A theory on party discipline and vote switching by legislators

We develop a new theory of vote switching by legislators that defect from party line voting. In our model, ideological candidates select their party label and, once elected, vote in parliament. Political parties select their policy platform as to maximize votes while preserving their candidates’ loyalty. We find that legislators that defect from party line voting arise within the majority party. Besides, the more legislators care about their ideology and the less about their own reputation, the more they defect from party line voting. Interestingly, when a party has larger electoral advantage and its candidates sufficiently care about their reputation, such a party can propose a more polarized policy to avoid party defectors. Our model suggests that polarization incentivizes loyalty. Finally, we discuss the robustness of our results in multi-party systems and multi-constituency systems.     

The Role of the Media in the Formulation of Economic Policy

This article examines and comments on the reporting of economic news in the Australian media, the influence on that reporting of media judgments about newsworthiness, the relationship between economic reporting and the financial markets, and governments' use of the media in the economic policy process. Finally, it focuses on the role of economic commentators in the quality press, their relations with the bureaucracy, their part in the rise of economic rationalism and the nature of their influence on the formulation of economic policy. It concludes that when the commentators as a group take up causes and pursue them over sustained periods, they help to create a climate of elite option which emboldens governments to undertake politically difficult policy reforms.     

BUREAUCRACY AND TIME CONSISTENCY*

We construct a model that takes seriously the role of bureaucracy in the characterization of time-consistent policies. We argue that if the possibilities for governments to reduce the size of bureaucracy are limited, bureaucracy can be used as a means for influencing future governments. We show that the political process has implications for the size and growth of bureaucracy. Parties in power may hire bureaucrats of the opposite political color. This is a part of the time-consistent policy. Our model also gives an explanation for the growth of bureaucracy. This is a consequence of the time-consistent policies, i.e. policies that partially tie the hands of future governments. We also show that if public sector production is inefficient, the public sector will be too large in the long run. In the short run it may be too small.     

基层政府间的“共谋现象”——一个政府行为的制度逻辑

中国政府行为的一个突出现象是,在执行来自上级部门特别是中央政府的各种指令政策时,基层上下级政府常常共谋策划、暗渡陈仓,采取“上有政策、下有对策”的各种手段,来应付这些政策要求以及随之而来的各种检查,导致了实际执行过程偏离政策初衷的结果。本文从组织学角度,对这类现象提出一个理论解释。本文的中心命题是：在中国行政体制中,基层政府间的共谋行为已经成为一个制度化了的非正式行为;这种共谋行为是其所处制度环境的产物,有着广泛深厚的合法性基础。本文讨论政府组织制度的三个悖论,对这一现象提出理论解释：一是政策一统性与执行灵活性的悖论,二是激励强度与目标替代的悖论,三是科层制度非人格化与行政关系入缘化的悖论。本研究强调,共谋行为不能简单地归咎于政府官员或执行人员的素质或能力,其稳定存在和重复再生是政府组织结构和制度环境的产物;是现行组织制度中决策过程与执行过程分离所导致的结果;在很大程度上也是近年来政府制度设计特别是集权决策过程和激励机制强化所导致的非预期结果。而欲改变这一状况,首先需要对政府组织现象进行深入系统的研究,提出有力的理论解释。     

Where a contract is signed determines its value: Chinese provincial variation in utilized vs. contracted FDI flows

There are major differences between ex ante corporate investment plans and ex post investments. The case of China is useful for understanding this problem because there is substantial time series and cross sectional variation in the ratio of utilized to contracted FDI (UC ratio), which is less than one in most province-year observations. Provinces may believe that they are rewarded for reporting higher levels of contracted FDI, which would lead to lower UC ratios and higher policy incentives in subsequent years. Alternatively, provinces may be rewarded for reporting data more accurately, which would lead to higher UC ratios and policy incentives in subsequent years. Empirical analysis supports the second, institutional theory and suggests that provinces may increase their rate of utilizing pledged FDI by strengthening their legal systems and reducing government bureaucracy.     

Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial Supervision and Regulation?

Over the last decade or so, addressing financial instabilityhas risen to the top of the policy agenda. This essay arguesthat in order to improve the safeguards against financial instability,it may be desirable to strengthen further the macroprudentialorientation of current prudential frameworks, a process thatis already under way. The essay defines, compares and contraststhe macro- and microprudential dimensions that inevitably coexistin financial regulatory and supervisory arrangements, examinesthe nature of financial instability against this backgroundand draws conclusions about the broad outline of desirable policyefforts.(JEL G2) "Words, like nature, half reveal and half conceal the soul within" Alfred Lord Tennyson "When I use a word... it just means what I choose it to mean– neither more, nor less" Humpty Dumpty     

