Non-neutral information costs with match-value uncertainty

This paper investigates a model featuring a monopolist seller and a buyer with an uncertain valuation for the seller’s product. The seller chooses an information system which allows the buyer to receive a private signal, potentially correlated with her valuation. No restrictions are imposed on the conditional distributions of the signal; the cost of the information system is proportional to its precision, measured by the mutual information between the distributions of the buyer’s valuation and the signal. In equilibrium, the information system trades off the information cost against the losses deriving from a probability of trade that is either “too high,” or “too low”—depending on the relative weight of the expected losses resulting from errors of the two types—and sends “non-neutral” signals, typically. Thus, in general, the probability of a correct signal depends on the buyer’s actual valuation, and the probability of trade differs from the probability of a valuation exceeding the cost of production. The expected total surplus generated by the exchange is maximized, in equilibrium.     

Monetary policy with linear information costs

The paper adresses the problem of a monetary economy with costs of information, imposed in linear form. In particular, we make use of a strategic market game with money where equilibria are standardly non-Walrasian, permitting an active role to monetary policy. The imposition of information costs alters the demand of real balances since traders demand extra money for gathering and processing the necessary information. As a result, money injections could be proved welfare improving only when the induced information costs do not offset the resulted gains to trade.     

The costs and benefits of additional information in agency models with endogenous information structures

We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously.     

Dilution costs,underinvestment, and utility regulation under asymmetric information

This article addresses the problem faced by a regulated natural monopolist who must raise outside funds to finance socially desirable projects. We demonstrate that fair rate of return utility price regulation will lead to underinvestment incentives in the presence of asymmetric information between the firm and the capital markets regarding the firm's assets and future costs. This problem is especially severe when financing choice is restricted to equity. Underinvestment can be either completely eliminated by adjusting the allowed rate of return above the fair rate or reduced by switching to debt finance.Support from the Center for the Study of Regulated Industry at Georgia State University is gratefully acknowledged. We have benefited from the comments of Victor Andrews, two anonymous reviewers, and the editor, Michael A. Crew. The usual disclaimer applies.     

The macroeconomic effects of infrequent information with adjustment costs

We extend the macroeconomic literature on Ss -type rules by introducing infrequent information in a kinked adjustment-cost model. We first show that optimal individual decision rules are both state and time dependent. We then develop an aggregation framework to study the macroeconomic implications of such optimal individual decision rules. In our model, a vast number of agents act together, and more so when uncertainty is large. The average effect of an aggregate shock is inversely related to its size and to aggregate uncertainty. These results contrast with those obtained with full information adjustment cost models. JEL Classification: E0,E1,E2,E3
Les effets macroéconomiques de l'information infréquente quand il y a des coûts d'ajustement. Les auteurs étendent la portée de la littérature spécialisée sur les règles de type Ss en proposant des postulats d'information infréquente et de fonction de coûts d'ajustement pliée. On montre que les règles de décision optimales des individus dépendent à la fois de l'état de l'environnement et du moment. On développe alors un cadre d'agrégation pour étudier les impacts macroéconomiques de ces règles optimales de décision. Dans ce modèle, un grand nombre d'agents agissent de concert, et optimales ce d'autant plus que l'incertitude s'accroît. L'effet moyen d'un choc au niveau global est inversement reliéà son importance et au niveau d'incertitude agrégée. Ces résultats contredisent ceux qu'on obtient dans des modèles de coûts d'ajustement avec pleine information.     

Loan processing costs,information asymmetries and the speed of technology adoption

This paper presents a simple model in which credit-constrained firms might delay the adoption of new and more productive technologies because of the external financing costs involved. Applying for a loan can be a very costly process by itself. Where there is a high degree of credit rationing, these costs might even deter entrepreneurs from applying for a loan altogether. We argue that the efficiency of the banking system, by affecting such costs, can influence the profitability of new technologies and entrepreneur's investment decisions, which, in turn, influence new technology implementation, capital accumulation and growth.     

Transaction costs and the collection of information: presale measurement on private timber sales

Measurement efforts to reduce the uncertainty concerning theattributes of heterogeneous goods may simply redistribute wealthand result in social waste. Individuals bearing the cost ofsuch distributional measurement have incentives to develop buyingand selling practices that limit such measurement. We examine,both theoretically and empirically, the determinants of thelevel of distributional measurement efforts in a competitiveauction framework. The empirical application, which uses a sampleof private timber sales, provides strong support for the implicationsof the theoretical model of presale measurement.     

On measuring the benefits of lower transport costs

Despite large amounts invested in rural roads in developing countries, little is known about their benefits. This paper derives an expression for the willingness-to-pay for a reduction in transport costs from the canonical agricultural household model and uses it to estimate the benefits of a hypothetical road project. Estimation is based on novel cross-sectional data collected in a small region of Madagascar with enormous, yet plausibly exogenous, variation in transport cost. A road that essentially eliminated transport costs in the study area would boost the incomes of the remotest households – those facing transport costs of about $75/ton – by nearly half, mostly by raising non-farm earnings. This benefit estimate is contrasted to one based on a hedonic approach.     

On the demand for information

Most previous research on the economics of information has been based on the expected utility hypothesis and Bayesian learning. Yet there is experimental evidence that decision makers do not always maximize expected utility and that human learning is not always consistent with Bayes' rule. Using a two-period model, this paper examines the valuation of information as well as the demanf for information in the broader context of a state preference approach under an ordinal representation of preferences. In particular, it is not assumed that the decision maker is Bayesian, nor that he behaves in a way consistent with the expected utility hypothesis. In this general framework, the value of information is defined and analysed. Also, under active learning, the optimal allocation of information gathering activities is discussed. Behavioural properties of the demand for information are derived making use of a compensation function. Implications of the results for measuring the value of information and for the economic analysis of learning activities are discussed.     

