Delegating recruitment under asymmetric information

This paper studies the incentive to delegate recruitment. The owner decides whether or not to delegate recruitment to senior employees who are better able to evaluate candidates but may avoid recruiting the best candidates as they threaten their seniority. We find that senior employees will not deliberately choose bad candidates if the only information asymmetry between the owner and the recruiter relates to candidates' ‘type’. Delegation is then superior to direct (owner) recruitment although ‘tenure’ may still be offered to elicit the ‘type’ of the recruit. If additional information asymmetry is present, however, moral hazard may exist and tenure is offered to ensure that the best candidate is selected.     

Per unit vs. ad valorem royalties under asymmetric information

We study an inside patent holder's optimal licensing policy when it has imperfect information about the value of the patent to its rival. The patent holder can choose any two-part licensing fee with either per unit or ad valorem royalties. We demonstrate that the equilibrium will be either a fully separating contract with different per unit royalty rates, or a contract with a single ad valorem royalty that excludes a high cost rival. Fixed fees will not be used. The presence of asymmetric information uniquely drives the per unit royalties that otherwise would not be adopted. Per unit royalties always generate higher social welfare than ad valorem royalties.     

Effects of asymmetric information on airport congestion management mechanisms

We study and compare three different mechanisms for capacity (slot) allocation in a congested airport when airlines have one-dimensional private information: direct allocation of slots, differentiated tolls and slot auctions. With perfect information, direct allocation is a first best policy which can be implemented through Pigouvian taxes or slot auctions; the mechanisms are equivalent in terms of social welfare. With the introduction of asymmetric information this equivalence is lost: direct allocation is always ex-post inefficient and, in some cases, tolls and subsequent quantity delegation is a better alternative social welfare wise. Auctions may be superior or inferior to tolls. We further show that naïve application of Pigouvian tolls is sub-optimal when imperfect information exists.     

Channel coordination with the newsvendor model using asymmetric information

In this paper, after surveying short-term two-echelon supply channel coordination methods, we present an extended version of the newsvendor model in which the supplier has to fulfil all demand of the customer, even if this calls for an additional setup of production. Given uncertain demand forecast, the solution is an optimal production quantity that minimises the expected total cost including setup, inventory holding and obsolete inventory costs. Then, the model is studied in a decentralised setting where the customer has private information about the demand forecast, while the supplier knows the various cost factors. We suggest such a coordination protocol and payment scheme that provides both partners the right incentive for minimising the total cost: the customer is interested in sharing her unbiased demand forecast and uncertainty, while the supplier's rational decision concurs with the overall optimum. Hence, local decisions based on asymmetric information coordinate the channel in the global sense. The results are also demonstrated by taking some real-life test cases from an industrial study that motivated our work.     

Threat of entry,asymmetric information,and pricing

This paper examines the impact of asymmetric information on incumbent firms' propensity to engage in limit pricing when faced with threat of entry. I draw from information economics to argue that incumbents will use price to respond ex ante to entry in situations characterized by asymmetric information. I suggest two situations in which asymmetric information can arise: when potential entrants are from outside the primary industry and when incumbent firms are members of R&D consortia. I then study pricing in the U.S. cable TV industry to show that pricing patterns of incumbent cable TV systems are consistent with limit pricing when the relationship between the incumbent and potential entrant is characterized by asymmetric information. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coordinating a channel with asymmetric cost information and the manufacturer's optimality

In a manufacturer-retailer system with private retail cost information, we find that a set of incentive-compatible contracts consisting of wholesale and buyback prices can coordinate the channel for any retail cost. We then design two wholesale-buyback contracts by imposing a cutoff point on the retail cost. The first contract maximizes the manufacturer's expected profit while ensuring the channel is coordinated. The second contract assumes the same contractual structure without considering the effect on the channel. Both contracts are exactly solved. We find from numerical study that the manufacturer in the first contract can perform closely to the second one in many cases, and cases exist where both the manufacturer and the channel can do better in the first contract versus the second one.     