欧债危机成因与前景的制度分析

希腊等欧元区国家的主权债务危机可以说是欧洲区域一体化建设中的独特现象,其折射的是欧元区所存在的一个结构性问题：奉行单一货币政策和各国分散的财政政策,集中暴露出了欧洲货币一体化与欧洲福利资本主义的不相容、以及统一货币运行所要求的财政紧缩与欧元成员国经济增长和福利制度之间的矛盾与冲突;欧元不会就此瓦解,但欧债问题的最终解决困难重重;欧元的未来取决于自由与市场的回归欧洲,取决于欧盟的制度完善与欧式福利资本主义改革的成功与否。     

Learning innovation policy based on historical experience

Innovation fosters structural change and growth and drives socio-economic change. The generation and diffusion of innovation is a dynamic process, which cannot adequately be guided by static policy conceptions. In this paper we will explore the possibility of devising and implementing a ‘learning’ innovation policy. As organisational and technological change is not completely haphazard, we argue that innovation policy can make use of structural regularities in socio-economic change whilst, at the same time, be open to advances in scientific knowledge. We devise a method that achieves these two aims and apply it to a concrete example (knowledge systems). We conclude with practical implications originating from such a ‘learning’ innovation policy.     

Local television,citizen knowledge and U.S. senators' roll-call voting

I study the effect of access to local television on citizens' political knowledge. I do so by utilizing the mismatch between U.S. television markets and state borders, causing some citizens to receive local television which primarily covers neighboring state politics. I find that access to relevant local television causes citizens to be more informed about their senators' roll-call votes, and more likely to hold opinions about these senators. I also find that citizens with access to relevant local television are more likely to assess their senators based on how well the senators' roll-call votes align with the citizens' policy preferences. These results suggest that passively acquired information through television can help individuals evaluate their elected representatives.     

Bound by Gravity or Living in a ‘Post Geography Trading World’?* Expert Knowledge and Affective Spatial Imaginaries in the Construction of the UK’s Post-Brexit Trade Policy

A key battle has been fought within the UK cabinet on the direction of post-Brexit trade policy. The opposing sides have favoured either continued alignment or a ‘hard’ break with the European Union’s (EU’s) regulatory and customs regime, in the latter case to allow the UK to pursue an independent and ambitious trade policy agenda. Contrary to much commentary on ‘post-truth’ politics, both sides have relied on rival forms of expertise to support their claims. I argue for the need to not only re-emphasise the malleability and political nature of expert knowledge, but also appreciate its emotional bases. The Treasury has led the charge in favour of a softer Brexit by drawing on econometric (‘gravity’) models that emphasise the economic costs of looser association with the EU. In contrast to this attempt at technocratic legitimation, the specific legal expertise drawn upon by cabinet advocates of ‘hard’ Brexit has appealed to an emotive political economy of bringing the UK, and its (in this imaginary) overly regulated economy, closer to its ‘kith and kin’ in the Anglosphere, deepening the UK ‘national business model’. I conclude by calling for more explicitly emotive and values-based argumentation in the public debate on the UK’s future trade policy to improve the quality of democratic deliberation.     

Electoral regime and trade policy

We study how trade protection varies with the electoral rules for legislative representation. In particular, we investigate different hypotheses about why trade policy differs between countries with legislatures elected by a plurality election rule in single member constituencies and legislatures elected by a proportional, or party-list, rule. Our results, which are in line with the existing literature, show that countries with list-PR systems tend to have lower trade barriers than countries with majoritarian systems. We expand on this literature by looking at the mechanisms through which this correlation can be explained. Our findings indicate that, contrary to existing theory, neither constituency size nor party strength are important when explaining this correlation. Country size does matter, but does not explain the whole of the correlation.     

Commitment to regulatory bureaucracy

A model is considered in which ‘regulatory bureaucracy’ is in the best interest of consumers as well as the regulated firm. Making it more costly for the regulator to discern the firm's true costs can help motivate the firm to act in the interest of consumers. But this is only true if the regulator cannot make binding precommitments concerning the use of his policy instruments. Endowed with the ability to precommit, prices below marginal cost, investment in excess of efficient levels, and the absence of regulatory bureaucracy will characterize the optimal regulatory policy.     

Gender bias and women’s political performance

We model voters’ gender bias as a prejudice on women’s competence coming from a distorted prior. We analyse the effect of this bias in a two-period two-party election model in which voters care about both policy preference and competence. We find that, if voters (wrongly) believe that women are drawn from a distribution of competences with higher weights on lower values, female politicians are less likely to win office but, when elected, they are on average more competent than male elected officials. As a consequence, female incumbents seek re-election more often.     

Independent courts and administrative agencies: an empirical analysis of the states

This article explores the hypothesis that state administrativeagencies spend more time and effort attempting to protect theiractions from judicial review in states with more independentappointed courts (as opposed to less independent elected courts).This is because more independent courts are (by definition)less influenced by the political/electoral forces that underlieagency - policymaking - as rational actors, agencies may thereforebe expected to recognize the degree of judicial independenceand respond to it. Three state agencies subject to substantialjudicial review in the 1970s are examined: utility commissions,insurance commissions, and the public education bureaucracy.Controlling for relevant political factors, each is found tohave significantly larger staffing for a given regulatory workloadin states with more independent appointed courts, consistentwith the hypothesis.     

THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS*

This paper investigates the incentives for candidates to make informative campaign speeches concerning their policy intentions. Electoral competition is modeled as a game of communication in which candidates’policy preferences are private information and they compete by making pre-electoral policy announcements. An equilibrium is shown to exist in which candidates reveal their true policy intentions. We find that campaign messages are more likely to be informative, the less powerful is the elected office, the more attractive are candidates’opportunities outside of office, and the more uniform are candidates’prior beliefs as to the median voter's preferred policy.     

Reflections on the perspectives of the global economy from the point of view of emerging economies

 Recently a number of emerging economies, with high inflation and various kinds of imbalances have experienced what has come to be referred to as dollarization– the phenomenon of currency substitution where the dollar gradually replaces the national currency in the performance of its fundamental functions. The phenomenon is most commonly encountered as a component of the exchange-rate-based stabilization programs implemented in a number of emerging economies in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. The fundamental issue we want to explore is whether this process forces the monetary authorities of emerging economies to act with their hands tied, as if caught in a trap. It is argued that when the expansion of liquidity and domestic credit is determined by the quantity of foreign-exchange reserves, an independent monetary policy vanishes and national sovereignty itself is shackled. Since this scenario typically occurs in a world of increasing globalization of finance, this paper also discusses (with reference to emerging economies) the risks and implications of capital inflows for macroeconomic policy autonomy, economic instability, and vulnerability to external shocks.     

Adjustments in Different Government Systems

This paper develops a model in which agents have a conflict of interest over what instrument to use for policy adjustment in response to shocks. Three different government systems are analyzed: cabinet systems, in which one decision-maker has full control over adjustment policies; consensus systems, in which adjustment policies must be agreed upon by all agents; and checks-and-balances systems, in which one agent decides what instrument should be used for adjustment, but the remaining agents may veto its use. All three systems may lead to inefficient policies. The cabinet system adjusts too often. The other systems may fail to adjust when adjustment is optimal. The relative performance of the three systems depends on the degree of political fragmentation and the size distribution of shocks.     

Moonlighting politicians

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. At the same time, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in terms of voting attendance.     

Innovation and Bureaucracy Under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints

Because of the inherent uncertainty, promotion of innovation critically depends on screening mechanisms to select projects. This paper studies the relationship between bureaucracy and financial constraints as two such mechanisms. The lack of commitment to hard financial constraints interferes with its ex post screening capability; ex ante bureaucratic screening is optimally chosen as a substitute. However, bureaucracy makes mistakes by rejecting promising projects and delays innovation, and the efficiency loss due to soft financial constraints increases as prior knowledge becomes worse and as research stage investment requirements become lower. In a centralized economy, bureaucracy may reduce the number of parallel projects, particularly for projects with higher uncertainties and less research stage requirements. This theory fits much of the evidence and in particular it explains why the computer industry, but not the nuclear or aerospace industries, has fared so poorly in centralized economies.     

Making green discourses matter in policy-making: Learning from discursive power struggles within the policy area of car taxation

This paper is about stability and change in the policy-making discourse of a traditional neoclassical policy area, the area of car taxation. Stability is here related to the unquestioned continuation of a traditional neoclassical economics perspective in policy-making, whereas change is related to the introduction and impact of environmental concerns. The aim of the paper is to investigate, what makes green discourses matter in traditional policy-making. It is based on an in-depth study of policy-making processes related to car taxation in two environmental front-runner countries, Sweden and Denmark.Making green discourses matter in policy-making is an important contemporary environmental challenge. Therefore, as Tian Shi argues, we need more research into the institutional setting of the policy-making process. Ecological economics as a policy science has to have a broad understanding of the political economic nature of the policy process. Taking this standpoint as the point of departure, the paper seeks to uncover questions such as, what is the policy-making reality in which Swedish and Danish green discourses have to make a difference? How do existing neoclassical regimes react, when green actors attempt to influence policy-making from an environmental point of view? And to what extent can green discourses actually have an impact on the policy world within the area of car taxation?The paper concludes that the traditional neoclassical economic discourse is particularly robust and resistant against alternative green discourses. Stability rather than change is the dominating picture. This does not imply that environmental concerns will not be taken into account in the future. Rather it implies that only the changes, which keep up the existing order, or enhance the narrow power-related interests of the dominating actors, will materialise more or less easily. The rest is a power struggle in which timing, coalition-building, persistence and thorough knowledge about the field in question is of importance. In this struggle change agents will also benefit from the ability to rethink dominating ways of thinking and doing in an environmentally benign way. A rethinking that is based on environmental values while at the same time holding positive visions that are ‘compatible’ with the existing dominating discourse.