Whose property is it anyway? The social nature of economic actors and egalitarian remuneration ∗

This article formulates an egalitarian theory of property based on an ethic of remuneration for economic contributions. The principle of egalitarian remuneration is developed by revising basic notions of economic contributions. Economic contributions are found to be those activities that contribute to the value of commodities not just those that produce a product. Consumers, and not only producers, contribute to the creation of value, and these economic contributions make consumers eligible for remuneration. However, the concept of consumer contributions needs to be recast, for consumer contributions do not consist of neoclassical, individualistic actors maximizing subjective preferences. Rather, consumers economic contributions flow from their socially self-determined attributes as formed through relation to the system of economic actors. Indirect social contributions spread responsibility throughout the members of the system, affecting calculations of dueness. Other members indirect contributions are relatively equal in degree of responsibility for the social formation of the consumer's economic contributions. The dispersion and equalization of responsibility for the creation of economic contributions entails a correlative equalization of claims to remuneration, on a principle of dueness for economic contributions. This implies a property right to egalitarian remuneration.     

Social welfare and the unrepresentative representative consumer

If, for all prices, income distribution is optimal for a planner with a social welfare function, then aggregate demand is the same as that of a single “representative consumer” whose preferences over aggregate consumption are the same as the planner's. This paper shows that the converse is false. Aggregate demand may be the demand function of a representative consumer although the income distribution is not optimal for any social welfare function. The representative consumer may be Pareto inconsistent, preferring situation A to B when all the actual consumers prefer B to A. We give conditions under which existence of a representative consumer implies that the income distribution satisfies first order conditions for optimality. Satisfying the first order optimality conditions for an additively separable social welfare function is essentially equivalent to aggregate demand for every pair of consumers having a symmetric Slutsky matrix.     

Conformity and the Demand for Environmental Goods

The existing literature on eco-labeling and green consumerism has been framed within a classical market context where price and quality are the drivers of consumer choice. However, it seems possible that consumers are also concerned about the choices made by other consumers. In fact, it is unclear that people’s consumption decisions are made independently of social context. For instance, under the desire to conform to certain social norms—or in the presence of status concerns—some individuals may be willing to pay a higher price premium for green products the more widespread green consumerism is in society. We test this hypothesis using a choice experiment where the respondents were asked to choose among coffee products varying with respect to their share of ecological beans, share of fair trade beans, and price. Three treatments were used, differing only in the information given about the choices made by other consumers. We find different responses to the treatments across individuals and we can only confirm our hypothesis of conformity for women, although men appear to have stronger preferences for ecological coffee than women have.     

An experimental study on individual choice, social welfare, and social preferences

We experimentally study subjects’ compliance with dominance relationships of income distributions in a ranking task. The experiment consisted of four different treatments: Lottery, individual choice, social preferences, and social planner. Our results suggest that people's risk attitudes do not adequately reflect their inequality attitudes. Uninvolved social planners exhibit randomization preferences, while self-interested social planners are generally more inequality averse and try to avoid extreme outcomes.     

Nonseparable preferences and optimal social security systems

In this paper, we consider economies in which agents are privately informed about their skills, which evolve stochastically over time. We require agents' preferences to be weakly separable between the lifetime paths of consumption and labor. However, we allow for intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences like habit formation. In this environment, we derive a generalized version of the Inverse Euler Equation and use it to show that intertemporal wedges characterizing optimal allocations of consumption can be strictly negative. We also show that preference nonseparabilities imply that optimal differentiable asset income taxes are necessarily retrospective in nature. We show that under weak conditions, it is possible to implement a socially optimal allocation using a social security system in which taxes on wealth are linear, and taxes/transfers are history-dependent only at retirement. The average asset income tax in this system is zero.     

Voting on the environment: Price or ideology? Evidence from Swiss referendums

Studies on preferences for environmental quality usually posit that price and income explain most of the observed choices. Incorporating recent advances in the economics of non-selfish behavior into the traditional public choice approach, we argue that the willingness to contribute to public goods as well as social norms need to be taken into account when analyzing environmental voting outcomes. We study aggregate results of three ballot proposals in Switzerland put to vote in the year 2000 which foresaw different tax schemes on fossil energy. Our main results show that the aggregate level choice pattern is to be explained by income as well as structural attributes that make costs and benefits of the projects vary. More importantly, our results underline the importance of including variables pertaining to the notion of ideology, both in terms of statistical fit and obtaining unbiased estimates for price and income determinants.     

