When does more aid imply less democracy? An empirical examination

Foreign aid flows have increased considerably during the last decades, targeting, apart from development objectives, goals related to democracy. In this paper we investigate whether aid has affected the political regime of recipient countries. To this end, we use annual data on Net Official Development Assistance covering 64 aid-recipients. Because of data limitations, we cover the 1967-2002 period. We find that aid flows decreased the likelihood of observing a democratic regime in a recipient country. This effect is sensitive to economic and social conditions. The negative relation between aid and democracy is moderated when aid flows are preceded by economic liberalization. Aid from the U.S. has a non-significant effect on the political regime of recipients.     

When and how politicians take ‘scandalous’ decisions?

We study the decisions of a politician who maximizes his probability of being re-elected, which depends on the enactment of legislative instruments defined ‘scandalous’ because of their highly redistributive content. The agents are a politician and the voters; the legislative instruments available to the legislator are ordinary and executive laws, which differ according to their visibility. The theoretical model predicts that ‘scandalous’ legislation tends to be passed at the beginning of the legislature, while ‘non scandalous’, broader legislation, is approved mostly at the end of the legislation. Scandalous decisions, moreover, tend to be implemented by means of less visible executive legislation, while ordinary acts are mainly used to implement non scandalous decisions. This explanation of the genesis of legislation cycles is consistent with the findings of the empirical literature.     

When do simple policies win?

We present a simple model of a debate between two interested parties which takes into account the complexity of their policy positions. The two debaters engage in all-pay-auctions to win slots of time/attention to present their positions to a decision-maker. Complexity of a policy is modelled through the number of slots of attention needed to get the policy across. We show that when the number of attention slots is scarce, but still large enough to allow for both sides to fully present their policies, simple policies have an advantage over more complex ones. We show that this advantage of simple policies is diminished only when the number of attention slots is fairly large and when the decision-maker is strongly persuaded by more complex policies.     

When do firms support environmental agreements?

Several firms have recently supported their countries’ participation in international environmental agreements where countries commit to stricter environmental regulation. This paper analyzes the rationale of this conduct by examining equilibrium emission standards with and without environmental treaties. We identify that more stringent environmental regulation produces two effects on firm profits: a negative effect due to larger abatement costs, and a positive effect that arises from the amelioration of duopoly overproduction. We describe under which conditions the positive effect dominates the negative effect, increasing firm profits, and inducing them to support their countries’ participation in environmental treaties.     

When do the USDA forecasters make mistakes?

This study analysed forecasts for all US corn, soya bean and wheat categories published within the World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE ) reports over the 1987/88 through 2009/10 marketing years in an attempt to identify patterns and better understand when the USDA forecasters make mistakes. Two general sources of errors were investigated: behavioural and macroeconomic factors. The first objective was to examine how these factors affect the size of the forecast error and the second concentrated on the direction of the error due to these effects. Our findings suggest that the largest increase in the size of USDA forecast errors was associated with structural changes in commodity markets that took place in the mid-2000s. Corn, soya bean and wheat forecast errors also grew during the periods of economic growth and with changes in exchange rates, while inflation and changes in oil price had a much smaller impact. With respect to behavioural sources, we identified patterns consistent with leniency and pessimism across different categories. Predictability of forecast errors based on the information available at the time the forecasts are made provides evidence of inefficiency and suggests that these forecasts may be improved using the findings of this study.     

Why do low-educated workers invest less in further training?

Several studies document that low-educated workers participate less often in further training than high-educated workers. This article investigates two possible explanations: low-educated workers invest less in training because of (1) the lower economic returns to these investments or (2) their lower willingness to participate in training. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we find that the economic returns to training for low-educated workers are positive and not significantly different from those for high-educated workers. However, low-educated workers are significantly less willing to participate in training. We show that this lesser willingness to train is driven by economic preferences, and personality traits.     

When and why do Austrian companies issue shares?

This paper examines the issuance of share capital via the Vienna Stock Exchange between 1985 and 2004. Evidence is supplied concerning the aggregate factors that help to explain the time-series variation in both the numbers of and proceeds from initial public offerings (IPOs) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Results indicate that there is no cyclical sensitivity of issues, but that firms successfully time their offerings to take advantage of high stock market valuations and the associated low cost of equity capital. Corporate indebtedness and interest rates are significant determinants of SEOs in statistical and economic terms. The proceeds from IPOs, rather than funds raised by firms already listed, are used to finance subsequent investment.

When do sell-side analysts switch industries they follow?

Between 1984 and 2014 over 3400 sell-side analysts changed the primary industry they followed. This article documents that analysts are more likely to change their industries when their absolute and relative forecasting accuracy in that industry is low and when the accuracy in the new industry is high. Analysts are more likely to switch industries at the beginning of their careers, after a recent change of an employing brokerage house, and if they have a history of switching industries before. Analysts are less likely to make a switch when their forecasting activity in the industry is high, when the industry is followed by many analysts and when they are employed by a top brokerage house.     

