Participatory budgeting and the pattern of local government spending: Evidence from South Korea

We use a panel of Korean municipalities to examine the impact of participatory budgeting on local government expenditures. We find that participatory budgeting systematically alters the pattern of local spending. Municipalities using participatory budgeting reallocate resources toward more immediate and visible expenditures and away from long-term development expenditure. We also find evidence that participatory budgeting affects the municipal budget by a greater amount than the expenditures directly allocated through participatory budgeting. Our findings indicate that participatory budgeting leads to the reallocation of local public spending by increasing information flows between policymakers and service users.     

Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities

This paper considers the presence of political budget cycles in Greece's municipalities. We construct a new dataset from primary sources and we find strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation through increased expenditures and excessive borrowing. We use a dynamic panel data approach producing evidence of opportunistic behavior in local government finances. Our results are robust in the face of a series of controls including mayors running for reelection, their political alignment with the central government, and prolonged terms. Moreover, the results are robust to the exclusion of small sized municipalities and to the restriction of the time range of our investigation to the post-Maastricht period. We also consider whether opportunistic policies influence incumbents' reelection prospects finding that increased expenditures and election year opportunistic excesses are electorally rewarding. Our findings provide a characterization of opportunistic public finance management in Greek municipalities where electorally motivated budgetary decisions appear impervious to the various municipal reform attempts.     

Demand for locally provided public services within the median voter's framework: the case of the Brazilian municipalities

In this paper we estimated the demand for local public spending for the Brazilian municipalities within a median voter's framework. The rationale for applying that framework came from the fact that in federal systems voters’ preferences are more likely to be reflected at the local level as the consumers of public services have a better knowledge of the benefits and costs of the local public expenditures. Results obtained are consistent with the theoretical background thus suggesting that this hypothesis might be useful to describe the demand for local public goods in Brazil. In particular, the use of quantile regression permitted us to investigate the impacts of the conditioning variables on local public expenses across different expenditures classes thus allowing for heterogeneity across municipalities. Our results also suggest that the impact of the city size on the quality of club goods shows crowding effects as γ is between zero and one. However, in the estimated models, marginal congestion slightly decreases with expenditure. This is a rather surprising result as one is tempted to conclude that the congestion effect should be higher on big cities. Yet, a more careful look shows the drawbacks of such an interpretation. The indivisibilities preclude the provision of certain services in small towns, concentrating their provision on larger cities. Hence, the higher expenditures of those big cities reflect not only a crowding cost but also the fact that these towns offer a wide range of services when compared to the small ones.     

‘Keeping up with the (Portuguese) Joneses’—a study on the spatial dependence of municipal expenditure

Municipalities tend to replicate the size and the composition of their neighbours’ expenditures, independently of being ruled by left-wing or right-wing parties. This is one important conclusion of the study, which includes spatial dependence to explain the value of Portuguese municipalities’ direct awards. We used observations for the 308 Portuguese municipalities from 2009 to 2015. We then tested this spatial dependence for the mean value (per contract of direct award) and we controlled the results considering the demographic characteristics of each municipality, the political wing of the ruling party at the municipality, and the composition of the municipal expenditures.     

The electoral budget cycle on municipal waste collection expenditure

This article analyses the determinants of municipal waste collection expenditure, specifically the effects of electoral cycles on municipal waste collection expenditure. We use a database with information on Spanish municipalities with more than 1000 inhabitants for the period 2002–2011. Our results reveal that incumbents adopt an opportunistic behaviour, increasing spending on waste in the preelection year and reducing it in the election and post-election years. Therefore, we confirm an electoral budget cycle on waste collection expenditures in Spain. Additionally, we find that the levels of income, unemployment and upper-level governments’ transfers have a positive impact on waste collection spending. Finally, population density, level of urbanization, average age of the population of the municipality and less fragmented governments negatively influence waste collection spending.     

Fiscal consolidation by intergovernmental transfers cuts? The unpleasant effect on expenditure arrears

For the period 2003–2014, we investigate unexplored effects of fiscal consolidation in decentralized public finance on a large dataset of Italian municipalities. Based on a simple, realistic theoretical model, we show that municipalities increase arrears on committed investment expenditure as a response to intergovernmental transfer cuts. Then, we test our predictions controlling for potential sources of endogeneity, and find that a reduction in intergovernmental transfers causes a significant increase in arrears, in addition to other common adjustments to local fiscal policies (e.g., tax revenues). Our results highlight a perverse effect of fiscal consolidation packages implemented by centrally imposed fiscal restraints.     

