The Merits of Dual Pricing of Russian Natural Gas

Our analysis reveals that, from Russia's perspective, there is no economic rationale to unify the price of natural gas it sells domestically and in Europe. We argue that pipelines allow Gazprom to segment the Russian market from the European (including Turkey) market and that Russia has market power in the European market. If Russia were to fail to exploit this market power in its European market, by selling its natural gas to Europe at only full long‐run marginal cost plus transportation costs, Russia would lose between $5 billion and $7.5 billion per year (almost two per cent of its GDP). If, instead, Russia were to raise its domestic prices to the prices it charges in Europe, Russian industry would incur very large investment adjustment and unemployment costs in the short run – adjustment costs that cannot be justified on the basis of comparative advantage. We estimate that the efficient world price would be achieved if Gazprom were to employ its optimal ‘two‐part tariff’. The optimal two‐part tariff would double Gazprom's annual profits in Europe, but it involves significant long‐term risks for Gazprom of lost market share.     

Energy policy constraints and perspectives in Russia

Once one of the world's most important energy producers, Russia is increasingly incapable of maintaining energy supplies to its industries and private households. However, the crisis in the energy sector has also become an ecological crisis. What chances are there for finding a solution to this double crisis?     

Economic and political risks of world oil markets

The present easing on the world oil market could foster the illusion that energy problems are now resolved. During 1981 various oil-producing countries (OPEC and non-OPEC alike) found they had to cut their prices. OPEC production has had to be reduced by about one-third from the 1979 level of 31 mbd¹. Last September’s OPEC output of 20 mbd was the lowest monthly figure for 12 years and has by year-end 1981 recovered to just 22 mbd. “The OPEC is no longer able to dictate prices; there is more oil than the market can take.” These are typical recent comments, but they reflect too short-term and superficial a view. The real issue is the question whether energy supplies are secure in thelong term, too, and whether energy itself presents a danger for general economic and political developments.     

In the Bear’s Shadow? Russia’s International Image and Its Influence on Investments of Russian Companies in Post-Socialist Europe

The paper examines Russia’s international image and its influence on investment by Russian companies in post-socialist Europe. Findings are based on the cases of Gazprom’s South Stream Pipeline project, and Sberbank’s acquisition of Volksbank’s Central and Eastern European assets in Hungary and Serbia. The paper demonstrates that international positions and economic interests of two countries determinate decisions regarding investments of Russian companies, while Russia’s image to some extent accelerates these decisions in Serbia. The paper is based on the results of interviews with representatives of business communities conducted in Hungary and Serbia in 2012–2017, professional reports, and official documents.     

EU Enlargement Creating a Framework for the Eu-Russian Rapprochement

Abstract

The Eastern enlargement of the European Union has substantial influence on EU external policy and its relations with non-EU countries, including Russia. In this situation, Russia's main concern is to avoid the creation of new dividing lines after the enlargement. This paper will argue that instead of dividing Europe, the EU enlargement would create a framework for further cooperation and eventually rapprochement between the EU and Russia. Therefore, Russia would be able to benefit from this process. The paper will analyse the consequences of the EU enlargement for Russia and examine the main political concepts determining directions of this rapprochement between the European Union and Russia: New Neighbourhood, Common Spaces and Eastern dimension.     

俄欧能源贸易中的利益博弈

能源贸易是俄欧贸易关系中最重要的方面，本文从博弈论的角度探讨了俄欧双方在能源贸易中的竞争与合作，其结论是通过双方的利益博弈，合作是双方在能源领域中的一种必然选择。     

江苏自贸试验区建设与跨境电商发展

近年来,我国外贸市场持续疲弱,以跨境电商为代表的新型贸易方式正成为中国外贸的全新增长引擎。东南亚作为"一带一路"倡议重要的经济区,是我国及江苏的重要贸易伙伴。本文对江苏外贸的现状及趋势和东南亚跨境电商发展的市场需求进行了深入地分析,提出了江苏自贸试验区建设对江苏与东南亚跨境电商发展带来的契机,以期加快江苏与东南亚跨境电商合作的进程。     

Soviet natural gas — A threat to Western Europe’s security?

The gas-pipeline deal planned between the Soviet Union and several Western European countries has met with objections from the US government, which fears that Western Europe could be politically blackmailed as a result of its increasing dependence on energy supplies from the USSR. Are these fears justified? Are there any realistic alternatives open to the countries concerned?     

加快推进中俄经贸高质量发展:基于产业链构建视角

高质量发展不仅成为中国经济发展的航标,也是中国对外经贸关系发展的行动指南。但从中俄两国经贸发展的现实来看,双边贸易规模波动比较大、贸易结构欠优、中间产品贸易占比低等问题均与经贸高质量发展要求不符。究其原因,缺乏产业对接与合作是制约中俄两国经贸高质量发展的关键因素。本文以中俄能源合作为例,以"能源+通道+市场"模式,搭建"俄罗斯主导、中国嵌入,中俄共同主导、相互嵌入,中国主导、俄罗斯嵌入"的产业链,实现上中下游全产业链合作,夯实两国贸易发展的产业基础,促进贸易与产业的互动发展,以产业链构建加快推进中俄两国经贸高质量发展。     

俄入世之后

中国在加工程度较复杂商品上的比较优势在强化,俄罗斯在特定动植物产品和矿产品上的比较优势在强化,两国贸易互补性在提高。     

Raw material supplies and development policy

The shortage of raw materials and the difficulties of ensuring adequate supplies of primary products are subjects whose topicality has become evident to everybody at least since the energy crisis. The policy of ensuring adequate supplies of raw materials, however, raises the question of whether, and if so in how far, its objectives and measures can be reconciled with the avowed principles of development aid and the long term interest of Germany’s own foreign trade policy.     

