Odd lot trading and earnings announcements

This study investigates odd lot trading, both trades and orders, around quarterly earnings announcements to determine whether odd lot traders are informed regarding the information contained in earnings announcements. We find pre-announcement odd lot order imbalances are not positively correlated with post-announcement returns and odd lot traders do not earn excess returns. Portfolios long stocks highly bought by odd lot traders in the pre-announcement period and short stocks highly sold by odd lot traders do not outperform the market. We conclude that odd lot traders are not in possession of earnings announcement information prior to its release to the public.     

Options trading volume and stock price response to earnings announcements

We examine the effect of options trading volume on the stock price response to earnings announcements over the period 1996–2007. Contrary to previous studies, we find no significant difference in the immediate stock price response to earnings information announcements in samples split between firms with listed options and firms without listed options. However, within the sample of firms with listed options stratified by options volume, we find that higher options trading volume reduces the immediate stock price response to earnings announcements. This conforms with evidence that stock prices of high options trading volume firms have anticipated and pre-empted some earnings information in the pre-announcement period. We also find that higher abnormal options trading volume around earnings announcements hastens the stock price adjustment to earnings news and reduces post-earnings announcement drift.     

Strategic insider trading around earnings announcements in Australia

This paper tests, within the Australian setting, whether directors strategically time trades in their own firms, around earnings announcements, in the context of impediments to trading in the immediately preceding period. I show that both signed and unsigned trade activity are insignificantly different from zero in the preceding period, and significantly negative and positive after the event. Further, directors in Australia significantly sell following positive earnings news, and buy after negative news, providing evidence of ‘indirect’ trading. Directors’ trades in the longer-term pre-announcement period are also negatively related to the news content sentiment, contrary to expectation. Finally, I find evidence of positive autocorrelation between directors’ trades over the longer-term past, and those executed after earnings announcements, which, in the absence of the ‘short-swing’ rule in Australia, casts doubt over short-term strategic insider trading, more generally.     

Informed trading around earnings and mutual fund alphas

We examine whether informed trading around earnings announcements drives mutual fund performance. The measure is motivated by prior studies arguing that a mutual fund is skilled if it buys stocks with subsequent high earnings announcement returns. We find that this measure predicts future mutual fund returns. On average, after adjusting for Carhart’s four risk factors, the top decile of mutual funds outperforms the bottom decile by 44 basis points per quarter. By decomposing fund alphas into two components in their relations to earnings, we find that this measure is only associated with earnings-related fund alphas. This measure can also be used to predict stock returns at future earnings announcements.     

The effect of restatements on trading volume reactions to earnings announcements

This paper examines whether restatements affect trading volume reactions to subsequent earnings announcements. It closely follows the theoretical model developed by Kim and Verrecchia (J Account Econ 24:395–419, 1997) that decomposes the trading volume reactions around earnings announcements into the effects of pre-disclosure and event-period private information, and examines whether restatements change the trading volume reactions to earnings announcements in the post-restatement period. We find that restatements increase the degree of differential event-period information, leading to more divergent interpretation of earnings announcements subsequent to restatements. We also find that investors have less differential pre-disclosure private information in the post-restatement period, consistent with the view that investors’ beliefs converge when facing higher uncertainty in the information environment. Finally, focusing on irregularity restatement firms, we document that the effect of restatements on trading volume is more pronounced for firms announcing restatements after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and after dismissing auditors and experiencing executive turnover. Overall, these results indicate that restatements affect investors’ behavior in forming judgments regarding earnings announcements.     

Past managerial guidance and returns to variance trading around earnings announcements

I investigate the relationship between past managerial guidance and realized variance risk premiums (VRPs) – i.e., the difference between implied and realized variance – in equity options around earnings announcements. I find that implied variances are lower before earnings announcements but VRPs are higher when firms provide guidance. I also find higher option-implied jump risk when firms issue surprising guidance. Further tests suggest a portion of the higher VRPs are due to changes in perceived higher-order risks, but traders also underreact to the precision of information in short-term guidance. These results are attenuated for firms with a better information environment.     

Block trading and information revelation around quarterly earnings announcements

I investigate the empirical importance of information revelationin the pricing of block trades. In particular, I examine whetherblock prices are correlated with the unexpected part of firms'quarterly earnings. For my sample of block trades, informationrevelation does indeed appear to be a significant factor shortlybefore earnings announcements.     

