Public information arrival: Price discovery and liquidity in electronic limit order markets

How information is translated into market prices is still an open question. This paper studies the impact of newswire messages on intraday price discovery, liquidity, and trading intensity in an electronic limit order market. We take an objective ex ante measure of the tone of a message to study the impacts of positive, negative, and neutral messages on price discovery and trading activity. As expected, we find higher adverse selection costs around the arrival of newswire messages. Negative messages are associated with higher adverse selection costs than positive or neutral messages. Liquidity increases around positive and neutral messages and decreases around negative messages. Available order book depth as well as the trading intensity increases around all news. Our results suggest that market participants possess different information gathering and processing capabilities and that negative news messages are particularly informative and induce stronger market reactions.     

Market or limit orders?

In this paper we investigate the problem of optimal order placement of an asset listed on an exchange using both market and limit orders in a simple model of market dynamics. We seek to understand under which settings it is optimal to place limit or market orders. Limit orders typically lower transaction costs but increase the risk of incomplete order execution, whereas market orders typically have higher transaction costs but are guaranteed to be executed. Rather than considering order book dynamics to determine if a limit order is executed we rely on price dynamics for this. We look at implementation shortfall in this setup with market impact of trading and propose a dynamic program to find the optimal placement of both market and limit orders for risk-neutral and risk-averse traders. With this we find a bound on the expected cost of trading and show that a trader who behaves optimally should always expect to pay less to trade less. We then solve the dynamic program numerically and examine optimal order placement strategies. We find that the decision between market and limit orders is sensitive to price volatility, risk aversion, and trading costs.     

Liquidity distribution in the limit order book on the stock exchange of Thailand

The liquidity distribution, or the shape of the limit order book, influences trading behavior and choice of order submission by public liquidity suppliers. The present study seeks to discover whether liquidity providers are concerned about being picked off by informed traders, and whether they are less willing to supply liquidity at the market or demand higher price spreads. The results show that liquidity at the market is a small portion of total liquidity, and that firm size, minimum tick size, volatility, and trading volume play significant roles in determining the liquidity distribution within an order book.     

Is the Electronic Open Limit Order Book Inevitable?

Under fairly general conditions, the article derives the equilibrium price schedule determined by the bids and offers in an open limit order book. The analysis shows: (1) the order book has a small-trade positive bid-ask spread, and limit orders profit from small trades; (2) the electronic exchange provides as much liquidity as possible in extreme situations; (3) the limit order book does not invite competition from third market dealers, while other trading institutions do; (4) If an entering exchange earns nonnegative trading profits, the consolidated price schedule matches the limit order book price schedule.     

Specialist participation and limit orders

We present a market microstructure model to examine specialist's strategic participation decisions in a security market where there are noise traders, limit order traders, an insider and a specialist. We argue that the specialist's participation rate depends on the depth of the limit book and its uncertainty. In particular, the specialist has incentives to trade against the market trend when the limit book depth is low and to trade with the market trend when the depth is high. Moreover, the specialist's participation rate is positively related to the limit book depth uncertainty and the asset price volatility, but is negative related to the average trading volume. We also discuss the specialist's participation strategies under the NYSE regulation that prohibits the specialist from trading with the market trend.     

Brokered versus dealer markets: Impact of proprietary trading with transaction fees

In this study, we consider a one-period financial market with a dealer/broker and an infinite number of investors. While the dealer who trades on his own account (with proprietary trading) simultaneously sets both the transaction fee and the asset price, the broker who brings investors' orders to the market (with no proprietary trading) sets only the transaction fee, given that the price is determined according to the market-clearing condition among investors. We analyze the impact of proprietary trading on the asset price, transaction fee, trading volume, and the welfare of investors. We find that the bid and ask prices set by the dealer who can engage in proprietary trading are more favorable to average investors. As a result, both the trading volume and the transaction fee increase, and social welfare improves.     

