Flypaper Effect and Sluggishness: Evidence from Regional Health Expenditure in Italy

In Italy, public expenditure reduction is achieved through a revision of social security and health care programs. In particular, public health expenditure control has been implemented through a reform that imposes more stringent budget rules to local governments and a considerable reduction in grants-in-aid from the central government. This paper investigates empirically whether the response to this decrease in categorical lump-sum grants from the central to local governments results in an asymmetric response to intergovernmental grants. Hard budget and soft budget constraint hypotheses are estimated by using a sample of cross-sectional and time observations covering the 20 Italian regions over the period 1989–1993. The main finding is the existence of a standard and a super flypaper effect in both models. The introduction of the soft-budget constraint hypothesis results in a stronger effect of grants and a lower response of own resources which shows that local governments prefer to incur some deficit instead of reducing health care expenditure.     

Do European recommendations impact on sustainability policies by Italian local governments?

Taking the role of a facilitator, the EU has published recommendations to steer sustainability policies in local governments. The authors analysed strategic plans published by Italian local governments and found that the EU’s recommendations had zero effect. The way forward is for local governments to be required to produce sustainability policies.     

中国地方政府财政支出效率及影响因素的实证研究

本文利用随机前沿分析方法对我国26个省级地方政府1978～2008年的财政支出效率进行了测算,并分析了影响地方政府财政支出效率的主要因素。研究结果表明:(1)中部地区的政府财政支出效率平均好于东部地区和西部地区;(2)1994年的分税制改革明显地提高了我国地方政府的财政支出效率,但之后地方政府的财政支出效率呈逐年下降趋势;(3)财政自主性、人均GDP、人均预算内财政收入对地方政府的财政支出效率有显著的负面影响,人口密度对地方政府的财政支出效率有显著的正面影响。     

Bribe payments under regulatory decentralization: Evidence from rights offering regulations in China

This paper investigates why and how firms’ bribe payments vary as a result of the interaction between firms and local public officials under the decentralized regulatory system for rights offerings implemented prior to 2001 in China. Using the gap between the estimated and reported total direct costs of rights offerings as a measure of firms’ bribes payments in the process of rights offering applications under this system, we find that bribe payments are positively related to local governments’ control rights, firms’ opportunity costs of refusing to pay bribes, and the severity of firms’ Jensen agency problems. We further show that after termination of the regulatory system, firms’ bribe payments are substantially reduced, and local governments’ control rights as well as the severity of firms’ Jensen agency problems can no longer explain the variation in bribe payments.     

Complementary currencies: what role should they be playing in local and regional government?

The current climate of fiscal austerity has seen a resurgence in ‘complementary currencies’ as local and regional governments look for ways to use under-utilized assets, maintain employment and avoid local economic decline. The authors explore how local and regional governments can facilitate complementary currencies to reduce the impact of external economic shocks and enable their economies to continue to function in the face of austerity. They recommend that localities consider participating in existing complementary currency ‘circles’.     

The real impact of a one-off fiscal restriction: empirical evidence of a flypaper effect in Flemish municipalities

This paper analyses the effects of a one-off fiscal restriction on Flemish local government spending. The authors provide evidence of a ‘flypaper effect’: fiscal restriction stimulated the sensitivity of local spending to grants. This means that higher-level governments (regional/national/supranational) need to take a flypaper effect into account when considering one-off fiscal restrictions on lower-level governments.     

Talent management in government in times of economic instability: selected cases from the BRICS countries

This paper explores the policies that three BRICS countries used to tackle the growing problem of attracting and retaining talent in public sector institutions. The authors trace the changes in these countries’ strategies and approaches resulting from growing budgetary constraints; labour market shifts; new demographic trends; increasing demands for higher performance by public servants; and complex challenges faced by governments worldwide. Although talent management in public sector institutions was a government priority for the three countries—Brazil, China, and Russia—the results achieved have been modest. The authors draw lessons for other governments from their analysis.     