Citizens’ support for inter-municipal cooperation: evidence from a survey in the German state of Hesse

Inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) is often proposed as a politically feasible way by which rural municipalities can cope with intensified interregional competition and demographic change. We provide first evidence on citizens’ support for IMC using survey data from rural Germany. We find little evidence that citizens are more willing to support IMC in munici-palities that can – by the logic of economic theory – expect higher net benefits from IMC. Citizens’ support for IMC is primarily shaped by individual-level factors like the level of education, trust in local politicians and the degree of emotional attachment to the home mu-nicipality. Citizens’ beliefs regarding the economic and political consequences of IMC are found to have the largest marginal effect by far. Regressions predicting interpersonal differ-ences in these beliefs show that these beliefs have to be considered independent drivers of policy preferences. This result suggests that more research is needed to better understand the factors shaping citizens’ understanding of how economic policy works. This lack of under-standing applies to virtually all fields of economic policy.     

Common pool problems in voluntary municipal mergers

We analyze free-riding behavior of Finnish municipalities prior to voluntary municipal mergers. The merger process creates a temporary common pool problem, because of a delay from the initial decision to the actual merger during which municipalities stay autonomous. Using a difference-in-differences strategy, we find that the stronger free-riding incentive a municipality faced the more it increased its debt and spent its cash reserves. These funds were spent mostly on investments and current expenditures.     

Putting all one's eggs in one basket: Relational contracts and the management of local public services

French municipalities often contract out the provision of local public services to private companies, and regularly choose the same private operator for a range of different services. We develop a model of relational contracts that shows how this strategy may lead to better performance at lower cost for public authorities. We test the implication of our model using an original database of the contractual choices made by 5000 French local public authorities in the years 2001, 2004 and 2008.     

Reforming the local public sector: economics and politics in privatization of water and solid waste

Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. We examine the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. We consider two relevant services accounting for different amounts of transaction costs: water and solid waste delivery. Our results show that privatization is less common for water, which has higher transaction costs. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation may be a suitable organizational form for some municipalities.     

Spatial fiscal interactions among French municipalities within inter-municipal groups

Based on a unique data set of French municipalities and a large number of budgetary variables, we estimate the extent of spatial fiscal interaction among the 33,484 French municipalities in 2008 by accounting for inter-municipal cooperation. Using a spatial autoregressive model with inter-municipal group fixed effects, we show that spatial interactions among French municipalities are inflated by correlated effects that affect similarly municipalities that cooperate together. Removing these confounding effects leads to considerably smaller positive spatial interactions for tax decisions and even negative ones for capital expenditures. In addition, we observe a clear distinction between complementary choices on current budget items and substitutable choices on capital budget items.     

Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence

We present a model of the political budget cycle in which incumbents try to influence voters by changing the composition of government spending, rather than overall spending or revenues. Rational voters may support an incumbent who targets them with spending before the election even though such spending may be due to opportunistic manipulation, because it may also reflect sincere preference of the incumbent for types of spending voters favor. Classifying expenditures into those which are likely targeted to voters and those that are not, we provide evidence supporting our model in data on local public finances for all Colombian municipalities. Our findings indicate both a pre-electoral increase in targeted expenditures, combined with a contraction of other types of expenditure, and a voter response to targeting.     

MEASURING THE BENEFITS FROM PUBLIC SERVICES: THE EFFECTS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN NORWAY

The purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of how local public in-kind benefits affect the distribution of income in Norway. To this end, a method that accounts for differences between municipalities in capacity to produce the same standard of public services is used for assessing the value of sector-specific local public services in each municipality. Moreover, recipient frequencies in various demographic groups are used as basis for determining the allocation of the assessed value of services on citizens of the municipalities. The empirical results show that inequality in the (marginal) distribution of municipal in-kind benefits is rather high. The contribution of municipal in-kind benefits to inequality in the distribution of extended income (cash (after-tax) income plus municipal in-kind benefits) proves, however, to be approximately neutral.     

