Modeling,analysis and mitigation of contagion in financial systems

Recent financial turmoil (e.g., the 2008–2009 global financial crisis) has resulted in financial contagion-induced instability becoming one of the major concerns in the fields of economics and finance. In this paper, we extend the network analysis of financial contagion from three perspectives. First, given that cross-holding of claims and obligations among financial institutions can be viewed as input-output linkages, we model the financial system and the contagion mechanism by introducing the classic Leontief input–output framework. Second, based on this modeling process, we propose a simple contagion algorithm to study how financial system heterogeneity influences its stability. Third, to mitigate financial contagion, we propose several concrete intervention policies based on two widely used prudential approaches—forced mergers and capital injections. The performance of these intervention policies is then evaluated by comprehensive numerical experiments. Our study has significant implications for financial regulation and supervision.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the EMU when cyclical conditions are uncertain

This paper examines economic policy interactions in the Economic and Monetary Union when the assessment of cyclical conditions in real time is surrounded by uncertainty. On the basis of a simple stylised model it shows that with a Nash-type of interaction different views about the output gap on the side of the policy players—the Council of the European Union, the European Commission and the European Central Bank—can give rise to excessive activism with policy players pushing economic variables into opposite directions. It argues that the costs of such policy conflicts can be reduced by agreeing on a common assessment of the cycle, by constraining policy variables, and/or by increasing the weight of fiscally conservative institutions. An alternative option to sidestep policy conflicts ensuing from diverging views of the cycle is to take policy decisions sequentially, as is the case in a Stackelberg-type of interaction. The paper shows that for a given misperception of the cycle, the impact on the policy instruments and on output and inflation are generally smaller in the Stackelberg equilibrium as compared to a Nash outcome. Alternative allocations of roles—that is leader versus follower—are discussed and assessed.

金融不平衡与货币政策——基于文献研究的角度

在现代经济金融体制下,金融不平衡的积累和破灭,对货币政策的最终目标—货币稳定和金融稳定产生了重大不利影响,货币政策如何应对金融不平衡成为很多学者关注的话题。本文分析了货币政策在金融不平衡形成中的作用,以及金融不平衡对货币政策最终目标产生的不利影响,介绍了货币政策应对金融不平衡的几种政策主张。     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in a New Keynesian model with capital accumulation and non-Ricardian consumers

The paper examines simple monetary and fiscal policy rules consistent with determinate equilibrium dynamics in the absence of Ricardian equivalence. Under this assumption, government debt turns into a relevant state variable which needs to be accounted for in the analysis of equilibrium dynamics. The key analytical finding is that without explicit reference to the level of government debt it is not possible to infer how strongly the monetary and fiscal instruments should be used to ensure determinate equilibrium dynamics. Specifically, we identify bifurcations associated with threshold values of steady-state debt, leading to qualitative changes in the local determinacy requirements.     

Monetary policy,fiscal policy and cross signal jamming

This paper considers the issue of rule versus discretion when the central bank and the government share private information but have different preferences over inflation and output. We demonstrate that if the monetary policy is rule-based, Intuitive Criterion selects the unique separating equilibrium in which the central bank signals a low supply shock by a low interest rate. Interestingly, discretion may be better than the rule for the central bank, contrary to the case of complete information. Also, we examine the effect of information asymmetry on the monetary and fiscal policy mix. We show that cross signal jamming whereby the monetary authority and the fiscal authority successfully jams an unfavorable signal of each other does not occur in equilibrium.     

Monetary policy and the financial decisions of firms

Summary. In this paper we develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous, long-lived firms where financial factors play an important role in their production and investment decisions. When the economy is hit by monetary shocks, the response of small and large firms differs substantially, with small firms responding more than big firms. As a result of the financial decisions of firms, monetary shocks have a persistent impact on output. Another finding of the paper is that monetary shocks lead to considerable volatility in stock market returns.Received: 20 November 2003, Revised: 26 August 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: E5, G3.T.F. Cooley, V. Quadrini: We have received helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper from Jeff Campbell, David Chapman, Thomas Cosimano, Joao Gomes, Boyan Jovanovic, José-Víctor Ríos-Rull, and Harald Uhlig. Correspondence to: V. Quadrini     

