Single versus multiple banking: lessons from initial public offerings

A vast research in banking addresses the question of the costs and benefits of multiple bank relationships versus a single bank relationship. Although no clear-cutting conclusion is reached, several contributions suggest that multiple bank relationships might lead to a sub-optimal level of monitoring, compared to a single bank relationship, as a result of free riding and coordination problems. We take a novel approach to tackle this research question, by looking at the role, if any, played by the number of lending relationships in initial public offerings (IPOs). We look at the short-term performances of IPOs as measured by underpricing and find that firms that go public with multiple bank relationships exhibit more underpricing than those that go public with a single bank relationship. This finding is independent of the number of bank relationships and/or whether any of the lending banks also acts as underwriter in the offering. We interpret our results as suggesting that the market attributes a weaker certification role to multiple bank relationships because of their less effective monitoring of IPO firms.     

The Underpricing and Excess Returns of Initial Public Offerings in Taiwan Based on Noisy Trading: A Stochastic Frontier Model

Initial public offerings (IPOs) are typically offered at prices lower than the transaction price in the early aftermarket. With a stochastic frontier model, we measured the fair offer price of an IPO and then the deliberate IPO underpricing and the market misvaluation based on the estimated fair offer price. Our results show that IPOs are deliberately underpriced. The extent of noisy trading leading to significantly higher market transaction prices explains the excess IPO returns. We conclude that initial IPO returns result primarily from the noisy trading activities instead of the deliberate IPO underpricing.     

How Do Investment Banks Value Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)?

Abstract:  We investigate the valuation and the pricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by investment banks for a unique dataset of 49 IPOs on Euronext Brussels in the 1993–2001 period. We find that for each IPO several valuation methods are used, of which Discounted Free Cash Flow (DFCF) is the most popular. The offer price is mainly based on DFCF valuation, to which a discount is applied. Our results suggest that DDM tends to underestimate value, while DFCF produces unbiased value estimates. When using multiples, investment banks rely mostly on future earnings and cash flows. Multiples based on post-IPO forecasted earnings and cash flows result in more accurate valuations.     

The underpricing of initial public offerings: A theoretical and empirical reconsideration of the adverse selection hypothesis

In this paper we generalize Rock's theory regarding the underpricing of IPOs. In Rock's model, informed investors have a firm-specific informational advantage pertaining to a firm's cash flow. We derive the new results that the level of beta and the size of the market risk premium positively affect underpricing. These implications extend the adverse selection theory and further distinguish this theory from the current state of signalling theories of underpricing. The results put the “hot and cold” issue markets phenomenon in a theoretical context. Empirical results are consistent with the theoretical propositions and provide support for Rock's theory of underpricing.     

The Diversification Effects of Initial Public Offerings

Abstract:  A firm's stock becomes publicly tradable through an initial public offering (IPO). This study suggests a portfolio diversification perspective to explore IPOs. We examine whether investors can gain diversification benefits by adding an IPO portfolio to a set of benchmark portfolios sorted by firm size and book-to-market ratio. Using US IPOs from 1980-2002, we find that adding a value-weighted IPO portfolio does lead to a statistically and economically significant enlargement of the investment opportunity set for investors relative to investing solely in a set of benchmark portfolios. Specifically, the Sharpe ratio of the tangency portfolio increases by 5.50% on average after including IPO stocks. Furthermore, IPOs associated with prestigious lead underwriters are the main source of this augmentation of the mean-variance investment opportunity set. Finally, our study implies that issuing IPO exchange traded funds or similar products can provide diversification gains to investors.     

Short- and Long-Term Performance of Polish IPOs

The paper documents short- and long-run performance of initial public offerings on the Warsaw Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2008. The study reveals positive initial market-adjusted returns of 13.95 percent and significant long-term underperformance with mean of -22.62 percent for the three-year buy-and-hold strategy. We introduce ordinary least squares regressions to find determinants of initial returns. Our findings document strong explanatory power of early aftermarket volatility, issuer's size, growth opportunities, and profitability before the offering. Moreover, those variables that can partly explain differences in initial returns can also help to shed light on the long-term underperformance issue. Our results are thus consistent with Miller's (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis.     

Underpricing, Subsequent Equity Offerings, and the Long-Run Performance of Japanese IPOs

Using data on IPOs that are issued in Japan during January 1975–March 1989, we examine the deliberate underpricing and overreaction hypotheses to explain high initial returns at offering dates. Specifically, we analyze the cross-sectional pattern of the short- and long-run performance of IPOs. The obtained results indicate that the deliberate underpricing theories which we examine are unable to explain the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs. Furthermore, for the average of the IPOs, the empirical results are not consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. However, there is evidence consistent with the hypothesis that for a certain minority group of IPOs, the high initial returns occur due to overreactions by investors. We interpret the overall results as indicating that the high initial returns on the Japanese IPOs can be attributed to a mixture of both underpricing and investor overreaction. We conjecture that the binding regulations in Japan led to underpricing. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Underwriter Compensation Structure: Can It Really Bond Underwriters?

Underwriter compensation can be structured as all cash or a combination of cash and warrants. Using a sample of small initial public offerings (IPOs), we find that underwriter compensation contracts that include warrants in exchange for cash can serve as certification for IPO firms by substituting for reputation capital. When underwriters accept warrants when they could have received more cash compensation, the IPOs avoid the well documented long‐run underperformance. However, when underwriters receive warrants after maximizing cash compensation, the IPO experiences higher underpricing and poorer long‐run performance. The findings are consistent with a motivation by the underwriters to circumvent regulatory constraints.     

Why do Underwriters Charge Low Underwriting Fees for Initial Public Offerings in Taiwan?

