Penny Stock IPOs

We examine underpricing, long-run returns, lockup periods, and gross spreads for penny stock IPOs over the 1990–1998 period. We find that penny stock IPOs have higher initial returns than ordinary IPOs, but significantly worse long-run underperformance. We also find that penny stock IPOs have longer lockup periods and larger gross spreads. To explore the effect of potential market manipulation, we examine IPOs led by a group of underwriters that were the subject of SEC enforcement actions and/or other penalties. Penny stock issues led by these banks are particularly underpriced and underperform ordinary IPOs led by other underwriters.     

How Much Do REITs Pay for Their IPOs?

Previous studies have documented the reversal in the initial returns of REIT IPOs from overpricing in the 1980s to underpricing in the 1990s. We find that the gross spreads of REIT IPOs decreased significantly in the 1990s. In particular, there is a bimodal clustering for gross spreads at 6.5 and 7.0%. Moreover, in the 1980s around 94% of REIT IPOs had integer offer prices, most of which were priced at either $10 or $20. However, the proportion of integer offer prices decreased to 64% in the 1990s. Higher gross spreads, overpricing, and high frequency of integer offer prices for REIT IPOs in the 1980s are consistent with the marketing hypothesis that in the 1980s REIT IPOs were mainly marketed to less-informed individual investors. Our results explain the dynamic process employed by underwriters in the setting of gross spreads and the pricing of REIT IPOs as a new financial product in response to various structural changes in REITs.     

What do investment banks charge to underwrite American Depositary Receipts?

We investigate how investment banks determine the gross spreads paid by American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) from 1980 to 2004. We begin by comparing the gross spreads of ADR IPOs and ADR SEOs to those of matching US IPOs and US SEOs. We document clustering at the 7% level for our ADR IPO sample (44% for the ADR IPO firms without a previous equity listing), whereas our ADR SEO sample exhibits no discernable clustering at any level. We then find that ADR IPO gross spreads can be explained by firm and offer characteristics (similar to our matched sample of US IPOs), and by whether the ADR IPO firm has a previous equity listing. ADR SEO gross spreads can be explained more by offer characteristics (more similar to our matched sample of US SEOs).     

Underwriter Quality and Long‐Run IPO Performance

We analyze the relationship between the quality of underwriters and the long‐run performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in light of underwriter marketing, certification and screening, and information production. We find that higher underwriter quality (measured by the number of managing underwriters, underwriter reputation, and absolute price adjustment) predicts better long‐run performance, even when returns are value weighted. We compare underwriter quality measures and find that the effects of the number of managing underwriters and underwriter reputation are mutually complementary and are especially strong among IPOs with high uncertainty, while absolute price adjustment, which is more likely to be associated with information production than marketing or certification/screening, loses significance. Our findings are consistent with the marketing and certification and screening roles of investment banks but lend little support for the information production role of underwriters.     

On the Benefits of Concurrent Lending and Underwriting

This paper examines whether there are efficiencies that benefit issuers and underwriters when a financial intermediary concurrently lends to an issuer while also underwriting its public securities offering. We find issuers, particularly noninvestment‐grade issuers for whom informational economies of scope are likely to be large, benefit through lower underwriter fees and discounted loan yield spreads. Underwriters, both commercial banks as well as investment banks, engage in concurrent lending and provide price discounts, albeit in different ways. We find concurrent lending helps underwriters build relationships, increasing the probability of receiving current and future business.     

Insider trading law enforcement and gross spreads of ADR IPOs

Using American Depositary Receipt (ADR) IPOs from 34 countries during 1980-2004, we find that, on average, the enforcement of insider trading laws reduces the underwriter gross spread by 49-61 basis points, which is about 10-12% of the average gross spread for ADR IPOs. This relation is present regardless of whether issuers have a prior listing or whether issuers are from developed or emerging markets. The association becomes stronger for ADRs underwritten by less prestigious underwriters and for issuers that are involved in privatization. The political institutions in the issuers’ home markets also affect gross spreads.     

Competitive IPOs

Competition between investment banks for lead underwriter mandates in IPOs is fierce, but having committed to a particular bank, the power of the issuer is greatly reduced. Although information revelation theories justify giving the underwriters influence over pricing and allocation, this creates the potential for conflicts of interest. In this clinical paper we analyse an interesting innovation that has been used in recent European IPOs whereby issuers separate the preparation and distribution roles of investment banks, and keep competitive pressure on the banks throughout the issue process. These 'competitive IPOs' allow the issuer greater control and facilitate more contingent fee structures that help to mitigate against 'bait and switch.' But unlike more radical departures from traditional bookbuilding – such as auctions – the competitive IPO is an incremental market-based response to potential conflicts of interest that retains many of the advantages of investment banks' active involvement in issues.     

