Australian Experiments in Wage Policy

Industrial conciliation and arbitration have been pivotal in pay determination in Australia throughout the twentieth century. This paper examines how these institutions influence macroeconomic performance, paying special reference to their impact on cost inflation. It goes on to evaluate the contribution of the Accord (incomes policy) in the last decade. Consensus and participation within the institutional framework are shown to be essential for effective wage policy.     

The Australian Wage System and Its Labor Market Effects

In Australia, quasi-judicial conciliation and arbitration tribunals set the terms and conditions under which the majority of employees work. Many commentators maintain that the activities of these tribunals have significantly affected the county's labor market and the operation of the economy. This paper outlines the distinguishing characteristics of Australia's wage determination system and reviews the research concerning its labor market consequences. Recent evidence suggests that critics of the system may have overstated their case.     

The Metamorphosis of Australian Industrial Relations

This article outlines the current processes of change in Australian industrial relations - processes whose ultimate direction and effects are unforeseeable. The traditional dominance of conciliation and arbitration tribunals is giving way to more devolved arrangements. Some protagonists of change envisage a move towards collective bargaining, with trade unions having a pervasive and secure role; others believe the place of unions is in question. The impulse for change comes partly from market-oriented ideology, but this is not extensively discussed, A second source is the desire of the Australian Council of Trade Unions and the Labor Government to determine wage policy jointly, with the role of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission being essentially that of implementation. Also important is a widely held view that reform of industrial relations is a path to better productivity performance. The paper discusses the justification for that view. Various questions remain to be answered. These include the possibility for enduring wages policy; the legal framework necessary for bargaining; the nature of the industrial relations system of non-union enterprises; and the congruence of enterprise bargaining with the structure of trade unionism.     

The Effect of Interest Arbitration on Salary Dispersion Among Employers

This study uses Wisconsin teacher salary grid data for the period 1974–75 to 1984–85 to examine the impact of interest arbitration on wage determination and salary dispersion among employers. Models of wage determination are developed and estimated using observations from a period before and after implementation of arbitration. These wage equations are then used to decompose the difference in the variance of the log wages for the two periods. The results suggest that although observed salary dispersion is greater at the statewide level under arbitration, the imposition of arbitration mitigates the impact of measured factors on wage determination, resulting in less salary dispersion within small clusters of school districts, all else constant.     

The Role of Arbitration Costs and Risk Aversion in Dispute Outcomes

The effects of risk aversion and of arbitration costs on bargaining outcomes are investigated using data from 171 simulated negotiations. The results are generally consistent with predictions from a simple economic bargaining model. We find strong evidence that directs costs of arbitration lead to higher rates of agreement. There is only weak evidence the risk aversion is related to the probability of agreement, but negotiated settlements seems to favor the less risk-averse bargainer.     

Final Offer Arbitration: Better Theory Than Practice

The theory of final offer arbitration promises more than its actual performance delivers, based on admittedly limited experience. There is no showing that fewer negotiations reach impasse than would occur under conventional arbitration. There is evidence, however, that final offer arbitration does tend to produce awards less equitable than warranted by the positions and strengths of the parties, particularly when there are multiple issues at impasse and when arbitrators may select only one overall package or another. This tendency is built-in to the process, since the whole point of final offer arbitration is deterrence, with little or no concern for getting a good settlement through arbitration. “Bad” awards cannot fail to generate irritation and to have a corrosive effect on responsible contract administration. It is possible that such awards, and their effects, will be accepted as the necessary price of a final offer selection system. What seems more likely, however, is that the system will be modified along the lines of those in Eugene and Michigan. Those modifications can be expected to have two effects. First, they will make it more likely that the parties will be able to reach their own agreement by encouraging mediation and further negotiations, even after arbitration has been invoked. Second, they will increase the possibility of an acceptable arbitrated settlement by allowing the arbitrator greater flexibility in making an award. By doing these things, however, the deterrent effect of final offer selection will be substantially weakened, and what will be left will be a useful form of mediation-arbitration but not a substitute for the strike which contains an equivalent incentive to negotiate.     

The Causes of Impasses in Labor Disputes

Using data on teacher contract negotiations under final-offer arbitration, this paper investigates the causes of impasses in contract negotiations and finds some support for each of three perspectives: game-theoretic, psychological, and political. The large number of "consent awards" suggests that negotiators frequently wish to avoid the political costs of a compromise settlement, preferring to blame arbitrators for the outcome. The positive correlation between the probability of an impasse and the variance in comparable negotiated settlements suggests that the parties base their judgments of fairness using evidence most consistent with their own position.     

Different Paths to Neo-Liberalism? Comparing Australia and New Zealand

Australia and New Zealand are best known for their systems of industrial relations based on compulsory arbitration. However, recent years have seen trends in both countries toward neo-liberalism—trends that represent the end of compulsory arbitration. This paper traces the path taken toward neo-liberalism, the speed of the journey, and the destination reached in both countries. In attempting to explain the differences between them, it is institutional factors—industrial and political—that are given highest priority.     

