Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight

In this paper, we propose a framework to integrate the identity of legislators in a politico-economic analysis of parliamentary oversight. Legislators decide about the effort they invest in oversight activities depending on their individual control costs and the level of electoral competition. We focus on public servants elected to parliament who face a conflict of interests but also have lower control costs due to their experience and information advantage. If held accountable, oversight becomes a relatively attractive activity for them to win votes. For German Laender, we find that the fraction of public servants in parliament is positively related to the number of submitted parliamentary interpellations. This result holds when instrumenting the fraction of public servants in parliament with its institutional determinants. Moreover, a mixed-member electoral system as well as a tighter race between the two biggest parties is related to more, a larger number of parties in parliament to less minor interpellations.     

Federalism,taxation, and economic growth

We present a model of endogenous growth where government provides a productive public good financed by income and capital taxes. In equilibrium, a decentralized government chooses tax policy to maximize economic growth, while a centralized government does not do so. Furthermore, these conclusions hold regardless of whether governments are beholden to a median voter or are rent-maximizing Leviathans. However, a decentralized government will under-provide public goods which benefit citizens directly, while a central government beholden to the median voter will optimally invest in such public goods.     

Trading equilibrium in a public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers

Lindahl and Nash equilibria are often used in the theory of public good. Shitovitz and Spiegel (1998) present an example of 2-person economy with one private good and one pure public good, where the core efficient Lindahl allocation does not Pareto dominate the (inefficient) Nash allocation. In this paper we introduce the new concept of Trading equilibrium for a general public good economy with smooth preferences and a mixed measure space of consumers. We obtain that this economy admits a unique Trading equilibrium. Moreover, the Trading equilibrium induces a core allocation that strictly Pareto dominates the Nash allocation.     

Aspects of growth in a system of cities

This paper explores and develops the modeling of growth in a system of cities in two alternative settings. First, we examine a large growing economy with a fully developed system of cities with perfectly malleable private and public capital. Local scale economies in production and diseconomies in consumption in equilibrium offset each other at the margin so that from a national point of view we have a constant returns to scale economy. We show that at the steady state the number of cities grows exponentially at the rate of growth of the population. We then examine the impact of technological change, considering a case where public capital is not perfectly malleable. In the second setting, we consider the problem of growth for a small economy and discuss problems associated with the transition to the steady state. We modify the previous model to describe a system of cities that is just starting to develop. Investment in public infrastructure capital is subject to sharp indivisibilities and as a result new cities are built at discrete points in time.     

Mergers between local public firms

We consider a country made up of two regions, where each region owns a local public firm and a domestic private one. A national authority decides whether or not to merge the two local public firms. The result depends on whether the goods produced by the firms are homogeneous, substitutes or complements. We find that if the two local public firms produce the same good, the national authority is indifferent as to whether to merge or not. When local public firms produce different goods two cases arise. First, if the firms in each region produce homogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms when the goods are complements, independent in demand and weak substitutes. Second, if the firms in each region produce heterogeneous goods the national authority merges the two local public firms only when the goods are close complements. Therefore, there is greater scope for mergers in the former case than in the later.     

Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness?

The pros and cons of stricter disclosure rules for parliamentarians are hotly debated. Some argue that disclosure rules for parliamentarians increase transparency of the legislative branch, leading to lower levels of rent-seeking and corruption, increased citizen trust in parliament, and better quality of law-making. Others argue that disclosure rules endanger the privacy of parliamentarians, that their introduction would stop businesspeople and lawyers from running for seats, which would decrease the quality of law-making. This is the first attempt to empirically test these conjectures on the composition of parliament empirically. We find that the introduction of disclosure rules is usually not accompanied by a significant shift in the proportion of lawyers and businesspeople in parliament.     

Growth and fluctuations: The role of public dividends and public spending

In this paper, we consider a discrete-time version of the endogenous growth model developed by Barro [Barro, R.J., 1990. Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth. Journal of Political Economy 98, 103–125], but augmented in order to envisage a public participation in the production of private goods. Public dividends are invested in order to provide a public good; in turn, the public good plays a role of indispensable production externality and, eventually, of growth engine.For what concerns the production of private goods, we find that an optimal policy is always based on a positive participation of the government as shareholder; also, when growth is slow, a public intervention or large substitution effects stabilize the economy.A right mix of short-run services and long-run infrastructures is suggested in slow economies to rule out expectation-driven fluctuations. Infrastructures are mainly recommended in presence of moderate income effects, while services are recommended in presence of strong income effects.     

