The Competitive Effect of Exclusive Dealing in the Presence of Renegotiation Breakdown

This paper analyzes the seller’s incentive to write exclusive contracts with buyers (“exclusive dealing”) and the welfare implications of such contracts in the presence of renegotiation breakdown whereby exclusive dealing is able to affect both the incumbent seller’s investment and a rival’s entry. The analysis shows that the probability of renegotiation breakdown plays a central role in determining the competitive effect of exclusive dealing. Exclusivity is likely to be anticompetitive for intermediate levels of renegotiation breakdown risk, while it is likely to be procompetitive for a very low breakdown risk under linear pricing (and for a very high breakdown risk under two-part tariffs). The result suggests that the competitive effect of exclusive dealing is decided by the interaction between investment promotion and foreclosure, which in turn depends on the probability of renegotiation breakdown and the pricing scheme that sellers can choose.     

Naked Exclusion in the Lab: The Case of Sequential Contracting

In the context of the naked exclusion model of Rasmusen, Ramseyer and Wiley [1991] and Segal and Whinston [2009b], we examine whether sequential contracting is more conducive to exclusion in the lab, and whether it is cheaper for the incumbent than simultaneous contracting. We find that an incumbent who proposes contracts to buyers sequentially, excludes significantly more often than an incumbent who proposes contracts simultaneously. In contrast to theory, this comes at a substantial cost for the incumbent. Accounting for the observation that buyers are more likely to accept an exclusive contract the higher the payment, substantially improves the fit between theoretical predictions and observed behavior.     

EXCLUSIVE QUALITY*

In the case of vertically differentiated products, Bertrand competition at the retail level does not prevent an incumbent upstream firm from using exclusivity contracts to deter the entry of a high‐quality rival. Indeed, because of differentiation, the incumbent's inferior product is not eliminated upon entry. Due to the resulting competitive pressure, a retailer who considers rejecting the exclusivity contract expects to earn much less than the incumbent's monopoly rents. Thus, in equilibrium, the incumbent can always offer high enough an upfront payment to induce all retailers to sign the contract and achieve exclusion. This is true under linear pricing for intermediate levels of entry costs, and with two‐part tariffs even in the absence of entry costs.     

An experimental study of exclusive contracts

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment based on exclusive contracts that may theoretically lead to inefficient “naked exclusion” of a potential rival. The data indicate that changes in the number of buyers in the market have no significant effect on exclusion rates but the likelihood of inefficient exclusion is decreased both when a larger fraction of signed buyers are needed to deter a rival's entry and when buyers engage in non-binding communication. These results have antitrust implications both in terms of helping to identify “at-risk” market characteristics and suggesting potential competition-enhancing strategies. A sub-game of the experiment where buyers make signing decisions can be illustrated as a coordination game with the unique feature that payoffs are affected by a separate but interested party (the incumbent seller). I find that the height of the potential function and relevant basin of attraction, especially when combined with quantal response estimation, have larger predictive power in this sub-game than several other equilibrium selection criteria.     

All-Unit Discounts and the Problem of Surplus Division

All-unit discounts (AUD) are non-linear pricing schemes whereby buyers who reach a specific quantity threshold get rebates also retroactively for all units bought before. This sets high incentives for buyers to meet the quantity threshold, and may also have foreclosure effects on potential entrants. In a model where an incumbent faces second-period competition by entrants, we show that AUD can indeed be abused to shift rents from entrants. In contrast to exclusive dealing which is usually seen as very similar to AUD, inefficient quantity distortions may arise even with perfect information if and only if there is sufficiently intense competition among potential entrants.     

Contracts as a barrier to entry: Impact of Buyer’s asymmetric information and bargaining power

An incumbent seller contracts with a buyer under the threat of entry. The contract stipulates a price and a penalty for breach if the buyer later switches to the entrant. Sellers are heterogenous in terms of the gross surplus they provide to the buyer. The buyer is privately informed on her valuation for the incumbent’s service. Asymmetric information makes the incumbent favor entry as it helps screening buyers. When the entrant has some bargaining power vis-à-vis the buyer and keeps a share of the gains from entry, the incumbent instead wants to reduce entry. The compounding effect of these two forces may lead to either excessive entry or foreclosure, and possibly to a fixed rebate for exclusivity which is afforded to all buyers.     