Interest Arbitration and the Narcotic Effect: Evidence from Three Decades of Collective Bargaining in Ontario

We study whether there is increased reliance on interest arbitration, that is, a narcotic or addictive effect or, alternatively, positive state dependence, in public sector contract settlements. We use contract data from three sectors (police, firefighters and hospitals) in the Canadian province of Ontario, which covers 1981 to 2012. The length of our study period yields much longer bargaining histories than previously used, which should provide more compelling evidence on whether there is increased reliance on interest arbitration to settle bargaining impasses over time. We obtain our estimates using a dynamic probit model with random effects that models the initial conditions. Our estimates indicate — across all the sectors we consider and some robustness checks — that there is a narcotic effect in interest arbitration usage despite very different average propensities to use arbitration across sectors.     

Labor Law and Reaching a First Collective Agreement: Evidence From a Quasi‐Experimental Set of Reforms in Ontario

This paper examines the effects of a major labor law reform package in the Canadian province of Ontario on the negotiation of first agreements for newly certified bargaining units using a quasi‐experimental research design. The findings indicate that first contract success rates were 8–14 percentage points higher under the regime that included automatic first contract arbitration relative to the comparison regime of “no‐fault” first contract arbitration, despite imposition rates being only 2–4 percentage points higher. Further, in the more hostile‐to‐labor regime, only 38 percent of petitions ultimately reached a first agreement despite the presence of quick‐votes, and “no‐fault” first contract arbitration.     

Convergence or Divergence in Final-Offer Arbitration in Professional Baseball

Many labor relations practitioners and theorists believe that final-offer arbitration by a neutral third party encourages union and management officials to resolve their bargaining differences. However, decision scientists have found that there is no median convergence between the parties. Using professional baseball in our model, we test the assumption that major league owners tend to maximize expected monetary value (EMV), finding that claims of divergence are invalidated in dispute management contexts where there is a broad range of other motivations for settling. Decision models offer even further support for the use of final-offer arbitration in such settings.     

How Do Organizational Environments and Mandatory Arbitration Shape Employment Attorney Case Selection? Evidence from an Experimental Vignette

Using a novel experimental vignette design, this study shows how firm adoption of equal employment opportunity (EEO) policies, internal dispute resolution procedures, occupational segregation, and use of mandatory arbitration agreements affect employment attorney perceptions of employment discrimination claims. Findings reveal the organizational environment of a claim can signal compliance with antidiscrimination law and the use of mandatory arbitration reduces the expected value of a claim and willingness to accept it for representation. These findings contribute to the understanding of antidiscrimination law as a social system by showing organizational environments and mandatory arbitration clauses predict attorney case assessment.     

Licensing Requirements as a Coordination Mechanism for Entry

Cheap talk, side payments, and arbitration are limited in their ability tocoordinate asymmetric entry among symmetric potential entrants.Externally imposed licensing requirements may provide a viablemechanism to attain the desired asymmetric outcome in equilibrium.     

The Pilots' Compensation Scheme: A Study in Arbitration, Interpretation and Causation

This article considers nine cases dealt with by ACAS arbitration in the period from September1991 to July 1993 under the statutory compensation scheme for marine pilots whose engagements were terminated in consequence of the major changes made to the provision of pilotage services by the Pilotage Act 1987. It explains the background to those changes and the problems that arose in the nine cases (problems of interpretation of the scheme, particularly in sickness cases, and then of proving causation in individual cases), and comments on the use of the arbitration procedures in circumstances such as these.     

工程纠纷ADR解决方式的研究

传统的诉讼解决纠纷机制由于费用高、时间长受到愈来愈多的批评和指责,而替代性纠纷解决机制（ADR）因其灵活、高效、友善引起关注,迅速在各行各业广泛使用。ADR的实质是一程序群,主要类型包括有协商、调解、调停、裁决、小型审理和租借法官等。通过国际工程中主要使用的ADR程序,对ADR机制的几种办法与诉讼进行比较,分析了ADR机制的关键成功因素,并对我国工程领域实施ADR机制提出了建议。     

The Ascendancy of Employment Arbitrators in US Employment Relations: A New Actor in the American System?

In this paper, we survey the underpinnings of the trend towards employment arbitration in the United States, and its implications for the broader industrial relations system. Specifically, we address the question of whether or not employment arbitrators have been substituted for collective bargaining by the government to an extent that warrants their inclusion as an actor in the industrial relations system. We review developments in workplace dispute resolution in the United States, the literature that attempts to explain these developments and posit an assessment of the stability of employment arbitration, and employment arbitrators, as a central feature of the US industrial relations system.     

Legal responses to technological change in Canada

Canadian labour laws ban lawful work stoppages while collective agreements are in force. Managerial prerogative generally governs technological change. Employees lawfully enjoy varying, but limited job security. Current laws may not deal adequately with the next wave of technology. Significantly, four jurisdictions provide midcontract arbitration.     

Arbitration Decisions in Subcontracting Disputes

This study examines factors underlying arbitrators' decisions in disputes involving subcontracting. A framework devised by Dash (1963) is used to code arbitration decisions according to the issues arbitrators raised in reaching their conclusions. In addition, external factors such as geographical location, background of the arbitrator, industry, and when the decision occurred are evaluated. The results of logit analyses indicate that Dash's framework explains much of the variance in the arbitrators' decisions. External factors are unrelated to the decisions.     

Strike-free Deals and Pendulum Arbitration

This article analyses the legal and procedural aspects of strike-free deals, focusing in particular on their contractual status, the drafting of their no-strike clauses, and the 'binding' nature of their provisions on pendulum arbitration. Drawing on the author's experience as an arbitrator, it is argued that there is considerable diversity within the strike-free format but that in general the similarities between strike-free and conventional procedures are greater than their differences.