中国的“影子保险”:来自监管自然实验的证据

影子保险在金融稳定中扮演着重要角色,但现有文献较多关注影子银行,对影子保险关注不足。“影子保险”即保险公司通过再保险方式将保险业务转移给不受监管或者受监管较弱的关联企业的活动,这会推高其真实的杠杆水平,增加金融体系脆弱性。然而,由于影子保险的不透明性和缺少自然实验,现有研究仅基于有限数据或模型给出简单的特征事实或结构性估计,很少能从因果关系上清楚地识别影子保险活动及其机制。本文利用中国加强对中资保险公司(处理组)再保险关联交易监管的政策冲击这一自然实验,使用微观数据和双重差分方法,识别了中国金融体系中的影子保险活动。研究发现,相关监管有效降低了影子保险活动,这一效应对集团公司的影响尤为显著;在机制方面,相关监管通过影响中资保险公司资产负债表两端的结构性调整进而降低了其风险承担行为,提高了经营稳定性。本文方法对识别金融机构的监管套利和防范系统性金融风险具有一定参考意义。     

The Capital Structure of Firms Subject to Price Regulation: Evidence from the Insurance Industry

Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers who sell insurance in both competitive and/or regulated markets. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that insurers subject to price regulation will choose to hold less capital. In addition, we hypothesize insurers subject to more stringent regulatory pricing constraints will choose even higher degrees of leverage because the benefits of holding additional amounts of capital are suppressed. We conduct empirical tests using cross-sectional data on insurers and find evidence consistent with both hypotheses. These findings have important implications for insurance price and solvency regulation. Stricter price regulation increases the default risk (i.e., reduces the financial quality) of insurance contracts purchased by individuals and firms.     

Health Care Reform,Efficiency of Health Insurers,and Optimal Health Insurance Markets

This research examines the efficiency of the U.S. health insurers. It shows that more insurers are less efficient than in the previous sample year; however, the results suggest that the federal health care reform has no significant effect on the overall efficiency of all insurers as a whole, which is very low but does not change much over time. This research explores how to improve the efficiency of the health insurance market by proposing state, regional, and national efficiency-based goal-oriented market models and an efficiency duplicating system, and it discusses important implications to the health care compacts, the health insurance exchanges or marketplaces, and the national multistate programs. It also analyzes further moves for efficiency enhancement with regard to payment methods and the health care delivery system. One interesting finding is that the Medicaid program is very efficient because it provides support to the offering of Medicaid coverage and further expansion, which enhances the health welfare of society with fewer resources inputs from the perspective of efficiency. This research should provide important insights for state and federal governments, policy makers, regulators, the health insurance industry, and consumers.     

CEO Turnover and Ownership Structure: Evidence From the U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry

This article examines the impact of ownership structure on the relation between firm performance and chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in the U.S. property–liability insurance industry. Theoretical implications of stock versus mutual ownership structures on the performance–turnover relation are ambiguous. Our empirical results indicate that CEO turnover is less responsive to firm underwriting performance in mutual insurers compared to stock insurers. In fact, we find that while CEO turnover for stock firms is negatively related to prior performance, no such relationship is found for mutual insurers. These results hold while controlling for board structure and other relevant factors.     

Unfair Discrimination and Homeowners Insurance Availability: An Empirical Analysis

There has been an active public policy debate about the availability and cost of homeowners insurance in urban markets, and insurers have been charged with intentional discrimination, or redlining, against minority buyers and neighborhoods with a large proportion of minority population. Studies of relative price, loss costs, agency location, and product quality have attempted to determine whether insurers unfairly discriminate against minority homeowners in urban areas. This study focuses on insurance availability, and examines whether there is a systematic difference in the breadth of insurance coverage in the market that corresponds to the proportion of minority residents in a state. The market share of dwelling fire insurance polices across states for years 2000 and 2003 is analyzed, and evidence is presented that shows a positive correlation between the proportion of minority homeowners in a state and the share of more restrictive dwelling fire policies. However, this difference is not statistically significant once other risk-related and economic factors are included in the analysis.     