What do deficits tell us about debt? Empirical evidence on creative accounting with fiscal rules in the EU

Fiscal rules, such as the excessive deficit procedure and the stability and growth pact (SGP), aim at constraining government behavior. [Milesi-Ferretti, G., 2003. Good, bad or ugly? On the effects of fiscal rules with creative accounting, Journal of Public Economics, 88, 377–394] develops a model in which governments circumvent such rules by reverting to creative accounting. The amount of this depends on the reputation cost for the government and the economic cost of sticking to the rule. We provide empirical evidence of creative accounting in the European Union. We find that the SGP rules have induced governments to use stock-flow adjustments, a form of creative accounting, to hide deficits. The tendency to substitute stock-flow adjustments for budget deficits is especially strong for the cyclical component of the deficit, as in times of recession the cost of reducing the deficit is particularly large.     

Credit risk and bond pricing of local government in China

The relationship between credit risk and the pricing of local government bonds in China is explored in this paper. The pricing of local government bonds was found to reflect credit risk, but the risk premium was small. The type of bond (‘directional’ or ‘non-directional’) significantly affected pricing. Repayment source had no effect. The authors make recommendations for the central government, local governments and investors.     

Fiscal Reconstruction and Local Government Financing

This paper investigates the dynamic properties of intergovernmental financing during a fiscal reconstruction process by analyzing the dynamic game among local governments, which operates with soft budget constraints because of concessionary region-specific transfers from a central government. The existence of intergovernmental transfers induces the free-riding behavior of local governments, thereby bringing considerable deficits to the central government. Raising local and/or national taxes is desirable for fiscal reconstruction, but is unable to attain the Pareto-efficient fiscal reconstruction. Taxes on lobbying activities, combined with uniform transfers, induce earlier concession and can attain the Pareto-efficient outcome in the long run.     

The Political Economy of Fiscal Supervision and Budget Deficits: Evidence from Germany

In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate the extent to which party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The data set includes 427 German local governments for the period 2000–2004. I exploit a period after a far‐reaching institutional reform that entirely re‐distributed political powers on both the government level and the fiscal supervisor level. The results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co‐partisanship) drive short‐term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left‐wing local governments run higher deficits than their right‐wing counterparts; left‐wing supervisors tolerate higher deficits than right‐wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal supervisors is recommended.     

“土地财政”问题研究：成因与治理——基于地方政府行为的视角

通过分析导致土地财政产生的制度变迁和政府行为选择,并运用计量经济模型验证理论分析结论的结果表明,地方政府间的＂标尺竞争＂格局、预算内财政压力和软预算约束的制度环境的综合作用是促使地方政府迈向土地财政的背后推力,土地财政的最大风险是危及中国的城市化进程。因此,须重构地方政府竞争体系,转换政绩考核标尺,发展地方主体税种,运用硬化预算约束等措施来＂校正＂地方政府行为选择,并进一步改革土地征收和出让制度,这样方能杜绝土地财政现象。     

“银根紧缩”政策下我国地方国资资产证券化的发展诉求及策略

在＂银根紧缩＂政策影响下,地方国资资产证券化既是地方政府实现直接融资的＂抓手＂,也是促进当地经济发展的＂推手＂。要完成十二.五时期地方政府确定的经济社会发展目标,地方国资资产证券化将是一条有效率的直接融资途径。因此,积极探索＂银根紧缩＂政策下我国地方国资资产证券化的发展诉求及策略具有重要意义。     

New development: The crisis and European local government reforms

This article highlights the main reform trajectories put in place in French, Italian, German and Portuguese local governments during the recent crisis and identifies a number of important trends: for example increasing centralization of decision-making powers away from local governments. The authors explain why local governments have an opportunity to use reforms during the crisis to strategically reposition their value proposition.     

