Strategic restraint in contests

Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities.     

Non-cooperative and cooperative policy reforms under uncertainty and spillovers

When countries need to implement costly economic policy reforms, these often imply uncertainties about their effectiveness for the home country and their spillovers to other countries. We develop a model to show that under these circumstances countries implement too few or too many policy reforms. From a social perspective, too many reforms follow if the spillover effects of reforms become sufficiently uncertain. Since centralization of policies to correct inefficient policies is often not possible, we look for alternative instruments that can restore the efficient level of reforms. We compare subsidizing reform efforts with insuring against bad outcomes, and argue that subsidies are advantageous in terms of requiring less information for implementation.     

A policy spectrum for spectrum economics

Recent reforms to radio spectrum regulation have sparked controversy over the respective merits of two mutually exclusive liberalization regimes: property rights and commons. This debate is restrictive because it is largely incomplete and misunderstood. It is also costly in terms of opposition and delays to reforms. Goals of efficient spectrum allocation are better served by a wider policy toolkit, inclusive of hybrid and intermediary regimes. In this article I sketch the contours of a ‘spectrum of spectrum regimes’, triangulating regulatory, private ownership and unlicensed approaches. I illustrate this triangulated model, which I then apply to confront allocative decisions in digital dividend policy, such as the FCC’s open access clause in the 700 MHz auction and Ofcom’s current review of UHF spectrum release in the 800 MHz band.     

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: A LOAN MECHANISM-DESIGN APPROACH

International Financial Institutions (IFIs) tie resource transfers to capital-scarce countries to improvements in their economic policies and institutions. The objective of this assistance is twofold: to augment the recipient's capital base and to improve its allocation of resources. This paper offers a political-economy explanation for the limited success of some of these loan programs. In our model, governments select policies under the influence of interest groups. Their capacity to absorb IFI loans and their reform efforts are both unobservable to the IFI. An optimally designed loan mechanism must create sufficient incentives – in the form of rewards and punishments – to counter the influence of interest groups on economic policy choices. The loan mechanism is, however, constrained in two ways: it cannot punish a country so severely as to threaten its political stability and it must remain affordable to the IFI. Whenever reform incentives are inadequate, a government will accept the loan but cheat on the implementation of reforms. If, on the other hand, the mechanism design is optimal, it might be so costly to the IFI that a well-entrenched interest group can block the reform program. Nonetheless, the availability of properly designed loan mechanisms will push governments to implement partial reforms even if the optimal mechanism is too costly for the IFI.     

Algeria: A three-sector macrofiscal model for debt sustainability and growth policy analysis

In this paper, we present a dynamic general equilibrium (DGE) model to address the macrofiscal vulnerabilities and the effects of fiscal policy on growth and employment in Algeria. We first discuss the baseline scenario over the period 2021–2040. According to our baseline results, without fundamental changes in fiscal policies, even relatively high growth will not be sufficient to put public debt on a sustainable path. We then conduct four experiments and assess their impact on fiscal accounts, growth, and unemployment: an increase in the efficiency of public spending on infrastructure investment, a gradual reduction in the share of noninterest government spending in GDP, the same gradual reduction in spending combined with a permanent increase in the share of investment in infrastructure in total noninterest government expenditure, and a composite fiscal reform program that combines these individual policies, respectively. The results suggest that public debt sustainability can be achieved, and growth and employment can be promoted, as long as an ambitious fiscal reform program involving tax, spending, and governance reforms is implemented. Importantly, our quantitative analysis shows that, with a well-designed fiscal program, there may be no trade-off between fiscal consolidation and economic growth.     

Development Policy Lending, Conditionality, and Ownership: A Dynamic Agency Model Perspective

Is the World Bank's Development Policy Lending likely to enhance ownership and have greater effectiveness than structural adjustment? We specify a dynamic common agency model in which a government considering economic reform faces domestic opposition from interest groups. The dynamic specification, which is original in the context of policy reforms supported by the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), is essential to allow the strength of special interest groups to arise endogenously during the reform process. We show that conditionality may alter the country's political equilibrium and lead to higher social welfare. However, under certain circumstances which depend on country‐specific circumstances, conditional assistance could lead to lower social welfare. Thus, for conditionality not to be inconsistent with ownership, its design must be appropriate to the country circumstances and directly affect the domestic political constraint.     

Economic Reform and Macroeconomic Policy in New Zealand

In 1984 the Labour government in New Zealand began a wide-ranging process of reform with the objective of achieving a sustainable improvement in economic performance. The breadth and rapidity with which deregulation, tax reform, and privatisation were implemented has attracted widespread interest. The expected improvement in macroeconomic performance, however, has not yet been realised.
This article describes some background to the policy shift, and focuses on macroeconomic aspects of the reforms. It argues that while many improvements in microeconomic resource allocation have been made, the interaction between monetary, fiscal and wages policies has contributed substantially to the present high cost of structural change in New Zealand.     

