Policy mix and debt sustainability: evidence from fiscal policy rules

This paper characterizes rules-based fiscal policy setting for G-3 and large EMS countries. We set up a simple fiscal policy rule and then infer on the policymakers’ reaction coefficients by testing with GMM. Our results qualify existing evidence on systematic fiscal policy in two respects. First, fiscal policy usually stabilizes public debt; and there is indeed substantial interaction between fiscal and monetary policies via the policy mix or the debt channel. Second, sustainability is achieved with a “stop–go” cycle of consolidation. Unless debt ratios are high, consolidation does not come at the cost of less cyclical stabilization.     

Does right or left matter? Cabinets, credibility and fiscal adjustments

This paper tests the widely held assumption that left-wing cabinets favor higher public spending and examines whether cabinet ideology affects the persistence of major fiscal adjustments. In a panel of large fiscal adjustments in OECD countries during the last 40 years, we find evidence that left-wing and right-wing cabinets are partisan: the left tends to reduce the deficit by raising tax revenues while the right relies mostly on spending cuts. Our testable hypothesis is that cabinets can signal commitment by undertaking fiscal adjustments in ways that are not favored by their constituencies. In other words, the left gains credibility when it cuts spending while the right becomes more credible when it increases tax revenues. Probit estimates of the determinants of persistence in fiscal adjustments confirm that spending cuts by the left and tax increases by the right are associated with persistent adjustments. The effect is significant for cuts in public spending, public consumption (wage or nonwage), increases in total revenues, direct taxes on businesses and other taxes. We test for the role of several other determinants of persistence, confirming that coalition and majority cabinets are associated with less persistence while periods of high or rising levels of indebtedness favor persistence. The estimates of the impact of ideology and other variables on GDP and its components show that it is the size of the spending cut rather than cabinet ideology that is most important.     

EMU fiscal indicators: a misleading compass?

The effectiveness of any device for fiscal discipline crucially depends on the indicators it refers to. This paper assesses the indicators adopted for fiscal rules in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with respect to their relevance for EMU’s objective of fiscal soundness and to the adequacy of the underlying statistical framework in providing conditions for enforcement. The paper argues that EMU’s deficit and debt indicators present several shortcomings with respect to both sustainability analysis and monitoring requirements. The debt indicator allows the achievement of targets via operations that do not improve fiscal sustainability and tends to underestimate overall outstanding liabilities. The deficit indicator cannot be monitored in a timely manner, allows too much room for discretion, and is subject to significant revisions. While acknowledging that any single indicator can be distorted when used as a policy target, the paper argues that the weaknesses of EMU’s indicators would be much reduced if consistency cross-checks played a larger role than they currently do.The authors wish to thank Claudia Braz, Carlo Cottarelli, Jorge Cunha, Mark De Broek, Albert␣Jaeger, Mohan Kumar, Joao Nogueira, Ethan Wiseman and the anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Under threat: Rules-based fiscal policy and how to preserve it

Rules-based fiscal policy is under threat. Over the last two decades, it proved frustratingly complicated to strike the right balance between three essential properties of sound fiscal policy rules: simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Simplicity has been sacrificed to ensure that more contingent (i.e. flexible) rules remained enforceable. The resulting arrangements have failed to adequately guide fiscal policy, undermining formal compliance, and ultimately, popular and political support for rules. To mitigate the risk that countries abandon rules-based policymaking, we suggest downplaying enforceability—i.e. the role of formal sanctions through enforcement—and enhancing the reputational costs of breaching rules. At the limit, the rule could consist of a simple quantitative benchmark for a key fiscal indicator. To boost reputational effects, independent fiscal councils should focus on debunking the “fiscal alchemy,” clearing the public debate from partisan smokescreens, and fostering popular support for sound fiscal policies.     

Policy coordination and the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus

This paper shows that government spending shocks in the U.S. has become ineffective due to lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal policies. Employing the post-war U.S. data, we report strong stimulus effects of fiscal policy during the pre-Volcker era, which rapidly dissipate as the sample period is shifted toward the post-Volcker era. We explain the causes of this phenomena via a sentiment channel. Employing the Survey of Professional Forecasters data, we show that forecasters tend to systematically overestimate real GDP growth in response to positive innovations in government spending when policies coordinate well with each other. On the other hand, they are likely to underestimate real GDP responses when the monetary authority maintains a hawkish stance that conflicts with the fiscal stimulus. The fiscal stimulus, under such circumstances, generates consumer pessimism, which reduces private spending and ultimately weakens the output effects of fiscal policy. We further report statistical test results that confirm our claims.     