Limit order books and trade informativeness

In the microstructure literature, information asymmetry is an important determinant of market liquidity. The classic setting is that uninformed dedicated liquidity suppliers charge price concessions when incoming market orders are likely to be informationally motivated. In limit order book (LOB) markets, however, this relationship is less clear, as market participants can switch roles, and freely choose to immediately demand or patiently supply liquidity by submitting either market or limit orders. We study the importance of information asymmetry in LOBs based on a recent sample of 30 German Deutscher Aktienindex (DAX) stocks. We find that Hasbrouck's (1991) measure of trade informativeness Granger causes book liquidity, in particular that required to fill large market orders. Picking-off risk due to public news-induced volatility is more important for top-of-the book liquidity supply. In our multivariate analysis, we control for volatility, trading volume, trading intensity and order imbalance to isolate the effect of trade informativeness on book liquidity.     

The impact of trading halts on liquidity and price volatility: Evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange

This study examines market behaviour around trading halts associated with information releases on the Australian Stock Exchange, which operates an open electronic limit order book. Using the Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) pseudo-halt methodology, we find trading halts increase both volume and price volatility. Trading halts also increase bid-ask spreads and reduce market depth at the best-quotes in the immediate post-halt period. The results of this study imply that trading halts impair rather than improve market quality in markets that operate open electronic limit order books.     

Multiple-limit trades: empirical facts and application to lead–lag measures

Order splitting is a standard practice in trading: traders constantly scan the limit order book and choose to limit the size of their market orders to the quantity available at the best limit, thereby controlling the market impact of their orders. In this article, we focus on the other trades, multiple-limit trades that go through the best available price in the order book, or ‘trade-throughs’. We provide various statistics on trade-throughs: frequency, volume, intraday distribution, market impact, etc., and present a new method for the measurement of lead–lag parameters between assets, sectors or markets.     

Do uninformed crossed and internalized trades tap into unexpressed liquidity? The case of Nokia

Crossed and internalized upstairs trades are analysed in a dataset in which institutional investors can be identified. Earlier findings that upstairs trading is uninformed, taps into unexpressed liquidity, and does not affect market quality are revisited. The permanent price effect of crossings and internalized upstairs trades is significantly lower than that of limit order book trades due to the fact that the least informed institutional trades are routed upstairs. Crossed and internalized trades affect the depth and transaction costs in the limit order book and a greater reliance is placed on the upstairs market when liquidity is low and volatility is high.     

Quote-based competition,market share,and execution quality in NASDAQ-listed securities

We show that competitive quotes help increase dealer market share on NASDAQ, despite the fact that a large proportion of order flow is preferenced. We find that decimal pricing and the introduction of new trading platforms such as SuperSOES and SuperMontage have significantly changed the effect of quote aggressiveness on dealer market share. In particular, decimal pricing reduces (increases) the price (size) elasticity, SuperSOES increases the size elasticity, and SuperMontage increases both the size and price elasticity of dealer market share. We also show that market centers provide greater price improvements and faster executions when they post competitive quotes.     

Order Flow and Liquidity around NYSE Trading Halts

We study order flow and liquidity around NYSE trading halts. We find that market and limit order submissions and cancellations increase significantly during trading halts, that a large proportion of the limit order book at the reopen is composed of orders submitted during the halt, and that the market-clearing price at the reopen is a good predictor of future prices. Depth near the quotes is unusually low around trading halts, though specialists and/or floor traders appear to provide additional liquidity at these times. Finally, specialists appear to 'spread the quote' prior to imbalance halts to convey information to market participants.     

Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity

We develop a dynamic model of a limit order market populatedby strategic liquidity traders of varying impatience. In equilibrium,patient traders tend to submit limit orders, whereas impatienttraders submit market orders. Two variables are the key determinantsof the limit order book dynamics in equilibrium: the proportionof patient traders and the order arrival rate. We offer severaltestable implications for various market quality measures suchas spread, trading frequency, market resiliency, and time toexecution for limit orders. Finally, we show the effect of imposinga minimal price variation on these measures.     

