Feasibility,Stability, and Multiple Research Joint Ventures

We study multiple research joint ventures (RJVs) using a repeated game with imperfect monitoring. Compared with the single joint venture case, we show that cooperation in multiple joint ventures creates two advantages for participating firms. First, by linking decisions together across all joint ventures firms can mitigate the likelihood of cooperation breakdowns following bad R&D outcomes. Second, as the incentive cost to sustain cooperation is independent of the number of joint ventures, the economy of scale effect reduces the efficiency loss due to imperfect monitoring.     

Sustaining Cooperation with Joint Ventures

Antitrust agencies and courts have expressed concerns that jointventures and strategic alliances between firms that competein other markets might serve to reduce the vigor of their competition.This article explores a mechanism through which a joint venturebetween two (or more) firms in one market can serve to facilitatecollusion in another market—even one unconnected verticallyor horizontally by costs or demand. In the models studied here,play in one market has the effect of altering players' beliefsabout their rivals' play in the second market. A joint venturein one market may provide a credible punishment mechanism forfirms colluding in another market. The joint venture may alsoprovide a vehicle for the transmission, between players, ofinformation in a way that helps cooperative types find eachother and collude in other markets. (JEL L12, L41, K21)     

Asymmetric Research Joint Ventures and Market Concentration

This paper studies two asymmetric R&D cooperation structures. In the first structure some firms in an industry organize a research joint venture (RJV) cartel while the remainder engage in independent R&D. In the other structure, each firm joins one of a number of competing RJV cartels. The findings indicate that cooperative R&D may lead to a more concentrated post-innovation industry than standard R&D competition owing to the technology advantage of the (large) cartel obtained from R&D co-operation. Under certain conditions these asymmetric structures are more efficient, but they result in a redistribution of income towards the firms in the (large) cartel.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13, O31.     

Asymmetric Contributions to Research Joint Ventures

We show that ex ante identical oligopolists may find it optimal to contribute asymmetrically to a research joint venture. The reason is found in the trade-off between the desire to increase the variance of the distribution of unit costs within the oligopoly (which increases gross profit, though not necessarily net profit, of the group) and the incentive to efficiently carry out R&D activities by equalizing marginal R&D costs across firms. Conditions for non-existence of symmetric contributions are given. We also propose a profit sharing rule for asymmetric research joint ventures.
JEL Classification Numbers: L13, L23.     

Takeovers, Joint Ventures and the Acquisition of Resources for Diversification

This paper explores the influence of acquisition costs on the choice between the takeover and joint venture modes of obtaining the resources required for diversifying expansion. It uses the conditions created by privatisation in the UK utility sector as a natural experiment to examine the determinants of mode choice across groups of firms with unusually homogeneous opportunity sets. The empirical design is able to incorporate acquirer, target and geographical market variables as explanatory factors in mode choice. It is shown that the form of diversifying expansion adopted is highly sensitive to the anticipated costs of using the acquisition process.     

Research Joint Ventures with Asymmetric Spillovers and Symmetric Contributions

The paper proposes a new type of R&D cooperation between firms endowed with asymmetric spillovers, which we call symmetric Research Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization, based on reciprocity in information exchange. In this setting, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures and also share information, but such that the asymmetric spillover rates are increased through cooperation by equal amounts. It is found that this type of cooperation reduces R&D investment by the low spillover firm when its spillover is sufficiently low and the spillover of its competitor is sufficiently high. But it always increases the R&D of the high spillover firm, as well as total R&D (and hence effective cost reduction and welfare). A firm prefers no cooperation to symmetric RJV cartelization if its spillover rate is very high and the spillover rate of its competitor is intermediate. The profitability of symmetric RJV cartelization relative to other modes of cooperation is analyzed. It is found that symmetric RJV cartelization constitutes an equilibrium for a very wide range of spillovers, namely, when asymmetries between spillovers are not too large. As these asymmetries increase, the equilibrium goes from symmetric RJV cartelization, to RJV cartelization, to R&D competition, to R&D cartelization.     