A new test for fiscal sustainability with endogenous sovereign bond yields: Evidence for EU economies

In this paper we develop a new test for fiscal sustainability and propose a synthetic fiscal sustainability indicator. Conventional tests based on fiscal reaction functions assume a constant real interest rate. However, many empirical studies find evidence on a positive response of long-term rates to sovereign debt levels. We take this evidence into account and endogenize the long-term real interest rate in testing fiscal sustainability. We apply the new test for the European economies. We find that considering the response of interest rate to debt may change the assessment of fiscal sustainability. More specifically, our results indicate that fiscal sustainability is at risk in a number of European Union economies, even if the results of traditional approaches suggest sustainable fiscal policy.     

Determinants of compliance with fiscal rules: Misplaced efforts or hidden motivations?

This paper empirically examines which factors have influenced numerical compliance with fiscal rules in Latin American and Caribbean countries over the period 2000 to 2020. We use logistic regression models to associate three groups of specific factors with a greater or lesser probability of compliance with the rule: the macroeconomic and political environment of the countries and the design features of the enforced rules. We find that only changes in the macroeconomic and political context affect the probability of compliance with the enforced rules. In contrast, the institutional design of the fiscal rules does not seem to play an essential role in the compliance outcome. This result suggests that adjustments in this direction are not decisive for rule compliance.     

The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy: evidence from the OECD

This paper addresses the topic of cyclicality in fiscal policy. In particular, we show that the level of cyclicality varies across spending categories and across OECD countries. In line with leading theories of fiscal cyclicality, we show that countries with volatile output and dispersed political power are the most likely to run procyclical fiscal policies. Wage government consumption is highlighted as the most important channel by which these variables affect fiscal cyclicality.     

A tool for fiscal policy planning in a medium-term fiscal framework: The FMM-MTFF model

This paper describes the FMM-MTFF model, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model developed to support the implementation of a Medium-Term Fiscal Framework (MTFF) in emerging market and developing economies. The model exhibits the following features. First, fiscal policy is defined in terms of multi-year fiscal plans, instead of restricting attention to univariate, single-period fiscal shocks. Second, the model temporarily deactivates the fiscal rule to avoid forcing fiscal policy to be mechanically countercyclical and sustainable. Third, the model is calibrated to match a three-sector, stylized version of a country’s input-output table, and finally, the model uses a chain-weighted procedure to measure GDP, a method consistent with what national account compilers do. The model is calibrated to Colombian and Peruvian data to illustrate the use of the model as a tool to quantify the scale of the fiscal challenges, to provide consistent medium-term macro fiscal projections and to assess the quantitative implications of past reforms and alternative fiscal policy plans on the economies, i.e., the typical questions of interest to an MTFF.     

When and why do countries break their national fiscal rules?

This paper identifies determinants of compliance with various types of national numerical fiscal rules. Based on 51 fiscal rules in force in EU member states from 1995 to 2015, the analysis identifies determinants among specific rule characteristics and their fiscal frameworks, as well as their political, (socio-)economic and supranational environments. While the average compliance across all rules and countries is around 50%, compliance with rules constraining stock (rather than flow) variables, set out in coalitional agreements, as well as rules covering larger parts of general government finances is significantly higher. Furthermore, independent monitoring and enforcement bodies (issuing real-time alerts) turn out to be significantly associated with a higher probability of compliance. Several theories of the deficit bias of governments due to government fragmentation, decentralization and political budget cycles are also significant with regards to compliance with fiscal rules. However, neither the economic environment or business cycle, nor forecast errors (except for an unexpectedly higher primary balance) on average seem to play a significant role.     

Macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policy shocks in the UK: A DSGE analysis

This paper develops and estimates a new-Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the analysis of fiscal policy in the UK. We find that government consumption and investment yield the highest GDP multipliers in the short-run, whereas capital income tax and public investment have dominating effect on GDP in the long-run. When nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound, consumption taxes and public consumption and investment are found to be the most effective fiscal instruments throughout the analysed horizon, and capital and labour income taxes are established to be the least effective. The paper also shows that the effectiveness of fiscal policy decreases in a small open-economy scenario and that nominal rigidities improve effectiveness of public spending and consumption taxes, whereas decrease that of income taxes.     

This time truly is different: The cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy during the Covid-19 crisis

Fiscal policy was more countercyclical during the Covid-19 crisis than in previous (crisis) episodes. This paper presents empirical evidence in favour of a “this time truly is different” moment based on analysing the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy for 28 advanced economies over 1995–2021. Discretionary fiscal policy during the Covid-19 crisis (2020–2021) did more to counteract the downturn – especially in the Eurozone –, as we do not find comparable evidence for countercyclicality during the financial crisis or Euro crisis. Automatic fiscal stabilisers, the non-discretionary domain of fiscal policy, significantly contributed to countercyclical stabilisation during the pandemic.     

