The effect of CEO incentives on deviations from institutional norms in foreign market expansion decisions: Behavioral agency and cross-border acquisitions

CEO incentives have been the subject of great interest for human resource scholars. We explore the institutional context within which the CEO makes sense of their incentives. Our theory suggests that CEO equity incentives interact with institutional norms to influence foreign market entry choices. Specifically, we argue that CEOs will weigh the risk bearing created by equity incentives, along with the consequences of legitimacy loss, when deciding whether to deviate from institutional norms when internationalizing. In doing so, we advance human resource literature by demonstrating that CEO responses to incentives are influenced by institutional norms and that CEOs' decisions to deviate from institutional norms are shaped by their incentives. We find support for our framework in the analysis of the stake taken by acquirers in 4,184 cross-border acquisitions.     

Financial reporting fraud and CEO pay-performance incentives

Because prior studies find mixed results on the relation between CEOs’ pay performance incentives and a firm’s likelihood of financial reporting fraud, we restudy their relationship using innovative research methods. First, we concentrate on incentives from granting options rather than equity-based incentives. Second, we emphasize vested options, disregarding unvested option holdings, and take the logarithm transformation of option incentives. Third, we analyse the impact of option incentives on future financial reporting irregularities. Using this innovative approach as well as a full sample and a matched sample, we find that an increase in executives’ option incentives raises the likelihood of financial reporting violations. Moreover, the effect of option incentives on financial reporting fraud is moderated by auditor effort. In addition, we find that another proxy for the measurement of executives’ option incentives, namely, the number of vested options by executives, is highly correlated with the CEO’s vested stock option sensitivity.     

Managerial incentives and corporate control auctions

An analysis of the sequence of bidding in corporate control contests involving white knights reveals a category of white knights termed as ‘delayed bid’ white knights who make their bid after two consecutive hostile bids. The ‘immediate bid’ white knights make their bid in relative haste after the first hostile bid. Overpayments by white knights are much larger for the ‘immediate bid’ white knights. An analysis of the respective compensation packages shows that the managers of the ‘immediate bid’ white knights have a lower proportion of their income linked to stock value (relative to their annual cash income) compared to ‘delayed bid’ white knights and hostile bidders.     

CEO overconfidence and agency cost of debt: An empirical analysis of CEO turnover events

We develop a model and characterize the differences between the investment policies of a rational CEO and an overconfident CEO. In the presence of risky outstanding debt, we show that an overconfident CEO has the incentive to overinvest more than that of a rational CEO. However, this incentive is mitigated by the discipline imposed by outside investors when an overconfident CEO seeks external financing. In contrast, when the firm has sufficient internal funds to meet its investment needs and outstanding debt is relatively safer, the overconfident CEO has no necessity to seek external funds and the overinvestment incentive persists. We examine bondholders’ and stockholders’ reaction around CEO turnover announcements and find evidence consistent with the over investment hypothesis.     

Business model innovation in corporate entrepreneurship: exploratory insights from corporate accelerators

Corporate accelerators are a rapidly growing entrepreneurial phenomenon occurring in different business contexts and business models within corporate entrepreneurship. Corporate accelerators are considered as an innovation fostering approach within new ventures provided by start-ups. The aim of the paper is twofold: firstly, to explore the motives behind corporations’ engagement with start-ups in launching corporate accelerators, and secondly, to identify the corporate benefits and challenges of this business model innovation. The research design is based on a qualitative interpretative approach exploiting a triangulation of methods by using in-depth interviews (IDI) with corporate managers involved in development of corporate accelerators as well as a focus group interview (FGI) with industry experts. In addition, secondary data were applied to strengthen the exploratory research. The study demonstrates that a wide range of benefits stem from the accelerator activities which can ultimately can initiate changes in large companies. Our research expands on prior findings and suggests that corporate accelerators are driven by internal and external push and pull motives. The study contributes to expanding the scope of corporate entrepreneurship research in regard to the challenges and benefits of corporate accelerators. It provides evidence that corporate accelerators are a source of innovation that can be used to foster entrepreneurial-market logic and entrepreneurial learning.