Ownership Structure and Technological Upgrading in International Joint Ventures

In a model of a joint venture between a local and a foreign firm who provide complementary inputs, this paper derives optimal ownership structures under different sharing rules. The local firm's profits may be maximized by assigning a majority share to the foreign firm. Efficiency (i.e., the minimization of double moral hazard) requires that the firm with the more productive input should get majority ownership. When only the foreign firm can upgrade its input, it should receive a larger share than what it receives in the absence of upgrading. The analysis implies that a blanket policy of prohibiting majority foreign ownership is theoretically unfounded.     

Joint Ventures versus Contractual Agreements: An Empirical Investigation

In this paper, we empirically investigate the determinants of the governance form of strategic alliances. We use a database with 1,344 worldwide alliances in several industrial sectors. In contrast with previous empirical studies, we find that alliances undertaking R&D activities are more likely to use loose forms of organization (contractual agreements) than more hierarchical ones (joint ventures), and this result is even stronger when the alliance takes place in technologically sophisticated sectors. Moreover, we show that alliances between rival firms tend also to be organized with forms closer to arm’s length transactions. When the scope of an alliance is multidimensional or the alliance is an international one, however, firms prefer more hierarchical organizations such as joint ventures. This paper was partially written while the first author was visiting the University of the Basque Country. We would like to thank Reinhilde Veugelers and the project FWO spillovers 6.0131.98 at the Katholieke Universiteit of Leuven for the use of the K.U. database. Financial support from projects Progetto Giovani Ricercatori – 1999 Universitá di Udine, SEJ 2004-02172/ECON, 9/UPV 00035.321-13560/2001, UPV 00038.321-13503/2001 is gratefully acknowledged. We are also indebted to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments.     

The Analysis of Professional Sports Leagues as Joint Ventures

This paper addresses whether the welfare analysis of the agreements and rules of a professional sports league should depend on the organisational form chosen by the league's participants. Courts have analysed sports leagues both as associations of horizontal competitors and as single entities. The former approach suggests much less tolerance for rules that affect competition. Drawing on the distinction between ex ante and ex post competition that has been found useful in the economic analysis of intellectual property rights, the authors suggest a middle road in the horizontal competitors versus single entity characterisations of professional sports leagues.     

合资公司控制和学习的关系研究

现有文献在重视合资公司中控制对学习绩效产生影响的同时,却忽视了学习对控制的反作用机制。本文贡献了该领域的文献。本文认为,(1)只有在学习类型和控制方式匹配的条件下,才有助于学习绩效的提高;(2)对合资伙伴的学习将降低伙伴企业强调正式控制的可能性;(3)如果一方的学习使另一方察觉到议价力转移,越有可能强调正式控制;(4)一方的学习导致越来越依赖另一方完成合资公司任务,学习方越有可能要求社会控制。本文最后在结论基础上提出了若干建议。     

Eco-labels, Trade and Protectionism

Eco-labels are suspected to serve protectionist purposes. We analyze the choice between an environmental standard and a voluntary eco-label scheme in a partial trade model with one domestic firm and one foreign firm. The environmental standard will only apply to the domestic firm, while both firms can adopt the eco-label. Pollution is production related, and domestic consumers demand products that are produced in an “environmentally friendly” way. Our results show that it may be optimal for the domestic government to introduce an eco-label and get both firms to adopt the label, instead of setting an environmental standard. However, to what extent this policy serves protectionist purposes is ambiguous. In particular, if the willingness to pay for green products is sufficient to cover the pollution abatement costs of the foreign firm, foreign firm profit will increase while domestic firm profit will decrease compared to the outcome with a domestic environmental standard. On the other hand, if the willingness to pay for green products is insufficient, the foreign firm would be better off with a domestic environmental standard.     

Under–provision of Inputs in Joint Ventures with Market Power

A joint venture with market power benefits from restricting its output which, in turn, requires the partners to restrict the supply of their inputs. However, since each partner benefits only partially from restricting its input, both over–supply their inputs from the viewpoint of the optimal use of market power. We show that this pecuniary negative externality in the partners' input decisions mitigates the standard under–provision problem that arises in joint ventures. We also show that the degree of this problem declines as demand becomes less elastic.     

