我国基本养老保险扩面的收入分配效应研究

文章基于一般均衡分析框架,通过构建“统账结合”制基本养老保险的异质性跨期交叠一般均衡动态模型,引入国发〔2005〕38号文的主要内容,利用政策仿真、参数估值和敏感性检验等方法,重点研究了养老保险制度覆盖面扩展的收入分配和再分配效应,并进行了理论推导和实证测算。结果发现：（1）我国基本养老保险扩面具有明显的收入分配和再分配效应,且再分配效应是累进的,发生了从城镇企业职工为代表的高收入者向以灵活就业人员和农民工为代表的低收入者的收入转移;（2）个人账户发挥了平滑作用,有利于改善不同类型劳动者终生的收入分配,但不利于收入再分配的改善;（3）社会统筹账户具有较强的收入再分配效应,有利于改善不同类型劳动者的收入再分配,缩小收入差距。参数敏感性检验表明结论是稳健的。因此,进一步优化社会统筹账户有利于减小收入不平等。     

税收、收入不平等和内生经济增长

企业家(通过金融中介)从家庭借贷来支撑创新。二者在企业家的努力不为外人所见的情形下双方签订信用合同分享创新带来的垄断利润(即蛋糕)。两个有代表性经济人(企业家和家庭)的存在允许人们在内生经济增长模型里研究收入不平等。本文研究发现,企业家分配份额的增加一开始会提升增长速度,但是过了一定值后会拉低增长速度;而该份额的增加一直拉大企业家和工人间的收入差距。所以降低企业家获得的蛋糕的份额的分配改革可缩小收入差距。提高企业家来自创新的收入的税率将降低他们的努力程度,从而降低增长速度,但是该税率的提高有助于降低收入不平等程度。存款收入的税率提高尽管不会改变企业家的努力程度,但是也会降低经济增长速度,而且不会降低收入不平等(如果工人有一定比例的存款)。对于劳动收入(工人工资)的税率增加会加剧工人和企业家间的收入不平等,但对经济增长速度没有影响。     

Effects of future pension benefits on pre-retirement labor supply: Evidence from Chile

In this paper, I estimate the effect of future pension benefits on pre-retirement labor supply for a representative sample of Chilean workers. Using nonlinear patterns in pension benefit formulas and a reform that permanently changed non-contributory pensions, I estimate the effect of pension accrual and expected pension wealth on labor force and contributory-sector participation, labor earnings, and hours worked. I find that the effect is concentrated on the impact of pension accrual on the probability to contribute to the pension system. The effect is heterogeneous and is concentrated among middle-aged workers, low-skilled workers, and workers with higher financial literacy.     

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two 'endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.     

The extension of social security coverage in developing countries

We study the dynamic general equilibrium effects of introducing a social pension program to elderly informal sector workers in developing countries who lack formal risk sharing mechanisms against income and longevity risks. To this end, we formulate a stochastic dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates defining features of developing countries: a large informal sector, private transfers as an informal safety net, and a non-universal social security system. We find that the extension of retirement benefits to informal sector workers results in efficiency losses due to adverse effects on capital accumulation and the allocation of resources across formal and informal sectors. Despite these losses recipients of social pensions experience welfare gains as the positive insurance effects attributed to the extension of a social insurance system dominate. The welfare gains crucially depend on the skill distribution, private intra-family transfers and the specific tax used to finance the expansion.     

Progressive Taxation and Wage Setting: Some Evidence for Denmark

The proposition that a progressive tax system contributes to wage moderation is studied using Danish earnings data disaggregated by occupation, gender and earnings level. Our main conclusions are that income-tax progression affects wage setting, but whether it moderates or exaggerates wage pressure is income dependent. An increase in progressivity reduces the pre-tax earnings of middle-income workers (manual male workers and moderate income earners among both male and female non-manual workers). The reverse is found for high-income earners (non-manual male workers), in that an increase in progressivity tends to raise pre-tax earnings. Finally, there is no significant effect of tax progressivity on the wages of low-income earners.
JEL classification : H 3; J 3; J 5; J 6     

The effects of recent Spanish pension reforms on sustainability and pension adequacy

