve fewer, but never more buyers when there is private information. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L12, D45, D82     

Regulation,Local Monopolies and Spatial Competition

Many regulated industries involve an oligopoly market structure. We examine optimal incentive regulation for a duopoly model of spatial competition when firms have private cost information. Market structure is endogenous as regulation determines market segments for firms and output distribution across consumers in each firm's market. By varying the assignment of consumers to firms, a relatively more efficient firm can be rewarded with a larger market, thus reducing quantity incentive distortions. We derive the optimal policy, assess the impact of asymmetric information relative to full information, and examine extensions to allow for ex ante asymmetries in firm structure.     

The Shapley Value of a Patent Licensing Game: the Asymptotic Equivalence to Non-cooperative Results

We consider a game in characteristic form played by firms and an outside patent holder of a cost-reducing innovation. The worth of a coalition of players is the total Cournot profit the coalition can guarantee to obtain when it operates an optimal number of its firms while the complement operates any number of its firms as to minimize the profit of the coalition. Only firms in a coalition with the patent holder are allowed to use the efficient technology. We prove that when the number of firms is large, the Shapley value of the patent holder approximates the payoff he obtains in the non-cooperative auction game traditionally studied in the literature.We thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments that significantly improved the paper. The second author is being partially supported by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), Grant-in-Aid for 21 Century COE Program. He wishes to thank his advisor Yair Tauman and co-advisor Pradeep Dubey for their intellectual guidance, Akira Okada and Haruo Imai for their encouragement, and Shigeo Muto for his helpful comments to the first draft of this paper at the autumn meeting of the Japanese Economic Association in 2003.     

An Alternative Approach to Valence Advantage in Spatial Competition

This paper explores a two‐candidate spatial voting model, where one candidate has a valence advantage. Contrary to previous models, we introduce a multiplicative advantage, rather than an additive one. This takes into account the possible interaction between the quality of a candidate and his policy platform. This leads to a strikingly different model, in which all extreme voters support the favored candidate.     

最优专利制度研究

本文构建了一个动态一般均衡模型来研究最优专利长度和最优专利宽度的问题。研究结论表明,最优的专利长度和专利宽度都是有限的。专利长度的增加会通过促进创新来提高社会福利水平,同时,也会导致市场扭曲,从而降低社会福利水平,但随着专利长度的不断增加,前者的效应会小于后者的效应,因此,有限的专利长度是最优的。有效的专利宽度应该一方面使得模仿产品的质量水平不要太低,从而保证模仿产品对专利产品形成潜在的威胁,逼迫专利产品的价格低于垄断价格,减小市场扭曲;另一方面使得模仿产品的质量不要太高,从而保证专利产品能够制定较高的垄断价格,促进创新。     

面向单一客源城市的乡村旅游空间竞争模型

大都市以外广大地域各自为政地发展乡村旅游必然引发激烈的市场竞争,既有的引力模型、环城游憩带模型及前田豪模型可在空间轴上解释竞争现象并启发缓解竞争的策略。本文在分析现有模型适用条件的基础上,首次提出了冠名为等距—临近区位竞争模型,并基于模型给出了专题化扇区新概念。     

A Spatial Theory of News Consumption and Electoral Competition

We characterize the optimal editorial positions of the media in a model in which the media influence both voting behaviour and party policies. Political parties are less likely to choose partisan policies when more voters consume informative news. When there are two media outlets, each should be slightly biased relative to its audience in order to attract voters with relatively extreme views. Voter welfare is typically higher under a duopoly than under a monopoly. Two media outlets under joint ownership may provide more diverse viewpoints than two independent ones, but voter welfare is not always higher.     

Spatial Cournot Competition in a Linear City with Directional Delivery Constraints

This study investigates a sequential game of location and transportation mode choices, as well as the subsequent quantity choice. The results show that spatial Cournot competition with directional delivery constraints yields a richer set of spatial configurations, involving midpoint agglomeration, maximum differentiation and asymmetric dispersion, and a richer set of transportation mode selections, involving delivery in different directions, asymmetric delivery between duopoly firms, and delivery in two directions by each firm, depending on the fixed cost of a transportation instrument. This paper concludes with an investigation of welfare analysis on optimal locations and transportation modes.     