How to tame two Leviathans? Revisiting the effect of direct democracy on local public expenditure in a federation

We explore how the presence of direct democracy across hierarchical levels of government in a federation affects the level of public expenditure. In so doing we revisit the effect of direct democratic institutions on public policies. Particularly, we are interested whether the effect of upper-level (state) direct democratic institutions on lower-level expenditure varies with lower-level direct democracy. Empirically, we exploit the large institutional variation in the degree of direct democracy both for state (cantons) and local governments (municipalities) in Switzerland. Considering 119 municipalities belonging to 22 cantons for the period 1993–2007, we find that the cantonal fiscal referendum increases local spending for those municipalities without fiscal referenda, while this effect is significantly reduced for municipalities that also avail of referenda. This suggests that upper-level fiscal restraint can be undone by lower-level profligacy if direct-democratic control is limited to the upper level.     

More Than You Can Handle: Decentralization and Spending Ability of Peruvian Municipalities

This article builds on a comprehensive dataset for Peru that merges municipal fiscal accounts with information about municipalities’ characteristics such as population, poverty, education, and local politics to analyze the leading factors affecting the ability of municipalities to execute the allocated budget. According to the existing literature and the Peruvian context, we divide these factors into four categories: the budget size and allocation process; local capacity; local needs; and political economy constraints. While we do find that all four factors affect decentralization, the largest determinant of spending ability is the adequacy of the budget with respect to local capacity. The results confirm the need for decentralization to be implemented gradually over time in parallel with strong capacity building efforts.     

我国自主创新能力影响因素的实证研究

以2004—2006年我国31个省、市、自治区自主创新投入和产出的面板数据为研究样本,运用因子分析和多元回归分析相结合的方法,对影响我国自主创新能力的因素进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,R&D人员全时当量、当地政府科技活动经费投入和科技活动经费支出与我国自主创新能力存在显著的正相关。然而,各地大中型工业企业R&D投入对创新能力的影响都不显著。     

Natural disasters and electoral outcomes

Natural disasters are good examples of catastrophic events that may affect vote decisions. In this study, we analyze how the occurrence of earthquakes changes voters' behavior at municipal elections and which channels drive this change, focusing in particular on the role of media exposure. We exploit data from 13,338 municipal electoral cycles where incumbents seek reelection between 1993 and 2015 in Italy. We apply a difference-in-difference strategy with time and cities fixed effect to the probability of reelection and vote share using three different control groups: the universe of municipalities, a sub-sample of neighboring municipalities, and a sub-sample of municipalities identified by a one-to-one nearest-neighbor propensity score matching procedure. We find that the occurrence of destructive earthquakes significantly increases the incumbent mayors’ chance of being reelected and their vote share. We argue that this result is driven by the incumbent mayor advantage in offering recovery from disaster damages combined with a higher visibility on the media in the aftermath of the disaster. Thus, the mediatic relevance of earthquake occurrence may bias voters towards the incumbent.     

Disentangling political and institutional determinants of budget forecast errors: A comparative approach

This paper provides a unique comparison between French and Portuguese local governments with respect to the nature and determinants of budget forecast errors. It starts by documenting and comparing their statistical properties. The results point at biased and inefficient budget forecasts, which seem to have been more cautious in French departments than in Portuguese municipalities. Second, we examine the political, institutional and economic determinants of forecast biases. Overall, we find that they are essentially driven by electoral motivations and by institutional differences across the two countries. In particular, opportunistic forecasting is more prevalent where governments enjoy greater margin of maneuver, and there is evidence of conservatism in French departments where fiscal autonomy is greater.     

Capacity,sustainability, and the community benefits of municipal utility ownership in the United States

ABSTRACT

Most literature on utility sustainability focuses on internal operations; this misses the role that utilities could play within a community. This study measures the impact of municipal ownership of water and electric utilities on the sustainability policymaking of local governments. I find that municipalities with government-owned water utilities adopt more sustainability measures than those with investor-owned service. Similarly, municipally-owned electric utilities have higher levels of energy sustainability in the community, but not in government operations. The utilities provide fiscal and technical capacity to municipalities. Interdepartmental coordination also strongly predicts sustainability policymaking. This study brings potential community benefits to the discussion of private investment in public service delivery.     

Reconsidering Wagner’s law: evidence from the functions of the government

We revisit Wagner’s law by function of government expenditure. Using data of 14 European countries between 1996 and 2013, we apply panel data and SUR methods to assess public expenditure–income elasticities. We find that some functions of government spending for a few countries (e.g. Austria, France, the Netherlands and Portugal) validate Wagner’s law. For the Netherlands, expenditures with environment protection increase more than proportionately to economic growth, and for France that is the case of spending in housing and community amenities. In addition, Greece is the only country where two public spending items react more than one to one to growth.