Entrepreneurship policy and targets: the case of a low absorptive capacity region

Despite the existence of a positive relationship between new firm creation and economic growth, a certain controversy still exists regarding the need for the public promotion of entrepreneurship. The recent surge of entrepreneurship policies encompasses a wide variety of instruments and goals that are mainly designed and implemented at a regional or local level, which allows for a more efficient use of public resources. Case studies are therefore a useful approach to assessing “good practices” in entrepreneurship policies. We adopt this approach to empirically analyse whether policies are targeting specific entrepreneurial projects or not in the region of Valencia. We identify the features (in relation to the entrepreneur, the sector and the characteristics of the project itself) that may influence greater access to public funding and are principally related to standard requirements for this means of financing. These variables do not address specific entrepreneurial profiles, sectors or applicant projects, thereby revealing a substantial degree of horizontal policy design. Other features, such as almost all entrepreneurial characteristics (previous experience, age, etc.), do not seem relevant in terms of receiving public funds.     

Spatial provision of local public goods with spillover effects

Most of the works dealing with local public goods are aspatial in their treatment since they consider only the case of a pure local public good; such works do not address the problem of where the good is to be supplied. In this paper, an initial attempt to treat the distribution of an impure local public good as a choice function is made within the framework of optimum urban land use. The distance-decay nature of spillover effects inherent in an impure local public good is explicitly considered by adopting a negative exponential function. To highlight the spatial aspect of an impure local public good, a two-supply-site problem with a log-linear utility function is formulated to determine the optimal supply sites. It is shown that if the weight of the utility function on the public service is greater than or equal to that on land, then the local public good is exclusively supplied at the center. Otherwise, separate supply sites can be optimal.     

Participation and study decisions in a public system of higher education

We analyze the decision whether to participate and where and what to study in a public system of higher education, based on a unique dataset of all eligible high school pupils in an essentially closed region (Flanders). We find that pupils perceive the available institutions and programs as close substitutes relative to the outside option. This implies an ambiguous role for travel costs: they hardly affect the participation decision, but have a strong impact on the decision where and what to study. To illustrate how our empirical results can inform the debate on reforming public systems, we assess the effects of tuition fee increases. Uniform cost‐based tuition fee increases achieve most of the welfare gains; the additional gains from fee differentiation are relatively limited. These welfare gains are quite large under conservative assumptions on the social cost of public funds, and there is a substantial redistribution from students to outsiders. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asymptotic seat bias formulas

Apportionment methods are used to round the vote proportions of parties in a proportional representation system to integer numbers of seats in the parliament. Seat biases quantify by how much on average a particular apportionment method favors larger (or smaller) parties. In this paper, we prove a previous conjecture on asymptotic seat biases of stationary divisor methods and the quota method of greatest remainders, as the size of the parliament tends to infinity.     

More reforms,less innovation? The impact of structural reform histories on innovation-oriented cultures in public organizations

The environments of public organizations have become substantially volatile due to economic and societal changes, requiring organizations to continuously adapt and to develop an innovation-oriented culture. In response to the multitude of challenges posed by this volatile environment, politicians in inter alia the executive and parliament impose structural reforms upon public organizations, implying that these organizations might be confronted with a series of structural reforms over their lifetime. This paper advances that a history of repeated and frequent structural reforms, irrespective of the underlying drivers of these reforms, has a negative effect on the innovation-orientedness of the organizational culture. We explore the link between an organization’s history of structural reforms and the degree to which the culture within these organizations is innovation-oriented. Results indicate that organizational turmoil generated by repeated structural reforms reduces innovativeness and suggest that too many structural reforms imposed in a too short time span will have detrimental side effects.     