On the competition enhancing effects of exclusive dealing contracts

Antitrust scholars have argued that exclusive contracts have anticompetitive, or at best neutral effects, if no efficiencies are generated. In contrast, this paper shows that exclusive contracts can have procompetitive effects, provided buyers are imperfect downstream competitors and contract breach is feasible. In that case, an efficient entrant is not necessarily foreclosed through exclusive contracts but induces buyers to breach. Because breaching buyers have to pay expectation damages to the incumbent, the downstream profits they obtain when breaching must be large enough. Therefore, the entrant needs to set a lower wholesale price than absent exclusive contracts, leading to lower final consumer prices and higher welfare.     

Defending Home against Giants: Exclusive Dealing as a Survival Strategy for Local Firms*

We consider exclusive contracts a survival strategy for a local incumbent manufacturer facing a multinational manufacturer's entry. Although both manufacturers prefer to trade with an efficient local distributor, trading with inefficient competitive distributors is acceptable only to the entrant, because of the entrant's efficiency. Hence, such competitive distributors can be an outside option for the entrant. As the entrant becomes efficient, the outside option works effectively, implying that the entry does not considerably benefit the efficient local distributor. Thus, the local manufacturer is more likely to sign an anticompetitive exclusive contract with the efficient distributor as the entrant becomes efficient.     

Robust exclusion and market division through loyalty discounts

We show that loyalty discounts create an externality among buyers because each buyer who signs a loyalty discount contract softens competition and raises prices for all buyers. This externality can enable an incumbent to use loyalty discounts to effectively divide the market with its rival and raise prices. If loyalty discounts also include a buyer commitment to buy from the incumbent, then loyalty discounts can also deter entry under conditions in which ordinary exclusive dealing cannot. With or without buyer commitment, loyalty discounts will increase profits while reducing consumer welfare and total welfare as long as enough buyers exist and the entrant does not have too large a cost advantage. These propositions are true even if the entrant is more efficient and the loyalty discounts are above cost and cover less than half the market. We also prove that these propositions hold without assuming economies of scale, downstream competition, buyer switching costs, financial constraints, limits on rival expandability, or any intra-product bundle of contestable and incontestable demand.     

ON THE ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECT OF EXCLUSIVE DEALING WHEN ENTRY BY MERGER IS POSSIBLE*

We extend the literature on exclusive dealing by allowing the incumbent and the potential entrant to merge. This uncovers new effects. First, exclusive dealing can be used to improve the incumbent's bargaining position in the merger negotiation. Second, the incumbent finds it easier to elicit the buyer's acceptance of exclusivity. Third, despite allowing the more efficient technology to find its way into the industry, exclusive dealing reduces welfare because (i) it may trigger entry through merger whereas independent entry would be socially optimal and (ii) it may deter entry altogether.     

Exclusion through speculation

We demonstrate how an incumbent producer of commodities can use cash-settled derivatives contracts to deter entry and extract rents from a potential competitor. By selling more derivatives than total demand, the producer commits to low prices and forces the entrant to price low upon entry. By setting a high upfront derivatives price, the producer can extract the consumer's gains from those low prices. This exclusionary scheme becomes more difficult when the buyer becomes more risk averse and with multiple buyers.     

Exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets

This paper studies the incentives to engage in exclusionary pricing in the context of two-sided markets. Platforms are horizontally differentiated, and seek to attract users of two groups who single-home and enjoy indirect network externalities from the size of the opposite user group active on the same platform. The entrant incurs a fixed cost of entry, and the incumbent can commit to its prices before the entry decision is taken. The incumbent has thus the option to either accommodate entry, or to exclude entry and enjoy monopolistic profits, albeit under the constraint that its price must be low enough to not leave any room for an entrant to cover its fixed cost of entry. We find that, in the spirit of the literature on limit pricing, under certain circumstances even platforms find it profitable to exclude entrants if the fixed entry cost lies above a certain threshold. By studying the properties of the threshold, we show that the stronger the network externality, the lower the thresholds for which incumbent platforms find it profitable to exclude. We also find that entry deterrence is more likely to harm consumers the weaker are network externalities, and the more differentiated are the two platforms.     

Naked exclusion by a dominant input supplier: Exclusive contracting and loyalty discounts

Recent literature has shown that an incumbent can use exclusive contracts to maintain supra-competitive prices when buyers of the good are also competitors. Most of the models require the incumbent to completely prevent a more efficient potential entrant from entering, and assume that the entrant is exogenously prevented from making exclusive offers. Such models cannot explain how exclusive arrangements can lower welfare when they do not completely foreclose a small rival, when the rival can make exclusive offers, nor can they identify rudimentary relationships such as how a dominant supplier's size affects his incentive and ability to exclude and lower welfare. I extend the intuition of the literature by formally modeling competition between a dominant input supplier and a small rival selling to competing downstream firms. I show that a dominant supplier can pay downstream firms for exclusivity, allowing him to maintain supra-competitive input prices, even when a small rival that is more efficient at serving some portion of the market can make exclusive offers. I also show that exclusives need not completely exclude the small rival to cause competitive harm. The payment the dominant supplier makes for exclusivity equals the incremental rents that the rival's input could generate if exactly one downstream firm sold final goods using it.     

