Presale Contract and its Embedded Default and Abandonment Options

The presale contract is a popular property selling method that allows a buyer to default on the remaining payment and/or a developer to abandon a project. Using a simple two-period game theoretical model, we derive a closed-form pricing equation for a presale contract that explicitly accounts for a developer??s abandonment option and a buyer??s default option. Although a developer has an abandonment option under either a spot sale or a presale method, the option is more valuable under a presale contract because of an additional cash inflow from the presale downpayment. A presale also provides a buyer a default option, which is valuable in a real estate market with uncertain demand and price risk. We analyze the implications of the abandonment option on a developer??s construction decision and choice of selling method, as well as the implications of the default option on a buyer??s purchase decision. Furthermore, our model framework has implications to the pricing of futures contracts that involve both stochastic revenues and costs.     

Path-dependent game options: a lookback case

The game option, which is also known as Israel option, is an American option with callable features. The option holder can exercise the option at any time up to maturity. This article studies the pricing behaviors of the path-dependent game option where the payoff of the option depends on the maximum or minimum asset price over the life of the option (i.e., the game option with the lookback feature). We obtain the explicit pricing formula for the perpetual case and provide the integral expression of pricing formula under the finite horizon case. In addition, we derive optimal exercise strategies and continuation regions of options in both floating and fixed strike cases.     

The optimal allocation of decision and exit rights in organizations

We show that in a bilateral relation with conflicting preferences and transferable utility it is unambiguously optimal to assign the authority over project decisions to the privately informed rather than the uninformed party. This holds irrespective of the degree of conflict and the distribution of private information. Under the optimal contract, the uninformed party is protected by an exit option, which it will exert when the decision maker has not chosen the promised decision. Exit terminates the relation and diminishes the project surplus. We show that the first‐best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract.     

金融合约设计的因素分析

通过一个模型说明,隐藏信息、隐藏行动、逆向选择和风险态度是影响金融合约设计的4个主要因素,但这是在要素市场上的局部均衡分析,在此之上加入产品市场作了一般均衡分析,得出市场结构也是影响金融合约设计的因素。隐藏信息和隐藏行动的存在激励参与方签订债务合约;对于具有项目风险的逆向选择情况来说,参与方倾向于签订股权合约。     

Mortgage Contracts,Strategic Options and Stochastic Collateral

This paper offers a game-theoretic model for both the analysis and valuation of mortgage contracts in the context of an economy with complete information and complete contingent claims markets. We analyze the equilibrium strategy of the lender, who holds an option over the magnitude of mortgage credit extended per dollar of collateral offered, and the mortgagor, who holds options to default or prepay, in a class of intertemporal mortgage contracts collateralized by property evolving according to a random process which is common knowledge to both parties to the mortgage contract. Using continuous–time arbitrage valuation principles, we derive the value of the mortgage contract to both parties and show, through both analytical solutions and numerical simulations, that Markov perfect equilibria exist in which, among other properties, a lower flow of housing services accruing to the borrower, per dollar of initial house value, and a correspondingly lower rate of effective depreciation, will elicit a larger volume of funds offered by a lender; the amount of credit offered, the values of the contract to both lender and mortgagor, and the expected losses to both parties from costly bankruptcy are highly sensitive to the perceived volatility of the value of the property collateralizing the mortgage, even in an economy with complete markets or risk neutrality on the parts of lender and borrower; the upper limit on mortgage credit offered by a rational lender may be a small fraction of the current fair market value of the property, regardless of the contractual yield offered by the borrower, and will decrease, at each such yield, as bankruptcy costs or housing service flows increase; and under significant but plausible values for bankruptcy and costs of liquidating property under foreclosure, the flow of mortgage credit can become negatively related to the spread of the mortgage yield over the riskless rate, with the lender preferring a lower contractual yield to a higher one.     

An economy with personal currency: theory and experimental evidence

Is personal currency issued by participants sufficient to operate an economy efficiently, with no outside or government money? Sahi and Yao (in J Math Econ, 1989) and Sorin (in J Econ Theory, 1996) constructed a strategic market game to prove that this is possible. We conduct an experimental game in which each agent issues his/her personal IOUs, and a costless efficient clearinghouse adjusts the exchange rates among them so the markets always clear. The results suggest that if the information system and clearing are so good as to preclude moral hazard, any form of information asymmetry, and need for trust, the economy operates efficiently at any price level without government money. These conditions cannot reasonably be expected to hold in natural settings. In a second set of treatments when agents have the option of not delivering on their promises, a high enough penalty for non-delivery is necessary to ensure an efficient market; a lower penalty leads to inefficient, even collapsing, markets due to moral hazard.     

Time consistent pricing of options with embedded decisions

Review of Derivatives Research - Many financial contracts are equipped with exercise rights or other features enabling the parties to actively shape the contract’s payoff. These decisions...     