Public spending,public governance and economic growth at the Vietnamese provincial level: A disaggregate analysis

This study examines the role of economic governance in the relationship between public spending, private investment, and economic growth in Vietnam at the provincial level. The study data consist of sixty-two Vietnamese provinces for the period 2006–2015. Some notable results are attained by applying a sequential (two-stage) estimation. First, the marginal benefits to economic growth of increased Vietnamese provincial government expenditures may be constrained because of the inefficiency of expenditures on education, business services, and public administration. Second, public spending and private investment are found to be substitutes at the provincial level. Third, based on the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) ranking, used as a proxy for provincial public governance in Vietnam, the significance of public governance can be observed. The study concludes that good governance, characterized by different attributes, such as lower informal charges, greater transparency, and unbiased policy, plays a critical role in improving the impact of government expenditure on economic growth in Vietnamese provinces, particularly through its interactions with private sector investment.     

Roles of Public Capital in Pakistan's Economy: Productivity, Investment and Growth Analysis

This study analyzes the role of public capital in Pakistan's economy, tracing the relationship between productivity of public capital and economic growth. We estimate a production function, with public capital as an inputs. The results indicate that the productivity (output elasticity) of aggregate as well as different components of public capital are sufficiently high. We also analyze substitutability and complementarity between public and private capital by estimating investment functions, revealing that public capital has worked as a substitute for private investment. The net effect of public capital on the national economy is analyzed by estimating reduced forms, with the result that public capital has a positive net effect on national product. The growth analysis shows that the contribution of public capital is declining over time.     

Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment

We consider a representative agent, infinite-horizon economy where production requires private and public capital. The supply of public capital is financed through distortionary taxation. The optimal (second best) tax policy of a benevolent government is time inconsistent. We therefore introduce explicitly the constraint that at no point in time the revision of the original tax plan is desirable. We completely characterize the (third best) tax plan that satisfies this constraint, and estimate the difference in tax rate between the second and third best policy for a wide range of parameters. For some of these the difference between the second and third best tax rates is large, and so are the associated rates of economic growth.     

Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods

We consider transfers in a Stackelberg game of private provision of a public good. It turns out that the agent who is the follower in the process of making voluntary contributions to a public good may have an incentive to make monetary transfers to the Stackelberg leader even in a situation where neither has a comparative advantage in making contributions to the public good. The Stackelberg leader is willing to accept such transfers if the actual contribution game is fully non-cooperative because the transfer generates a Pareto superior outcome. If the contributions in the Stackelberg equilibrium is the threat point of a possible cooperative Nash bargaining game, the Stackelberg leader will refuse to accept the transfer if she can. Received: 30 June 1995 / Accepted: 18 February 1997     

Reviewing Oates' insights in a repeated game setting

This paper analyzes the optimal assignment of public good policies to layers of a federal system in a repeated game setting. Under a centralized regime, public goods are financed jointly across regions, and a federal legislature decides on the regional quantities. Under a decentralized regime, public goods are financed locally, and governments play a non-cooperative provision game. We find that a centralized (decentralized) regime is more likely to provide the efficient public good policies in case spillovers are small (large). Received: September 2003, Accepted: October 2004 JEL Classification: H11, H41 I wish to thank Clemens Fuest, Anke Kessler, Christoph Lülfesmann, and an anonymous referee for valuable comments on this paper. Financial support by the DFG (SPP 1142) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods

This paper analyses the effects of taxation and subsidies in an economy with private provision of a public good. It is shown that in a situation where all individuals contribute, taxation affects the equilibrium allocation if and only if at least one individual's voluntary contribution to the public good has an impact on the aggregate tax payments of the others. We then consider linear nonneutral tax-subsidy schemes and analyse efficiency and uniqueness of the resulting Nash equilibria. We show that an efficient Nash equilibrium, where all individuals contribute, will in general not be unique, and establish a non-uniformity property which a tax-subsidy scheme must fulfil in order to induce a unique interior equilibrium that is efficient. Throughout the paper it is assumed that individuals fully understand and take into account the government's budget constraint. Received: 3 November 1997 / Accepted: 23 March 1999     

Optimal Growth with Public Capital and Public Services

We characterize optimal economic growth in an endogenous growth model in which production requires public capital (a stock) and public services (a flow) in addition to private capital and labor. We analyze the comparative static effects of changes in the fundamental technological and preference parameters of the model on the optimal values of several variables, such as the optimal rate of growth and the optimal allocation of resources among consumption, the provision of public services, and investment in public and private capital. We show that the general optimal path converges in finite time to the balanced growth optimal path. We relate our paper to important contributions to the existing literature by obtaining them as special cases of our model.