Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?

Environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties. There is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments. This paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs. The theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as: 1) transaction characteristics; 2) transactor characteristics; 3) nature of the institutional environment; and 4) nature of the institutional arrangements. We examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two Australian-based development offset schemes with different policy designs. We found evidence of all four theory-based categories of influence in the policy case studies. The degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties. Policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator. An important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given.     

The Law of One Price—A Case Study

We use retail transaction prices for a multinational retailer to examine the extent and permanence of violations of the law of one price. For identical products, we find typical deviations of 20–50 percent, with some evidence for convergence over time. Such differences might be due to differences in local costs. If so, relative prices of similar products (round versus square mirrors) should be equal across countries. In fact, relative prices vary significantly across very similar goods within a product group. The finding suggests that differences in local distribution costs, local taxes, and probably tariffs do not explain the price pattern, leaving strategic pricing or other factors resulting in varying markups as alternative explanations.
JEL classification : F 41; L 11     

信任、交易成本与商业信用模式

本文研究信任这一非正式制度对企业交易成本和商业信用模式的影响。以我国各省的信任调查数据为研究基础,本文发现地区间信任差异将导致企业的签约形式显著不同,商业信用模式存在较大差异。地区间信任度越低,该地区企业的签约成本越高,具体表现为:企业较多地采用预付账款和应付票据等成本较高的商业信用模式,且相应的销售费用和折扣支出也越多。与以往文献关注法律等正式制度安排的差异不同,本文不仅验证了转轨经济环境下信任等非正式制度的重要性,同时还为"地区"与"个体"间信任的传递特征提供了经验证据,这有助于深入理解我国现阶段企业交易行为和"地区"与"个体"间的信任关系。     

流动性与资产定价:基于我国股市资产换手率与预期收益的实证研究

流动性与资产定价是目前金融研究的热点之一 (O’Hara,2 0 0 3 )。本文通过检验交易频率零假设和交易成本备择假设 ,深入分析我国股市流动性与资产定价的理论与经验关系 ,发现 :我国股市存在显著的流动性溢价 ,换手率低、交易成本高且流动性小的资产具有较高的预期收益 ;产生流动性溢价的原因是交易成本而不是交易频率 ;与国外股市相似 ,小企业收益率高于大企业 ,价值股收益率高于成长股。因此 ,我国股市并非令人无法捉摸 ,流动性、规模和价值效应都是资产定价的因素     

Local government efficiency: determinants and spatial interdependence

We analyse the determinants of local government efficiency taking into account the presence of spatial interactions among neighbouring municipalities. To do so, first we estimate an efficiency index using the robust order-m methodology in Valencian municipalities (Spain). Second, we examine the socio-economic, political and budgetary factors that might influence efficiency levels. Finally, we analyse the spatial interactions present in our data. The results of estimating a spatial autoregressive model show that government efficiency in neighbouring municipalities positively affects the local government’s own efficiency. This highlights the importance of considering spatial dependence structures in studies on efficiency in the public sector.     

Methods of privatization and economic growth in transition economies1

We examine how different methods of privatization might have affected growth in transition economies. Using several econometric specifications, including fixed effects and GMM, we estimate a cross‐country panel growth model for 1990–2003. We find only voucher privatization to have been significantly associated with faster growth. Moreover, neither private sector development per se nor capital market development exercised a significant influence. We speculate that voucher privatization may have been effective because of the speed with which links between firms and the state were severed.     

Assist or desist? Conditional bailouts and fiscal discipline in local governments

Central government bailouts of local governments are commonly viewed as a recipe for local fiscal indiscipline, as local governments learn that the center will come to the rescue in times of trouble. However, little is known about the consequences of bailouts granted conditional on local governments first making efforts to improve the situation. We examine a case in which the Swedish central government provided conditional grants to 36 financially troubled municipalities. We use the synthetic control method to identify suitable comparison units for each of the 36 municipalities. To compare the development of costs and the fiscal surplus of admitted municipalities to that of their most similar counterparts during the decade after the program, we then estimate fixed effects regressions on the resulting sample. The analysis suggests that conditional bailouts did not erode, and may even have improved, fiscal discipline.     

The effects of inter-municipal cooperation and central grant allocation on the size of the French local public sector

The analysis of French municipalities’ public personnel expenditures allows us to study the issue of the size of the local public sector. We concentrate on two paths that French authorities have followed to limit it, i.e., the promotion of inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) and the cut in grants received by municipalities. Our objective is to evaluate their respective role in the evolution of public personnel expenditures at the municipal level, in a context where local politics comes into play. We consider a large panel dataset of municipalities embedded in IMC structures between 2011 and 2018. Our main results, obtained using an original identification strategy, are threefold. We first find evidence that a substitution effect between municipal and IMC personnel expenditures is at work. Second, we find a partisan distorsion through the grant allocation: despite its formula-based definition, aligned and unaligned municipalities are treated differently by the central government. Third, we show that cuts in grants lead to cuts in municipalities’ public wage bills, while partisanship hinders such cuts.     

