On the evolution of conditional cooperation

A long series of laboratory and field experiments, as well as conventional empirical studies, has established that (1) individuals voluntarily provide themselves with public goods at levels exceeding those predicted by the Nash voluntary contributions mechanism, and (2) agents reciprocate increases in the contributions of their counterparts in such settings (conditional cooperation). This paper presents a simple model of the evolution of preferences for conditional cooperation in the presence of a public good, which explains these two empirical findings without employing reputational or group selection arguments. In this model, individuals inherit preferences to match other agents' contributions to the provision of a public good, at some specified “matching rate.” Agents whose preferences induce them to be relatively successful – in material terms – increase in number, from one generation to the next. Under complete information and with randomly matched groups of N agents who have quasilinear preferences over the public good and a private good, the unique evolutionarily stable matching rate is 1, leading to Pareto optimal voluntary provision of the public good, regardless of group size N. The evolutionarily stable matching rate can be viewed as an endogenous social norm.     

The evolution of human cooperation

We argue that cooperation is instinctual. Human cooperation conferred advantages to individuals in the ancestral environment in which evolution occurred. Explanations of the evolution of cooperation for any species (human, pre-human, and non-human) have to be consistent with the biological, physiological, and environmental constraints that existed in the ancestral environment during which evolutionary selection occurred. Our explanation is consistent with: (1) the anatomical evolution of humanity; (2) the paleontological and chronological evidence; and (3) modern biology.     

Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation

We develop a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the co-evolution of norm compliance. The multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, is linked to the evolutionary analysis: individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments favors conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others’ cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators.     

The evolution of cooperation through imitation

We study evolutionarily stable outcomes for a class of games that admit cooperation and conflict as possible Nash equilibria. We make use of two ideas: existing strategies are more likely to be imitated than new strategies are to be introduced; players are able to identify opponents' behavior prior to interaction. The long-run evolutionary limit is efficient for the case of perfect recognition of opponents' behavior. For the case of imperfect recognition, efficiency is not achieved and long-run outcomes are more efficient the more accurate is the information. Strategies that emerge in the long run are those where players reward opponents who are likely to play the same way, and punish opponents who are likely to play differently.     

On the size and structure of group cooperation

When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how “much” cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group cooperation vary with the group's size and structure? This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior in the class of symmetric, repeated games of collective action. These are games characterized by “free rider problems” in the level of cooperation achieved. The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games is a special case.We characterize the level of maximal average cooperation (MAC), the highest average level of cooperation, over all stationary subgame perfect equilibrium paths, that the group can achieve. The MAC is shown to be increasing in monotone shifts, and decreasing in mean preserving spreads of the distribution of discount factors. The latter suggests that more heterogeneous groups are less cooperative on average. Finally, in a class of Prisoner's Dilemma games, we show under weak conditions that the MAC exhibits increasing returns to scale in a range of heterogeneous discount factors. That is, larger groups are more cooperative, on average, than smaller ones. By contrast, when the group has a common discount factor, the MAC is invariant to group size.     

Bargaining and the evolution of cooperation in a dynamic game

An example of a dynamic game between a union and a firm is constructed in which an equilibrium path starts out with non-cooperative strategies and switches to cooperative strategies as the level of employment increases.     

Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation

We examine the ability of focal points to transform situations of potential conflict into situations of cooperation. In performing this function, focal points convert “worst-case scenarios” into “better-case scenarios,” which are easier for political economic systems to handle. Focal points thus contribute to the ability of political economies to perform well in the face of less than ideal conditions, enhancing systemic robustness. JEL Code P0     

The effects of heterogeneous interaction and risk attitude adaptation on the evolution of cooperation