Competitive provision of tune-ins under common private information

Television (TV) stations forego millions of dollars of advertising revenues by airing tune-ins (preview advertisements) for their upcoming programs. In this paper, I analyze the equilibrium as well as welfare properties of tune-ins in a duopolistic TV market that lasts for two periods. Importantly, each TV station is fully informed about its own as well as its rival's program. Viewers receive information via tune-ins, if any, or alternatively by sampling a program for a few minutes (and switching across stations). I find that equilibrium tune-in decisions do not necessarily depend on TV stations' knowledge of their rival's program. In this case, the opportunity costs of tune-ins could be so high that a regime without any tune-ins may be socially better. However, when tune-ins depend on both of the upcoming programs, it is possible that they enhance welfare by helping viewers avoid some of the inefficient program sampling they would otherwise do in a regime without any tune-ins.     

网络环境下的图书馆信息资源管理

21世纪全球进入信息化和网络时代,计算机和通讯技术的高速发展,网络作为这个时代的标志,起着前所未有的重大作用。目前,通过因特网上最先进的搜索引擎google能检索到大约13亿个网页,图书馆电子信息资源已经成为人们重要的信息资源。与传统图书馆相比,网络环境下图书馆信息资源发生了很大变化,图书馆应在信息基础建设的前沿,吸收新技术、新方法,这是摆在我们图书馆员面前的新问题。1、网络环境下用户提出了更高的信息需求在二十世纪末和二十一世纪初,社会经济和科学技术发生了翻天覆地的变化,现代高科技的飞速发展给人们带来了更多的便利,计…     

Irreversibility, sunk costs and investment under incomplete information

Despite its importance to economic growth, the investment behavior of firms remains poorly understood. Existing models ignore irreversibility and the opportunity to wait for new information. Even if some recent literature accounts for these two characteristics, these models ignore information costs. This paper presents a framework for the valuation of investment opportunities accounting for information costs regarding the project cash‐flows.
We develop some basic models of irreversible investment to illustrate the option‐like characteristics of investment opportunities under incomplete information. We show how optimal investment rules can be obtained using option pricing theory under incomplete information. It is possible to value real options and investment decisions using our approach in a context of incomplete information. Simulations are provided to illustrate our main results.     

非对称信息下的考试作弊行为分析

本文运用委托-代理理论对考试作弊行为进行了研究,建立了国家与考生之间的非对称信息动态博弈模型,并据此提出了解决考生作弊问题的具体策略.     

A Stackelberg model of pricing of complementary goods under information asymmetry

We consider a duopoly market where two separate firms offer complementary goods in a leader–follower type move. Each firm has private forecast information about the uncertain market demand and decides whether to share it with the other firm. We show that information sharing would benefit the leader firm but hurt the follower firm as well as the total system if the follower firm shares information unconditionally. We then devise a “simple to implement” information sharing scheme under which both firms and the total system are better off. We also provide several interesting managerial insights and establish the robustness of the model in managing a supply chain through our analytical and simulation results.     

基于需求信息泄露的企业利润及社会效益研究

供应链中的信息对于供应链参与者的利益及供应链的绩效是有价值的,旨在对需求信息的泄露问题展开分析。给出了1个供应商2个零售商的基本模型,从供应商是否泄露零售商信息上给出了非泄露均衡和分离均衡下的零售商利润及供应商利润,并进一步从社会效益角度对2种信息保有情况展开了对比分析。研究得出:对跟随者而言,高需求下以及低需求且θ≥3下的零售商利润可以通过平均市场需求的范围进行确定;对于社会效益而言,高需求且非泄露信息下带来的社会效益总是优于分离均衡下的社会效益。     

Oligopoly under incomplete information: On the welfare effects of price discrimination

We study competition by firms that simultaneously post (potentially nonlinear) tariffs to consumers who are privately informed about their tastes. Market power stems from informational frictions, in that consumers are heterogeneously informed about firms’ offers. In the absence of regulation, all firms offer quantity discounts. As a result, relative to Bertrand pricing, imperfect competition benefits disproportionately more consumers whose willingness to pay is high, rather than low. Regulation imposing linear pricing hurts the former but benefits the latter consumers. While consumer surplus increases, firms’ profits decrease, enough to drive down utilitarian welfare. By contrast, improvements in market transparency increase utilitarian welfare, and achieve similar gains on consumer surplus as imposing linear pricing, although with limited distributive impact. On normative grounds, our analysis suggests that banning price discrimination is warranted only if its distributive benefits have a weight on the societal objective.     