城市专利战略基本概念探析

一、城市专利战略的定义 1．城市专利战略的主体。吴汉东教授曾撰文指出：知识产权战略从主体的角度看,可以包括国家知识产权战略、地区知识产权战略、行业知识产权战略、企业知识产权战略四个方面。吴教授提到的地区知识产权战略对我们定义城市知识产权战略有很好的借鉴作用。作者认为在城市专利战略首先是地区知识产权战略的一部分,其次,城市专利战略的主体应当是城市所在的人民政府。     

应用实物期权方法评估专利价值

企业持有专利进行生产决策时具有灵活性,可以根据市场行情来决定是否实施该专利技术。当市场行情好时,专利成果能带来可观收益,进行投资,实施专利;否则,就可以等待暂不实施。专利具有类似于金融市场中的看涨期权的特性,可以应用期权方法对其评估。本文考虑到专利技术的生命周期特征,运用实物期权方法中的动态规划方法倒推计算出任意时点的专利价值和专利实施临界值,并给出了具体的计算方法。     

网上零售顾客价值研究

文章在现有顾客价值理论研究的基础上,从"利益/成本"的研究视角,提出了网上零售顾客价值模型,即网上零售顾客价值等于总利益与总成本之差,其中总利益包括产品利益、服务利益、商品信息利益、便利及效率利益、购物乐趣利益五大因素,总成本包括货币成本、接入成本、学习成本、时间成本、安全风险成本、产品认知成本六大因素。     

论企业的可持续性竞争优势

当前理论界对于企业如何在激烈的市场竞争中赢得并保持优势的持续性问题,提出了不同的认识和看法,但由于其主要采用静态的分析方法,因而无法解决企业在动态环境下获得可持续性竞争优势的问题。文章认为,企业要保持可持续性的竞争优势,关键在于采取有效的战略措施突破原有的优势,创设新的优势,进入新的平衡态,才能推动企业向前发展。     

On the Competition of Asymmetric Agents

Abstract. Rank-order tournaments are usually implemented in organizations to provide incentives for eliciting employees' effort and/or to identify the agent with the higher ability, for example in promotion tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by experimentally analyzing a ceteris paribus variation of the prize spread – being the major design feature of tournaments – in a symmetric and an asymmetric setting. We find that effort significantly increases with the prize spread as predicted by standard theory. However, only for sufficiently large prize spreads weak players competing against strong players strain themselves all the more and sorting of agents is feasible.     

县际竞争和公共教育财政资源配置——基于空间经济计量研究

根据Moran’s I检验发现,公共教育财政资源地区配置上存在显著空间自相关性,即邻近县之间在配置公共教育财政资源上会互相影响,存在策略性行动,表明县际竞争的存在。此外,县级竞争力强弱受到诸多因素的影响。人均GDP、第二产业劳动力人数、人均居住面积对县级人均教育经费总支出的影响是正面显著的,而少数民族人口比率的影响是负面显著,非农业人口比率的影响是倒U型关系,外省迁入人口和本地适龄人口的影响是非线性的。在估计方法上,空间误差模型比OLS模型要好。     

基于生态位测评的区域旅游城市空间格局研究

旅游空间格局研究以主要旅游城市为依托,运用生态住测评理论,构建了河北省主要旅游城市生态位测评指标体系.结合聚类分析,从双核心城市、节点城市、网络城市的空间角度构建出河北省区域旅游城市的双扇形空间格局,有利于河北省区域旅游城市综合竞争力的提升.     

世界专利资源布局的可视化分析

本文通过对世界专利资源的数据统计,分析各国专利的申请、授权的态势,综合比较各国的资源分布情况,揭示出当前世界专利资源的总体格局,并通过展示我国在世界专利版图的地位,为我国专利战略的制定和调整提供参考意见。