This paper addresses the evolution of cooperation in a multi-agent system with agents interacting heterogeneously with each other based on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game. The heterogeneity of interaction is defined in two models. First, agents in a network are restricted to interacting with only their neighbors (local interaction). Second, agents are allowed to adopt different IPD strategies against different opponents (discriminative interaction). These two heterogeneous interaction scenarios are different to the classical evolutionary game, in which each agent interacts with every other agent in the population by adopting the same strategy against all opponents. Moreover, agents adapt their risk attitudes while engaging in interactions. Agents with payoffs above (or below) their aspirations will become more risk averse (or risk seeking) in subsequent interactions, wherein risk is defined as the standard deviation of one-move payoffs in the IPD game. In simulation experiments with agents using only own historical payoffs as aspirations (historical comparison), we find that the whole population can achieve a high level of cooperation via the risk attitude adaptation mechanism, in the cases of either local or discriminative interaction models. Meanwhile, when agents use the population’s average payoff as aspirations (social comparison) for adapting risk attitudes, the high level of cooperation can only be sustained in a portion of the population (i.e., partial cooperation). This finding also holds true in both of the heterogeneous scenarios. Considering that payoffs cannot be precisely estimated in a realistic IPD game, simulation experiments are also conducted with a Gaussian disturbance added to the game payoffs. The results reveal that partial cooperation in the population under social comparison is more robust to the variation in payoffs than the global cooperation under historical comparison.     

中国农村非正规劳动合作的演进——基于一个贫困县的经验研究

调查表明,一直到市场化改革前,我国的农村都较好地继承了非正规劳动合作,但市场化改革的洗礼,使一直被历史认同的非正规劳动合作有退出历史舞台之势,一些市场方式正逐步替代非正规劳动合作.长期以来,人们习惯于从农业部门的贫困、道德力量的影响来解释非正规劳动合作的演进规律,而未能发现伦理道德背后行为抉择的力量.本文基于农民的经济理性,分析了其行为选择的力量,以及由这种力量主导的中国农村非正规劳动合作的演进规律及未来趋势,从另一种视角解释了调查结论.     

A naturalistic approach to the theory of the firm: The role of cooperation and cultural evolution

One reason why firms exist, this paper argues, is because they are suitable organizations within which cooperative production systems based on human social predispositions can evolve. In addition, we show how an entrepreneur, given these predispositions, can shape human behavior within a firm. To illustrate these processes, we will present a model that depicts how the biased transmission of cultural contents via social learning processes within the firm influence employees’ behavior and the performance of the firm. These biases can be traced back to evolved social predispositions. Humans lived in tribal scale social systems based on significant amounts of intra- and even intergroup cooperation for tens if not a few hundred thousand years before the first complex societies arose. Firms rest upon the social psychology originally evolved for tribal life. We also relate our conclusions to empirical evidence on the performance and size of different kinds of organizations. Modern organizations have functions rather different from ancient tribes, leading to friction between our social predispositions and organization goals. Firms that manage to reduce this friction will tend to function better.     

Rotating the Necker cube: A bioeconomic approach to cooperation and the causal role of synergy in evolution

The paradox of widespread cooperation in an intensely competitive natural world has been a major focus of theory and research in evolutionary biology and related disciplines over the past several decades. While much of the earlier work in this vein was gene-centered and grounded in inclusive fitness (or kin selection) theory, more recent developments suggest that it might also be useful to view cooperation (and biological complexity) from a bioeconomic perspective. Here I will briefly explore the case for a paradigm shift, with special reference to the role of functional synergy as a distinct class of interdependent causal influences in evolution. I will argue that synergies of various kinds have been important drivers for cooperation in living systems at all levels. From this perspective, inclusive fitness and other factors may be enablers for cooperation, but the many exceptions show that genetic relatedness is neither necessary nor sufficient for the emergence of cooperative phenomena.     

Technological regimes and demand structure in the evolution of the pharmaceutical industry

This paper examines how the nature of the technological regime governing innovative activities and the structure of demand interact in determining market structure, with specific reference to the pharmaceutical industry. The key question concerns the observation that—despite high degrees of R&D and marketing-intensity—concentration has been consistently low during the whole evolution of the industry. Standard explanations of this phenomenon refer to the random nature of the innovative process, the patterns of imitation, and the fragmented nature of the market into multiple, independent submarkets. We delve deeper into this issue by using an improved version of our previous “history-friendly” model of the evolution of pharmaceuticals. Thus, we explore the way in which changes in the technological regime and/or in the structure of demand may generate or not substantially higher degrees of concentration. The main results are that, while technological regimes remain fundamental determinants of the patterns of innovation, the demand structure plays a crucial role in preventing the emergence of concentration through a partially endogenous process of discovery of new submarkets. However, it is not simply market fragmentation as such that produces this result, but rather the entity of the “prize” that innovators can gain relative to the overall size of the market. Further, the model shows that emerging industry leaders are innovative early entrants in large submarkets.     

