Keiretsu and risk: An examination of the risk exposure of keiretsu banks in Japan

We compare risk positions adopted by keiretsu and non-keiretsu banks in Japan and examine how the risk positions of Japanese banks changed following the conclusion in 1997 of an escalating series of banking crises in Japan and East-Asia. The results indicate that keiretsu banks take less risk than non-keiretsu banks, and that Japanese banks in general adopted lower risk profiles after 1997. Japanese bank risk is positively associated with the ratio of non-performing loans to capital, interest rates, and private investment in residential construction, and negatively with the ratio of administrative expenses to average assets and the money supply     

What drives credit risk in the Indian banking industry? An empirical investigation

Using a two-step system GMM approach on a unique bank-level dataset for the period 1998/99–2013/14, this paper tries to explore the key determinants of credit risk in the Indian banking industry. The main premise of this paper is that, along with regulatory and institutional factors, both macroeconomic and bank-specific variables influence the formation of credit risk in a banking system, and their influences vary across ownership groups. The empirical findings suggest that lower profitability, more diversification in the banking business, the large size of banks and a higher concentration of banks in lending increase the probability of defaults in India. We find a significant degree of persistence in credit risk, and the observed persistence is higher in the gross non-performing loans (NPLs) specification relative to what has been observed in the net NPLs specification. In the case of public sector banks, NPLs are more sensitive to internal bank-specific factors, while for private and foreign banks, macroeconomic and industry-related factors play a significant role in determining credit risk. Our results are robust for different panel data estimation models and sub-samples of ownership groups. The findings of this paper provide important insights into the formation of default risk in the banking system of an emerging market economy.     

Federal Home Loan Bank advances and bank risk

The Federal Home Loan Bank system (FHLB) has evolved into a major source of liquidity for the banking system with the demonstrated ability to borrow over a trillion dollars in world financial markets based on an implied U. S. Treasury guarantee. The FHLB loans the borrowed funds to commercial banks at reduced rates that are not adjusted for the risk of an individual bank. Moral hazard could cause member banks using FHLB loans to increase financial leverage and exposure to high risk assets. Conversely, the FHLB offers banks additional liquidity and specialized debt instruments that help them manage interest rate risk. We use dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimation to test the relation between FHLB advances and bank risk. We find that if banks have relatively normal default probabilities, advances are not associated with increased bank risk but, instead, advances are related to decreased interest rate risk. However, when bank default probabilities are high, our evidence suggests advances and higher bank risk are related.     

Indirect Convertibility,Equity‐Based Banking and Financial Stability

Banking reform proposals put forward in the wake of the recent financial crisis maintain that equity‐based banking would be stable and would prevent bank runs. This article argues that complementing this form of banking with an indirect convertibility monetary standard and thereby dispensing with base money would enhance financial stability further. Banks would not hold a distinctive asset (base money) that would be called upon by customers at short notice, thereby removing the possibility of bank runs. No discrepancy in value between the two sides of a bank's balance sheet would arise as its assets (securitised loans) would be marked to market. Unlike other recent contributions, the intermediation model outlined here is not ‘limited purpose’ in nature as banks would not be restricted in the form of lending activity they can pursue. Common sources of banking and financial instability – liquidity risk, solvency risk, moral hazard – would be absent.     

Green banking disclosure,firm value and the moderating role of a contextual factor: Evidence from a distinctive regulatory setting

The idea that green banking disclosure leads to increased firm value has been rightly considered as over-simplistic. This paper builds on key prior insights by investigating whether combining green disclosure with other contextual factor, such as non-performing loans, provides additional insight into the complex green disclosure–firm value relationship in a regulatory setting where green law has recently been enacted for the banking industry. We present an analysis of seven years of data sourced from listed banks in Bangladesh (2008–2014), with data analysed using multiple regression. Our findings indicate that, while green disclosure has a positive effect on the overall firm value of banks, this positive effect is negatively moderated by banks' non-performing loans. This research contributes to the knowledge by showing that green disclosure alone is insufficient for creating market value for banks. Additional contextual matters need attention to understand the impact of green disclosure in contributing to increased market value for banks.     