Abstract:  In Taiwan, underwriting fees for initial public offerings (IPOs) are extremely low compared to fees in other countries. From 1989 to 1999, the average underwriting fee for IPOs in Taiwan is 0.99%—far below the regulatory limit. Although the Taiwanese underwriting industry is highly concentrated, underwriting fees do not cluster at any particular level. We examine the underwriting fee and income structure in Taiwan and find support for an incentive hypothesis. Underwriters have an incentive to charge lower underwriting fees when market demand for IPO shares increases and capital gains account for a larger portion of their total income.     

U.S. banks’ IPOs and political money contributions

This study analyses the effect of political money contributions on U.S. banks’ IPOs. We employ unbalanced panel data of 367 U.S. banks’ IPOs for the period January 1998 to December 2019. Our findings reveal that investors perceive Political Money Contributions (PMC) by U.S. banks as a proxy for political reach and connectedness. We document an inverse relationship between total PMC and the level of underpricing, which implies that both lobbying and PAC expenditure pay off on issue day as donors incur less underpricing. Initial returns decrease with PAC contributions to House of Representatives candidates, whereas the returns relate to the partisan identity of the candidates receiving PAC contributions. We document that those individual contributions by directors bring significant benefits to the IPO banks. Finally, we show that the political contributions of board members, particularly those of CEOs and founders, are associated with better returns in the long term.     

The Impact of Strategic Investment Choices on Post-Issue Operating Performance and Survival of US IPO Firms

Abstract:  We examine the impact of strategic investment choices at the time of the IPO on: (i) the post-issue operating performance and (ii) the likelihood of failure and time-to-failure of newly public US firms. Our post-issue operating performance analysis uses various performance metrics, benchmarks, and expectation models. Overall, our evidence indicates that the extent of diversification and industry-adjusted capital expenditures intensity are generally positively related to changes in operating performance. We do not, however, document a consistent relation between industry-adjusted R&D expenditures and changes in operating performance. The results from our survival analysis suggest that pre-issue managerial commitment to R&D spending and developing diversified product lines enhance the ability of IPO issuing firms to remain viable for longer periods of time. Our study highlights the impact of various managerial investment decisions on the subsequent performance of newly public firms.     

Are IPO investors rational? Evidence from closed-end funds

Why buy a closed-end fund at IPO, when it is likely to trade at a discount in a few months’ time? One theory suggests that buying a new fund is justified by an initial period of investment outperformance. A second theory is that new funds are launched to provide access to assets that are temporarily illiquid and to exploit the subsequent liquidity gain while a third theory asserts that buyers of new issues are not fully rational but are influenced by time-varying sentiment. This paper tests the three theories using data from UK-traded closed-end equity-fund IPOs over 1984–2006. The empirical results provide strong support for the influence of sentiment but provide little or no support for the two other theories.     

Does earnings management lead to favorable IPO price formation or further underpricing? Evidence from Japan

This study addresses an important but unanswered question regarding the relationship between earnings management and underpricing. Earnings management has long been one of the central issues in initial public offerings (IPOs), however little evidence exists on whether earnings management leads to favorable price formation or further underpricing. Using several proxies for earnings management, this study finds evidence that firms with aggressive earnings management during the pre-IPO period tend to be more underpriced than firms without it, in contrast to the dominant hypothesis that IPO firms can sell their stocks at inflated prices by manipulating earnings upwardly. This finding is consistent with the asymmetric information theory of underpricing and suggests that aggressive earnings management increases valuation uncertainty of IPO firms and leads to steeper price discounts.     

The Benefit of Excluding Institutional Investors from Fixed-Price IPOs: Evidence from Taiwan

A simple way to mitigate the winner's curse in initial public offerings (IPOs) is to reduce the number of informed investors in IPO markets. In Taiwan, institutional investors are not permitted to subscribe to fixed-price IPOs. Excluding institutional investors raises uninformed investors' allocation rates. We show that the winner's curse is still present in Taiwan's fixed-price IPO markets even without the participation of institutional investors, but that IPO underpricing is reduced by at least 4 percent due to alleviating the winner's curse, as institutional investors are excluded from the fixed-price offerings.     

Determinants of Underwriter Participation in Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock: An Empirical Study

This paper examines an optimal underwriter participation model and develops testable hypotheses regarding the influence of certain factors on the degree of underwriter participation in initial public offerings (IPOs) of common stock. The issue of underwriter participation is important primarily due to the tradeoff between foregone underwriter compensation and underwriting risk reduction. The results of this paper indicate that factors related to the issue, issuing firm, underwriter, and IPO market conditions all are important determinants of the participation decision. Interestingly, the results also show that the importance of these factors is not consistent across underwriter prestige groups. In particular, factors external to underwriters (e.g., the issuing firm and market characteristics) are more important for explaining nonprestigious underwriter participation, while factors related to underwriters themselves play a more important role for explaining prestigious underwriter participation.     

REIT IPOs and the Cost of Going Public

We examine Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) that went public between 1986 and 2004. Consistent with previous studies, we find that REIT IPOs are associated with lower levels of underpricing relative to traditional issues. We also find that REITs are associated with smaller file price revisions. Both findings are potentially attributable to the lower level of uncertainty associated with pricing REITs. In contrast, using an alternative measure of issuance costs that incorporates the share retention decision by preexisting owners, we find no significant difference between REIT and non-REIT issues, suggesting the results of previous studies are not robust to various specifications of issuance cost and that preexisting owners do not necessarily benefit from the lower level of underpricing. Additionally, we find no difference in the issuance costs of equity versus mortgage REITs, particularly once we control for the use of umbrella partnerships.