Monetary policy and real estate returns

Previous research established that Federal Reserve monetary policy influences stock, bond, and other financial asset returns. This research extends past research and shows that similar patterns exist for real estate returns. We also provide evidence consistent with the contention that returns to underlying real estate are less sensitive than stock returns or securitized real estate returns to changes in monetary policy conditions. Investing in real estate may provide a hedge against changes in the monetary environment; however, investing in REITs represents an ineffective method to capture this benefit.     

Unconventional monetary policy and the stock market’s reaction to Federal Reserve policy actions

We examine the change in the effect of Federal Reserve’s policy actions on stock returns after the Fed started to use unconventional policy actions. We find that the response of stock returns to monetary policy actions are almost seven times higher after the federal funds rate hit the zero lower bound. We conduct additional analysis to examine the underlying causes of the increase in the impact of monetary policy actions of stock returns. We show that investors rebalance their portfolios towards equity after selling Treasury securities to the Federal Reserve during large scale asset purchases.     

Monetary Policy and the Stock Market: Theory and Empirical Evidence

This paper gives a comprehensive review of the literature on the interaction between real stock returns, inflation, and money growth, with a special emphasis on the role of monetary policy. This is an area of research that has interested monetary and financial economists for a long time. Monetary economists have been interested in the question whether money has any effect on real stock prices, while financial economists have investigated whether equity is a good hedge against inflation. Empirical studies show that money can be helpful in predicting future stock returns. Empirical evidence also suggest that equity is not a good hedge against inflation in the short run but may be so in the long run. The short-run negative relation between stock returns and inflation can easily be explained by theoretical models. If the central bank conducts a countercyclical monetary policy this will result in a negative relation between inflation and stock returns, while if it conducts a procyclical policy we could observe a positive relation. According to both theoretical and empirical studies investors receive an inflation risk premium for holding equity.     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Forecasts steady but near‐term signals mixed

• Our world growth forecasts are steady this month, at 2.3% for 2016 and 2.7% for 2017.
• One factor behind the more stable outlook is the rally in financial markets since mid‐February. This rally appears to have been the result of a number of factors including a more dovish Fed and an improvement in some near‐term economic indicators.
• The implied 12‐month ahead Fed funds rate dropped around 0.5% from its January peak to mid-February and remains around 0.35% lower now. So the Fed still apparently has the capacity to boost markets with changes in communication policy.
• The Citigroup economic surprise indicators have also improved over recent weeks, especially for emerging markets where the indicator is back in positive territory. The G10 index nevertheless remains clearly negative.
• Other economic signals are mixed. The latest reading of OE's world trade indicator (based on survey evidence for March) suggests a modest improvement, although again the indicator continues to signal weak world trade growth.
• Meanwhile, there have been some warnings of potentially softer labour market conditions. Though payrolls gains have remained solid, a weighted sum of the employment subindices of the US ISM surveys has dropped sharply over recent months. A similar index for the Eurozone is more positive, although it has also softened from its late‐2015 peaks.
• These mixed signals suggest limited likelihood of near‐term upgrades to the world growth outlook and overall we maintain our view from last month that risks look skewed to the downside – so that further monetary policy stimulus remains a possibility.
• This assessment appears to be shared, to some extent at least, by global bond markets. US 10‐year yields have dropped back to only 1.7% since mid‐March (only 0.1% above their February lows), with German yields at just 0.1% and Japanese yields at ‐ 0.1%. So the ‘great squeeze’ on G7 bond yields is still continuing.

     

Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.     

Analyzing Fed behavior using a dynamic Taylor-type rule

This paper estimates a dynamic Taylor-type model in order to analyze the behavior of the Federal Reserve under the leadership of three different Fed chairs: Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker, and Alan Greenspan. The model proves useful in distinguishing the conduct of monetary policy under each. Burns is found to have paid little attention to inflation and inflationary pressures. Volcker focused on reducing actual inflation during his first term while turning his attention to the GDP gap and inflationary pressures in his second term. Greenspan emphasized preemptive strikes against inflation as indicated by high weights attributed to the GDP gap and expected inflation.     

The impact of monetary policy in the midst of big shocks

This paper studies the impact of Federal Reserve policies that created the largest deviations from price stability during the Fed׳s first 100 years: the post-World War I deflation, the deflation of the Great Depression, the inflation of World War II, and the Great Inflation of the 1970s. In terms of their macroeconomic impacts, I find that deflation was uniquely depressing in the 1930s because of cartel policies that prevented nominal prices and wages from adjusting to clear markets, and not because deflation is generically depressing. I find that the biggest impact of monetary policy during World War II was in debasing debt through inflation. I find that the main drivers of the 1970s economy were long-run changes in productivity and the labor market, and that there may have been little that the Fed could have done at this time to expand employment and output. More broadly, I find that macroeconomic performance would have been better over the Fed׳s first century had the Fed followed a monetary policy to deliver stable prices.     