Systemic risk governance in a dynamical model of a banking system with stochastic assets and liabilities

We consider the problem of governing systemic risk in an assets–liabilities dynamical model of a banking system. In the model considered, each bank is represented by its assets and liabilities. The net worth of a bank is the difference between its assets and liabilities and bank is solvent when its net worth is greater than or equal to zero; otherwise, the bank has failed. The banking system dynamics is defined by an initial value problem for a system of stochastic differential equations whose independent variable is time and whose dependent variables are the assets and liabilities of the banks. The banking system model presented generalizes those discussed in Fouque and Sun (in: Fouque, Langsam (eds) Handbook of systemic risk, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 444–452, 2013) and Fatone and Mariani (J Glob Optim 75(3):851–883, 2019) and describes a homogeneous population of banks. The main features of the model are a cooperation mechanism among banks and the possibility of the (direct) intervention of the monetary authority in the banking system dynamics. By “systemic risk” or “systemic event” in a bounded time interval, we mean that in that time interval at least a given fraction of banks have failed. The probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval is evaluated via statistical simulation. Systemic risk governance aims to maintain the probability of systemic risk in a bounded time interval between two given thresholds. The monetary authority is responsible for systemic risk governance. The governance consists in the choice of assets and liabilities of a kind of “ideal bank” as functions of time and in the choice of the rules for the cooperation mechanism among banks. These rules are obtained by solving an optimal control problem for the pseudo mean field approximation of the banking system model. Governance induces banks in the system to behave like the “ideal bank”. Shocks acting on the banks’ assets or liabilities are simulated. Numerical examples of systemic risk governance in the presence and absence of shocks acting on the banking system are studied.

     

金融行业间的资产风险外溢影响

银行业、保险业和证券业因投资业务而构建起联系，并基于金融资产价格而具有了传染渠道。随着投资活动愈发频繁，金融行业中各行业内部的资产风险可能外溢至其他行业。本文首先从理论上分析金融行业资产风险通过投资资产外溢的过程，通过搭建资产抛售模型模拟资产风险的传染机制，从机构层面和行业层面分析资产风险的生成与传递。其次，基于金融机构实际数据的模拟分析结果显示，四大国有商业银行和中国平安具有外溢风险的能力，首先影响银行和保险公司，随后再扩散到整个金融行业，而证券业则相对较为独立。银行业的外溢影响最大，其次是保险业和证券业。但事实上很难发生足以对外部造成显著影响的损失事件。资产、投资比例、杠杆和监管要求水平在资产风险外溢的过程中具有一定的影响。     

Exploring competitiveness in banking sector of a small island economy: a study of Fiji

The paper explores the competitiveness in the banking sector in Fiji using the Panzar and Rosse (J Ind Econ 35:443–456, 1987) method. We compute the concentration ratios and Herfindahl–Hirschman index based on total assets, loans, and deposits to examine the concentration level. To compute the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics, we use fixed effect regression method duly controlling for heterogeneity. The results show banks in Fiji exhibit monopolistic behavior and are biased towards monopoly/conjectural variation short-run oligopoly upon examining the significance level of the upper and lower bounds of the computed H-statistics. Moreover, the results also show that banks revenue are influenced positively by interest expenses, capital adequacy ratio, and the number of branches; and negatively by personnel expenses, other operating expenses, and firm size measured by total assets.     

Political Influence and the Banking Sector: Evidence from Korea*

This paper uses panel data to compare the performance of Korean banks with and without effective government control of the appointment of chief operating officers. A privatization programme succeeded in spreading ownership of banks widely among the public, but government retention of an ownership stake in an institution meant de facto control by government. Despite charging lower loan rates, banks controlled by government experience higher bad loans ratios. This is in line with expectations of regulatory forbearance and government protection for recipients of political loans. Banks controlled by government are less efficient than privately controlled banks and bad loan variables are higher at banks with lower efficiency scores.     

Investor protection,regulation and bank risk-taking behavior

This paper examines whether the influence of investor protection on banks’ risk is channeled through banking regulation, and vice-versa, using panel data from a sample of 567 European and US banks for the 2004–2015 period. As banking regulatory factors, we consider capital stringency, activity restrictions and private monitoring, whereas as investor protection factors, we consider the level of shareholder and creditor protection. We find that banking regulation moderates the positive direct influence of investor protection on banks’ risk, while investor protection reinforces the negative direct influence of banking regulation on risk. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of national regulations on banks’ risk is more pronounced during systemic crisis years. Finally, taking into account market competition, we argue that private monitoring only has a direct effect on banks’ risk, whereas the effects of capital stringency and activity restriction are channeled through market competition.     