Rethinking Land Reform in East Asia: Egalitarian or Inegalitarian?

Taking a historical and comparative view, we explore the long debated cause of the spectacular economic successes of East Asia using land reforms in China and Japan during the 1940-50s. Examining the approach to land reform embodied by technocrats such as Liu Shaoqi in China and Wada Hiroo in Japan in addition to the implementation mechanisms of the policies they adopted, we show that the land reforms developed characteristics of dynamic factor endowment according to the Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis. Fairly equal land redistribution led to political power equality and improved agricultural productivity and income equality, which is conducive to long-term economic development and the prevention of the Kuznets effect ex ante. Nevertheless, factors such as initial exogenous shocks, insufficient scale of family farming, persistent government support and consequential interest groups obstruct sustainable development of the agricultural sector as well as the generalization of East Asian experiences. Equality or inequality is essentially a policy choice in addition to being a long-term ex post evaluation of the reforms.     

A BARGAINING THEORY OF INEFFICIENT REDISTRIBUTION POLICIES*

When two policies are available to achieve the same goal why is the relatively inefficient one often observed? We address this question in the context of policies used to redistribute income towards special interest groups (SIGs) where in the first stage the constraints on policy instruments are chosen and in the second the government bargains with SIGs over the level of the available policies. Restrictions on the use of efficient policies and the use of inefficient ones reduce the surplus over which SIGs and governments can bargain but it also improves the government's bargaining position thus increasing its share of the surplus. The positive effect for the government dominates under plausible conditions. Inefficient policies are the equilibrium outcome under alternative policy selection mechanisms, e.g., election of policymakers and bargaining between SIGs and the government. The model also explains the coexistence of transfer policies. Moreover, we show why a weak government is more likely to choose the inefficient transfer and discuss how this result may be tested.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

Financial reform and stabilization policy in a developing economy

Despite the long-run efficiency benefits that can be generated by a financial reform program, the authorities in developing countries are often reluctant to enact the required reforms because they fear that these programs will create short-run difficulties for important segments of the financial system. This paper argues that many of these difficulties can be avoided if financial reform is integrated with stabilization policy. The analysis focuses on the specific problem of how to remove nominal interest rate ceilings when complete interest rate decontrolwould lead to widespread bankruptcies amongst the firms in a major segment of the financial system. The optimal combination of stabilization policy and financial reform is shown to involve a mix of discrete and gradual changes in the rate of monetary growth and ceiling lending and depocit rates under either adaptive or rational expectations.     

Learning about reform: Time-varying support for structural adjustment

Political support for structural reforms can vary dramatically over time. Countries that have sustained reforms have seen their popularity grow, while others have witnessed sudden reversals of political support. Opinion can reverse itself, without any apparent provocation, when voters are learning about the effects of reform. In this model, structural adjustment causes a drop in government services and temporary unemployment. The unemployed gradually learn about when they will be re-employed. As labor markets adjust and the cost of reform is revealed, support can gradually rise, it can remain low and suddenly rise, or there can be a quick reversal of support for a previously popular policy. Cross-sectional data, event studies and case study support the explanation. Extensions consider international policies to maintain support for reform.     

Policy effects of the elasticity of substitution across labor types in life cycle models

This paper investigates how the production function elasticity of substitution across different labor types impacts the results of policy analysis in multiperiod lived agent overlapping generations models. We critique and investigate the popular structure that simply assumes that workers with different age, experience or education are perfectly substitutable in production. This structure is inconsistent with empirical evidence of production complementarities. We couch our findings in the context of two types of policy reforms: a social security reform and a tax reform. These reforms were chosen in part not only because of the large interest in them, but also because of their differing effects on life cycle decisions. We find that ignoring production complementarity may influence the conclusions of policy analysis.     

Free trade and the burden of domestic policy

Abstract. Consider a small economy facing accession to a exogenously defined trade agreement. Before accession, the government controls trade and pollution policy. After accession, it retains control over pollution policy, but must allow free trade in all goods. This is a choice many governments face while joining trade agreements today. They decide whether greater market access to other members is more valuable than control over trade policy. I ask two questions. All else being equal what happens to environmental policy after accession? Second, what affects the choice of accession and how does this choice impact aggregate welfare? I show that a loss in control over trade policy alters the political incentives determining environmental policy. Before accession, producers can transfer a portion of their burden of environmental regulation to consumers through price increases. After accession the same regulation is borne entirely by producers. Owing to the change in burden, there exist plausible conditions under which the adoption of free trade can lead to more stringent environmental regulation, a reduction in the preferential treatment of special interest groups, and an increase in aggregate welfare.     