Impact of uncertainty on high frequency response of the U.S. stock markets to the Fed's policy surprises

This paper examines the impact of uncertainty on estimated response of stock returns to U.S. monetary policy surprise. This is motivated by the Lucas island model which suggests an inverse relationship between the effectiveness of a policy and the level of uncertainty in the economy. Using high frequency daily data from the Federal funds futures market, we first estimate the response of S&P 500 stock returns to monetary policy surprises within the time varying parameter (TVP) model. We then analyze the relationship of these time varying estimates with the benchmark VIX index and alternative measures of uncertainty. Evidence suggests a significant negative relationship between the level of uncertainty and the time varying response of S&P 500 stock returns to unanticipated changes in the interest rate. Thus, at higher levels of uncertainty the impact of monetary policy shocks on stock markets is lower. The results are robust to different measures of uncertainty.     

Testing the Structural Interpretation of the Price Puzzle with a Cost‐Channel Model*

We estimate a variety of small‐scale new‐Keynesian DSGE models with the cost channel to assess their ability to replicate the ‘price puzzle’, i.e. the inflationary impact of a monetary policy shock typically arising in vector autoregression (VAR) analysis. To correctly identify the monetary policy shock, we distinguish between a standard policy rate shifter and a shock to ‘trend inflation’, i.e. the time‐varying inflation target set by the Fed. Our estimated models predict a negative inflation reaction to a monetary policy tightening. We offer a discussion of the possible sources of mismatch between the VAR evidence and our own.     

Optimal monetary policy under incomplete markets and aggregate uncertainty: A long-run perspective

This paper examines the role of monetary policy in an environment with aggregate risk and incomplete markets. In a two-period overlapping-generations model with aggregate uncertainty, optimal monetary policy attains the ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation. This policy aims to stabilize the savings rate in the economy by changing real returns of nominal bonds via variation in expected inflation. Optimal expected inflation is procylical and on average higher than without uncertainty. Simple inflation targeting rules closely approximate the optimal monetary policy.     

What Would Milton Friedman Have Thought of the Great Recession?

Milton Friedman died in 2006 , right before the onset of the Great Recession. Unfortunately, we will never know how Friedman would have interpreted this event. However, we can draw some inferences from his published views on the Great Depression, as well as his views on more recent monetary policy, especially in Japan. It seems likely that Friedman would have blamed the Fed for insufficiently expansionary monetary policy during 2008 and 2009, a view that is quite different from the conventional conservative interpretation of events.     

The Fed’s TRAP

The article examines if US monetary policy implicitly responds to asset price booms. Using real-time data and a GMM framework we estimate a Taylor-type rule with an asset variable that captures phases of booms and busts in the real estate market. We identify quasi real-time booms and busts using an asset cycle dating procedure. Our analysis yields two main findings. Firstly, the Fed does implicitly respond to asset price booms in the real estate market. Secondly, these responses are typically pro-cyclic and their intensity changes over time.     

The Conduct of Monetary Policy Without Monetary Aggregates

A central dilemma for the monetary authorities is how to determine monetary policy. The increasing unreliability of monetary aggregates has led over the past few years to less concern for monetary targeting, both in the UK and elsewhere, and a greater influence for the exchange rate on monetary policy. But in the UK, most recently, there has been a move away from setting monetary policy in relation to the exchange rate and external considerations in favour of setting monetary policy in relation to domestic demand. Not surprisingly, this shift has occurred at a time of rising concern about domestic overheating. It illustrates the dilemma of whether monetary policy should be driven by domestic demand considerations or by external, exchange rate considerations. This dilemma is not just confined to the UK for it is a real source of conflict underlying the Louvre Accord and its successors that seek to determine G7 exchange rates in a cooperative manner. In what follows, we argue that exchange rate developments should have an appreciable influence on monetary policy, since this is helpful in attaining stable inflation. But we also suggest that this influence should not go too far, since this stability of inflation may be at the expense of stability of domestic demand and output. Targeting of exchange rates within narrow bands is unlikely to be desirable, unless fiscal policy can be used more flexibly to stabilize domestic demand. This suggests that, in the period up to the spring, the use of monetary policy to hold the £/JDM exchange rate within narrow limits may have been overdone. More seriously, international exchange rate agreements among the G7 countries are likely to founder under adverse market pressures, unless current imbalances in fiscal policy are adjusted. In the absence of greater flexibility in fiscal policy, policy makers will have to trade off domestic and exchange rate considerations in determining monetary policy. An important outstanding issue that needs further consideration is what indicators should be used for monetary policy, in a world in which monetary aggregates provide unreliable signals.     

