Does corporate governance play an important role in BHC performance? Evidence from the U.S.

This study explores the relationship between the operating performance and corporate governance of bank holding companies (BHCs) in the U.S. The modified data envelopment analysis (DEA) is utilized to integrate the five rating indicators of CAMEL (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, and Liquidity) so as to estimate the BHCs' performance. This study also employs the modified tiered DEA to categorize 68 BHCs into three Tiers. Additionally, the truncated-regression is employed to discuss whether or not the corporate governance would affect the performance of BHCs. The empirical results present the trade-off relationship with CAMEL indicators in the Tier1—Efficient BHCs. Moreover, it has been found that there are negative impacts on BHC's performance from board size, outside directors, the average age of directors and CEO/Chairman duality, while there are positive impacts from the number of committee and Big-4 auditors. The results further prove that corporate governance is important for the operating performance of BHCs.     

What drives international financial flows? Politics,institutions and other determinants

This paper uses a large panel of financial flow data from banks to assess how institutions affect international lending. First, employing a time varying composite institutional quality index in a fixed-effects framework, the paper shows that institutional improvements are followed by significant increases in international finance. Second, cross-sectional models also show a strong effect of initial levels of institutional quality on future bank lending. Third, instrumental variable estimates further show that the historically predetermined component of institutional development is also a significant correlate of international bank inflows. The results thus suggest that institutional underdeveloped can explain a significant part of Lucas [Lucas, Robert E. 1990. “Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?” American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 80 (2): 92–96. 1990] paradox of why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries. The analysis also does a first-step towards understanding which institutional features affect international banking.     

Financial openness,market structure and private credit: An empirical investigation

Consistent with recent theoretical models, this paper finds that financial openness has a positive effect on private credit in economies characterized by a competitive banking sector, but that this effect vanishes and even becomes negative in economies with imperfect banking competition.     

The macrodynamics of financial fragility within a hard peg arrangement

The paper presents an open-economy macrodynamical growth model with the aim of giving an endogenous characterisation to the process that leads a small country with a currency-board arrangement to accumulate dangerously high levels of external debt and become vulnerable to macroeconomic instability. The macrodynamics of the model results from the combination of the commitment to maintain the peg - that makes liquidity closely dependent on the dynamics of foreign reserves - and the non-linear real and financial interactions that drives the pro-cyclical behaviour of the economy. Within this context, the external financing ease during an economic upswing leads to debt-supported growth and financial fragility; the consequent deterioration of profitability expectations brings about a capital reversal that, in the absence of monetary stabilisation tools, makes the currency arrangement unsustainable. A financial crisis may thus turn into a currency crisis.We run a continuous-time estimation of a non-linear differential equations system for Argentina during the years of the currency-board arrangement. We find that two steady-state solutions exist. The local stability and sensitivity analysis show that both equilibria are unstable and that the qualitative nature of the equilibria depends in particular on lenders' responsiveness to the degree of leverage. We also show that relaxing the assumption on the currency arrangement and allowing for an autonomous monetary policy makes both equilibria stable.     

SME performance in transition economies: The financial regulation and firm-level corruption nexus

Using a general equilibrium endogenous growth model we explain underperformance in the small and medium enterprise sector as an effect of corruption and non-competitive banking. Limited competition in the banking sector causes a high loan-deposit spread, worsens the initial effect of corruption, and depresses growth. Fostering bank competition, for instance, by allowing foreign bank entry, would be a simple solution to this problem, but frequently, authorities choose to hamper bank competition. Therefore, we explain the persistence of non-competitive banking as a result of governments’ regulatory choice. If the government has a stake in the banking sector there exists a trade-off between current benefits from bank profits and future growth. Firm-level corruption affects intertemporal optimization and distorts the government’s choice towards more restrictive regulation, i.e., less bank competition, even if the deciding institution itself is not corrupt. These results show that the two prominent problems for small and medium enterprises, corruption and finance, are mutually reinforcing.     

Have the returns to education really increased in Vietnam? Wage versus employment effect

Many studies have analyzed changes in the returns to education in globalizing economies using the Mincerian framework. These studies have typically estimated the returns to education in terms of changes in wages rather than employment, effectively ignoring the fact that during globalization not only wages but also employment patterns are affected. In this paper we use four large-scale representative household surveys from the transition economy Vietnam for the period 1998–2006 to estimate the returns to education taking into account both changes in wages and employment. The results show that the estimated increases in returns to education are lower once changes in employment patterns are taken into account.     

Does the Single Currency Affect Foreign Direct Investment?*

Does the creation of the euro partly explain the sharp increase in European investments? To address this question, we derive a simple gravity‐like model for bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI). Using this model, we find that the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has increased intra‐EMU FDI stocks on average by around 30 percent. This effect varies over time and across EMU members. It is found to be larger for the outward investments of the less‐developed EMU members. Moreover, contrary to early expectations of FDI diversion effects, EMU countries have invested more in non‐EMU countries since the launch of the euro.