Role of forecast effort on supply chain profitability under various information sharing scenarios

In this paper, we consider a manufacturer who sells a product to a retailer in a single selling season. Each party obtains a forecast of the market demand independent of each other. We study three different forecast scenarios: Non-Information Sharing, Information Sharing, and Retailer Forecasting cases. In the first scenario, both parties make their forecasts, but do not share the information with the other firm. In the second scenario, they share the information with each other, while in the last scenario, only the retailer makes the forecast, and shares it with the manufacturer. Noting that the forecast accuracy comes at a cost, we derive the optimal price and forecast accuracy level for each of the three cases. We then compare the optimal policies of the three cases and derive conditions under which the two parties should share information with each other. Results of extensive numerical experimentation are also presented.     

National brand's local advertising and wholesale-price incentive under prior versus no prior information

We study the context of one private label (PL) competing against one national brand (NB) through a unique retailer. We propose a novel utility-demand function that includes the consumer's brand valuation, the retail prices, and the brands' qualities. We investigate the effect of the NB local advertising strategy on supply chain players' profits when either one of the players supports the advertising. Also, we explore the role of prior information about the manufacturer's incentive function on supply chain players' behaviors. We show that although the support for advertising from either the manufacturer or the retailer is Pareto improving, the manufacturer prefers to incite the retailer to invest in local NB advertising through profit sharing instead of using its money to counter the threat of the PL. Furthermore, we also show that the wholesale price incentive motivating the retailer to invest further in advertising is not preferred as expected, and all supply chain players are better off without prior information about the manufacturer's behavior in the context of branding competition and advertising-level dependent incentive.     

Quality perceptions under evolving information conditions: Implications for diet,health and consumer satisfaction

Consumers’ perception of, and satisfaction with, fruit quality is an important issue for both public policy and commercial reasons. However, because of information problems, consumers cannot easily choose fruits of a quality most likely to satisfy their preferences and health needs. The research reported here employed an experimental auction method to test perceptions of fruit quality by evaluating the willingness to pay (WTP) of consumers for five different varieties of soft citrus under three different information conditions: visual inspection of the fruit before peeling; visual inspection after peeling; and after consumption. Significant differences were found in valuations of the different varieties as consumers gained information. Conclusions are drawn about the value of the methodology and the results themselves, and implications are inferred for policy and for growers and traders. It is argued that product information should be oriented not just towards nutritional education but also towards increasing the pleasure of healthy eating.     

A serial supply chain of newsvendor problem with safety stocks under complete and partial information sharing

We consider a supply chain where multiple members are serially connected. The decision is to determine the ordering quantity of a member to the next upstream member in the supply chain. The basic cost model is similar to the newsvendor problem with additional consideration to safety stock. This paper presents optimal approaches for coordination of the supply chain under both complete and partial information sharing in order to maximize the total expected benefit. For complete information sharing we develop an optimal coordination algorithm. For partial information sharing, we propose an optimal coordination algorithm based on the Alternating Direction Method and the Diagonal Quadratic Approximation Method. A numerical example is discussed to show the optimal convergence of ordering quantities and discuss the properties of the proposed algorithms.     

Labouring under an illusion? The labour process of software development in the Australian information industry

In this paper a case study of a small firm engaged in producing packaged software in the Australian 'information industry' is conducted in order to shed light on the nature of control over the labour process of software development. It is shown that the interplay of human agency and structural forces means employees are largely unaware of the exercise of control over their work.     

A centralized/decentralized design of a full return contract for a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer under partial information sharing

We consider the design of full return contract in a simple supply chain with a risk-free manufacturer and a risk-neutral retailer. In this problem, the ordering quantity and the rebate price for unsold products are determined by the retailer and the manufacturer, respectively. We propose an optimal solution procedure in centralized and decentralized decision making environments considering when the information sharing among the retailer and the manufacturer is partial. We provide numerical examples to explain the proposed solution procedures.     

管理信息系统支撑下的P、D、C、A循环在企业财务管理工作中的应用

管理信息系统是企业实现现代化管理的平台,P、D、C、A循环是质量管理的方法,如何将两者结合在一起,是优化企业财务管理的有效手段,本文在这里做了一些尝试.