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1.
James Wiseman 《Economic Theory》2000,15(2):477-483
Summary. Approval voting is designed to be “insensitive to numbers” of voters, and likely to elect a Condorcet candidate. However, the result of an election among one group of candidates gives no information about the results of elections among any other groups, even if every voter follows the recommended utility-maximizing strategy, which places strong restrictions on the individual voter's subset ballots. Thus the addition of a single candidate could completely reverse the outcome of an election, or a Condorcet candidate could finish last. Received: November 5, 1998; revised version: November 30, 1998 相似文献
2.
Summary. Serizawa [3] characterized the set of strategy-proof, individually rational, no exploitative, and non-bossy social choice functions in economies with pure public goods. He left an open question whether non-bossiness is necessary for his characterization. We will prove that non-bossiness is implied by the other three axioms in his characterization. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: January 19, 1998 相似文献
3.
Summary. We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Arrows independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. Under a weak richness condition, these domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations (Condorcet cycles). We then ask on which domains the Borda count is non-manipulable. It turns out that it is non-manipulable on a broader class of domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules. On the other hand, we also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda count is non-manipulable for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation domains.Received: 24 November 2003, Revised: 12 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D71.
Correspondence to: Clemens PuppeThe third author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), Graduiertenkolleg 629 at the University of Bonn and from the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA F 043496). 相似文献
4.
Summary. By generalizing the classical Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz Theorem, we obtain a result that provides sufficient conditions
to ensure the non-emptiness of several kinds of choice functions. This result generalizes well-known results on the existence
of maximal elements for binary relations (Bergstrom [4]; Walker [16]; Tian [15]), on the non-emptiness of non-binary choice
functions (Nehring [12]; Llinares and Sánchez [9]) and on the non-emptiness of some classical solutions for tournaments (top
cycle and uncovered set) on non-finite sets.
Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: October 18, 2001 相似文献
5.
Summary. This paper proves the C 1,1 differentiability of the value function for continuous time concave dynamic optimization problems, under the assumption that the instantaneous utility is C 1,1 and the initial segment of optimal solutions is interior. From this result, the Lipschitz dependence of optimal solutions on initial data and the Lipschitz continuity of the policy function are derived, by adding an assumption of strong concavity of the integrand. Received: July 29, 1996; revised version: November 25, 1997 相似文献
6.
Hideki Mizukami 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):211-217
Summary. We consider the problem of choosing one point in a set of alternatives when monetary transfers are possible. In this context,
Schummer (2000) shows that a social choice function must be a constant function if manipulation through bribes is ruled out.
But he requires two kinds of domain-richness conditions. One is either smooth connectedness or the finiteness of the set of
alternatives and the other is monotonical closedness. However, dispensing with the former condition, we alternatively prove
the same result under a weaker condition than monotonical closedness.
Received: April 11, 2000; revised version: February 25, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper received the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Moriguchi Prize in January 2001.
I am grateful to Prof. Ryoichi Nagahisa, Prof. Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Prof. Ken-ichi Shimomura, Prof. Ken Urai, and especially
two anonymous referees for their useful and helpful comments and suggestions. I am a Research Fellow of the Japan Society
for the Promotion of Science. 相似文献
7.
Summary. We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational agents interact locally in order to play a coordination
game. Agents differ in their mobility with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents
enjoy a higher payoff and always benefit from increased mobility, while immobile agents benefit from increased mobility at
low levels of mobility only. This wedge in payoffs weakly increases as mobility increases. Some extensions are discussed.
Received: January 10, 2001; revised version: December 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank, without implicating in any way, George Mailath for helpful discussions. Some of the ideas in this paper were
developed during the V Conference of the Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory in Ischia, Italy. The NSF provided
financial support.
Correspondence to: T. Temzelides 相似文献
8.
Summary. We offer a new proof of the maximum principle, by using the envelope theorem that is frequently used in the standard microeconomic
theory.
Received: April 11, 2002; revised version: June 26, 2002
Correspondence to: K. Shimomura 相似文献
9.
Ilaria Ossella 《Economic Theory》1999,14(3):597-607
Summary. This paper establishes a ‘turnpike theorem’ for a closed linear model of production with a primitive input requirement matrix. Optimal programs of resource allocation have a ‘turnpike property’ if the growth factor of every sector in the economy converges, in the long run, to a common value. The usefulness of such a theorem is due to the fact that the input requirement matrix for an economy with a large number of goods may be primitive (some power of the matrix is strictly positive). Received: April 19, 1998; revised version: July 15, 1998 相似文献
10.
Summary. We prove that locally, Walras' law and homogeneity characterize the structure of market excess demand functions when financial
markets are incomplete and assets' returns are nominal. The method of proof is substantially different from all existing arguments
as the properties of individual demand are also different. We show that this result has important implications and is part
of a more general result that excess demand is an essentially arbitrary function not just of prices, but also of the exogenous
parameters of the economy as asset returns, preferences, and endowments. Thus locally the equilibrium manifold, relating equilibrium
prices to these parameters has also no structure.
Received: September 17, 1996; revised version: November 7, 1997 相似文献
11.