选择实验理论及其在食品需求研究中的应用:文献综述

概述了选择实验理论及其应用,在此基础上对利用选择实验方法研究食品需求的国内外文献进行综述。得出结论:美国的此类研究主要聚焦于消费者对食品质量和安全属性的偏好和支付意愿方面;欧洲的此类研究除了关注消费者的食品质量和安全需求外,还关注转基因、动物福利等问题。提出后续基于此类方法的研究应进一步关注食品特定属性的变化对消费者或社会福利的影响以及由此导致的市场效应的评价,而消费者需求行为与食品生产者行为、政府角色的结合可作为未来研究的切入点,同时应将选择实验方法更多地应用于中国食品需求研究。     

Strategic take-back programs when consumers have heterogeneous environmental preferences

We look at the strategic introduction of take-back programs (TBPs) which offer consumers a discount on their next purchase (reward) when they drop off previous purchases. In a Hotelling duopoly, consumers are heterogeneous not only in terms of their location on the Hotelling line but also in terms of their recycling preferences. Firms introduce TBPs to obtain a market share advantage (reward effect) and/or to recover the intrinsic value of the recycled units (recycling effect); their choice of the optimal reward balances these two effects: for instance, a firm might be willing to introduce a TBP, even if this means losing money on each recycled unit, in order to prevent the competitor from gaining a too large market share advantage. Comparing the level of TBP uptake at the market equilibrium to the one that maximizes social welfare, we show that a lower or higher TBP uptake can be socially desirable, depending, among other, on the weight that is given to the environmental benefits of TBPs. Several extended producer responsibility policies are discussed in terms of their potential to encourage TBP uptake and their overall impact on social welfare.     

Equity,efficiency, and the structure of indirect taxation

Optimal tax formulae are derived and optimal tax rates calculated for the case where there are many consumers, an income tax is impossible and the government has to trade off efficiency in order to improve the real distribution of income. Consistent aggregation assumptions are used to permit the derivation of simple tax rules depending only on the behaviour of the average consumer and of a socially representative consumer. Calculations for the U.K. in 1972 show how subsidies and taxes vary with the government's revenue requirement and with the degree of egalitarianism in the social welfare function.     

Estimating consumer preferences for online music services

This article analyses consumer preferences with regard to important attributes of online music services. Conjoint analysis and a random coefficient discrete choice model using Bayesian approach with Gibbs sampling are used to estimate the preferences. Based on the quantitative results, we use simulation to look at how a new pricing strategy and the threat of legal penalty for file sharing would influence the online music market. Findings include these: estimated willingness to pay for downloading one music file is significantly less than the actual price of the file; consumers are sensitive to longer search and download times for music files and very sensitive to the threat of legal action; and consumers are not sensitive to online music services broadening their catalogues. Finally, the simulation shows that a combination of increased transaction costs for illegal file sharing and lower-priced digital music files would inhibit illegal file sharing and bolster the number of people purchasing music legally from the online services.     

Salience and social choice

The axioms of expected utility and discounted utility theory have been tested extensively. In contrast, the axioms of social welfare functions have only been tested in a few questionnaire studies involving choices between hypothetical income distributions. In a controlled experiment with 100 subjects placed in the role of social planners, we test five fundamental properties of social welfare functions to determine the efficacy of traditional social choice models in predicting social planner allocations when presented with choice sets designed to test the axioms of the theory. We find that three properties of the standard social welfare functions tested are systematically violated, producing an Allais paradox, a common ratio effect, and a framing effect in social choice. We find support for scale invariance and a preference for tail-increasing transfers. Our experiment also enables us to test a model of salience-based social choice which predicts the systematic deviations and highlights the close relationship between these anomalies and the classical paradoxes for risk and time.

     

Aggregation and pairwise aggregation of demand when the distribution of income is fixed

This paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for “pairwise aggregation” of the demand functions of a group of consumers (conditions under which the mean demand for each pair of consumers satisfies the Slutsky restrictions) when the distribution of income is fixed. The sufficient conditions imply existence of a “representative” competitive consumer whose demand is the mean demand of the group. The necessary conditions imply that such a representative consumer exists for every fixed income distribution only if the consumers have homothetic preferences or, alternatively, if for each price vector, all the consumers' income expansion paths lie in the same plane.     

Estimating consumer demand in Korea

In this paper, time series annual data on five consumer goods for Korea are analyzed using the neoclassical model of consumer behavior. The approach taken is the indirect utility function and employs a translog form. Various restrictive specifications of consumer preferences with respect to homotheticity and separability are examined and rejected by the likelihood ratio test. Income and price elasticities are estimated, which appear to be generally high relative to those of developed countries. Growth in real income is primarily responsible for changes in commodity demand. Marginal utilities of income and associated income elasticities are calculated, which are consistent with normal expectations.     