Financial distress and fiscal inflation

Is inflation ‘always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon’ or is it fundamentally a fiscal phenomenon? The answer hinges crucially on the underlying monetary–fiscal policy regime. Scant attention has been directed to the role of credit market frictions in discerning the policy regime, despite its growing importance in empirical macroeconomics. We augment a standard monetary model to incorporate fiscal details and credit market imperfections. These ingredients allow for both interpretations of the inflation process in a financially constrained environment. We find that introducing financial frictions to the model and adding financial variables to the dataset generate important identifying restrictions on the observed pattern between inflation and measures of financial and fiscal stress, to the extent that it overturns existing findings about which monetary–fiscal policy regime produced the U.S. data. To confront policy regime uncertainty, we propose the use of dynamic prediction pools and find strong cyclical patterns in the estimated historical regime weights.     

财政、货币政策作用空间的历史变迁及其启示——基于中国财政、货币政策实践

财政政策发挥调控功能以国家财政拥有一定财力为基础,货币政策发挥调控功能以商业银行体系对中央银行的资金依赖为前提。失却此基础和前提,财政政策和货币政策调控功能就会大打折扣甚或完全丧失调控功能。新中国财政政策与货币政策作用空间的变迁经历了三个阶段,与之相适应,财政政策与货币政策调控功能分别经历了“强、弱、强”和“弱、强、弱”三种状态。经验表明,财政政策与货币政策作用空间的变迁与经济体制、国民经济运行格局息息相关。财政政策和货币政策要真正发挥宏观调控功能必须改善其赖以发挥作用的经济运行环境并加强两者之间的协调。     

Monetary policy,endogenous transactions,and financial market segmentation

An endogenous financial market segmentation model is constructed to explore the role of costly credit as a medium of exchange in the monetary policy elasticity of financial market activity. Against inflation risk, credit is an alternative insurance device to a cash transfer from the financial market. In equilibrium, credit reduces the financial market activity rate. Monetary policy has redistributive effects across economic individuals. Inflation may not tax financial market non-participants. However, it may tax financial market participants by increasing the financial market activity rate. Welfare may increase and the optimal money growth rate can be positive.     

宏观审慎管理与货币政策协调配合研究

宏观审慎政策与货币政策之间的关系是当前研究的热点,国际金融危机的教训表明货币政策无法保证宏观经济稳定,需要引入宏观审慎政策加强金融稳定管理。宏观审慎管理侧重防范化解系统性风险并维护金融稳定,货币政策侧重维护价格稳定并促进经济增长,二者并非完全独立而且相互影响。为了更好地提高宏观政策配合有效性和实施好经济管理,要把握宏观审慎政策和货币政策目标定位、执行和测度的兼容性,加强宏观审慎工具和货币政策工具在种类设置、使用规则、使用时机上的配合,统筹实施主体的权责设置、激励机制、约束机制、政策边界及国际合作,在政策目标、操作工具、组织安排、微观机制等方面促进宏观审慎管理与货币政策的协调配合,实现促进经济增长和维持金融稳定。     

中国实行通货膨胀目标制的可行性分析

通货膨胀目标制是一种以保持低而稳定的通货膨胀为首要目标的货币政策框架。本研究参照IMF提出的相关指标,并考虑到中国作为转型国家的经济特征,从中国当前经济运行中控制一般物价水平的必要性、经济结构的完善性、金融市场和银行体系的健全性、中央银行的独立性、货币政策的透明度以及央行准确预测通货膨胀的技术等方面考察了中国实行通货膨胀目标制的可行性,得出中国已经初步具备实施该货币制度的条件。并提出更彻底的制度改革将会确保中国成功实施通货膨胀目标制,从而使得宏观经济运行处于稳定的价格水平因而更有效率。     