Exclusive Dealing: Investment Promotion May Facilitate Inefficient Foreclosure

This paper studies a model whereby exclusive dealing (ED) can both promote investment and foreclose a more efficient supplier. Since ED promotes the incumbent seller's investment, the seller and the buyer realize a greater surplus from bilateral trade under exclusivity. Hence, the parties involved may sign an ED contract that excludes a more efficient entrant in circumstances where ED would not arise absent investment. The paper therefore invites a more cautious attitude towards accepting possible investment promotion arguments as a defense for ED.     

Estimating the foreclosure effect of exclusive dealing: Evidence from the entry of specialty beer producers

This paper estimates an entry model to study the effect of exclusive dealing between Anheuser Busch and its distributors on rival brewers' entry decisions and consumer surplus. The entry model accounts for post-entry demand conditions and strategic spillover effects. I recover a brewer's fixed costs using a two-step estimator and find spillover effects on brewers' entry decisions. I find that a brewer has higher fixed costs at locations where Anheuser Busch employ exclusive distributors, but the effect is only statistically significant in certain local areas. The estimates also show that a brewer is less likely to enter a location that is farther from its brewery, has lower expected demand, or is smaller in store size. I implement counterfactual experiments to study the effect of banning exclusive contracts between Anheuser Busch and its distributors. The results show that the welfare improvement associated with banning such contracts is very small.     

Competing buyers,rent extraction and inefficient exclusion

The article illustrates how a seller profitably can prevent entry of a potential competitor, even when entry would increase industry profit. Entry is prevented by offering exclusive contracts to the buyers. The buyers are assumed to be differentiated firms, competing in a downstream market. Exclusion occurs in equilibrium as long as there is some degree of competition among the downstream firms, and even when there are no economies of scale in upstream production.     

Exclusionary Pricing When Scale Matters

We consider an incumbent firm and a more efficient entrant, both offering a network good to several asymmetric buyers, and both being able to price discriminate. The good has positive value to buyers only if the network size exceeds a certain threshold. The incumbent's installed base guarantees this critical size to the incumbent, while the entrant needs to attract enough ‘new’ buyers to meet this threshold. We show that price discrimination (in the various forms it may take) reduces the set of achievable socially efficient entry equilibria, and discuss the policy implications of this result.     

Is exclusionary pricing anticompetitive in two-sided markets?

This paper studies the competitive effects of exclusionary pricing in two-sided markets. While formally showing that below-cost pricing on one market side can allow an incumbent firm to exclude a potential rival which does not have a customer base yet, the proposed model does not necessarily imply that below-cost pricing in such markets should be taken as anti-competitive conduct. Instead, I find that in sufficiently asymmetric two-sided markets, exclusion is always beneficial and if anything, there is too little of it in the sense that there are cases in which there is inefficient entry. Further, prohibiting below marginal cost pricing may destroy some socially efficient exclusion and worsen the problem of excessive (or inefficient) entry.     

Tying in evolving industries,when future entry cannot be deterred

We show that the incentive to engage in exclusionary tying (of two complementary products) may arise even when tying cannot be used as a defensive strategy to protect the incumbent’s dominant position in the primary market. By engaging in tying, an incumbent firm sacrifices current profits but can exclude a more efficient rival from a complementary market by depriving it of the critical scale it needs to be successful. In turn, exclusion in the complementary market allows the incumbent to be in a favorable position when a more efficient rival will enter the primary market, and to appropriate some of the rival’s efficiency rents. The paper also shows that tying is a more profitable exclusionary strategy than pure bundling, and that exclusion is the less likely the higher the proportion of consumers who multi-home.     

Vertical relations,pass-through,and market definition: Evidence from grocery retailing

We examine how different pass-through rates from input prices to retail prices and different vertical contracts affect upstream market definition. Simple theoretical considerations suggest that vertical restraints induce higher pass-through rates and thus lead to a larger upstream market definition when compared to linear wholesale pricing, given that contracts with linear pricing are associated with lower pass-through rates under imperfect competition. Data from grocery retailing is used to quantify the empirical implications of our theoretical assertion. We find that resale price maintenance leads to larger upstream market definitions than linear pricing. We therefore advise competition authorities to carefully model vertical market structures, whenever they expect incomplete pass-through to be important.