Annals of a Crusade: Wright Patman and the Federal Reserve System

A bstract . As a Congressman from Texas from 1929 to 1976, Wright Patman supported Populist-type legislation which aided farmers, small businessmen and consumers. His perennial target in the postwar era was the Federal Reserve System. He resented the central bank's political independence and believed that "high" interest rates brought about by monetary policy actions benefited banks and harmed ordinary citizens. Rather than attacking the Fed's control of monetary policy directly, Patman tried to improve Fed accountability to Congress by subjecting the Fed's budgetary process and expenditures to government audit and/or the Congressional appropriations process. Despite numerous investigations, reports, and pieces of legislation, Patman's crusade failed to achieve its objectives. Nevertheless, his persistent criticism over 25 years undoubtedly created an atmosphere for change. Eschewing the indirect approach, Patman's political heirs in Congress demanded and received more accountability (and less secrecy) from the Fed regarding monetary policy objectives. Ironically Patman's abortive crusade may have paved the way for their later success.     

Forward guidance – what does it mean and will it work?

The Bank of England has introduced ‘state‐contingent threshold guidance’, stating that it will not consider tightening monetary policy until the ILO unemployment rate has fallen below 7%. This is a similar policy to that adopted by the Fed in the US and represents an attempt to better manage the expectations of households, firms and financial markets about future changes in monetary policy.…     

The Influence and Policy Signalling Role of FOMC Forecasts

Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) policymakers have published macroeconomic forecasts since 1979 and we examine the effects of FOMC inflation forecasts using a structural VAR model. First, we assess whether they influence private inflation expectations. Second, we investigate the underlying mechanism at work and whether they convey policy signals. We provide original evidence that FOMC inflation forecasts influence private ones. We also find that the influencing effect of FOMC forecasts does not come through current Fed rate changes, that FOMC forecasts affect private expectations in a different way than current policy decisions, and that FOMC forecasts are informative about future Fed rate movements.     

Fed Credit Policy: What is a Lender of Last Resort?

Discussions of the Fed׳s financial crisis lending – and its role as “Lender of Last Resort” more generally – often overlook the distinction between monetary policy and credit policy. Central bank actions constitute monetary policy if they alter the quantity of the bank׳s monetary liabilities, but constitute credit policy if they alter the composition of the bank׳s portfolio without affecting the outstanding amount of monetary liabilities. In the 19th century, Henry Thornton and Walter Bagehot advocated Lender of Last Resort policies as a means of expanding the money supply when the demand for money surged in a crisis. In contrast, the Fed׳s recent crisis lending for the most part left its outstanding monetary liabilities unaffected, and thus represented credit policy, not Lender of Last Resort activity. Credit allocation in a crisis is potentially costly because it affects market participants׳ beliefs about the likelihood of future central bank rescues, which in turn reduces their incentive to protect themselves against financial distress and thus exacerbates financial instability. Credible limits on credit policy thus are critical to central banks׳ core policy mission. One path to establishing such limits is to create “living wills” that detail how to resolve large, complex financial firms without government support.     

Monetary policy on twitter and asset prices: Evidence from computational text analysis

In this paper, we dissect the Twitter debate about the future course of monetary policy and trace the effects of selected topics of this discourse on U.S. asset prices. We focus on the “taper tantrum” episode in 2013, a period with large revisions in expectations about future Fed policy. Based on a novel data set of 90,000 Twitter messages (“tweets”) covering the debate of Fed tapering on Twitter, we use Latent Dirichlet Allocation, a computational text analysis tool, to quantify the content of the discussion. Several estimated topic frequencies are then included in a VAR model to estimate the effects of topic shocks on asset prices. We find that the discussion about Fed policy on social media contains price-relevant information. Shocks to the discussion about the timing of the tapering, about the broader economic policy context and worrying investors are shown to lead to significant asset price changes. We also show that the effects are mostly due to changes in the term premium of yields consistent with the portfolio balance channel of unconventional monetary policy.     

Effect of monetary policy shocks on the racial unemployment rates in the US

This study analyzes the effect of monetary policy shocks on the unemployment rate of different racial groups in the US, using data from 1969Q2 to 2015Q4. Employing a narrative approach to identify monetary policy shocks and local projections, we find that although an expansionary monetary shock affects White workers positively and significantly, the effect on Black workers is larger, and for Hispanic workers it is not statistically different from zero. These results are robust when considering unconventional monetary policy measures in the specification, and when exploring the impact of monetary policy on different genders and age groups. We also highlight how recession affects the transmission channel of monetary policy to the labor market for White and Hispanic workers. Finally, further extensions suggest that the Fed’s monetary policy is effective in reducing the racial unemployment gap, particularly between Whites and Blacks, and during economic booms.     

The role of liquid government bonds in the great transformation of American monetary policy

A fundamental shift in monetary policy occurred around 1980: the Fed went from a “passive” policy to an “active” policy. We study a model in which government bonds provide transactions services. We present two calibrations of our model, using pre- and post-1980 data. We show that estimates of pre- and post-1980 policy rules all lie within our determinacy regions. But, the pre-1980 policy was a very bad monetary policy, even if it avoided sunspot equilibria. Model simulations suggest that household welfare would have increased by 3.3 percent of permanent consumption in this period under an active policy.