Great expectations: Banks as equity underwriters

We examine the in-roads commercial banks have made into equity underwriting over 1990–2002. While banks end the period handling upwards of 25% of equity underwriting, this increase results almost exclusively from acquisitions of investment banks with an already established market share of equity underwriting. We find a significant decline in the market share of equity underwriting that banks acquired in the post-merger period, a decline that is larger than that experienced by independent investment banks of comparable reputation. Banks lose market share because they originate fewer IPOs and their IPOs have a lower incidence of follow-on SEOs compared to independent investment banks. Following the merger, banks experience a large fall off in their ability to retain follow-on SEOs and are less successful in winning SEO mandates when an issuer switches from its IPO underwriter. Overall, the findings suggest it has been difficult for banks to achieve scope economies in equity underwriting.     

Why Don't U.S. Issuers Demand European Fees for IPOs?

We compare fees charged by investment banks for conducting IPOs in the United States and Europe. In recent years, the “7% solution,” as documented by Chen and Ritter (2000) , has become even more prevalent in the United States, and is now the norm for IPOs raising up to $250 million. The same banks dominate both markets, but European IPO fees are roughly three percentage points lower, are much more variable, and have been falling. We review explanations for the gap in spreads and find the evidence consistent with strategic pricing. U.S. issuers could have saved over $1 billion a year by paying European fees.     

Underpricing and long-run performance of Chinese IPOs: the role of underwriter reputation

This study examines the impact of underwriter reputation on IPO underpricing and long-run performance in the China stock market over the period 2001 to 2006. This sample period is notable for the implementation of a verification and approval system that occurred during it, which provided underwriters more freedom to price IPOs. We develop two alternative proxies to measure underwriter reputation based on either the ratio of the total gross proceeds raised or the number of IPOs managed by each underwriter. We find that underwriter reputation does not affect the level of underpricing, but that the level of long-run underperformance is significantly mitigated when IPOs are managed by more prestigious underwriters.     

The Pricing of Initial Public Offers of Corporate Straight Debt

This study examines the initial-day and aftermarket price performance of corporate straight debt IPOs. We find that IPOs of speculative grade debt are underpriced like equity IPOs, while those rated investment grade are overpriced. IPOs of investment grade debt are typically issued by firms listed on the major exchanges and underwritten by prestigious underwriters. In contrast, junk bond IPOs are more likely to be handled by less prestigious underwriters and are typically issued by OTC firms. Our analysis also reveals that bond rating, market listing of the firm, and investment banker quality are significant determinants of bond IPO returns.     

Does the Market Incorporate Previous IPO Withdrawals When Pricing Second‐Time IPOs?

This paper examines the initial public offering (IPO) valuations of issuers that return to the IPO market successfully after withdrawing their first IPO attempt. We find that these second-time IPOs sell at a significant discount relative to similar contemporaneous IPOs that succeed in their first attempt. We also demonstrate that switching underwriters on the second IPO attempt reduces, but does not eliminate, the discount for second-time IPOs. When compared to their matched first-time IPOs, second-time IPOs have similar price revisions and post-IPO long-run stock and operating performances. Overall, these results suggest that the negative information conveyed by the withdrawal event is incorporated into the lower offer valuations for second-time IPOs. Switching investment banks can mitigate, but not eliminate, the perceived higher risk of the second-time offerings.     

A Comparison of Underwriting Costs of Initial Public Offerings by Investment and Commercial Banks

We examine differences in underwriting costs between commercial‐bank‐Section‐20‐underwritten initial public offerings (IPOs) and investment‐bank‐underwritten IPOs. Our results suggest that total underwriting costs (gross margin plus underpricing) are significantly lower for commercial bank IPOs. The lower cost for commercial bank IPOs is attributable to less severe underpricing for these issues. Gross margin costs generally do not differ between commercial bank and investment bank issues. Furthermore, we find that the long‐run stock price performance for commercial bank issues is superior to that of investment bank issues. That is, lower underpricing for Section 20 issues may not be a short‐run phenomenon. Rather, there appears to be a favorable outcome for investors in the long run for holding IPOs underwritten by Section 20 commercial banks. These results are inconsistent with the conflict of interest hypothesis often associated with merging commercial and investment bank functions in one organization.     