Trade size clustering and the cost of trading at the London Stock Exchange

For the London Stock Exchange, this paper investigates differences in trading costs between market maker (off-book) and order book trades, in the context of clustering in trade sizes and prices. We report several substantial findings. Even after controlling for differences in trade size, the realised spread measure is lower for off-book trades. For the order book, trade size clustering is not associated with differences in transaction costs nor with differences in the information content of trades. For the off-book market, trades in clustered (popular) sizes carry significantly more information than non-clustered trades. Despite the significant differences in the price impact estimates between the order book and off-book, we show that traders placing large orders off-book are still better off than trading via the order book as they benefit from a large discount from the current midpoint price. Additionally, we highlight that price and size clustering tend to occur simultaneously rather than being substitutes in this market setting.     

Whose trades convey information? Evidence from a cross-section of traders

This paper contributes empirically to our understanding of informed traders. It analyzes traders’ characteristics in a foreign exchange electronic limit order market via anonymous trader identities. We use six indicators of informed trading in a cross-sectional multivariate approach to identify traders with high price impact. More information is conveyed by those traders’ trades which—simultaneously—use medium-sized orders (practice stealth trading), have large trading volume, are located in a financial center, trade early in the trading session, at times of wide spreads and when the order book is thin.     

Liquidity,information, strategic trading in an electronic order book: New insights from the European carbon markets

The electronic limit order book (LOB hereafter) has rapidly become the primary way of trading European carbon assets over the 4 years of the EU ETS programme (2008–2012). In this first attempt of examining the informational content of an electronic order book, we evidence that order flow imbalances have a moderate capacity to predict short term price changes. However, we find that both LOB slope and immediacy costs help to forecast quote improvements and volatility in the next 30 min. Further, we explain why informed trading is highly influential and show that it consists in mixing order splitting strategies and posting fleeting orders once the asymmetric information is reduced (Rosu, 2009). Overall, the consolidated status of the order book mirrors a high level of market uncertainty and a low degree of informational efficiency. In this way, strategic trading can in itself explain some of order book properties, independently of the degree of traders’ sophistication and market competition.     

The information content of a limit order book: The case of an FX market

In this paper we examine the question of whether knowledge of the information contained in a limit order book helps to provide economic value in a simple trading scheme. Given the greater information content of the order book, over simple price information, it might naturally be expected that the order book would dominate. Using Dollar Sterling tick data, we find that despite the in-sample statistical significance of variables describing the structure of the limit order book in explaining tick-by-tick returns, they do not consistently add significant economic value out-of-sample. We show this using a simple linear model to determine trading activity, as well as a model-free genetic algorithm based on price, order flow, and order book information. We also find that the profitability of all trading rules based on genetic algorithms dropped substantially in 2008 compared to 2003 data.     

The self-financing equation in limit order book markets

The goal of this paper is to present a mathematical framework for trading on a limit order book, including its associated transaction costs, and to propose continuous-time equations which generalise the self-financing relationships of frictionless markets. These equations naturally differentiate between trading via limit and via market orders, as they include a price impact or adverse selection constraint. We briefly mention several possible applications, including hedging European options with limit orders, to illustrate their impact and how they can be used to the benefit of low-frequency traders. Two appendices include empirical evidence for facts which are not universally recognised in the current literature on the subject.

     

Liquidity determination in an order-driven market

We exploit full order level information from an electronic FX broking system to provide a comprehensive account of the determination of its liquidity. We not only look at bid-ask spreads and trading volumes, but also study the determination of order entry rates and depth measures derived from the entire limit order book. We find strong predictability in the arrival of liquidity supply/demand events. Further, in times of low (high) liquidity, liquidity supply (demand) events are more common. In times of high trading activity and volatility, the ratio of limit to market order arrivals is high but order book spreads and depth deteriorate. These results are consistent with market order traders having better information than limit order traders.     

Market structure, informational efficiency and liquidity: An experimental comparison of auction and dealer markets

We report the results of 18 market experiments that were conducted in order to compare the call market, the continuous auction and the dealer market. Transaction prices in the call and continuous auction markets are much more efficient than prices in the dealer markets. The call market shows a tendency towards underreaction to new information. Execution costs are lowest in the call market and highest in the dealer market. The trading volume and Roll's (Journal of Finance (1984) 1127–1139) serial covariance estimator are inappropriate measures of execution costs in the present context. The relation between private signals, trading decisions and trading profits is analyzed.