The Impact of Insurance Fraud Detection Systems

This article analyzes the impact of detection systems in an insurance fraud context. In a noncommitment Costly State Verification setting insurers can only detect fraudulent claims by performing costly audits, and policyholders are overcompensated by the optimal insurance contract. We show that auditing becomes more effective and overcompensation can be reduced, when insurers are able to condition their audits on the information provided by detection systems.     

中国保险业经营效率的动态演进：基于DEA与MI模型的考察

中国保险业的效率呈现逐年上升的趋势,年均增长16%;前沿技术进步已成为中国保险业效率增长的最主要动力,保险公司因前沿技术进步平均每年提高全要素生产率高达16.6个百分点;保险公司相对前沿的技术效率差距拉大,已出现阻碍效率增长的趋势,这种技术效率的差距不是由于纯技术效率的差异影响而主要是受规模效率的影响;股份保险公司效率略高于国有公司,全国性保险公司的经营效率明显高于区域性保险公司。     

Equilibrium Pricing of General Insurance Policies

Abstract

A model is developed for determining the price of general insurance policies in a competitive, noncooperative market. This model extends previous single-optimizer pricing models by supposing that each participant chooses an optimal pricing strategy. Specifically, prices are determined by finding a Nash equilibrium of an N-player differential game. In the game, a demand law describes the relationship between policy sales and premium, and each insurer aims to maximize its (expected) utility of wealth at the end of the planning horizon. Two features of the model are investigated in detail: the effect of limited total demand for policies, and the uncertainty in the calculation of the breakeven (or cost price) of an insurance policy.

It is found that if the demand for policies is unlimited, then the equilibrium pricing strategy is identical for all insurers, and it can be found analytically for particular model parameterizations. However, if the demand for policies is limited, then, for entrants to a new line of business, there are additional asymmetric Nash equilibria with insurers alternating between maximal and minimal selling. Consequently it is proposed that the actuarial cycle is a result of price competition, limited demand, and entry of new insurers into the market. If the breakeven premium is highly volatile, then the symmetric equilibrium premium loading tends to a constant, and it is suggested that this will dampen the oscillatory pricing of new entrants.     

Estimating the Cost of Equity for Property-Liability Insurance Companies

Due to the highly skewed and heavy‐tailed distributions associated with the insurance claims process, we evaluate the Rubinstein‐Leland (RL) model for its ability to improve the cost of equity estimates of insurance companies because of its distribution‐free feature. Our analyses show that there is as large as a 94‐basis‐point difference in the estimated cost of insurance equity between the RL model and the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) for the sample of property‐liability insurers with more severe departures from normality. In addition, consistent with our hypotheses, significant differences in the market risk estimates are found for insurers with return distributions that are asymmetrically distributed, and for small insurers. Third, we find significant performance improvements from using the RL model by showing smaller values of excess return of the expected return of the portfolio to the model return for a portfolio of insurers with returns that are more skewed and for a portfolio of small insurers. Finally, our panel data analysis shows the differences in the market risk estimates are significantly influenced by firm size, degree of leverage, and degree of asymmetry. The implication is that insurers should use the RL model rather than the CAPM to estimate its cost of capital if the insurer is small (assets size is less than $2,291 million), and/or its returns are not symmetrical (the value of skewness is greater than 0.509 or less than ?0.509).     

Deterring Fraud: The Role of General Damage Awards in Automobile Insurance Settlements

Awards for pain and suffering and other noneconomic losses account for over half of all damages awarded under third‐party auto insurance bodily injury settlements. This article hypothesizes that third‐party insurers use general damage awards to reduce the incentive to submit exaggerated claims for specific damages for injuries and lost wages. Consistent with this hypothesis, the article finds evidence using data on over 17,000 closed bodily injury claims that special damage claims that exceed their expected value receive proportionally lower general damage awards than claims that do not. Among the implications of this research is the possibility that insurers will be less zealous in challenging fraudulent special damage claims under a third‐party insurance regime than they will be under a first‐party insurance regime in which access to general damages is limited.     

