WTO membership and corruption

Despite widespread belief that accession process and formal membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO) improve the quality of governance within a country, there is no convincing empirical evidence to substantiate this thought. Here, I investigate whether the WTO status of a country has a causal effect on firm-level reports of political corruption using a nonparametric partial identification approach to bound the average treatment effects (ATEs). I also analyze conditional ATEs to explore various sources of potential heterogeneity. Contrary to popular belief, I find that WTO membership is likely to have no causal effect on domestic corruption overall. And if anything, it is likely to increase corrupt practices, particularly among firms that are established post WTO membership and those that are government owned.     

Corruption and local democratization in Indonesia: The role of Islamic parties

Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms. This paper examines whether corruption is affected by local democratization and by the party composition of local assemblies. Democratization occurred in 1999 and decentralization in 2001. We have firm-level data for 2001 and 2004. The 2001 data benchmark corruption at the time of decentralization. We find that corruption declines between 2001 and 2004 overall, but much less so in districts with more secular party as opposed to Islamic party representatives in district assemblies. For a larger sample of districts, correspondingly, we find that corruption in 2004 is more in districts which voted more in favor of secular party representatives in the first elections in 1999. We argue that the effects seem to be causal, over above any effects of changing religiosity and economic circumstances across districts.     

Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?

Corruption is harmful for public finances and appears closely related to fiscal deficits. We open a new avenue in addressing the effects of corruption on public deficits through fiscal decentralization. For a sample of 31 OECD countries over the period 1986–2010, we find that fiscal decentralization contributes to mitigating the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits. In addition, our findings indicate diversity in the effects of fiscal decentralization, in that it appears related to lower deficits in countries with higher levels of corruption but not in less corrupt countries. Our results suggest that bringing the government closer to the people through fiscal decentralization in relatively corrupt countries leads to more responsible fiscal management.     

Firm-level productivity in Latin America and the Caribbean

While the accumulation of factors of production, both physical and human capital, has helped Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) to narrow the income gap with developed economies, aggregate productivity is still relatively low. Although there are numerous determinants of aggregate productivity, it is largely based on the underlying productivity of all firms in the economy. Using firm-level data from several waves of the World Bank Enterprise Survey and Chile's National Manufacturing Survey, we explore the ‘what’ question on productivity dispersion in LAC. We document three stylized facts: (i) there are significant differences in firm productivity within industries – the firm at the 90th percentile of the productivity distribution produces almost seven times as much output (using the same measured inputs) as the 10^th percentile firm; (ii) productivity differences persist over time – regressing a firm's current productivity on its one-year lagged productivity yields an autoregressive coefficient of around 0.9; and (iii) most of the growth in aggregate productivity comes from improvements in the productivity of existing firms.     

财政分权与官员腐败——基于1999-2007年中国省级面板数据的实证研究

利用1999-2007年的省级面板数据,分析了中国地区腐败水平的决定因素,并特别关注财政分权的反腐作用。研究发现:财政分权影响地区腐败机制的多元性,财政分权能够通过推动政府规模膨胀和支出结构扭曲而加重地区的腐败水平;而在控制政府规模和支出结构的前提下,财政分权则能对地区腐败水平产生抑制作用。同时,地区人均GDP、受教育年限和开放程度都是影响地区腐败的重要因素。最后,还尝试性地给出反腐倡廉的政策建议。     

Asymmetries in Household Consumption and Liquidity Constraints — A Switching Regression Approach

Most of the empirical work in the Euler equation tradition in the consumption literature, that addressed the issue of liquidity constraints, has tested the hypotheses of Excess sensitivity and Liquidity constraints, with the sample selection based on a single exogenous criterion. Such a method will give misleading inferences, if the sample selection criterion is correlated with the Euler equation errors. In this paper, an attempt is made to correct for the sample selection bias and estimate the probability of a household being constrained simultaneously with the Euler equation parameters. Using the Additional Rural Incomes Survey (ARIS) data on rural Indian households, I find that consumption is excessively sensitive to income changes for constrained than for the unconstrained. In addition, I also find that consumption responds asymmetrically to positive and negative changes in income indicating a preference asymmetry for the unconstrained and binding liquidity constraints for the constrained group.

     

Political decentralization and corruption: Exploring the conditional role of parties

This study investigates how national levels of corruption are influenced by the interaction of two factors in political decentralization: the presence of local elections and the organizational structure of national parties. Previous studies have focused primarily on the role of fiscal decentralization on corruption and have mostly ignored the institutions of political decentralization. Using new data in a series of expansive models across multiple countries and years, we find that corruption will be lower when local governments are more accountable to and more transparent toward their constituents. This beneficial arrangement is most likely to occur when local elections are combined with nonintegrated political parties, meaning that party institutions themselves are decentralized from national control. Such an institutional arrangement maximizes local accountability by putting the decision to nominate and elect local leaders in the hands of those best in a position to evaluate their honesty—local electors.     