The Spanish pension system has been recently reformed as a response to the demographic challenge and with the objective of ensuring the sustainability of the pension system in the long-term. The overall reforms include changes in the majority of the system parameters, a new indexation rule and a sustainability factor that links life expectancy and the first pension amount. The aim of this work is to analyse how these reforms affect two important features of a pension system: fiscal sustainability and adequacy. For this purpose, the real internal rate of return (IRR) of the lifetime contributions and benefits and the prospective gross theoretical replacement rate (TRR), both before and after the reforms, have been computed. The calculations are case-study based, for a few hypothetical workers who are sufficiently representative of the earnings and retirement patterns in Spain. The results show that the real IRR is 0.7 p.p. lower and the prospective gross TRR is 18 p.p. lower after the reform process for the base case of a man with an uninterrupted career of 40 years with average earnings and a retirement age of 65. In addition, pension reform process in Spain has different effects among the individuals depending on the gender, level of earnings, retirement age and career length.     

The Political Economy of Social Security under Differential Longevity and Voluntary Retirement

This paper studies a model where the existence of a pension system is decided by majority voting. We assume that individuals have the same income but different longevity. Retirement is voluntary and the pension system is characterised by a payroll tax on earnings and a flat pension benefit. Individuals vote only on the tax level. We show that a pension system emerges when there is a majority of long-lived individuals and that voluntary retirement enables to lower the size of the transfers received by the long-lived. A rise in average longevity will also increase the size of the pension system.     

Can optimism solve the entrepreneurial earnings puzzle?*

In this paper, we apply a general equilibrium occupational choice model to the study of the impact of optimism on the earnings of entrepreneurs and workers. We extend the work of Lucas (1978 Bell Journal of Economics 9, 508–523) by assuming a fraction of individuals are optimistic about their ability as entrepreneurs. The model shows that optimism leads to a misallocation of talent and inputs, which raises input prices and lowers output. The model is calibrated to match salient features of the UK economy and the British Household Panel Survey. The calibration shows that optimism can account for more than half of the size of the entrepreneurial earnings puzzle in the UK.     

On the optimal design of pension systems

The present paper aims to quantify efficiency properties of flat and earnings-related pay-as-you-go financed social security systems of various institutional designs in order to identify an optimal pension design. Starting from a benchmark economy without social security, we introduce alternative pension systems and compare the costs arising from liquidity constraints as well as distortions of labor supply versus the benefits from insurance provision against income and lifespan uncertainty. Our findings suggest an optimal replacement rate of about 50 % of average earnings. In our model a single-tier earnings-related pension system yields the highest efficiency gains dominating flat benefits as well as two-tier systems of any form. We also show that the negative correlation between pension progressivity and pension generosity of real-world social security systems can be justified on efficiency grounds. Finally, our results indicate a positive impact of means-testing flat benefits against earnings-related benefits within multi-pillar pension systems.     

SOCIAL INSURANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY

This article studies how insurance from progressive taxation improves the matching of workers to occupations. We propose an equilibrium dynamic assignment model to illustrate how social insurance encourages mobility. Workers experiment to find their best occupational fit in a process filled with uncertainty. Risk aversion and limited earnings insurance induce workers to remain in unfitting occupations. We estimate the model using microdata from the United States and Germany. Higher earnings uncertainty explains the U.S. higher mobility rate. When workers in the United States enjoy Germany's higher progressivity, mobility rises. Output and welfare gains are large.     

OCCUPATIONAL PENSIONS, WAGES, AND JOB MOBILITY IN GERMANY

Pension‐covered workers in Germany are three times less likely to change jobs than workers not covered by an occupational pension scheme. This paper examines the effects of occupational pension coverage and pension portability loss on voluntary job changes using a sample selection model with endogenous switching. The model estimates, derived from western German panel data for 1985–1998, indicate that occupational pension coverage reduces worker mobility by imposing a capital loss on those leaving their job before retirement age. Moreover, pension‐covered workers receive a higher compensation, which discourages mobility. Making pensions portable increases mobility, but from a low initial level.     

