浅析独立学院学风的内涵与建设

学风是独立学院学生学生学习、生活和遵纪守法等多种因素的集中体现,分析独立学院学风的内涵和建设,加快独立学院学风的建设步伐,从根本上搞好独立学院的学风。     

Managing the hollow state Collaboration and contracting

This article presents what the authors have learned about managing networks of public, private and nonprofit service providers in the context of decentralized and devolved governmental regimes - what the authors have termed the hollow state. The characteristics of the hollow state are discussed along with two strategies for managing networks of organizations that jointly produce a public service - collaboration and contracting. The article revisits the authors' preliminary theory of network effectiveness, based on a four-city study of mental health in light of an evolutionary study conducted on one city's mental health system over four years.     

Who bribes in public contracting and why: worldwide evidence from firms

We study procurement bribery utilizing survey data from 11,000 enterprises in 125 countries. About one-third of managers report that firms like theirs bribe to secure a public contract, paying about 8 % of the contract value. Econometric estimations suggest that national governance factors, such as democratic accountability, press freedom, and rule of law, are associated with lower bribery. Larger and foreign-owned firms are less likely to bribe than smaller domestic ones. But among bribers, foreign and domestic firms pay similar amounts. Multinational firms appear sensitive to reputational risks in their home countries, but partially adapt to their host country environments.     

独立董事及监察人与企业盈余品质的关联性

本研究目的在于探讨独立董事与监察人对企业盈余品质的影响,研究中以2004至2009年台湾上市(柜)公司为对象,采用panel data模式进行实证研究。研究结果指出,独立董事比例(或人数)对企业向下盈余管理有显著负向影响,这表明独立董事对企业向下盈余管理具有抑制作用;独立监察人比例(或人数)对企业向上盈余管理有显著负向影响,这表明独立监察人对企业向上盈余管理具有监督效果。此实证结果显示,独立董事与监察人在公司盈余品质监督上关注的重点不同。     

物流价值和附加值:涵义和衡量

1 引言 现在实业界和学术界普遍认为物流是商业中的一个必要职能,这样产生了一个问题:物流是一个有附加值的运作或者仅是一个成本,这两种说法哪种更富有代表性。文献[1]认为物流具有“分销”的特征并把它看成“一个成本领域”和“单纯一个成本领域”。文献[2]提出物流经理,进而物流本身不增加价值,它指出这样一个看法即时间和地点是基本的并且必须在市场中恰好完成。它推理说如果一个活动是基本的,那么它必须增加价值,最后,他指出会计人员认为大多数物流活动是“没有附加值”的活动。这样就提出了一个问题即:物流的价值是什么?对它进行衡量有益吗?     

Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each firm competes for the business of a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. The timing in our model is Stackelberg: in the first stage, given the distribution of buyer types known to all firms and the deducible, type-dependent best responses of the agent, firms simultaneously and noncooperatively choose their catalog offers. In the second stage the buyer, knowing his type, chooses a single firm and product-price pair from that firm’s catalog. By backward induction, this Stackelberg game with asymmetric information reduces to a game over catalogs with payoff indeterminacies. In particular, due to ties within catalogs and/or across catalogs, corresponding to any catalog profile offered by firms there may be multiple possible expected firm payoffs, all consistent with the rational optimizing behavior of the agent for each of his types. The resolution of these indeterminacies depends on the tie-breaking mechanism which emerges in the market. Because each tie-breaking mechanism induces a particular game over catalogs, a reasonable candidate would be a tie-breaking mechanism which supports a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding catalog game. We call such a mechanism an endogenous Nash mechanism. The fundamental question we address in this paper is, does there exist an endogenous Nash mechanism—and therefore, does there exist a Nash equilibrium for the catalog game? We show under fairly mild conditions on primitives that catalog games naturally possess tie-breaking mechanisms which support Nash equilibria.     

Individual contracting,collective bargaining and wages in Australia

We examine wages in Australia under federally registered individual contracts and collective agreements (CAs) using unpublished data from a national earnings survey. The distribution of earnings under registered individual contracts was more unequal than under CAs. Average and median earnings under registered individual contracts were lower than under CAs. There was little evidence that individual contracting raised wages through raising productivity. The link between contracting and pay appears contingent, varying between occupations, industries, and firm size bands and dependent upon employees' position in the labour market and employers' use of union avoidance strategies. This has implications for the interpretation of studies of union wage effects.     