Political connection of financial intermediaries: Evidence from China's IPO market

Using a sample of Chinese Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) from 2006 to 2011, we document that politically connected (PC) underwriters increase the likelihood of clients’ IPO applications being approved by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We further show that PC underwriters charge premium underwriting fees. Consistent with the rent-seeking argument, we find that minority shareholders’ interests may be impaired as indicated by post-IPO underperformance. We do not detect significant differences in the underpricing of IPO deals underwritten by PC versus non-PC investment banks.     

Relationship-Specific Assets and the Pricing of Underwriter Services

This paper investigates the effect of setup costs on the pricing of investment banking services. The existence of setup costs is predicted to result in lower underwriter spreads in IPOs for firms that are expected to issue again. Consistent with this prediction, I find significantly lower spreads for firms that make subsequent issues. I also find that a firm's likelihood of changing underwriters in a subsequent offer is related to the time between offerings and the underwriter's pricing performance in the IPO. These results suggest that the deviations from optimal IPO pricing carry a penalty for the underwriter.     

Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks

We find that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. Among the various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, the Carter–Manaster measure is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the context of the three-year performance of IPOs. The study also provides an updated list of the Carter–Manaster measure for various underwriters.     

UNDERWRITING SPREADS AND REPUTATIONAL CAPITAL: AN ANALYSIS OF NEW CORPORATE SECURITIES

When entering a new security market, investment banks must establish their reputation. This is done through direct experience in the security market or through reputational capital established in existing security markets. I examine the effects of underwriters' market reputation in publicly underwritten offerings in forty-three financial innovations and find more significant entry barriers for less prestigious underwriters. An analysis of underwriting spreads reveals first-issue pricing advantages due to reputational capital. Unlike the more prestigious underwriters, the less prestigious underwriters reduce spreads upon first entry into each new security market to overcome their lack of market reputation.     

Underwriter learning about unfamiliar firms: Evidence from the history of biotech IPOS

This study examines the ability of underwriters to properly value unfamiliar firms prior to issuance. I use a sample of IPOs in biotechnology, a relatively new but thriving industry. The first American biotech IPO was in 1980. Through the end of 2004, almost 500 biotech IPOs have appeared in the public market. I find that biotechnology differs from other industries in the attributes of individual firms valued by the market. In particular, R&D and the quality of human capital (e.g., star scientists on the staff) are much more important for biotech valuations. I find also that underwriters appeared not to appreciate this distinction for early biotech IPOs; in those cases, first-day market returns were predictable by firm attributes not used by underwriters to establish IPO issue prices. I also find that underwriters have learned over time, albeit slowly. Over the 20+ years of biotech history, IPO issue prices have become more dependent on firm attributes unique to biotechs while first-day market returns have become less predictable.     

Securities litigation,withdrawal risk and initial public offerings

I examine the relations between litigation risk, withdrawal risk, and the costs of going public using a sample of withdrawn and completed initial public offerings (IPOs) filed during 1996–2005. Firms with a higher probability of offer withdrawal face higher litigation risk if they complete these offers. Firms with higher litigation risk pay slightly higher gross spreads, but do not underprice their IPOs by a greater amount. Withdrawal probability is strongly and positively associated with underwriter gross spreads, consistent with underwriters charging fees that reflect the probability of not getting paid. When the pre-market demand for an IPO is weak, a higher withdrawal probability raises underpricing on completed deals.     

Conflict of interest and certification in the U.S. IPO market

We examine the long-term return performance of U.S. IPOs underwritten by relationship banks. We show that, over one- to three-year horizons, IPOs managed by relationship banks experience buy-and-hold benchmark-adjusted returns that are similar to those observed for a matching sample of stocks managed by non-relationship underwriters. This result holds even when the returns' skewness and cross-sectional correlation is accounted for. Further, we examine the calendar-time returns on a portfolio that is long the stocks underwritten by relationship banks and short ex-ante similar stocks taken public by non-relationship institutions. Again, we conclude that the two groups of IPOs yield similar long-run returns. These findings support the certification role of relationship banks and suggest that, in this respect, the effect of the 1999 repeal of Sections 20 and 32 of the Glass–Steagall Act has not been negative.