Valuation and Optimal Exercise of the Wild Card Option in the Treasury Bond Futures Market

The Chicago Board of Trade Treasury Bond Futures Contract allows the short position several delivery options as to when and with which bond the contract will be settled. The timing option allows the short position to choose any business day in the delivery month to make delivery. In addition, the contract settlement price is locked in at 2:00 p .m . when the futures market closes, despite the facts that the short position need not declare an intent to settle the contract until 8:00 p .m . and that trading in Treasury bonds can occur all day in dealer markets. If bond prices change significantly between 2:00 and 8:00 p .m ., the short has the option of settling the contract at a favorable 2:00 p .m . price. This phenomenon, which recurs on every trading day of the delivery month, creates a sequence of 6-hour put options for the short position which has been dubbed the “wild card option.” This paper presents a valuation model for the wild card option and computes estimates of the value of that option, as well as rules for its optimal exercise.     

Regulatory arbitrage and the efficiency of banking regulation

We study the efficiency of banking regulation under financial integration. Banks freely choose the jurisdiction where to locate their activities and have private information about their efficiency level. Regulators non-cooperatively offer any regulatory contract that satisfies information and participation constraints of banks. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium of the regulatory game is a simple pooling contract: financial integration is characterized by the inability for regulators to discriminate between banks with different efficiency levels. This result is driven by the endogenous restriction caused by regulatory arbitrage on the capacity of regulators to use several regulatory instruments.     

Expansions and Contractions of Major US Shopping Centers

We analyze the determinants of expansions and contractions of shopping centers using a unique dataset of property level data for shopping centers in eleven metropolitan areas over the period from 1995 through 2005. We find that shopping centers with large operating costs are less likely to expand and are more likely to contract. Higher expected revenue per square foot increases the likelihood of expansion and decreases the likelihood of contraction. For small shopping centers the decision to change gross leasable area (GLA) is largely driven by potential revenue, while the decision to change the number of stores is largely a function of cost. We find some support for Grenadier’s theory that a larger number of competitors reduces the value of option to wait and increases the likelihood of both expansion and contraction. The market share of competitors reduces the likelihood of increasing the number of stores as suggested by the theory of strategic positioning. Our hypotheses best explain contraction decisions of large shopping centers and expansion decisions of small shopping centers. We find that both expansions and contractions of GLA are less likely for large shopping centers in MSAs with greater uncertainty about real estate prices, indicating that the option to delay has value. Moreover, small centers are significantly less sensitive to cost and revenue; since small centers are likely to have greater idiosyncratic risk than large; this provides indirect evidence for a significant delay option.     

Optimal pension insurance design

In this paper we analyze how the traditional life and pension contracts with a guaranteed rate of return can be optimized to increase customers’ welfare. Given that the contracts have to be priced correctly, we use individuals’ preferences to find the preferred design. Assuming CRRA utility, we cannot explain the existence of any form of guarantees. Through numerical solutions we quantify the difference (measured in certainty equivalents) to the preferred Merton solution of direct investments in a fixed proportion of risky and risk free assets. The largest welfare loss seems to come from the fact that guarantees are effective by the end of each year, not only by the expiry of the contract. However, the demand for products with guarantees may be explained through behavioral models. We use cumulative prospect theory as an example, showing that the optimal design is a simple contract with a life-time guarantee and no default option.     

Strategic entry and market leadership in a two-player real options game

We analyse the entry decisions of competing firms in a two-player stochastic real option game, when rivals earn different but correlated uncertain profitabilities from operating. In the presence of entry costs, decision thresholds exhibit hysteresis, the range of which is decreasing in the correlation between competing firms. A measure of the expected time of each firm being active in the market and the probability of both rivals entering within a finite time are explicitly calculated. The former (latter) is found to decrease (increase) with the volatility of relative firm profitabilities implying that market leadership is shorter-lived the more uncertain the industry environment. In an application of the model to the aircraft industry, we find that Boeing’s optimal response to Airbus’ launch of the A380 super carrier is to accommodate entry and supplement its current product line, as opposed to the riskier alternative of committing to the development of a corresponding super jumbo.     

Entrenchment or incentive? CEO employment contracts and acquisition decisions

A long-standing controversy is whether CEO employment contracts insulate inferior managers from discipline leading to shareholder wealth destruction, or whether contracts alleviate managerial risk aversion and encourage value-enhancing decisions. Using a unique dataset on S&P 500 CEO employment contracts during 1993–2005, I find that acquirers with a CEO contract obtain better announcement returns, pay lower premiums for their targets, garner superior long-run post-acquisition operating performance, and undertake riskier deals than acquirers without a contract. Further investigation of individual contract provisions reveals substantial heterogeneity. Specifically, the fixed term rather than at will contract, longer contract duration, long-term equity incentives, accelerated stock and option vesting provisions in severance arrangement, and more refined definitions of just cause (good reason) for CEO termination (resignation) alleviate managerial risk aversion, reduce contracting ambiguity, and motivate value-creating decisions.     