Gaslieferungen aus Russland können kurzfristig nicht kompensiert werden

Wirtschaftsdienst - As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues, more and more people are calling for a ban on Russian energy imports. The proponents argue that abstaining from importing...     

China’s Growing Influence in Southeast Asia – Monetary Policy and Equity Markets

This study analyses the potential transmission of China’s monetary policy shocks to equity markets in Southeast Asia. Impulse response functions indicate that the impact of a monetary expansion in China is significant and positive for four of the five Southeast Asian equity markets. One explanation for this result is that monetary policy shocks in China lead to an increase in demand for goods and services in both China and abroad, which then shows up in the foreign equity market. The results in this paper provide evidence of China’s influence in Southeast Asia and its financial markets. The transmission effect is small and very short lived, but can be expected to increase if the current trends of a deepening economic integration between China and Southeast Asia and a maturing Chinese central bank continue.     

中国对俄罗斯农产品出口贸易效率研究--基于“一带一路”背景

2013年"一带一路"倡议提出以来,中国与俄罗斯在政治、经济、文化、科技等方面的交流与合作取得了显著成果。中国对俄罗斯农产品出口贸易已经进入历史发展机遇期,中国要有效利用"一带一路"的发展时机,提升对俄农产品出口贸易效率。通过运用随机前沿引力模型,对"一带一路"背景下影响中国对俄罗斯农产品出口贸易的效率进行测算,发现中国对俄罗斯农产品出口贸易效率水平较低。并立足于"一带一路"建设的"五通"政策,全面提出提升农业发展水平、增强贸易畅通便利化、构建贸易设施联通网络、拓展贸易资金融通渠道、推动民心相通交流建设、强化贸易政策沟通布局的对策建议。     

国际贸易技术溢出对我国的影响——基于工业制成品部门的GTAP模型分析

本文运用GTAP模型实证模拟了北美等八大区域工业制品部门的技术进步对我国经济发展、国际贸易及社会福利等方面的影响。研究发现:八大区域均能通过国际贸易技术溢出促进我国工业制成品部门技术的进步及社会福利的增加;但与Jaumotte(1999)和Connolly(2003)等文献结论不同,俄罗斯、北美和欧洲等区域对我国工业制成品部门产出及GDP增长至少在短期内有较大冲击,并会加大我国的贸易逆差。     

Some Notes on Current Problems of Foreign Economic Relations of Russia

This paper discusses developments on the trade front in Russia since the deep structural crisis during the 90s which significantly affected the dynamics and structure of Russian foreign trade. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), a major part of the Soviet Union’s internal trade has become a component of Russia’s foreign trade, the ‘export versus import’ structure in Russia has deteriorated, and there has been a rapid increase in the export of energy resources and metals, however, the export of high‐technology products, including those in the defence sectors, have actually been reduced. The opening of boundaries in the domestic market has resulted in saturation with foreign‐made consumer goods, machinery, and equipment all of which have hindered national development.     

The New Generation of Structural and Investment Funds–More Than Financial Transfers?

The European Structural and Investment Funds make up more than 40% of the EU budget and are thereby the EU’s most important financial support to growth, employment, investment and structural change. The funds are programmed for (overlapping) seven-year periods, and all programmes for the new 2014-2020 period were adopted by the end of 2015. What can the EU and its taxpayers expect from this new generation of programmes? How do they fit into the EU’s efforts to strengthen its economic governance and performance, and what role do they play in the Juncker Commission’s “Investment Plan for Europe”?     

EU vor der Zerreißprobe – wie sieht die gemeinsame Zukunft aus?

In the midst of the EU’s current “polycrisis “, several serious dangers threaten the future of Europe’s unity. The looming Brexit vote as well as the refugee crisis and–above all–the rise of nationalistic, right-wing extremist parties demonstrate the fragility of the EU. One of the EU’s fundamental problems is its institutional design in general. In particular the role of the European Central Bank is not fit for the challenges of the time. Moreover, the EU is facing disintegrative pressures while simultaneously pursuing moves towards deepening the Union as a reaction to the multiple crises. Against this background, it is highly likely that differentiation within the EU will increase. Deeper cooperation among small groups of member states will likely increase efficiency but may also reduce transparency, accountability and cohesion within the EU. If handled well, differentiation may also open new pathways for cooperation with the EU’s neighbours and accession countries. The foundation for a fresh start in Europe is the Franco-German relationship, as only these two Member States together can prevent Euroscepticism from spreading even further and the new radical right from taking control of Europe.     

Industrial innovation and foreign trade in the 80’s

The 1980’s will be decisive for Europe. But Europe, to use Valéry’s phrase, seems to be entering the future backwards. Not a few Europeans are beginning to worry about their political, economic and cultural future. Poor in raw materials and energy, burdened with a considerable downward trend in the economy and rising unemployment, confronted with a shift in the international division of labour, politically fragmented and only to a limited extent capable of action, Europe seems to many to be heading for “the decline and fall” which was forecast more than 50 years ago. But anxiety can be a creative force, provided we have the courage to analyse its causes and to transform it into tangible proposals for action.¹