货币政策对金融生态的影响机理及实证检验——基于上市商业银行面板数据的分析

传统的货币理论忽视了货币政策对银行风险承担及金融生态的影响,文章从商业银行的微观视角出发研究了货币政策对金融生态的影响机理。理论层面,金融生态与货币政策制度供给、传导机制和有效性相互关联,货币政策则通过资产价格或估值机制、收入及现金流机制、追求收益机制、杠杆调整机制、道德风险机制和风险转移机制影响商业银行的风险承担;实证层面,构建了货币政策影响商业银行信贷投放和风险承担的数理模型,选取国有和股份制两类共12家上市商业银行2008-2013年的面板数据进行固定效应模型实证检验。结果表明,宽松货币政策导致商业银行的信贷投放规模增加、风险承担意愿增强,有利于优化金融生态,反之则反是;国有商业银行对货币政策变化更敏感,而股份制商业银行对金融生态更敏感。因此,在我国宏观经济管理中,需要货币政策与宏观审慎政策相互协调配合。     

货币需求稳定性、货币目标制与中国货币政策框架改革

稳定的货币需求是货币目标制有效发挥作用的前提条件。文章首先从理论上阐述了货币需求与货币目标制的内在关联。其次,基于协整理论与误差修正模型,利用1996-2011年季度数据实证检验了中国货币需求函数的稳定性。实证研究结果表明,中国长期货币需求函数和短期货币需求函数的系数都缺乏稳定性。货币需求函数的不稳定势必增加中国以货币供应量为中间目标的货币政策操作难度,从而导致现行货币目标制的有效性和适宜性不断降低。最后提出为提高货币政策框架的有效性,中国应择机引入通胀目标制。     

Monetary policy and fiscal limits with no-default

This paper discusses monetary and fiscal policy interactions that stabilize government debt. Two distortions prevail in the model economy: income taxes and liquidity constraints. Possible obstructions to fiscal policy include a ceiling on the equilibrium debt-to-GDP ratio, zero or negative elasticity of tax revenues, and a political intolerance of raising tax rates. At the fiscal limit two mechanisms restore solvency: fiscal inflation, which reduces the real value of nominal debt, and open market operations, which diminish the size of government debt held by the private sector. Three regimes achieve this goal. In all regimes monetary policy is passive. In all regimes a muted tax response to government debt is consistent with equilibrium. The propensity of a fiscal authority to smooth output is found to determine what is an acceptable response (in the form of tax rate changes) to the level of government debt, while monetary policy determines the timing and magnitude of fiscal inflation. Impulse responses show that the inflation and tax hikes needed to offset a permanent shock to transfers are lowest under nominal interest rate pegs. In this regime, most of the reduction in the real value of government debt comes from open market purchases.     

我国货币政策对人民币汇率影响的实证研究

文章基于2005年7月21日我国人民币汇率改革以来的连续时间序列数据和离散数据,利用多元回归模型,实证研究了人民币汇率市场化改革以来我国货币政策对人民币汇率的影响。实证结果表明:我国货币政策的两个变量—货币供应量和利率,会对人民币汇率产生显著的影响,其中人民币货币供应量增加会引起人民币汇率贬值,银行间信用隔夜拆借利率上升可以引起人民币汇率升值。因此,中国在稳步推进人民币汇率制度改革同时,应有效监控我国货币供应量对汇率的影响,密切关注银行间同业拆解利率对人民币汇率波动的影响,从而促进我国经济内外平衡和外汇市场的平稳健康发展。     

Monetary policy design and transmission asymmetry in EMU: Does uncertainty matter?

In this paper, we consider how uncertainty affects the choice between federal monetary policy based on national and union-wide aggregate data under conditions of asymmetry in the transmission of monetary policy. We find that the uncertainty about the transmission process sustains (and, in some cases, even reinforces) the need to take into account information about national economies in the formulation of monetary policy. Also the forecasting process matters when uncertainty is additive: in particular, when union-wide forecasting is more accurate than national-based forecasting, this advantage can compensate for the welfare loss from using union-wide aggregation. There is, however, a strong case for using national information in the optimal design of common monetary policy.     