产业组织范式的演进:从竞争垄断到竞争合作

产业组织竞争合作范式的生成是内生变量和外生变量交互发生作用的结果。分工与专业化是孕育竞争合作范式的主要内生变量,而经济全球化和网络经济则是竞争合作范式生成的两大外生变量。我国企业应深刻认识现代产业组织范式的演化趋势,一方面要加强产业分工协作,积极融入国际产业分工体系,另一方面要主动参与并加强同跨国公司的合作,真正提升我国产业的国际竞争力。     

Neighborhood price externalities of foreclosure rehabilitation: an examination of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program

The federally funded, HUD-administered Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) was enacted in the wake of the financial recession to mitigate the underlying adverse neighborhood effects associated with foreclosed properties. We examined the neighborhood price impacts of NSP-funded foreclosure rehabilitation undertaken by Habitat for Humanity in Dallas County, Texas, using a difference-in-difference framework. Foreclosure rehabilitation projects in Dallas County produced an average 15% increase in neighborhood home prices that sold up to 30 months after the rehabilitated property sale and within 0.1 miles of the rehabilitated property. Foreclosure rehabilitation that involved significant exterior repairs was associated with the largest estimated effect sizes. Results suggest that NSP funding in Dallas County effectively targeted homes that had the potential to have the most severe neighborhood impacts and that rehabilitation was an effective means of reversing neighborhood price externalities associated with blighted foreclosed properties.     

对外经济合作在贸易结构调整中的作用

对外经济合作是资本、资本品、技术、劳务和管理等一揽子输出的载体。目前,对外工程承包对中国经济的影响基本上可代表对外经济合作对中国经济的影响。利用LINK模型和同步时间序列技术分析的结果表明,对外工程承包对国民经济发展的带动作用是十分显著的。如果将对外经济合作项目所吸引的后续出口和后续技术贸易纳入到统计中,那么对外经济合作对中国GDP的带动作用还要大。以对外工程承包为主体的对外经济合作对改善我国的贸易产品结构同样具有重要意义。贸易的市场结构应由主要依靠发达国家的对外贸易一元结构向与发达国家的贸易和与发展…     

基于解释结构模型的东北亚区域能源安全合作系统的分析

东北亚地区具有地缘优势和较强的互补性,但是缺乏全面地的实质性的合作,特别是在能源安全领域。东北亚区域能源安全合作是对东北亚区域各国都十分重要的一个现实问题。本文采用系统工程中的解释结构模型分析东北亚区域能源安全合作系统的影响因素及其相互之间的关系。进而构建东北亚区域能源安全合作系统的结构。并对其系统结柏进行分析,为东北亚区域能源安全合作提供相应的理论依据。东北亚区域能源安全合作系统由信用子系统、行为体需求子系统和经济依存子系统构成。在外部环境因素的影响下三个子系统的相互关系将影响东北亚区域能源安全合作的模式和水平,并促进合作系统的发展。     

Network structure and industrial dynamics. The long-term evolution of the aircraft-engine industry

This paper proposes a new approach to explain the long-term evolution of a supplier industry. The network of vertical relations between suppliers and buyers is identified as a determinant of the concentration of the supplier industry and of the dynamics of market shares. The vertical structure of the industry is captured by collecting information on all vertical relations between dyads of firms and by building matrices of interaction for the aircraft-engine industry from 1953 to 1997. An econometric exercise is used to test some hypotheses about the relation between selected network measures and industrial dynamics.     

Interbranch cooperation and the shadow of the future

Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) experiments confirm and extend Axelrod’s (The evolution of cooperation. Basic Books, New York, 1984) Shadow of the Future hypothesis: subjects cooperate in infinitely repeated PD, but they also cooperate until near the end in finitely repeated PD. So the extended hypothesis is that cooperation depends on the probability of continued play. Observational tests of this hypothesis, or even applications, have been rare at best. Here we not only apply but test it for interbranch cooperation under separated-powers constitutions, specifically those of the American states, using the end of governors’ final terms as end points and the rate of overridden vetoes as the extreme case of a breakdown in interbranch cooperation. Controlling for a variety of factors, including divided government, we find support for the hypothesis, whose explanation of interbranch interaction fills a gap left open by Madison’s Federalist 51: how republican government can control itself when what is needed is “energy” more than safeguards.