Informed trading before positive vs. negative earnings surprises

This paper investigates whether institutional investors trade profitably around the announcements of positive or negative earnings surprises. Using Korean data over the period of 2001–2010, we find that information asymmetry is larger before negative earnings surprises (earnings shock) among investors and that the trading volume decreases only before earnings shock announcements due to the severe information asymmetry. We also find that institutions sell their stocks prior to earnings shock announcements whereas individual and foreign investors do not anticipate bad news. Finally, we find that institutional trade imbalance is positively related to the post-announcement abnormal returns of negative events. This study complements and extends prior literature on informed trading around earnings announcements by documenting evidence that domestic institutions exploit their superior information around particularly earnings shock announcements.     

Insider trading and response to earnings announcements: the impact of accelerated disclosure requirements

This paper contributes to the debate on the consequences of increased disclosure regulation by investigating the effects of expedited reporting requirements of Form 4 filings, mandated by the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), on the market response to earnings announcements. We first confirm that SOX reduces opportunistic insider trading without deterring insider trading due to diversification needs, and that post-SOX, opportunistic insider trades more strongly reveal upcoming earnings surprises. We then document that, at the earnings announcement date, earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are lower when earnings are preceded by opportunistic insider trades. We conclude that accelerated disclosures of insider transactions mandated by SOX lend to more informationally efficient prices prior to earnings announcements. Our findings stand as one piece of evidence suggesting positive externalities from recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure regulation and add to the scarce evidence on the consequences of changes in Form 4 filing requirements.     

Caught on tape: Institutional trading,stock returns,and earnings announcements

Many questions about institutional trading can only be answered if one tracks high-frequency changes in institutional ownership. In the United States, however, institutions are only required to report their ownership quarterly in 13-F filings. We infer daily institutional trading behavior from the “tape”, the Transactions and Quotes database of the New York Stock Exchange, using a sophisticated method that best predicts quarterly 13-F data from trades of different sizes. We find that daily institutional trades are highly persistent and respond positively to recent daily returns but negatively to longer-term past daily returns. Institutional trades, particularly sells, appear to generate short-term losses—possibly reflecting institutional demand for liquidity—but longer-term profits. One source of these profits is that institutions anticipate both earnings surprises and post-earnings announcement drift. These results are different from those obtained using a standard size cutoff rule for institutional trades.     

Are trading bans effective? Exchange regulation and corporate insider transactions around earnings announcements

There is considerable controversy on the role of corporate insider trading in the financial markets. However, there appears to be a consensus view that some form of regulation concerning their activities should be imposed. One such constraint involves a trading ban in periods when corporate insiders are expected to be advantaged vis-à-vis the information flow. This paper directly tests whether constraints of this kind are effective in curtailing insider activity through a study of the trading characteristics of UK company directors. The London Stock Exchange Model Code (1977) imposes a two-month close period prior to company earnings announcements. We find that although the close period affects the timing of director trades, it is unable to affect their performance or distribution. Directors consistently earn abnormal returns irrespective of the period in which they trade. They tend to buy after abnormally bad earnings news and sell after abnormally good earnings news. Moreover, there are systematic differences in the trading patterns of directors surrounding interim and final earnings announcements. It appears that many corporate insiders have private information and exploit this in their trading activities. As a result, one can conclude that trading bans do not impose significant opportunity costs on the trading of corporate insiders.     

The impact of regulation Fair Disclosure on investors' prior information quality — Evidence from an analysis of changes in trading volume and stock price reactions to earnings announcements

We document that Regulation Fair Disclosure has reduced differences in information quality between investors prior to quarterly earnings announcements consistent with the intent of the regulation. This reduction is driven by small firms and high technology firms, rather than the large firms targeted by the SEC, which suggests that selective disclosure among large firms may have been much more limited than what was presumed by proponents of FD. In addition, we document that FD has decreased the average information quality of investors in small and high technology firms in the period prior to an earnings announcement while having no lasting effect on other firms. Taken together these two results suggest that, for small and high technology firms, FD succeeded in eliminating selective disclosure but also lowered the average quality of information available about these firms.     

The effect of option transaction costs on informed trading in the options market around earnings announcements

We investigate the effect of option market transaction costs (a form of market imperfection) on the ability of option implied volatility-based measures to predict future stock returns and volatility around quarterly earnings announcements. We find that the predictability is significantly stronger for firms with lower option relative bid-ask spreads. The effect is more pronounced around positive rather than negative earnings news. We find no significant effect of option transaction costs around randomly chosen dates when there is no clustering of major information events. Trading strategies based on option market predictors and transaction costs earn monthly abnormal returns of 1.39% to 1.91%.     