Intergenerational consequences of gradual pension reforms

Balancing the government budget in an aging economy may require adjusting gradually pension benefits. Such policy change can take two forms: adjusting the accrual rate (the rate at which individuals built-up pension entitlements while working) or the indexation rate (the rate a which accrued entitlements are linked to nominal wage growth). We compare the consequences of such gradual policies across cohorts. We identify a fundamental generational trade-off between democracy and equality. In particular, we show that for Belgium, 80% of the population alive at the time of the reform prefers the accrual to the indexation reform, with the implication that the youngest half of the population would bear 85% of the total adjustment cost. The indexation reform provides more generational equality because the phasing in over time has larger base and thus benefit cut can be smaller per capita. We then consider other reforms improving the generational equality, showing that all those reforms fail to gain majority support. Finally, considering labor incentives, we show that the indexation reform is also more efficient than the accrual reform. Efficiency meets generational equality.     

Optimal tax reform in the presence of adjustment costs

The optimal implementation of an efficiency-enhancing capital taxation reform is examined when the government is concerned about arbitrary reform-induced redistributions and investment causes firms to incur adjustment costs. Theoretical results indicate that immediate partial enactment of reform is optimal with concave adjustment costs, while with convex adjustment costs, the optimal reform implementation policy is either (i) immediate partial enactment with sufficiently low adjustment costs, (ii) phased-in partial enactment with intermediate adjustment costs, or (iii) postponed partial enactment with sufficiently high adjustment costs. Numerical results suggest that, relative to the optimal one-step implementation policy, little is gained by phasing-in reform.     

Reforming the public administration: The role of crisis and the power of bureaucracy

The need to balance austerity with growth policies has put government efficiency high on the economic policy agenda in Europe. Administrative reforms that boost the internal efficiency of bureaucracy can alleviate the trade-off between consolidation and public service provision. Against such a backdrop, this paper constructs (and makes available) a novel reform indicator to explore the determinants of public administration reforms for a panel of EU countries. The findings support political-economic reasoning: An economic and fiscal crisis is a potent catalyst for reforms, but a powerful bureaucracy constrains the opportunities of a crisis to promote reform. Furthermore, there is some suggestive evidence for horizontal learning from other EU countries, and for vertical learning associated with a particular type of EU cohesion spending.     

Long-run costs of piecemeal reform: Wage inequality and returns to education in Vietnam

In this paper, we examine changes in wage structure and wage premia during Vietnam’s transition from command to market economy. Relative to other work in this literature, our paper is unique in that we identify the policies that lead to such changes. By examining skill premium trends along the two dimensions of particular importance to the transition—state or non-state firms, and traded or non-traded industries—we are able to separate the contribution of external liberalization to wage growth and rising skill premia from that of domestic labor market reforms, and to examine potential interactions between the two types of reform. The results point to the high cost of incomplete reform in Vietnam. Capital market segmentation creates a two-track market for skills, in which state sector workers earn high salaries while non-state workers face lower demand and lower compensation. Growth is reduced directly by diminished allocative efficiency and reduced incentives to acquire education, and indirectly by higher wage inequality and rents for workers with access to state jobs.     

An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government

Endogenous policy models usually neglect that government policies are frequently the result of decisions taken at different tiers by different agents, each enjoying some degree of autonomy. In this paper, policies are the outcome of the choices made by two agents within a hierarchy. A legislator decides on the budget to be successively spent by a bureaucrat. Both agents are lobbied by one or two interest groups. The combination of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying implies that the interaction between the agent at one tier and the interest group(s) depends on the exchange between the same interest group(s) and the agent at the other tier. Our results concerning multi-tier lobbying and legislatorial oversight substantially qualify the conventional wisdom related to one-tier lobbying. In particular, the reaction of the legislator to lobbying at the bureaucratic tier may make lobbying wasteful even when there is no competition from other lobbies. Moreover, the legislator benefits from lobbying only when there is competition between interest groups at the upper tier. It is also shown that competition for influence at the bureaucratic tier may work as a perfect substitute for legislatorial oversight. Extensions of the model indicate its usefulness for the analysis of decisionmaking in other multilevel governance structures, like federations or firms.     

Temporary work and neoliberal government policy: evidence from British Columbia,Canada

We examine the impact of government policy on the incidence of temporary work by analysing the case of British Columbia (BC), Canada. The analysis is based upon the Canadian Labour Force Survey 1997–2004; temporary work is defined as work that is not expected to last for more than 6 months and includes seasonal, fixed‐term, casual, and temporary help agency work. A case study of BC provides a valuable opportunity to assess the impacts of neoliberal government policy, designed to increase labour market flexibility, on the extent of temporary work because we are able to compare labour market trends in BC both before and after the reforms introduced in 2001 and to compare BC with other provinces in Canada that were not subject to such large changes in their policy environments. We find that the shift to neoliberal policies in BC led to significant increases in the likelihood of workers finding themselves in temporary employment. We also find that the likelihood of being a temporary worker in BC in the post‐policy change period increases relative to all other provinces over the same period. Taken together, these results indicate that government policy is a key determinant of the level of temporary work. As such, the level of temporary work should be seen as a policy‐sensitive variable, rather than as a phenomenon determined solely by the exogenous forces of globalization and technological change.