Probability and the synthetic <Emphasis Type="Italic">a Priori</Emphasis>: A reply to block

Conclusion Contrary to Block, the synthetic a priori has little to do with our dispute. My critique of the Austrians is not that their methods are “unscientific,” but that their most distinctive positions are false or overstated. Yet Block’s latest reply does inadvertently make Austrian economics more reasonable. If synthetic a priori claims vary in degree of probability, they can no longer be treated as scientifically superior to empirical claims. Furthermore, while empirically testing absolutely certain synthetic a priori claims is pointless, empirically testing uncertain synthetic a priori claims is not. As is often the case with Austrians, Block is better at criticizing neoclassicals than he is at producing a sound alternative. He is right that most economists do not practice the logical positivism that they preach. He is also correct to maintain that logical positivism is mistaken. However, both of these problems can be resolved if neoclassical economists themselves adopt the Bayesian model of belief formation that they routinely apply to everyone else.     

Whites,Blacks, and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Brown</Emphasis> in the Labor Market in Brazil: A Study About Inequalities

This paper examines inequalities between white and black and brown populations in Brazil within occupations that require university degree. The main result confirms that once reached the university degree, blacks/brown usually obtain smaller but comparable income to that of whites. Although some racial discrimination in labor market may exist, such result corroborates other studies that identify schooling differentials as the main reason for the high income inequality found in Brazil.     

Tax evasion as a<Emphasis Type="Italic">de facto</Emphasis> vote of disapproval of PAC contributions

In this study, it is hypothesized that higher (rising) real PAC election campaign contributions may lead the public to increasingly distrust and resent politicians because of the perceived political influence that these contributions exercise. It is further hypothesized that to express that distrust and resentment, the public may make greater efforts to evade income taxation so as to deny tax revenues to the Treasury and “influence-peddling” politicians. Instrumenatal Variable (IV) estimates in first differences that allow for income tax rates, IRS audit rates, IRS penalty assessments on detected unreported income, and the public's dissatisfaction with government per se, find strong, albeit only preliminary, empirical evidence that tax evasion is an increasing function of real PAC election campaign contributions. The author is indebted to Jim Alm, Mike McKee, Joel Slemrod, and Thomas Stratmann and to the University of Miami Economics Seminar faculty and the University of Nevada, Las Vegas Economics Seminar faculty for ideas and helpful comments.