The Insurance Industry's Talent Gap and Where We Go From Here

There is concern among insurers and related firms in the United States and abroad that there will be a shortage of skilled insurance professionals in the next few years as current workers retire. Though there have been discussions among insurers, organizations, and academics as to how to address this issue, until recently, each group has been primarily working in isolation. The Insurance Education & Career Summit, which took place in September 2011, brought together 110 individuals across these groups for the purpose of creating a unified strategy to both attract and retain skilled workers to the insurance industry and work to create the next generation of insurance executives. This article provides a brief background on the talent gap issue. We also discuss its potential impact on the insurance industry. Finally, we summarize the main obstacles identified by Summit participants to both attracting and retaining skilled workers as well as the strategies developed to overcome these obstacles.     

The Economics of Insurance Intermediaries

This article analyzes the economic functions of independent insurance intermediaries (brokers and independent agents), focusing on the commercial property–casualty insurance market. The article investigates the functions performed by intermediaries, the competitiveness of the market, the compensation arrangements for intermediaries, and the process by which policies are placed with insurers. Insurance intermediaries are essentially market makers who match the insurance needs of policyholders with insurers who have the capability of meeting those needs. Intermediary compensation comprises premium‐based commissions, expressed as a percentage of the premium paid, and contingent commissions based on the profitability, persistency, and/or volume of the business placed with the insurer. Empirical evidence is provided that premium‐based and contingent commissions are passed on to policyholders in the premium. However, contingent commissions can enhance competitive bidding by aligning the insurer's and the intermediary's interests. This alignment of interests gives insurers more confidence in the selection of risks and thus helps to break the “winner's curse” and encourages insurers to bid more aggressively. Independent intermediaries also help markets operate more efficiently by reducing the information asymmetries between insurers and buyers that can cause adverse selection.     

On the Lack of Participating Policy Usage by Stock Insurance Companies

Stock insurers can reduce or eliminate agency conflicts between policyholders and stockholders by issuing participating insurance. Despite this benefit, most stock companies don't offer participating contracts. This study explains why. We study an equilibrium with both stock and mutual insurers in which stockholders set premiums to provide a fair expected return on their investment, and with a policyholder who chooses the insurance contract that maximizes her expected utility. We demonstrate that stockholders cannot profitably offer fully participating contracts, but can profitably offer partially participating insurance. However, when the policyholder participation fraction is high, the fair‐return premium is so large that the policyholder always prefers fully participating insurance from the mutual company. Policies with lower levels of policyholder participation are optimal for policyholders with relatively high risk aversion, though such policies are usually prohibited by insurance legislation. Thus, the reason stock insurers rarely issue participating contracts isn't because the potential benefits are small or unimportant. Rather, profitability or regulatory constraints simply prevent stock insurers from exercising those benefits in equilibrium.     

Recent Developments in the Aviation Insurance Industry

The aviation industry has been hard hit in recent years. While there are numerous factors that have contributed to the industry's dilemma, rising and volatile insurance premiums—particularly after the events of 9/11—have posed a particular problem for many airline managers. Despite a general trend for accident rates involving commercial passenger airplanes to decrease as aviation technology has advanced over the years and airplanes have become safer, the aviation insurance market has been far from stable. This article provides an overview of how the aviation insurance industry works and how it has changed in recent years. We take a look at how the risk is spread between insurers, how insurers treat deliberate acts of violence, and lastly, how insurers price the risk. Our article shows that the aviation insurance market has undergone considerable changes in recent years and that it has adjusted to the post-9/11 aviation insurance realities being reasonably ready to handle events of an even more catastrophic magnitude.     

Empirical Evidence for Advantageous Selection in the Commercial Fire Insurance Market

De Meza and Webb (2001) indicated that individuals with a higher degree of risk aversion would demand more insurance and invest in self-protection to reduce risk probability when both the preference type and investment in self-protection are hidden from insurers. They referred to the negative correlation between market insurance and risk type as advantageous selection. However, the relationship between risk type and the degree of risk aversion is debatable in both theoretical and empirical research. This paper therefore proposes that advantageous selection could be supported from another angle by directly examining the relationships that exist among market insurance, self-protection, and risk probability. By focusing on the commercial fire insurance market, information on the purchase of market insurance, investment in self-protection, and fire accident records is hand-collected by means of a unique survey. It is found that firms purchasing market insurance have a greater tendency to channel efforts into self-protection. It is also found that firms expending effort on self-protection are less likely to suffer a fire accident. Furthermore, it is found that firms with commercial fire insurance have less chance of suffering a fire accident than those without such insurance. Each of the above three findings jointly supports the view that advantageous selection could play a critical role in the commercial fire insurance market.     