Credit risk pricing and the rationality of lending decision-making within dual banking systems: A parametric approach

The reduction of non-performing loans, and making correct provisions for them, plays a primary role in the management and minimization of banking credit risk. However, these actions depend primarily upon the cost at which banks may dispose of these bad loans. Hence, this study aims to perceive the price of banks’ credit risk via estimating the shadow price of non-performing loans. We assess and compare the perceived price of the credit risk of Islamic and conventional banks operating in 9 countries from the Middle East and Asia, using a quadratic directional distance function. Following this, we evaluate the impact of different settings of directional vectors on shadow prices by conducting a risk-sensitivity analysis. Applying bootstrap regression, the factors affecting NPLs’ prices are further investigated. The paper concludes that the estimation of the shadow prices of bad loans can provide important elements in favor of credit risk management and, therefore, credit risk mitigation.     

Are commercial bank lending propensities useful in understanding small firm finance?

We consider recent criticism by Berger et al. (J Bank Finance 31:11–33, 2007) of the use of commercial bank lending propensities (e.g., small business loans/total assets) as research tools. We use 2SLS cross sectional regressions with bank fixed effects to examine the relationship between small business lending and bank size. Our results indicate that the propensity to lend to small businesses declines as bank size increases, and the growth in small business lending does not keep pace with the growth in bank size. An increase in bank asset size from $1 billion to $100 billion reduces the ratio of small business loans to total loans and leases by 28 percentage points. Contrary to Berger and Black (2007) we find that most small business loans are made by small banks. For 1993 to 2006 as a whole, small banks (those under $1 billion) accounted for only 14.1% of total deposits and 9.7% of total banking assets, but they accounted for 28.4% of small business loans outstanding. This is consistent with the pattern shown by lending propensities. We conclude that these propensities remain very useful tools in research on small firm finance.     

Is the secondary loan market valuable to borrowers?

In recent years, the secondary loan market has developed into an over-the-counter market where loans are not only sold but also subsequently traded. This shift away from traditional banking is altering the business of lending. Loan sales are valuable to banks because they free up capital, generate fee-based income and facilitate risk management; but they may be costly to borrowers because they negatively affect bank monitoring incentives. In this paper, however, we argue that there is another potential benefit to borrowers from loan sales. Borrowers with trading loans, in particular those with liquid loans, may “demand” a share of bank benefits from loan sales when they take out new loans as it will be easier for banks to sell these loans afterwards. We investigate this potential benefit of the secondary loan market by comparing the interest rates borrowers pay before their loans start to trade with the interest rates they pay on loans originated post-trading. Our results show that, on average, borrowers pay higher spreads on the loans they take out after the onset of trading on their loans. Importantly, our results also show that borrowers with liquid trading loans are able to borrow at lower interest rates after the onset of trading on their loans. Thus, while the banks’ decision to sell loans may initially impose a cost on borrowers, those whose loans enter the secondary loan market and become liquid benefit from an interest rate discount on their subsequent loans.     

Why do banks acquire non-banks?

This study focuses on the reasons for and the implications of banks?? decisions to acquire non-bank financial service firms (non-banks). The choice to acquire non-banks is driven by both external forces such as deregulation and regulatory capital and by internal forces such as a diversification strategy and efforts to enhance revenue and return to equity holders. We find that whereas the impact of acquiring non-banks increases their non-interest income, it also increases their non-interest expense. The net effect of choosing non-bank acquisitions lowers their subsequent return on assets, market value, and stock returns, as well as increasing their risk. However, the non-bank acquisitions do significantly increase the acquiring banks top executives?? subsequent compensation. We conclude that non-bank acquisitions are driven by both regulatory and strategic forces within the banking industry. However, such acquisitions manifest into agency problems.     

Does diversification promote systemic risk?

We measure systemic risk when faced with simulated shocks through the systemic model of banking originated losses. The formation mechanism of systemic risk is explored from the perspective of investment diversification and asset similarity. The results indicate that contagion risks formed by the over similarity of investment assets are the main cause of systemic risk. The similarity generally promotes contagion risks, however, it shows a double-faced effect for state-owned commercial banks that disperse shocks from counterparties through their too-big-to-fail advantages. The similarity is determined by diversification, which initially promotes similarity and disperses it after a threshold. The diversification acts on the contagion process of systemic risk by the mediation of the similarity. Therefore, diversification generally has a nonlinear impact on systemic risk. The results provide regulatory implications for the systemic stability of the banking system.     