Rationalizable variable-population choice functions 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Summary. We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that
fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice,
given a plausible dominance property that prevents the choice of alternatives involving low utility levels. In addition, a
class of critical-level separable choice functions is characterized. This result, which extends an earlier axiomatization
of a related class of bargaining solutions to a variable-population setting, is the first axiomatization of critical-level
principles in a general choice-theoretic model.
Received: November 30, 1999; revised version: September 11, 2000 相似文献
12.
Summary. A disturbing phenomenon in voting, which causes most of the problems as well as the interest in the field, is that election outcomes (for fixed preferences) can change with the way the ballots are tallied. This causes difficulties because with each possible choice, some set of voters can be dubious about whether it is the “correct” one. But, how likely are these settings allowing multiple election outcomes? By combining properties of the geometry of voting developed by Saari with a analytic-geometric technique created by Schlafli, we determine the likelihood that a three candidate election can cause these potentially dubious outcomes. Received: April 11, 1997; revised version: November 12, 1997 相似文献
13.
Summary. This paper examines the proposition that homotheticity is equivalent to the property that (e.g., in the context of a production
function) the marginal rate of substitution is constant along any ray from the origin. This claim is made in many places,
but hitherto the prerequisites have not been stated explicitly. In the present contribution it is demonstrated that an additional
condition is required for the claim to hold. We present a theorem that achieves equivalence by also assuming ‘nowhere ray
constancy’. It turns out that this condition is implied by assumptions often made, e.g., in production theory. Further, a
complete characterization is given of the class of functions that satisfy ray constant marginal rates of substitution or,
somewhat more generally, a condition of ray parallel gradients. In addition to homothetic functions this class contains functions
homogeneous of degree 0 (i.e., ray constant) and functions which are homothetic in disjoint regions separated by regions of
ray constancy.
Received: November 5, 1999; revised version: October 31, 2000 相似文献
14.
Summary. This note presents a simple proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem using Saari's [3, 4] “geometry of voting”. Received: March 5, 2001; revised version: August 16, 2001 相似文献
15.
James Schummer 《Economic Theory》1999,13(3):709-722
Summary. It has long been known that when agents have von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries, there is an incompatibility between strategy-proofness and efficiency (Gibbard, [9]; Hylland, [12]) – a solution satisfying those properties must be dictatorial. We strengthen this result by showing that it follows from the same incompatibility on a series of much smaller domains of preferences. Specifically, we first show the incompatibility to hold on our smallest domain, in which two agents are restricted to have linear preferences over one private good and one public good produced from the private good (Kolm triangle economies). This result then implies the same incompatibility on increasingly larger domains of preferences, ending finally with the class of von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences over lotteries. Received: February 6, 1997; revised version: January 29, 1998 相似文献
16.
James Bergin 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):875-892
In implementation theory it is common to consider social choice functions that map to lotteries over outcomes. For example,
virtual implementation has been used widely with social choice functions that involve randomization. This paper investigates
(in incomplete information environments) the possibility of purification of such social choice functions, where purification
means that the “replacement” social choice function maps to outcomes rather than distributions over outcomes, is incentive
compatible and generates the same distribution over payoffs and outcomes as the original social choice function.
Received: July 31, 2000; revised version: December 2, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Thanks are due to Ole Nielsen, Terence Tao and Lin Zhou for helpful conversations. Thanks are also due to an anonymous
referee for detailed comments. 相似文献
17.
Summary. In this paper we fully characterize an individual's choice behaviour according to three different so–called external references. The first system which we describe axiomatically is standard utility maximization or preference optimization. The second approach characterizes the choice of the second largest element as an optimal choice, the third system is the choice of a medium element, also as a first best choice. For all three approaches, we have established a common axiomatic structure which allows us to point out rather precisely congruences and divergences among the different systems considered. Received: December 12, 1997; revised version: September 15, 1998 相似文献
18.
Antonio Quesada 《Economic Theory》2002,20(3):623-627
Summary. Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are “almost unanimous\": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three positions. Profiles of the second type are “appropriately heterogeneous”, with preferences similar to those generating the “paradox of voting”. Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001 相似文献
19.
Tito Pietra 《Economic Theory》2001,18(3):649-659
Summary. I consider the set of equilibria of two-period economies with S extrinsic states of nature in the second period and I assets
with linearly independent nominal payoffs. Asset prices are variable. If the number of agents is greater than (S-I), the payoff
matrix is in general position and S 2I, the set of equilibrium allocations generically (in utility function space) contains a smooth manifold of dimension (S-1).
Moreover, the map from states o
f nature to equilibrium allocations (restricted to this manifold) is one-to-one at each equilibrium.
Received: February 23, 1998; revised version: June 1, 2000 相似文献
20.
Wilfredo Leiva Maldonado 《Economic Theory》1999,14(2):473-478
Summary. In this paper I give a method for finding long-run-average policies in the undiscounted economic growth problem using approximations
by finite horizons. Required hypothesis is the strong interiority of T-horizon solutions.
Received: March 25, 1996; revised version: July 29, 1997 相似文献