OTHER-REGARDING UZAWA PREFERENCES AND LIVING STANDARD CATCH-UP

This paper provides a new rationale for Uzawa preferences based on social choice; instead of positing that poor people are more patient because they are poor, it posits that poor people should be more patient if they wish their living standards to catch up with richer people. To provide a setting for this new rationale, the present paper studies the socially optimal choice of living standards over time by social planners for countries that, from low levels of total factor productivity (TFP), experience a gradual catch-up of their TFP level with that of the leader country. In the TFP catch-up scenario, the socially optimal choice of consumption and saving based on time additive preferences leads to no catch-up of living standards. To generate living standard catch-up we propose other-regarding Uzawa preferences, in which the rate of time preference is influenced by the gap in living standards between follower country and leader country. This other-regarding specification is consistent with recent findings emphasized in behavioural economics. The other-regarding Uzawa preferences form is illustrated quantitatively by simulating a model of the world economy.     

Welfare effects of energy subsidy reform in developing countries

We analyze the potential welfare effect of energy subsidy reforms. The income distributions of eleven developing countries from different geographical regions are simulated using the assumption that income is lognormally distributed. We use the concept of the compensating variation to measure how much compensation is required to compensate consumers for a price increase in formerly subsidized goods. The behavior of consumers is modeled by a standard Cobb–Douglas and a quasilinear utility function. In the Cobb–Douglas case, a fixed fraction of income is spent on the subsidized good, which does not change after a price increase. With quasilinear preferences, the optimal amount of the subsidized good does not vary with income, but does change as prices change. We show theoretically and empirically that the required compensating variation can be set below the saved expenditures on subsidies, so a budget neutral reform can have a positive effect on social welfare.     

Position-Dependent order effects on the prediction of consumer preferences in repeated choice experiments

Using stated choice data collected by experimental design with repeated choice tasks, this study developed an approach to quantify the position-dependent order effects on the prediction of preferences and marginal willingness to pay for product attributes. Results showed that repeated choice tasks allow learning to occur. Models with order effect adjustments showed significant improvements in goodness of fit. Attribute-specific polynomial trends showed the best fit among all models, which could possibly be explained by respondents’ familiarity and sensitivity to different product attributes. Repeated-choice experiments have a good potential to capture consumer preferences more accurately than the single-choice design. But order effects need to be taken into account for preferences and market prediction.     

Preferences with and without prices - does the price attribute affect behavior in stated preference surveys?

The experimental as well as the non-market valuation literature include several examples of how an introduced price can affect behavior in otherwise not expected ways. It has become standard to include a price vector as an attribute in choice experiments, something that enables us to estimate a marginal willingness to pay for other attributes. We test the impact on preferences by an inclusion of a price in a choice experiment. Preferences are affected, as might be expected. However, also the relative ranking of individual attributes is affected.      

Should Mobile Marketers Collect Data Other Than Geo‐Location?*

We take today's mobile marketing data landscape as a starting point and consider a duopoly model of third‐degree price discrimination in which firms can complement geo‐location information with data on consumer flexibility of varying quality. We show that, depending on consumer heterogeneity, higher‐quality flexibility data affect profits according to three different patterns. In equilibrium, both firms tend to acquire data if the data are of high quality, while only one acquires data if the data quality is low. Firms are likely to gain from additional data if consumers have similar preferences and/or when data are precise. Although social welfare (weakly) improves, consumers can be harmed.     

Socially responsible firms and endogenous choice of strategic incentives

In this paper we are analyzing a mixed quantity-setting duopoly consisting of a socially concerned firm and a profit-maximizing firm. The socially concerned firm considers one group of stakeholders in its objective function and maximizes its profit plus a share of consumer surplus. Both firms have the option to hire a manager who determines the production quantity on behalf of the firm's owner. We find that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game both firms hire a manager and delegate the production choice. If the unit production costs of the firms are similar, then the socially concerned firm has a higher market share and even higher profit. Interestingly, we observe that the relationship between the share of consumer surplus taken into account by the socially concerned firm and its profit is non-monotonic. As the share increases, the socially concerned firm's profit first increases and then decreases. The conclusion is that it pays off to take stakeholder interests into account, but not too much.     

Modelling preference heterogeneity for theatre tickets: a discrete choice modelling approach on Royal Danish Theatre booking data

This article analyses the behavioural choice for theatre tickets using a rich data set for 2010–2013 from the sale system of the Royal Danish National Theatre. A consumer who decides to attend a theatre production faces multiple sources of price variation that involves a choice by the consumer among different ticket alternatives. Three modelling approaches are proposed in order to model ticket purchases: conditional logit with socio-demographic characteristics, nested logit and latent class. These models allow us explicitly to take into account consumers’ preference heterogeneity with respect to the attributes associated with each ticket alternative (quality of the seat and day of the performance). In addition, the willingness to pay of choice attributes is estimated. Final results suggest that customers’ characteristics in terms of age and frequency of theatre attendance characterize different patterns of behaviour in the choice of theatre ticket.