Welfare Analysis of Pension Reforms in an Ageing Japan

This paper uses a computable general equilibrium model with overlapping generations to explore the effects of different public pension schemes on economic welfare, and intergenerational and intragenerational equity. Besides the benchmark case based on the 2004 public pension reform, the present paper considers two alternative reforms: financing the basic pension benefit through a consumption tax, and eliminating the earnings‐related pension benefit. The simulation results suggest that even the consumption‐tax financing of only the basic pension, namely, the combination of both reforms, might not improve overall economic welfare, although it increases economic output by inducing capital formation.     

中国养老保险制度变迁的经济效应

本文针对中国目前正在进行的社会养老保险制度变迁 ,在一般均衡框架下构建了一个两期的动态生命周期模拟模型。我们从宏观经济、微观经济生产者、微观经济消费者、经济公平和转轨代价五个方面对制度变迁的经济效应进行了模拟量化分析。分析表明 ,制度变迁将使资本量和产量增加 ,资本 -产出比提高 ,利率下降 ,工资率上升 ;两类劳动者个人效用上升 ,养老金替代率上升 ,收入分配差距缩小 ;同时发生一定转轨代价。总的来看 ,此次中国养老保险制度变迁的经济效应是正面的。     

MEASURING THE EFFECT OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION ON INCOME: EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION?

The effect of nonheterosexuality on individual income is estimated using 1991–1996 General Social Survey data. Other researchers have concluded that homosexuals earn less than similarly qualified workers, in contrast to the popular perception that homosexuals are more affluent than nonhomosexuals. Using improved statistical techniques, this article finds noticeable earnings effects that go in opposite directions across genders. Nonheterosexual men earn 22% less than heterosexual men, and nonheterosexual women earn 30% more than heterosexual women. These findings, viewed together with previous empirical work on this topic, help narrow the field of theories that can explain the sexual-orientation earnings gaps present in the data.     

Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives

We study an overlapping generations version of the principal-agent problem, where incentive contracts are determined in general equilibrium. All individuals are workers when young, but have a choice between becoming entrepreneurs or remaining workers when old. Imperfections in the credit market give rise to rents in entrepreneurial activities involving capital. These rents motivate poor young agents to work hard and save to overcome the borrowing constraints. With a labour market that is subject to moral hazard, the increased effort raises social welfare. Policies that reduce credit market imperfections, or redistribute income, may reduce welfare by dampening this effect.     

CAN HOUSEHOLDS AND WELFARE STATES MITIGATE RISING EARNINGS INSTABILITY?

We compare the evolution of earnings instability in Germany and the United Kingdom, two countries which stand for different types of welfare states. Deploying data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel (SOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), we estimate permanent and transitory variances of male income over the period 1984–2009 and 1991–2006, respectively. Studies in this literature generally use individual labor earnings. To uncover the role of welfare state and households in smoothening earnings shocks, we compute different income concepts ranging from gross earnings to net equivalent household income. We find evidence that the overall inequality of earnings in Germany and the United Kingdom has been rising throughout the period due to both higher permanent earnings inequality and higher earnings volatility. However, taking institutions of the welfare state and risk‐sharing households into account, we find that the volatility of net household income has remained fairly stable. Furthermore, redistribution and risk insurance provided by the welfare state is more pronounced in Germany than in the United Kingdom.     

Adverse selection in credit markets and regressive profit taxation

In many countries, taxes on businesses are less progressive than labor income taxes. This paper provides a justification for this pattern based on adverse selection that entrepreneurs face in credit markets. Individuals choose between becoming entrepreneurs or workers and differ in their skill in both of these occupations. I find that endogenous cross-subsidization in the credit market equilibrium results in excessive (insufficient) entry of low-skilled (high-skilled) agents into entrepreneurship. This gives rise to a corrective role for differential taxation of entrepreneurial profits and labor income. In particular, a profit tax that is regressive relative to taxes on labor income restores the efficient occupational choice.     

Do tax subsidies for retirement saving affect total private saving? New evidence on middle-income workers*

We exploit exogenous variation from a pension reform in Denmark to estimate the effect of tax subsidies on total private saving. We present new evidence on individuals in the middle of the income distribution and show that a reduction in tax subsidies for retirement saving reduces total private saving. The reform changed the tax incentives for saving in the pension scheme that holds the highest tax advantage for middle-income workers in Denmark. We find that for each unit of reduced saving in this pension scheme, only 64 percent is substituted to other types of saving.