A framework for the study of expansion options,loan commitments and agency costs

We consider a firm that operates a single plant and has an expansion option to invest in a new plant. This setup leads to two-sided optimal stopping problems. We analyze optimal expansion timing and quantify the value of the loan commitment that the equityholder obtained from the lender and associated agency costs incurred on the lender's side. Moreover, we incorporate construction period for the new plant, which throws another layer of uncertainty into the model: the parties cannot tell price level of the firm's product when the construction completes. This analysis contrasts with the conventional one-sided stopping models in corporate finance literature. We can study expansion options by viewing a firm's existing operation, bankruptcy threat, and financing decisions all together.     

Negotiating the spirit of the deal

Most experienced negotiators are comfortable working out the terms of an economic contract--they bargain for the best price, haggle over equity splits, and finesse detailed exit clauses. Yet these same seasoned professionals spend so much time ironing out the letter of the deal that they often pay little attention to the spirit of the deal--the social contract. And that can lead to major problems, say the authors, because even though the parties agree to the same terms on paper, they may have very different expectations about how to meet them. Those on one side, for instance, might think they're entering into a long-term partnership, while those on the other believe they're simply making a series of discrete transactions. Because the parties have failed to have a true meeting of the minds, they sign a deal that is likely to fall apart. To avoid such a disastrous outcome, negotiators should explicitly discuss the details of their social contract before inking the deal. They should talk about the underlying social contract, which answers the question, What? For instance, what is the real nature, extent, and duration of the agreement? And they should discuss the ongoing social contract, which answers the question, How? For instance, in practice, how will we make decisions, handle unforeseen events, communicate with one another, and resolve disputes? Drawing on real-life examples, the authors explore the problems that arise when the letter and spirit of the deal are at odds and suggest ways to dovetail them so they are both independently strong and mutually reinforcing. They also highlight risk factors that can lead to misunderstandings and expose common misperceptions about the social contract.     

Assessing the Risk Potential of Premium Payment Options in Participating Life Insurance Contracts

Most life insurance contracts embed the right to stop premium payments during the term of the contract (paid-up option). Thereby, the contract is not terminated but continues with reduced benefits and often provides the right to resume premium payments later, thus increasing the previously reduced benefits (resumption option). In our analysis, we start with a basic contract with two standard options, namely, an interest rate guarantee and annual surplus participation. Next, in addition to the features of the basic contract, a paid-up and resumption option is included in the framework. The valuation process is not based on assumptions about a particular policyholders' exercise strategy but instead assesses the risk potential from the insurer's viewpoint by providing an upper bound for any possible exercise behavior. This approach provides important information to the insurer about the potential hazard of offering the paid-up and resumption option. Further, the approach allows an analysis of the impact of guaranteed interest rate, annual surplus participation, and investment volatility on the values of the premium payment options.     

Costly contracting in a long‐term relationship

We examine a model of contracting where parties interact repeatedly and can contract at any point in time, but writing formal contracts is costly. A contract can describe the external environment and the parties' behavior in a more or less detailed way, and the cost of writing a contract is proportional to the amount of detail. We consider both formal (externally enforced) and informal (self‐enforcing) contracts. The presence of writing costs has important implications both for the optimal structure of formal contracts, particularly the tradeoff between contingent and spot contracting, and for the interaction between formal and informal contracting. Our model sheds light on these implications and generates a rich set of predictions about the determinants of the optimal mode of contracting.     

担保型商品房买卖合同纠纷的裁判困境及其出路

为担保借款合同,当事人同步签署商品房买卖合同,约定借款人不能归还借款本金及利息时,应履行商品房买卖合同。此类具有担保功能的商品房买卖合同,在性质上属于债务清偿协议。法释\[2015\]18号第24条虽要求当事人以民间借贷提起诉讼,但未否定商品房买卖合同的效力。在确认应还本金及利息及借款人没有如期清偿的前提下,出借人请求移转房屋所有权的,应予支持。     

A multi-agent-based negotiation support system for distributed transmission cost allocation

We have developed a multi-agent system (MAS), based on the network flow model and KQML, called MASCAN, to support negotiations in the cost allocation of network transmission. This is very important to industries that have different entities connected with lines or pipes, such as the Internet and telecommunications. Such an approach is especially useful to the utility industries, such as electricity and gas, and the transportation industry. In the system, each agent represents a node in a network, for example supplier or consumer. Agents do not receive any centralized controls or information from centralized sources to guarantee autonomy–a key requirement for the agent. In this all decisions are made locally based on the rules or knowledge that each agent has or captured to communicate or coordinate with other agents for the cheapest path under fair-play requirements. We also assume that each agent is rational, that is, one of the goals or objectives of agent decisions or movements is to minimize costs or increase profits. The solution to cost allocation is to search for the equilibrium point of a non-cooperative game subject to the given constraints, for example network capacity. We applied MASCAN to model and support the negotiation of cost allocation in power transmission, and the results and how this approach supported the process of negotiation are perceived to be closer to the real-world negotiation and the outcomes were accepted more easily by the participants. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.