When do we Start? Pension reform in ageing Japan

Japan is faced with rapid demographic ageing and fiscal challenges. This paper simulates pension reform to reduce the replacement rate by 20% and raise the retirement age by 3 years gradually over a 30‐year period. We consider three scenarios with different points in time to initiate reform in 2020, 2030 and 2040, respectively. A delay would suppress economic activities, lowering output by up to 4% and raising tax burden by more than 8% of total consumption. Delaying reform implies a transfer of costs of demographic ageing to the young and deteriorates the welfare of future generations by up to 3% in terms of consumption equivalence.     

Individual versus group strategy-proofness: When do they coincide?

A social choice function is group strategy-proof on a domain if no group of agents can manipulate its final outcome to their own benefit by declaring false preferences on that domain. There are a number of economically significant domains where interesting rules satisfying individual strategy-proofness can be defined, and for some of them, all these rules turn out to also satisfy the stronger requirement of group strategy-proofness. We provide conditions on domains guaranteeing that for all rules defined on them, individual and group strategy-proofness become equivalent. We also provide a partial answer regarding the necessity of our conditions.     

When and why do countries break their national fiscal rules?

This paper identifies determinants of compliance with various types of national numerical fiscal rules. Based on 51 fiscal rules in force in EU member states from 1995 to 2015, the analysis identifies determinants among specific rule characteristics and their fiscal frameworks, as well as their political, (socio-)economic and supranational environments. While the average compliance across all rules and countries is around 50%, compliance with rules constraining stock (rather than flow) variables, set out in coalitional agreements, as well as rules covering larger parts of general government finances is significantly higher. Furthermore, independent monitoring and enforcement bodies (issuing real-time alerts) turn out to be significantly associated with a higher probability of compliance. Several theories of the deficit bias of governments due to government fragmentation, decentralization and political budget cycles are also significant with regards to compliance with fiscal rules. However, neither the economic environment or business cycle, nor forecast errors (except for an unexpectedly higher primary balance) on average seem to play a significant role.     

To favor more or less? Corporate lobbying over preferential treatment to state-owned enterprises

Journal of Regulatory Economics - In OECD and many other countries, state-owned public enterprises normally receive various forms of exclusive preferential treatment that directly affect the...     

When do thick venture capital markets foster innovation? An evolutionary analysis

In this paper, we examine the trade off between different effects of the availability of venture capital on the speed of technological progress in an industry. We consider an evolutionary industry simulation model based on Nelson and Winter (1982), in which R&D efforts of an incumbent firm generate technological know-how embodied in key R&D employees, who might use this know-how to found a spinoff of the incumbent. Venture capital is needed to finance a spinoff, so that the expected profits from founding a spinoff depend on how easily venture capital can be acquired. Accordingly, thick venture capital markets might have two opposing effects. First, incentives of firms to invest in R&D might be reduced and, second, if spinoff formation results in technological spillovers between the parent firm and the spinoffs, the generation of spinoff firms might positively influence the future efficiency of the incumbent’s innovation efforts. We study the manner in which this tradeoff influences the effect of venture capital on innovation expenditures, speed of technological change and evolution of industry concentration in several scenarios with different industry characteristics.     

When is a Nation not a Nation? The Case of Anglo-British Nationhood

This article examines the articulation of Anglo-British national identity in the tabloid Press, paying particular attention to how the emotions of shame, sorrow, defiance and nostalgia underlie much tabloid discourse of nationhood. These are depicted either as emotions aroused in the writer (and, by extension, the reader) by aspects of the Anglo-British nation; or as emotions which the nation itself (and, again, the reader) is experiencing. The exaggeration and intensity of this discourse suggests that the tabloids are adopting a special role in defending not only the virtues of the Anglo-British nation but also the very notion of nationhood, at a time when this is being undermined by various social, political and economic forces. The study thus provides insight into the dynamic and contested character of contemporary Anglo-Britishness, and illustrates that the nation is a process rather than an entity that either exists or does not exist.     

Why do promises affect trustworthiness,or do they?

We set out to test whether the effect of promises on trustworthiness derives from the fact that they are made (internal consistency) or that they are received (social obligation). The results of an experimental trust game appeared at first to support the former mechanism. Even when trustee messages are not delivered to trustors, trustees who make a promise are more likely to act trustworthy than those who do not make a promise. However, we subsequently ran a control treatment with restricted (non-promise) communication to examine whether the correlation between promises and trustworthiness is causal. The results show that the absence of promises does not decrease average cooperation rates. This indicates that promises do not induce trustworthiness, they are just more likely to be sent by cooperators than by non-cooperators.     

Why do women still earn less than men? Decomposing the Dutch gender pay gap, 1996–2006

Despite major improvements in women's labour market attachment, women still earn considerably less than men. International research shows that the persistence of the gender pay gap may be due to the fact that although the gap in characteristics between men and women is diminishing, changes in the wage structure counteract this change. This article will study whether this ‘swimming upstream’ phenomenon is also playing a role in the rather slow convergence between male and female wages in the Netherlands. Our results indicate that this is not the case; most of the changes in the Dutch wage structure have been rather favourable to women. The lacking convergence in wages has to be explained from the fact that despite the favourable changes, the Dutch wage structure still contains a considerable implicit gender bias.