The impact of bank competition and concentration on bank risk-taking behavior and stability: Evidence from GCC countries

This paper presents a comprehensive assessment of the impact of competition on bank fragility pre and post financial crisis period in the GCC banking market as measured by bank risk-taking behavior and bank stability during the period 1998–2016. Our results indicate that a higher level of bank competition and the greater degree of concentration adds to financial fragility. The findings further shows that during the 2008 crisis, lower bank competition maintain the stability of GCC banks. We also find that lower level of competition and lower concentration in the banking market increases the risk-taking behavior of the low capitalized, low liquid and small banks which add to fragility in the banking system. Our findings suggest that countries with greater capital stringency, greater supervisory power, greater market discipline, and private monitoring, with explicit deposit insurance schemes, higher shareholder protection, and higher legal efficiency decrease banks’ risk-taking and increase their stability. We also find that greater regulatory restrictions and higher creditor protection decrease banks’ stability and increase risk in concerned countries. We find support for both competition-fragility and competition-stability hypotheses in the GCC banking market. The results also confirm that the use of a single measure of competition is insufficient to assess the role of competition in banking stability.     

Contagion risk in the Czech financial system: A network analysis and simulation approach

This paper examines the potential for contagion within the Czech banking system via the channel of interbank exposures of domestic banks, enriched by a liquidity channel and an asset price channel, over the period March 2007 to June 2012. A computational model is used to assess the resilience of the Czech banking system to interbank contagion, taking into account the size and structure of interbank exposures as well as balance sheet and regulatory characteristics of individual banks in the network. The simulation results suggest that the potential for contagion due to credit losses on interbank exposures was rather limited. Even after the introduction of a liquidity condition into the simulations, the average contagion was below 3.8% of the remaining banking sector assets, with the exception of the period from December 2007 to September 2008. Activation of the asset price channel further increases the losses due to interbank contagion, showing that the liquidity of government bonds would be essential for the stability of Czech banks in stress situations. Finally, the simulation results for both idiosyncratic and multiple bank failure shocks suggest that the potential for contagion in the Czech banking system has decreased since the onset of the global financial crisis.     

An assessment of Portuguese banks’ efficiency and productivity towards euro area participation

This paper analyses the production technology of Portuguese banks during the 1992–2006 period through the estimation of a translog cost frontier. This period is of major interest because it covers Portugal’s euro area accession and its impact on the banking system. Hence, critical factors impacting the banking system are identified against the background of increasing financial integration prior to the financial crisis that started in 2007 and later translated into strains in some European sovereign debt markets. Banks are modelled as firms which produce loans and other earning assets, choosing the cost minimizing combination of labour, capital and interest bearing debt, subject to holding a predetermined level of equity. According to the results of this study, technological progress has shifted the cost frontier downwards throughout the period under consideration, whereas the distance at which banks have operated from the frontier seems to have remained constant. Further, increases in production under scale economies have also contributed to the recorded increase in productivity.     

Liquidity,bank runs,and fire sales under local thinking

We examine the implications on banking crises when markets are populated by agents that neglect tail risks and form expectations conditioned on a favorable subset of possible states of the economy. We find that optimal bank liquidity is lower than would be the case under rational expectations, and, consequently, the banking system is more vulnerable to adverse shocks, which lead to bank runs. Asset pledgeability of surviving banks is also affected so that their capacity to raise external funds for purchasing assets of distressed banks is weakened. Further, we examine the case when asset returns are correlated through securitization. In this case adverse shocks are felt uniformly across the banking sector and banks that survive with the help of a public liquidity backstop will become risk-averse and reluctant to purchase distressed assets. Finally, we explore a government funded asset purchase program, that is implemented with an asset price target.     

中国商业银行信用风险管理存在的问题及对策

信用风险是商业银行所面临的基本风险,也是目前中国商业银行最主要的金融风险。银行大量的不良资产和国外银行的竞争,使得提高银行的信用风险管理水平成为中国银行业面临的重要课题。本文将以商业银行信用风险为主题,分析信用风险的危害及信用风险管理的重要性,探寻中国银行业信用风险管理的缺陷与不足,提出解决方案。