The size and composition of government expenditure

This paper tests several leading hypotheses on determinants of government expenditure. The purpose is to avoid omitted variables bias by testing the prominent theories in a comprehensive specification, to identify persistent puzzles for the current set of theories, and to explore those puzzles in greater depth by looking at the composition of government expenditure and the level of government at which it takes place as well as its magnitude. Using Government Financial Statistics data from the IMF covering over 100 countries from 1970–2000, I look at cross-sectional and inter-temporal variation in government expenditure and both individual categories of expenditure (such as defense, education, health care) and different levels of government (central, and local). Among other results, I find a new explanation for Wagner's Law, widespread evidence that preference heterogeneity leads to decentralization rather than outright decreases in expenditures, that a great deal of the expenditure associated with increased trade openness is not in categories that explicitly insure for risk, and evidence that both political access and income inequality affect the extent of social insurance.     

Who Secures Job Opportunities in the Chinese Government? Evidence Based on the First Jobs of Graduates from a Chinese College

Using a unique data set obtained from a Chinese college, the present paper investigates the determinants of obtaining a job in the Chinese Government. Despite the significant amount of attention paid to this issue by the media, academic study on this subject has been limited. We find that the parents' social capital, membership to the Communist Party, gender and personal ability significantly affect the possibility of a graduate obtaining a job in the public sector. Moreover, although acquiring a job in the government is difficult, no significant wage premium exists for graduates working in this sector. Finally, these results still hold after conducting the Heckman tests to validate the self‐selection bias. This study identifies the determinants of young Chinese people's aspirations to be civil servants, which raises significant policy implications for the government.     

Fiscal decentralization and corporate investment: empirical evidence from China

This paper examines the effect of fiscal decentralization on levels and efficiency of corporate investment. The results indicate that as the extent of local government fiscal decentralization increases, the level of new investment by firms under their jurisdiction rises. Furthermore, fiscal decentralization has an impact on corporate investment by aggravating over-investment rather than alleviating under-investment, leading to a situation whereby fiscal decentralization is negatively associated with investment efficiency at the level of the firm. Finally, the impact of fiscal decentralization on over-investment, under-investment and investment efficiency is not different between state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises, suggesting that economic leverages are the dominant government intervention measures. The findings imply that fiscal decentralization is another determinant of firm-level investment and corporate investment efficiency, which broadens the existing literature on the economic consequence of fiscal decentralization, resulting in important implications for policy-making.     

Priorities and sequencing in privatization: Evidence from Czech firm panel data

While privatization of state-owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously. This raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically. In this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. To obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing, we investigate the following competing government objectives: (i) Maximizing efficiency through resource allocation; (ii) maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; (iii) minimizing political costs; (iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains; and (v) maximizing privatization revenues. Next, we use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing predictions about the sequencing of privatization. Consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on revenues and public goodwill, we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first. The sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information gains. Our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from a selection bias.     

DETERMINATION OF PARTICIPATION DECISION, HIRING DECISION, AND WAGES IN A DOUBLE SELECTION FRAMEWORK: MALE-FEMALE WAGE DIFFERENTIALS IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET REVISITED

The magnitude of the male-female wage differential is known to be highly sensitive to the specification of the wage equations used. An important source of misspecification is the failure to correct the sample selection bias that results from estimating the wage equation obtained through two sequential decisions: the worker's decision to participate in the labor market and the employer's decision to hire. Estimation of the wage equation ignoring this double selection process leads to biased estimates, and consequently the resulting male-female wage differentials are likely to be misleading. Following a double selection approach and using a sample from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, this article examines the determinants of not only the wage equation but also the worker's participation and the employer's hiring decisions in both male and female samples. The study further demonstrates that the unexplained male-female wage differential remains underestimated when the roles of both selection decisions are ignored in the estimation of wage equations.     

On the Cultural Transmission of Corruption

We provide a cultural explanation to the phenomenon of corruption in the framework of an overlapping generations model with intergenerational transmission of values. We show that the economy has two steady states with different levels of corruption. The driving force in the equilibrium selection process is the education effort exerted by parents which depends on the distribution of ethics in the population and on expectations about future policies. We propose some policy interventions which via parents' efforts have long-lasting effects on corruption and show the success of intensive education campaigns. Educating the young is a key element in reducing corruption successfully. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D10, J13.     