Strategic Price Discrimination in Compulsory Insurance Markets

This paper considers price discrimination when competing firms do not observe a customer’s type but only some other variable correlated to it. This is a typical situation in many insurance markets—such as motor insurance—where it is also often the case that insurance is compulsory. We characterise the equilibria and their welfare properties under various price regimes. We show that discrimination based on immutable characteristics such as gender is a dominant strategy, either when firms offer policies at a fixed price or when they charge according to some consumption variable that is correlated to costs. In the latter case, gender discrimination can be an outcome of strategic interaction alone in situations where it would not be adopted by a monopolist. Strategic price discrimination may also increase cross subsidies between types, contrary to expectations.JEL Classification No.: L13, G22     

AT THE CROSSROADS: THE LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY AND FINANCIAL SERVICES REFORM

Abstract: In September of 1996, The Board of Directors of the American Council of Life Insurance ("ACLI")reversed decades of policy and embraced for the first time the concept of reciprocal ownership or "affiliations" between life insurance companies and commercial banks. Under this new policy mandate, the ACLI is advocating federal legislation that would permit banks to sell all types of insurance and control insurance underwriters through separate affiliates or subsidiaries. In return, 1) insurers would have the authority to acquire banks; 2) the insurance activities of banks would be fully subject to state insurance regulation; and 3) federal bank regulators would be precluded from preempting state regulatory authority.
This article reviews the various factors that precipitated this watershed policy decision, discusses the structural and regulatory issues that are important to life insurers, and speculates briefly on the prospects for financial services legislation.     

The Association between External Monitoring and Earnings Management in the Property-Casualty Insurance Industry

This paper examines the association between external monitoring and earnings management by property-casualty insurers. We extend previous work by Petroni and Beasley (1996) by expanding the set of external monitors to include both auditors and actuaries. We investigate whether certain auditor-actuary pairs are associated with less understatement of the loss reserve account by financially struggling insurers. Our data consist of loss adjustments reported by 465 property-casualty insurers for reserves established in 1993. The results indicate that under-reserving by weak insurers is essentially eliminated when the firm uses auditors and actuaries that are both from Big Six accounting firms. In contrast, non-Big Six actuaries have less impact on under-reserving by weak insurers. Our results suggest that the quality usually associated with Big Six auditors falls when the audit firm relies on third party actuaries to evaluate the loss reserve estimates of struggling insurance clients. We conjecture that Big Six actuaries insist on more conservative loss reserve levels because, compared to actuarial consulting firms, they are more attuned to the liability exposure of the auditor.     

Insurance law and incomplete contracts

We analyze how insurance law can mitigate moral hazard by allowing insurers to reduce or cancel coverage in some circumstances. We consider an incomplete contract setting in which the insurer may obtain information related to the policyholder's behavior through a costly audit of the circumstances of the loss. Court decisions are based on a standard of proof such as the balance of probabilities. We show that an optimal insurance law brings efficiency gains compared to the no-audit case. We also highlight the conditions under which the burden of proof should be on the insured, provided that insurers are threatened with sanctions for bad faith.     

Open‐Market Stock Repurchases by Insurance Companies and Signaling

The signaling hypothesis of share repurchases implies that management uses repurchases to signal either that their firm's future operating performance will improve or that shares of their stock are simply underpriced by the market. This study examines which of the two interpretations can better explain open‐market share repurchase programs announced by insurance companies. We find no evidence that future‐operating performance of insurers improves following the repurchase announcement. In addition, changes in future operating performance cannot explain the announcement‐period abnormal return. Instead, the stock undervaluation prior to the repurchase announcement can significantly explain the announcement‐period abnormal return, particularly for life insurers. Overall, our results suggest that the positive market reaction to insurers’ open‐market share repurchase announcements is due to the stock undervaluation by the market, but not due to positive information content about future operating performance conveyed in the repurchase announcement.