Priorities and sequencing in privatization: Evidence from Czech firm panel data

While privatization of state-owned enterprises has been one of the most important aspects of the economic transition from a centrally planned to a market system, no transition economy has privatized all its firms simultaneously. This raises the question of whether governments privatize firms strategically. In this paper we examine the determinants of the sequencing of privatization. To obtain testable predictions about the factors that may affect sequencing, we investigate the following competing government objectives: (i) Maximizing efficiency through resource allocation; (ii) maximizing public goodwill from the free transfers of shares to the public; (iii) minimizing political costs; (iv) maximizing efficiency through information gains; and (v) maximizing privatization revenues. Next, we use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to test the competing predictions about the sequencing of privatization. Consistent with the hypotheses of a government priority on revenues and public goodwill, we find strong evidence that more profitable firms were privatized first. The sequencing of privatization is also consistent with maximizing efficiency through information gains. Our results indicate that many empirical studies of the effects of privatization on firm performance suffer from a selection bias.     

企业边界的确定:“内部化”与“外部化”

基于企业边界理论的"内部化"和"外部化"趋向,重点回顾交易成本理论与能力理论的分歧,重新梳理二者之间可相互借鉴的部分.企业边界从内部化转向外部化的过程受到资产专用性、所有权安排、核心能力以及吸收能力的综合影响.资产专用性和核心能力与"内部化"息息相关,而所有权安排和吸收能力与"外部化"紧密相连,企业边界的确定是"内部化"因素与"外部化"因素综合作用的结果.     

More Than You Can Handle: Decentralization and Spending Ability of Peruvian Municipalities

This article builds on a comprehensive dataset for Peru that merges municipal fiscal accounts with information about municipalities’ characteristics such as population, poverty, education, and local politics to analyze the leading factors affecting the ability of municipalities to execute the allocated budget. According to the existing literature and the Peruvian context, we divide these factors into four categories: the budget size and allocation process; local capacity; local needs; and political economy constraints. While we do find that all four factors affect decentralization, the largest determinant of spending ability is the adequacy of the budget with respect to local capacity. The results confirm the need for decentralization to be implemented gradually over time in parallel with strong capacity building efforts.     

Law, trade, and development

This paper uses a Ricardian model to generate predictions about the influence of institutions on trade in differentiated (complex) and commoditized (simple) products and then uses a rich international trade data set for empirical tests. The model draws the distinction between the role of international transaction costs and domestic production costs in the trade of complex and simple products. The effects of institutions predicted by the model are identified with a three-step estimation procedure. We find that when countries have low quality institutions, institutional reform primarily influences production costs and has little influence on the volume of trade. Institutional reform, however, increases the diversity of exports in complex goods markets. Conversely, in countries with more developed institutions, institutional reform primarily influences transaction costs and is associated with gains in the volume and the diversity of complex exports.     

企业改制模式和改制绩效——基于企业数据调查的经验分析

本文以上世纪90年代后半期的企业调查数据为基础,通过建立经济计量模型来研究公有企业的改制绩效,通过相应的技术处理消除企业的各种先天因素或改制前固有的优势,试图测试改制是否能够确实激发出显著的效率效应。分析发现,向私有产权方向改制的企业效率得到显著提高;不同的改制模式是改制绩效的重要决定因素,经营者持大股从效率上来讲是最优的改制方式,而平均分配的股份合作制的改制方式则具有较差的业绩效果。我们还讨论了其原因,以及为什么中国现阶段特定制度环境下最优的公司治理结构是大股东控股。我们认为给定当前制度背景下,最佳的改革方案之一是股权向经营者集中,股权合理定价。因为只有市场的初次分配是有效率的,才能得到收入再分配的源泉。在此基础上,国家可通过各种税收设计,进行较为公平合理的收入再分配。     

地区间竞争、财政自给率和公有制企业民营化

相关文献认为 ,分权化改革导致的地区间竞争加剧引发了各地区的国有企业民营化进程。本文试图通过实证分析验证这一结论。本文的实证分析表明 ,地区间竞争加剧的确会推动相关地区国有经济民营化进程。但是由于 1 994年以来 ,地区间市场一体化水平基本没有提高 ,从而地区间竞争并没有明显加剧 ,因此 ,2 0世纪 90年代以来普遍展开的公有制企业改制进程主要不是由地区间竞争推动的。地方政府积极推动公有制企业民营化的主要动因来自于财政方面 ,来自于 1 994年分税制改革给地方政府造成的财政压力和预算约束硬化 ,来自于非国有经济发展、非国有经济比重提高对改善地方财政状况的显著作用。本文的实证分析表明 ,非国有经济比重的提高明显有助于提高地方财政自给率。     

Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities

This paper considers the presence of political budget cycles in Greece's municipalities. We construct a new dataset from primary sources and we find strong evidence of pre-electoral manipulation through increased expenditures and excessive borrowing. We use a dynamic panel data approach producing evidence of opportunistic behavior in local government finances. Our results are robust in the face of a series of controls including mayors running for reelection, their political alignment with the central government, and prolonged terms. Moreover, the results are robust to the exclusion of small sized municipalities and to the restriction of the time range of our investigation to the post-Maastricht period. We also consider whether opportunistic policies influence incumbents' reelection prospects finding that increased expenditures and election year opportunistic excesses are electorally rewarding. Our findings provide a characterization of opportunistic public finance management in Greek municipalities where electorally motivated budgetary decisions appear impervious to the various municipal reform attempts.     

Nonlinear dynamics and covered interest rate parity

This paper examines the dynamics of deviations from covered interest parity using daily data on the UK/US spot, forward exchange rates and interest rates over the period January 1974 to September 1993. Like other studies we find a substantial number of instances during the sample in which the covered interest parity condition exceeds the transaction costs band, implying arbitrage profit opportunities. While most of these implied profit opportunities are relatively small, there is also evidence of some very large deviations from covered interest parity in the sample. In order to examine the persistence of these deviations, we estimated a threshold autoregression in which the dynamics behavior of deviations from covered interest parity is different outside the transaction costs band than inside them. We find that while the impulse response functions when inside the transaction costs band are nearly symmetric, those for the outside the bands are asymmetric-suggesting less persistence outside of the transaction costs band than inside the band.The authors would like to thank Jeanette Diamond, Michael O'Hara, Baldev Raj, and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions on an earlier draft. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be construed to be those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas or the Federal Reserve System.     

Talk is cheap,or is it? The cost of consulting about uncertain reallocation of water in the Murray–Darling Basin,Australia

In this paper we reflect on the challenge of reallocating water resources from agricultural interests to environmental uses. The area of interest is the Murray–Darling Basin, Australia, although the evidence presented provides salient lessons for a range of settings. We draw on the transaction cost literature where the tasks of re-designing and using institutions can help conceptualise the costs associated with policy change. A framework for improving ex ante assessment of transaction costs and its relationship to transformation or abatement costs is elaborated, especially as it relates to community consultation exercises. Against the background of the water reforms of the past three decades we conclude that policy makers and administrators could limit increases in transformation costs and contain transaction costs by giving greater attention to the form of community consultation, by taking account of the sources of uncertainty that attend policy choices and recognising the potential for consultation fatigue.     

Market entry,privatization and bank performance in transition1

This paper examines how market entry and privatization have affected the margins and marginal costs of banks in the post‐communist transition. We estimate bank revenue and cost functions, allowing the estimated parameters to change over time. In the first sub‐period (1995–98), we find that privatized banks earned higher margins than other banks, while foreign start‐ups had lower marginal costs. In the third sub‐period (2002–2004), foreign banks remained low marginal cost service providers, while privatized domestic banks had the widest margins. Subtracting marginal costs from margins to calculate mark‐ups, an indication of demand for services, shows that initially privatized banks had the largest mark‐ups. However, by the third sub‐period, differences among private banks diminished. In comparison to private banks, state banks persistently under‐performed in controlling costs and attracting demand. Our evidence therefore indicates that foreign bank entry promoted lower costs and that privatization and market entry encouraged more demand for services.     

Municipalizing American Waterworks, 1897-1915

We consider three explanations for public ownership: publicinterest, regulation, and a transaction cost interpretation.We employ a large dataset containing information on the municipalacquisition of U.S. private water companies between 1897 and1915. Those data allow us to isolate the effects of high waterrates, water quality, financial difficulties, extensivenessof distribution system, and the like in determining the probabilityof subsequent municipal takeover of companies that were privatein 1897. After controlling for such factors, we find evidenceconsistent with a transaction cost interpretation of municipalacquisition. We find relatively little support for regulation-basedor public interest interpretations. Our evidence indicates thatmunicipalities were unable to credibly precommit to not expropriatingvalue from private water companies once investments were made,resulting in a rational reduction in investment in water provisionby private companies. Local governments, in turn, used thisrational underinvestment as a pretext for municipalizing privatewater companies.