The options market response to accounting earnings announcements

We examine the reaction of the equity options market to accounting earnings announcements over the period 1996–2008 using changes in implied volatility to measure the options market response to earnings news. We find that positive earnings surprises and positive profit announcements produce a larger uncertainty resolution than negative earnings surprises and loss announcements. We demonstrate an inverse relation between the change in implied volatility and earnings news in a three-day window immediately after an earnings announcement. We refer to the magnitude of this relation as the ‘options market earnings response coefficient’. This ‘options market earnings response coefficient’ is stronger for both bad news announcements and positive profit announcements. We do not find any significant relation between changes in implied volatility and earnings news in the pre- or post-announcement periods. We conclude that the options market efficiently absorbs earnings information.     

The information content of implied skewness and kurtosis changes prior to earnings announcements for stock and option returns

We use option prices to examine whether changes in stock return skewness and kurtosis preceding earnings announcements provide information about subsequent stock and option returns. We demonstrate that changes in jump risk premiums can lead to changes in implied skewness and kurtosis and are also associated with the mean and variability of the stock price response to the earnings announcement. We find that changes in both moments have strong predictive power for future stock returns, even after controlling for implied volatility. Additionally, changes in both moments predict call returns, while put return predictability is primarily linked to changes in skewness.     

Is there information content from insider trading activities preceding earnings and dividend announcements in Hong Kong?

This study examines whether insiders (directors) exploit information advantage of their firms by trading stocks before the simultaneous earnings and dividend announcements in Hong Kong. Our findings show that there are significant net-insider-buying activities before the announcements of good news ('Earnings-Dividend Increase') and significant net-insider-selling activities before bad news ('Earnings-Dividend Decrease' and 'Earnings Decrease-Dividend Zero'). In addition, our regression results provide some support for the hypothesis that there is a predictive relation between pre-event insider trading activity and the abnormal return of the announcements.     

Informed trading and order type

Each trader must choose between a limit order, a market order, or using a floor broker. We hypothesize that informed investors will: (1) concentrate their trading in floor broker orders and (2) sometimes trade patiently. Consistent with our hypotheses, empirical results suggest that most informed trading occurs through orders executed by floor brokers and that informed floor brokers are sometimes patient. Regardless of their patience, however, quote revisions following trade executions are consistent with the hypothesis that markets recognize that floor traders are more likely to be informed than other traders. As a result, informed trading moves equilibrium security values.     

Under-or-overreaction: Market responses to announcements of earnings surprises

We test whether the well-documented market reaction to the announcements of earnings surprises is a manifestation of an investor underreaction or overreaction to extremely good or bad earnings news. Using the market reaction in the three-day period surrounding the announcements of extreme earnings surprises (i.e., SUE) in quarter Q_t as a reference point, we show that firms reporting a high (low) SUE in subsequent quarter Q_t + 1 that confirms their initial quarter Q_t SUE ranking in the same highest or lowest SUE quintiles generate an incremental price run that moves in the same direction as that of the initial SUE. However, the price impact of the confirming SUE signal is weaker than that of its initial SUE. Our findings are robust to the Fama-French three-factor daily regression extended by the momentum factor and a number of other robustness tests. Our result is not consistent with the prevalent view that investors underreact to earnings news. To the contrary, the evidence suggests an initial investor overreaction to extreme SUE signals.     

Effects of prior voluntary disclosure on earnings announcements in an environment with low information and regulation

This study examines the association between levels of annual report voluntary disclosure and the market reaction to the next interim earnings announcement in a market with both low regulation and analyst following. We examine the first order effects of voluntary disclosure by using direct measures for both the level of voluntary disclosure, and the market effects of such disclosure. The results show that preannouncement voluntary disclosure significantly reduces the price and volume reactions in the earnings announcement period, and is consistent with the Kim and Verrecchia (1991a) framework and the Atiase and Bamber (1994) empirical findings. We extend the analysis to investigate trading behavior during the earnings announcement period, and observe the trading behavior predicted by Kim and Verrecchia (1991b, 1994). We conclude that voluntary disclosure in annual reports can be regarded as an important determinant of preannouncement information precision in markets with low regulation and analyst following, and observe the expected trading behavior as modeled in Kim and Verrecchia (1991a), and extended in Kim and Verrecchia (1991b, 1994).     

Options and earnings announcements: an empirical study of volatility, trading volume, open interest and liquidity

In this paper we study the impact of earnings announcements on implied volatility, trading volume, open interest and spreads in the stock options market. We find that implied volatility increases before announcement days and drops afterwards. Also option trading volume is higher around announcement days. During the days before the announcement open interest tends to increase, while it returns to regular levels afterwards. Changes in the quoted spread largely respond to higher trading volume and changes in implied volatility. The effective spread increases on the event day and on the first two days following the earnings announcement.