论法务会计与独立审计的联系和区别

本文在阐述法务会计的含义之后，着重分析了法务会计与独立审计在工作程序与方法、证据与业务活动、执业准则与道德规范等方面的密切联系，并进一步指出了两者在目的、对象、立场、执业标准、工作起点、推断方式、职能、主体、证据的取得与运用、业务报告等方面的重要区别。     

Dynamic contracting under imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs

We develop a dynamic principal–agent model to show how imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs about payoff-relevant parameters, agency conflicts, and the agent's implicit incentives to influence the principal's posterior beliefs through his unobservable actions interact to affect optimal dynamic contracts. We make a methodological contribution to the literature by solving the continuous-time contracting problem using a discrete-time approximation approach. We obtain a simple characterization of optimal renegotiation-proof contracts in terms of the solution to a nonlinear ordinary differential equation (ODE). We then exploit the properties of the ODE to derive a number of novel implications for the dynamics of long-term contracts that alter the intuition gleaned from the previous literature. Optimism has a first-order impact on incentives, investment and output that could reconcile the “private equity” puzzle. Consistent with empirical evidence, the interaction between asymmetric beliefs, risk-sharing and adverse selection costs could cause the time-paths of the agent's incentive intensities to be increasing or decreasing. Our results also suggest that the incorporation of imperfect public information and asymmetric beliefs could potentially reconcile empirical evidence of an ambiguous relation between risk and incentives, and a non-monotonic relation between firm value and incentives. Permanent and transitory components of risk have differing effects on incentives, which suggest that empirical investigations of the link between risk and incentives should appropriately account for different components of risk.     

浅析句意和话语意义之间的关系（英文）

意义在语言学领域内扮演重要的角色,对意义的研究也经历了相长的时间。然而＂,意义＂？这个词本身就有不同的意思,因此,对意义的研究并非易事。意义既影响客观世界又受到客观世界的影响。我们可以从两方面来对意义进行研究,一类关系到意义内在的方面,比较稳定,另一类则与语境关系密切。前者属于语义学范畴而后者属于语义学范畴。由于语义和语用对意义研究的焦点不同,出现了两类不同的意义：句子意义和话语意义。文章通过分析不同的学者提出的理论对句子意思和话语意义进行了详细的阐释,例如合成原则、语义角色、言语行为理论以及会话含义。并指出,语境在区分句子意义和话语意义方面起了决定性的作用。     

独立学院教师教学研究能力现状及提升策略——以广西独立学院为例

文章基于对广西独立学院教师教学能力现状的抽样调查及其统计汇总结果,针对其中的教师教学研究能力现状进行分析,提出了独立学院教师教学研究能力的提升策略。     

Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment

This paper analyses multi-period regulation or procurement policies under asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated firms. As well known in the literature, some degree of separation is always optimal under any form of commitment. In contrast, we show that full pooling is optimal under noncommitment when the discount factor is sufficiently high. We also discuss the meaning of full pooling under double randomization. Finally, we provide a graphical analysis of the second-best policy in terms of the regulator's commitment capacity. Received: 4 December 1996 / 7 October 1999     

现代独立审计：一项公共政策

社会的发展既给独立审计提供了机遇,同时也提出了挑战。独立审计将在高度发达的资本市场和充满机会和风险的现代社会中担当什么样的角色,以及如何充当这一角色应是职业界重点研究的一个问题。本文从独立审计的历史角色、内在机制和现代社会环境出发,认为现代独立审计应该定位于公共政策的社会角色。     

自主创新：中国经济新誓言

中国经济凭借着自身改革所释放出来的巨大潜能刷新了一个又一个的历史记录,但却强烈地遭遇到结构趋同、产能过剩、能源短缺以及对外贸易摩擦等多元力量的掣肘。打通经济增长的未来脉络已经客观地落在了自主创新的战略命题之上。     

Smart logistics transformation collaboration between manufacturers and logistics service providers: A supply chain contracting perspective

Intelligent transformation of manufacturers requires smart logistics transformation collaboration, which improves competitiveness. In this study, we construct a Stackelberg game model based on the mutual influence and restriction in the relationship between a manufacturer and a logistics service provider (LSP) undergoing smart logistics transformation. We investigate whether cost-sharing (CS) or revenue-sharing (RS) contracts can coordinate the supply chain and suggest a hybrid CS–RS contract to improve performance. We find that, compared with decentralized options, CS and RS contracts achieve a higher level of smart logistics transformation. While the coordination and effectiveness of CS contracts are superior to those of RS contracts, neither can fully coordinate the supply chain. The proposed hybrid CS–RS contract allows the manufacturer to share the LSP’s costs before the transformation and its partial revenue after transformation, so that the LSP can reduce its service charge, thereby achieving full supply chain coordination.