Biotechnology as a Technological Paradigm in the Global Knowledge Structure

The aim of this study is to analyse whether the receipt of public R&D funding determines firm's R&D strategy selection. This issue is crucial, as previous studies have shown that each R&D strategy is associated to a higher, or lower, innovation performance. We consider three R&D strategies – make, buy, make–buy – and three different sources of public funding – regional, state and other (such as EU). The model estimation is performed through a multinomial logit model with random effects with a sample of 457 large firms for the period 1992–2005, taken from the Spanish Survey of Business Strategies. The main finding is that the source of the funding influences whether firms select the make, buy or make–buy strategy. Additionally, because of the panel structure of the sample, we observe that the effect of public funding on the R&D strategy selection lasts longer for state and regional funds than for other funds.     

Politicians at higher levels of government are perceived as more corrupt

The relationship between decentralization and corruption has been discussed extensively, but little is known about the variation of corruption across government levels. Using an original survey where French citizens were asked to assess corruption at all levels of government, we observe that corruption perceived at a government level is higher, the higher the government level in the government hierarchy. Specifically, municipal governments are perceived as the least corrupt, followed by local governments, senators, deputies, and the national cabinet. The president of the Republic is perceived as slightly less corrupt than the national cabinet, but more corrupt than any other level of government. The relationship is robust to alternative specifications, controlling for a series of individual and regional characteristics, and to alternative definitions of the dependent variable. The finding is not reducible to geographic distance. We observe it in several other countries.     

The Effects of Screening and Monitoring on Credit Rationing of SMEs

In this paper, we seek to empirically assess which determinants of the capability and incentives of banks to screen and monitor firms are significant in explaining credit rationing to Italian SMEs. After testing for the presence of non‐random selection bias and the potential endogeneity of some determinants of interest, the probit model results we obtain suggest that the average banking size and the multiple banking relationship phenomenon are statistically significant factors affecting credit rationing, presumably through their impact on the aforementioned banks' capability and incentives. Other potential determinants of banks' incentives to monitor and screen, such as local banking competition and firm' capacity to collateralize, are never significant. However, when we split the sample according to the level of competition in credit markets, we find that the estimated marginal effects of all significant determinants of interest are larger in absolute value than those obtained when using the whole sample.     

The effects of federal regulations on corruption in U.S. States

Using the newly constructed Federal Regulation and State Enterprise Index (FRASE Index) to measure the federal regulations and the existing Corruption Convictions Index (CCI), we investigate the effects of federal regulations on corruption in U.S. states. Controlling for several demographic and economic variables including the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom Index (EFI), which measures the size and scope of government in U.S. states, we find a positive and statistically significant relationship between federal regulations and corruption. Our findings have important policy implications. A 1 standard deviation increase in FRASE Index causes CCI to increase by approximately 0.5 standard deviations. Standardized coefficient of EFI is also approximately equal to 0.5. In other words, it is possible to mitigate the effects of regulations at the federal level by reducing the size and the scope of the government at the state level.     

Quantifying the trade-reducing effect of embargoes: Firm-level evidence from Russia

In 2014, Russia responded to sanctions imposed by a coalition of Western countries with a retaliatory import embargo. I draw on this unique case study and a customs data set on firm-level import transactions to investigate the ramifications of Russia's counter-sanctions on firm-level foreign trade. Using detailed data and a triple-difference estimation strategy, I examine micro-level dynamics and heterogeneities that aggregate data alone do not reveal. I identify the effects of the embargo on the extensive margin (the probability that a firm imports a particular product from a given country in a particular time period) and the intensive margin (the value of a firm's import transaction) of firm-level trade, as well as its effects on logged unit values. The main findings of this study show that the embargo had statistically significant negative impacts on extensive and intensive margins of firm-level trade. I also pinpoint evidence of multiple exemptions from the embargo and a large degree of heterogeneity of firm-level responses to the embargo based on firm attributes, such as firm size and government connection.     

Group Dynamics of Corruption in Public Organizations

Abstract

When there are two groups of officials in a public organization, we show that depending on the groups’ behavior – collusive or competitive – increasing the level of monitoring and punishment may have different impacts on corruption. If the two groups of public officials had been demonstrating collusive behavior, increased monitoring or punishment reduces both the level of corrupt activities and the corrupt officials’ bribe revenues. However, if the groups had not been colluding, increased monitoring reduces the level of corruption, but increases the corruption revenues collected. Only after reaching the optimum level of monitoring, is this result reversed.