Information-based contagion and the implications for financial fragility

This paper explores a global game model of information-based financial contagion. By revealing information on a common fundamental factor and thereby affecting the behavior of creditors, the failure of a single firm can trigger the failure of another firm. The model provides a unique equilibrium framework to assess the consequences of contagion and yields some hitherto unnoticed insights. While contagion increases the correlation among the financial failures of different firms, its impact on the incidence of failure is ambiguous. I consider an analytically tractable version of the model in which the effect on the ex ante failure probabilities is exactly zero. Moreover, the impact of contagion increases with the relevance of a common underlying fundamental, but is limited to firms near the brink of success or failure.     

Optimal fiscal policy in a world liquidity trap

We construct a model of the international transmission of ‘liquidity trap’ shocks, and examine the case for international coordination of fiscal policy to respond to the liquidity trap. Integrated financial markets tend to propagate liquidity traps. In a global environment, fiscal policy may be effective in raising GDP when the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap, but it does so in a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ fashion; when one economy is in a liquidity trap, the cross country spillover effect of fiscal policy is negative. We examine the welfare optimizing policy response to a liquidity trap when countries coordinate on fiscal policy. Fiscal policy may be an effective tool in responding to a liquidity trap, although it is never optimal to use fiscal expansion sufficiently to fully eliminate a downturn. Moreover, there is little case for coordinated global fiscal expansion. For the most part, the country worst hit by a liquidity trap shock should use its own policies to respond, without much help from foreign policies.     

Alternative Monetary Targets,Instruments and Future Monetary Policy Frameworks

ABSTRACT

This article expands on the debate of whether merely controlling inflation can be considered a good outcome in terms of monetary policy, discussing proposals for adopting alternative monetary targets (e.g., price level, nominal GDP), alternative instruments (e.g., monetary finance, central bank digital currencies), for enlarging central banks' mandates (e.g., incorporating employment, wages, inequality, environmental objectives) and for the design of future monetary policy frameworks.

We argue that in the coming years, central banks should not simply maintain their pre-2008 standards by de-implementing unconventional monetary policies. Instead, they must take advantage of their past and recent experiences in order to improve, under an evolutionary perspective, future monetary policy and financial stability frameworks. Based on this, measures implemented since the 2008 crisis would have three possible treatments in new frameworks: i) be discarded, due to their predominantly adverse effects; ii) not be regularly implemented, but be used as backstop mechanisms if needed; iii) be incorporated as regular measures of monetary policy/financial stability frameworks. Accordingly, monetary and financial stability authorities will increasingly need to evolve and engage in a continuously adaptive and innovative process in order to face challenges posed by financial markets that are becoming more dynamic, innovative, complex, interconnected and globalised.     

A model to analyse financial fragility

Summary. This paper sets out a tractable model which illuminates problems relating to individual bank behaviour, to possible contagious inter-relationships between banks, and to the appropriate design of prudential requirements and incentives to limit ‘excessive’ risk-taking. Our model is rich enough to include heterogeneous agents, endogenous default, and multiple commodity, and credit and deposit markets. Yet, it is simple enough to be effectively computable and can therefore be used as a practical framework to analyse financial fragility. Financial fragility in our model emerges naturally as an equilibrium phenomenon. Among other results, a non-trivial quantity theory of money is derived, liquidity and default premia co-determine interest rates, and both regulatory and monetary policies have non-neutral effects. The model also indicates how monetary policy may affect financial fragility, thus highlighting the trade-off between financial stability and economic efficiency.Received: 6 November 2003, Revised: 6 October 2004 JEL Classification Numbers: D52, E4, E5, G11, G21.C.A.E. Goodhart, P. Sunirand, D.P. Tsomocos: We are grateful to T.F. Bewley, S. Bhattacharya, F. Hahn, C. Mayer, H.S. Shin and seminar participants at the Bank of Austria, Bank of England, Bank of Norway, Bank for International Settlements, Brown University, the 7th Annual Macroeconomic Conference, Crete, EcoMod-IIOA International Conference, Brussels, the 2nd Oxford Finance Summer Symposium and Nuffield, Oxford, the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research, Purdue University, the University of Birmingham, the VI SAET Conference, Rhodes, Yale University, and especially an anonymous referee and H.M. Polemarchakis for helpful comments. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of England. Correspondence to: D.P. Tsomocos