     

CEO compensation and the seasoned equity offering decision

Empirical research on seasoned equity offerings indicates that the decision to make an SEO typically engenders a decline in firm value, as investors interpret this decision as a signal of poor financial health or that the stock is overpriced. Here, we add to the literature by analyzing the short‐term market reaction to SEO announcements and the chief executive officer's link to firm performance (i.e. the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation). Results support the hypothesis that investors are more likely to view the announcement of an SEO as a last resort source of capital when the proportion of CEO equity‐based compensation is high. In such cases of high equity‐based compensation, our findings indicate that the SEO announcement provides an incremental signal of financial distress above that provided by financial statements. We also find this relationship (last resort signal) to be stronger when large information asymmetries exist between management and investors. Thus, managers should consider the ramifications of executive compensation structure when considering whether to make an SEO. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Network legitimacy diffusion: a model for corporate entrepreneurship

International corporate entrepreneurship increasingly requires broader internal and external networks and legitimacy seeking in areas where the corporation and the entrepreneur are not well known. In this article, the important factors that influence the degree of legitimacy granted to corporate entrepreneurs are proposed and discussed. Specifically, we identify three primary levels of legitimacy: pragmatic legitimacy, normative legitimacy, and structural legitimacy. A model is proposed that suggests that organizations move through these levels of legitimacy resulting in differing brokering behaviors for network building. In addition, we integrate this effort into a global perspective by focusing on corporate entrepreneurs who seek to engage in international efforts. Implications for future research are provided.     

CEO retention,firm performance and corporate governance

This paper seeks to determine if CEO turnover is a function of firm performance, and therefore attempts to gauge the extent to which CEO interests are aligned with those of stockholders. The methodology in this paper focuses primarily on estimating the relationship between the probability of CEO exit and indices of firm performance and corporate governance structure. A major finding of the paper is that the accountability of CEOs to stockholders is significantly limited by CEO power, and CEO turnover is influenced more by internal governance structure than by firm profit or sales performance.     

Enhancing managerial incentives and value creation: Evidence from corporate spinoffs

We study corporate spinoffs with changes in CEO compensation to examine how spinoffs affect managerial incentive compensation and whether the changes in managerial compensation can explain the value enhancement and operating performance improvements that occur following spinoffs. Analyzing a sample of 124 non-taxable spinoffs during 1990–1997, we find that changes in incentive compensation are a significant motive for spinoffs. Changes in managerial incentives alone are consistent with the post-spinoff changes in operating performance, while changes in business focus are not. Spinoffs that are not accompanied by enhanced pay-performance relationship do not improve operating performance even with increased business focus. (JELG34, J33)     

The legitimacy of corporate entrepreneurship: a structured literature review

Management Review Quarterly - Corporate entrepreneurship (CE) is essential for today’s firms and currently a topic of considerable interest within the business community. Although the...     

创投企业财务管理探讨

科技是第一生产力,由科技直接带动的知识经济将成为本世纪经济发展的主流,作为知识经济的支柱产业,以高新技术为代表的创投产业正以前所未有的速度发展,但与此同时,创投企业的财务管理工作却相对落后,不能为创投企业的投融资作出科学的决策。研究目的在于充分认识创投企业财务管理工作特殊性,并结合其高收益和高风险的财务经营特征,研究创投企业如何在财务管理工作的各个阶段做好财务决策。     

A new editorial order in entrepreneurship & regional development

The aim of this paper is to contribute to international entrepreneurship theory by adopting a foreign market perspective when examining the links between network development and knowledge creation. Network development is argued to enhance the understanding of regional market structures and make firms more inclined ? and better able ? to create knowledge in foreign market business relationships (business relationships represent focal points in networks). The basis of this argument is that networks provide a multitude of opportunities for the exploitation of previously unexploited combinations of knowledge. Data were gathered from surveys conducted with an effective random sample of 188 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Sweden. A LISREL-based analysis was performed to test the three hypotheses deduced from theory. Findings showed that network development has a direct positive impact on knowledge creation and that knowledge combination functions as a mediating construct between network development and knowledge creation.     

CEO ownership, corporate control, and bank performance

This study examines the relation between CEO ownership and bank performance. In contrast to Pi and Timme (1993), we find that, when economic measures of performance are used, the relation between ownership and the performance of commerical banks is nonlinear. Additionally, in contrast to previous studies, we find the question of whether or not the CEO also holds the title of chairman of the board has an insignificant impact on bank performance. We conclude that, in commercial banks, management entrenchment may offset the effects predicted by Jensen and Meckling's (1976) convergence-of-interest hypothesis.     

Five decades of corporate entrepreneurship research: measuring and mapping the field

International Entrepreneurship and Management Journal - Research on corporate entrepreneurship—venturing activities by established corporations—has received increasing scholarly...     

Earnings fraud: board control vs CEO control and corporate performance – 1992–2004

The turn of the millennium is associated with increased corporate fraud, largely attributed to the failure of corporate governance. The compensation committee is expected to minimize fraud by rewarding only appropriate CEO behavior. A causal modeling approach, the Directed Acyclic Graph, was used to estimate the structure of corporate fraud. Corporate fraud was measured as illegal earnings statement(s), not all restatements but only those found illegal. A major finding is that the CEO's stock‐option compensation motivates the CEO to commit corporate earnings fraud, while cash salaries and bonuses are only indirectly related to earnings fraud through those stock options. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Environmental influences on corporate entrepreneurship: executive perspectives on the internet

This paper focuses on the likelihood of firms adopting corporate entrepreneurship in response to the challenges and opportunities presented by a change in their business environment shaped by the growth of the Internet. We further examined if firms are willing to modify their existing systems in response to such a change. We also investigated the paths or modes of entrepreneurship that firms would adopt when they perceive being entrepreneurial to be a viable response in light of a specific change in their business environment. Finally, we identified the impediments that firms may need to overcome when adopting corporate entrepreneurship. Results based on the data from senior executives lend support to our hypotheses. Managerial implications of the results are discussed.     

CEO compensation, shareholder rights, and corporate governance: An empirical investigation

We investigate whether CEO compensation is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our evidence reveals that CEOs of firms where shareholder rights are weak obtain more favorable compensation. It is also found that higher CEO pay is associated with a higher degree of potential managerial entrenchment. Additionally, CEOs of firms with governance provisions that offer them protection from takeovers enjoy more generous pay. We also examine the change in CEO compensation relative to the change in shareholders' wealth. The evidence shows that when there is an increase in shareholders' wealth, the CEO is able to obtain higher incremental compensation when shareholder rights are weak. On the contrary, when shareholders' wealth falls, there is no corresponding decline in CEO compensation when shareholder rights are weak. Given the empirical evidence, we argue that CEO compensation practices reflect rent expropriation rather than optimal contracting.     

CEO compensation structure following succession: Evidence of optimal incentives with career concerns

To motivate managers to pursue shareholder interests, boards may design management compensation packages to reward managers for good firm performance. However, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) note that when CEOs are far from retirement, they have career concerns. In these cases, Gibbons and Murphy argue that it may not be optimal for their current compensation to be too dependent on firm performance. Testing this proposition, we find that abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of performance-based pay of newly hired CEOs when companies announce CEO successions. Since these newly hired CEOs are likely some distance from retirement, we interpret these results as being consistent with Gibbons and Murphy; it may be better to allow newly hired CEOs to be paid in human capital increases from the managerial labor market than to have their current pay too closely related to performance.