On the welfare costs of misspecified monetary policy objectives

This paper quantifies the effects on welfare of misspecified monetary policy objectives in a stylized DSGE model. We show that using inappropriate objectives generates relatively large welfare costs. When expressed in terms of ‘consumption equivalent’ units, these costs correspond to permanent decreases in steady-state consumption of up to two percent. The latter are generated by both the inappropriate choice of weights and the omission of variables. In particular, it is costly to assume an interest-rate smoothing incentive for central bankers when it is not socially optimal to do so. Finally, a parameter uncertainty decomposition indicates that uncertainty about the properties of markup shocks gives rise to the largest welfare costs.     

On monopoly welfare gains,scale efficiency and the costs of decentralization

Inside the neoclassical framework a monopoly produces an unambiguous loss of social welfare. In this article some dynamic efficiency aspects of monopoly in connection with economies of scale are discussed. Two different cases of the costs of capacity expansion for a branch are compared: (1) the capacity expansion takes place with only one, multiplant, monopoly firm, (2) the capacity expansion takes place in a branch producing the same output but with two or more multiplant firms. It is argued that monopoly welfare gains are likely to arise for a centralized process of capacity expansion compared to a decentralized one.     

On mixed markets with asymmetric information

In asymmetric information exchange economies involving both non-negligible and negligible agents, one should expect the failure of the private Core-Walras Equivalence Theorem. This paper shows that if “large” traders are similar to each other, then they lose their market power and hence the Equivalence Theorem can be restored. We also investigate on weaker equivalences among Walrasian expectations allocations, Aubin private core and private core allocations of the original mixed economy and the atomless one associated to it, without the assumption that all atoms are of the same type. Furthermore, extensions of Hervés-Moreno-Yannelis and Schmeidler Theorems (compare Hervés et al. in J Math Econ 41:844–856, 2005a; Schemidler in Econometrica 40:579–580, 1972) are given for differential information economies in which the feasibility constraints are imposed with an equality (exact feasibility).     

On redundant types and Bayesian formulation of incomplete information

A type structure is non-redundant if no two types of a player represent the same hierarchy of beliefs over the given set of basic uncertainties, and it is redundant otherwise. Under a mild necessary and sufficient condition termed separativity, we show that any redundant structure can be identified with a non-redundant structure with an extended space of basic uncertainties. The belief hierarchies induced by the latter structure, when “marginalized,” coincide with those induced by the former. We argue that redundant structures can provide different Bayesian equilibrium predictions only because they reflect a richer set of uncertainties entertained by players but unspecified by the analyst. The analyst shall make use of a non-redundant structure, unless he believes that he misspecified the players' space of basic uncertainties. We also consider bounding the extra uncertainties by the action space for Bayesian equilibrium predictions.     

On the static and dynamic costs of trade restrictions for small developing countries

We analyze the costs of trade restrictions for a small developing economy (LDC). Intermediate goods invented elsewhere are only introduced on the LDC market if it is profitable to do so. The LDC economy evolves to a balanced growth path in which income, welfare, and the share of available goods increase if trade restrictions fall. The adjustment path is asymmetric: an increase in trade restrictions leads to a slow-down of economic growth, while a decrease may lead to a rapid catch-up process. The dynamic costs of trade restrictions are in general substantially larger than the static costs.     

On the difficulty of eliciting summary information

The revelation principle asserts that, in principle, the allocative performance of direct mechanisms (institutions in which an exhaustive report of privately held information is elicited from each agent) is at least as good as that of any other class of institutions. The distinction between the incentive properties of such exhaustive reporting and of summary reporting is studied here. It is shown that, unless strong restrictions are placed on an agent's utility function, the incentive properties of truthful summary reporting about a multidimensional parameter (e.g., reporting of its first coordinate) are extremely fragile.     

略论信息时代信息人才的培养

随着科学技术的迅速发展,世界将进入一个全新的信息时代,数字化、网络化等技术,改变了人们的生活、思维和相互交流方式。我国网络用户将急剧扩大。如果按目前Internet流量每7个月翻一番的速度,我国到2002年将达到4000万户。中国将成为世界上网络最多的国家之一。在现代计算机网络技术日臻成熟的基础上,加快培养信息人才是当前重要的任务之一。 一、信息技术的发展对信息教育提出了挑战 计算机网络的成长,使信息高速公路向社会的各个角落迅速延伸,有力地带动着人类社会由“工业化社会”     

On the quantitative significance of imperfect information

Economic models of markets with imperfect information have increasingly involved high degrees of theoretical sophistication. So far there has been no movement beyond qualitative prediction. This paper attempts to make quantitative assessments of the new features arising from imperfect information following on recent work by Braverman (1980) and Braverman and Dixit (1981). The information structure of these models is based on non-sequential search, where consumers enter the market only once. It is of interest to question under what circumstances single price equilibria will exist under different assumptions about the distribution of search costs. Therefore for particular families of demand, cost and information conditions, the possibilities of competitive, monopolistic and two price equilibria are examined and their relative likelihoods assessed.     

On the information provided by forecasting models

The aim of the paper is to evaluate the information provided by forecasting models that include explanatory variables besides the variables to be forecasted. It is argued that the content of a forecast is a combination of historical information about the variable to be forecasted and theoretical considerations, normally manifested by a model. The historical information is assessed by a time series model for the variable. In order to assess the theoretical information about a variable, one suggests a measure. This measure is based on the improvement of fit to the actual values of the values obtained from the forecasting model in comparison to the values obtained from the time series model. The R² measure, which frequently is used as a measure of the explanatory power of a forecasting model, is critically discussed.