中国汽车合资自主品牌发展模式的因素分析

由于2008年世界金融危机,发达国家汽车市场集体低迷,然而中国汽车市场仍然保持了良好的增长势头和发展潜力,并在2009年成为世界第一产销国。随着世界汽车工业巨头在华布局的不断完善,形成了以合资品牌为主、民族自主品牌与进口品牌为辅的市场竞争格局。2008年4月广汽本田提出了合资自主品牌的创新发展模式。本文基于以上背景,通过研究影响中国合资自主品牌发展模式的经济、政治、市场环境和企业内部四大因素,并重点论述经济因素中重要变量与中国合资自主品牌导入时机的直接关系,从而提出了中国汽车合资自主品牌导入时机的研究系统。     

中国汽车合资企业管理学习绩效的关键影响因素

基于文献综述,结合中国汽车工业的实践,构建了中国汽车合资企业管理学习绩效影响因素分析框架,对中国本土企业通过建立合资企业学习国外企业的管理技术提供了管理启示。     

Joint Ventures versus Fully Owned Subsidiaries: Multinational Strategies in Liberalizing Economies

As ceilings on foreign shareholdings are withdrawn during liberalization, multinationals enter through fully owned subsidiaries that compete with their own joint ventures, unless local partners permit them to raise their stakes. In a framework of quantity competition, this paper demonstrates that an entry threat is more credible when joint venture investment is reversible, the units are independently managed and the local stake is high. Further, profitability of horizontal merger between the units encourages a share reallocation, while its absence favours a new subsidiary. Under irreversible investment, the threat is less credible and both share reallocations or new subsidiaries are less likely.     

中外合资企业的人力资源管理的问题及对策

中外合资企业对中国经济的发展具有重要的促进作用，但是在合资过程中存在着许多问题，特别是在人力资源管理中的问题尤为突出，主要表现为招聘，报酬和福利，培训和发展，绩效评估，退出机制等方面的问题，本文还进一步分析了产生这些问题的主要原因并提出了建设性的意见。     

经济一体化、地方保护主义与地区专业化

地区专业化是社会生产地域分工的表现形式,经济一体化和地方保护主义是影响地区专业化水平的重要因素。本文以2001～2008年我国30个省区的面板数据为样本,就经济一体化、地方保护主义与地区专业化的关系进行实证检验,结果发现:对外经济一体化对地区专业化具有显著的正效应,区域经济一体化的作用不显著,地方保护主义则会阻碍地区专业化水平的提高。因此,应进一步推动区域经济一体化,减少地方保护主义行为,发挥各地区的比较优势,促进地区产业的专业化发展。     

出口产品质量、出口关系存续与增长

本文检验了我国企业出口产品质量提升对企业出口关系存续及其增长率的影响。研究结果表明:企业出口产品质量升级有利于企业出口关系的存续,并能够提升其出口增长率。稳健性检验显示,更换产品质量测算方法、样本区间、计量方法等并不影响本文基本结论,且在考虑了内生性问题后,本文基本结论依然不变。从影响机制来看,产品质量升级通过增强消费者偏好提高了企业出口关系存续概率,通过增强消费者偏好以及提高出口价格促进了出口增长率提升;同时,产品质量升级还通过提高企业出口关系存活概率进一步促进了企业出口增长率的提升。最后,异质性检验结果显示,出口产品质量提高对外资企业和出口到高收入国家的企业出口关系存续的积极影响较大,而对私营企业和出口到低收入国家的出口增长率的积极影响较大。     

对外贸易、地方保护和中国的产业布局

本文研究发现，20世纪80年代由于新旧工业基地的轮替，地区专业化和分布的不平衡性稍有退化；而90年代地区专业化则显著加深，分布的不平衡性和集中程度明显加速。对外贸易中的地理优势显著地影响中国的产业布局，但地方保护的影响在90年代仅限于内地。传统比较优势理论在中国产业分布中的解释力是显然的，而新经济地理学的部分预测也在本文的实证中得到支持。