地方政府债务管理及危机处置的国际经验借鉴

地方政府举债是工业化、城市化的必然选择,合理举债有利于地方财政的高效运转,但若监管错位、过度举债则有可能引发债务危机。自2014年起,我国赋予地方政府发债权,随着近年来收益类专项债的扩容,地方政府债务规模不断扩大,同时融资平台、政府引导基金等各种形式的隐性债务风险依然突出。当前地方政府债务风险被视为“灰犀牛”,亟需引起重视和关注。本文通过梳理美国、日本、巴西地方政府债务危机产生的原因和处置方式,总结国外地方政府债务管理和危机处置的有效经验,并结合现阶段我国地方政府债务管理中存在的预算软约束、发行主体单一、债务透明度差、评级和监管缺位、预警和处置机制不完善等主要问题,提出相关对策建议。     

地方竞争是否阻碍了地方政府债务绩效的提升？——理论框架及空间计量研究

本文从举债行为策略视角考察地方竞争对地方政府债务绩效的影响。 首先,从不同地区间举债行为策略互动的视角对地方竞争如何影响地方政府债务绩效进行理论诠释,其次,在采用Global超效率DEA方法测度地方政府债务绩效的基础上,突破空间独立性假设,运用空间杜宾模型对地方竞争影响地方政府债务绩效的效果及空间外溢性进行实证检验。研究发现,在地方效用最大化目标导向下,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都对债务增速产生了较为显著的正向影响和空间外溢效应,导致地方采取主动扩大债务规模的举债行为策略。与此同时,随着债务规模的持续增长,无论是地方税收竞争还是公共投资竞争,都将对债务绩效产生“规模报酬递减”的负向影响和空间外溢效应,尤其是公共投资竞争的影响效果更加明显。进一步地,如果考虑到可能存在预算软约束现象,地方竞争还将与预算软约束行为相结合,对债务绩效产生了“使用效率递减”的负向影响。本文结论为通过债务合理使用来促进经济高质量发展,防范化解地方政府债务风险提供了政策启示。     

Price Setting Practices in Australian Local Government

Revenues generated on a ‘fee‐for‐service’ or ‘user‐pays’ basis are a significant source of income for Australian local governments. However, how local governments set prices and charges remains under‐explicated. This article reports empirical evidence obtained on the pricing policies and practices of Australian local governments. The responses to a national survey reveal considerable diversity – and often an apparent lack of ‘rationality’– in setting specific prices. Instead, general ‘across the board’ adjustments to historical prices are typically made to assist in balancing budgets. The cost of service delivery is neither a prominent nor standardised input to pricing decisions.     

地方政府债务预算约束的制度逻辑、规范控制与实践检验

地方政府债务预算约束是实现财政民主的必然要求,是限制政府权力的重要途径,也是保护公民财产权的有力手段.对地方政府债务预算约束需要相关的预算立法,对债务规模、债务资金支出以及举债程序予以规制.我国新《预算法》将地方政府债务纳入预算管理,对控制规模、优化结构、规范行为、化解风险等方面产生了良好的效果.     

Prediction accuracy and the Canadian federal budget

It is generally recognized that governments cannot accurately predict annual budget balances. This paper examines the record of ‘fiscal marksmanship’ for the Canadian Federal Government for the period 1949–1978 and attempts to explain why significant errors in tax, expenditure and budget result outcomes occurred. Using a measure of inequality, errors are classified into three distinct categories to isolate random as compared to consistent errors. These errors are then related to a series of exogenous shocks on the economy and unexpected policy impacts.     

Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities

The level of revenues pocketed by a government during the fiscal year often deviates from that projected by this government in its budget. Despite a flourishing literature on, for example, the technical or procedural determinants of such forecast errors, little is yet known about how political stratagems may affect forecast errors. In the present paper, we analyse whether differences in the level of government fragmentation are useful in explaining local government tax revenue forecast errors—controlling for various other factors. Using data on 242 Flemish municipalities for the period 1992–2002, we find that two-party governments are more optimistic than single-party governments. In contrast to our initial expectations, governments with at least three parties are significantly more careful (or less optimistic) in their revenue projections than single- or two-party governments.