How elections affect fiscal policy and growth: revisiting the mechanism

This paper reconsiders the popular result that the lower is the probability of reelection, the greater is the incentive of incumbent politicians to choose short-sighted, inefficient policies. The set-up is a general equilibrium model of economic growth, in which fiscal policy is endogenously chosen under electoral uncertainty. Political parties can value possible economic benefits differently depending on whether they are in or out of power, and—by contrast with the literature—the relevant preference coefficient is a choice variable rather than an exogenous taste parameter. The main result is that, when political parties choose both economic policy instruments and preference coefficients, the fundamental reason for short-sighted policy is the extra rents from being in power per se.     

Time-varying effects of fiscal policy in Spain: a Markov-switching approach

How have the effects of Spanish fiscal policy varied over time? Given this starting point, in this article we analyse the regime dependence of fiscal policy in Spain by estimating a vector autoregressive model within a Markov-switching framework. Our results indicate that Spain’s membership of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is the most likely source of time variation in the fiscal outcomes. Accordingly, increases in the primary deficit-to-GDP ratio do not succeed in stimulating economic activity in the first regime; rather, unexpected upsurges in the primary deficit harm economic activity (non-Keynesian effect) in the second regime, which prevails since the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty.     

Macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in Pakistan: a disaggregate analysis

This study analyzes the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables in Pakistan. The study utilizes VAR framework and uses quarterly data of Pakistan from 1976Q1 to 2017Q4. The results showed that after an increase in government expenditures, private consumption and prices take three quarters to increase, while private investment follows the declining trend. Private consumption and interest rate are negatively related with taxes, while private investment and prices are positively related with taxes. Real GDP, private consumption and interest rate respond positively with an increase in developmental expenditure, public consumption and public investment. Private investment is negatively related with development expenditure, public consumption and public investment. An increase in direct tax as well as indirect tax leads to an increase in real GDP, private investment and interest rate, while private consumption takes three to five quarters to responds. Private investment and prices are positively related with non-tax revenue, while real GDP, private consumption and interest rate are negatively related. These results support the Keynesian view that government expenditure and taxes are useful tools to stimulate the economic activity, while crowding-out hypothesis holds in Pakistan as well. An active and efficient role of government is required for macroeconomic stability.     

On the benefits of fiscal policy coordination in a currency union: a note

It is quite often claimed by politicians that a common currency makes it beneficial to be also endowed with a common fiscal policy. However, if fiscal policy can reasonably be considered to be a source of shocks, national fiscal policies which are steered independently from each other are generally preferable because they allow the possibility to diversify macroeconomic risks. Abstracting from automatic stabilizers, this view is valid independent on whether the ECB targets money growth or interest rates.

后经济危机时期我国经济政策的选择:基于历史经验与现实的思考

本文基于上世纪30年代以来几次经济危机后美国所采取的不同的经济政策,研究了后经济危机时期的政策选择对国家经济结构、经济增长及综合实力的影响.认为在后危机时代美国的政策选择对其综合实力的提升具有重要作用.同时,基于对各国次贷危机时采取的经济政策的现实思考,本文提出中国后经济危机时代应采用的经济政策,主要包括调整升级产业结构和转变经济发展方式、及时退出扩张性的财政和货币政策、提高城乡居民收入与构建福利国家等.     

Fiscal financing and the efficacy of fiscal policy in Korea: An empirical assessment with comparison to the U.S. evidence

This paper aims to assess the empirical implications of fiscal financing in Korea and study how they differ from those of the U.S. We estimate two versions of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model—a small open economy (SOE) model for Korea and its closed economy counterpart for the U.S.—in which the former nests the latter as a special case. The fiscal policy specification posits that government spending, lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation on labor income, capital income and consumption expenditures respond to the level of government debt and the state of economic activity. Analysis of the data from 2000 to 2015 shows that distortionary capital taxes play a critical role in stabilizing government debt in the U.S., whereas non-distorting fiscal instruments are the primary means of fiscal adjustment in Korea. Regarding the magnitude of debt-financed fiscal stimuli, the substantial trade openness of Korea is significant in that it produces relatively smaller government spending and transfer multipliers compared to the U.S.     

The welfare implications of resource allocation policies under uncertainty: The case of public education spending

In this paper, we examine whether policy interventions, aimed at improving resource allocation, also have important stabilization effects over the business cycle. To this end, we employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which public education expenditures, financed by distorting taxes, enhance the productivity of private education choices. We then calculate the welfare implications of competing operating targets using a state-contingent instrument rule for public education spending. Our main findings are: (i) there can be important cyclical effects of different resource allocation policies depending on the operating target used and the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty; (ii) it is important to use an operating target which is as close as possible to the heart of the market imperfection that justifies policy action; (iii) policy action should not be monotonic in the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty.