Smooth preferences and the regularity of equilibria

To study equilibria we describe an economy by its distribution of consumers' preferences and endowments. All preferences are smooth and weakly convex. Demand of an economy need not be single valued, but there is an open dense set of economies for which demand is a C¹-function in a neighborhood of the equilibrium prices. We call an economy regular if its excess demand is transversal to zero. A regular economy has locally unique equilibria. It is shown that regular economies form an open dense set on which the equilibrium price correspondence varies continuously and the number of equilibria is locally constant.     

Perturbed utility and general equilibrium analysis

We study general equilibrium theory of complete markets in an otherwise standard economy with each household having an additive perturbed utility function. Since this function represents a type of stochastic choice theory, the equilibrium of the corresponding economy is defined to be a price vector that makes its mean expected demand equal its mean endowment. We begin with a study of the economic meaning of this notion, by showing that at any given price vector, there always exists an economy with deterministic utilities whose mean demand is just the mean expected demand of our economy with additive perturbed utilities. We then show the existence of equilibrium, its Pareto inefficiency, and the upper hemi-continuity of the equilibrium set correspondence. Specializing to the case of regular economies, we finally demonstrate that almost every economy is regular and the equilibrium set correspondence in this regular case is continuous and locally constant.     

On the strictly descending multi-unit auction

We analyze the bidding behavior in a strictly descending multi-unit auction where the price decreases continuously without going back to the initial start price once an object is sold. We prove that any equilibrium in the multi-unit descending auction is inefficient. We derive a symmetric equilibrium for general distribution functions as well as an arbitrary number of bidders and objects. Moreover, equilibrium bidding is characterized by a set of initial value problems. Our analysis thus generalizes previous results in the literature.     

强势投资者的博弈与信息流转

股票价格的运行是全体投资者相互博弈的结果,而投资者的策略选择是其所拥有信息的函数。本文主要讨论在多个强势投资者共存时,投资者的信息修正和策略选择。研究使强势投资者的信息修正和个股市场价格运行满足马尔可夫性质,并快速达到均衡状态的信息结构。研究显示,多强势投资者的共存是平抑个股价格波动、提高市场效率的关键,强势投资者数目越多,信息流转速度越快。     

Endowment-regarding preferences

We consider a general equilibrium model of pure exchange economies with endowment externalities. Consumers’ behaviors depend not only on their own consumption but also on the endowments of the other consumers. Applying the same method of analysis in Balasko (2015) about wealth concerns, we first show that almost all properties of equilibrium, including smooth equilibrium manifold and genericity of regular economies, can be directly extended to the economy where the demand function depends on the endowments of others and wealth of only one consumer. Next, we clarify the sufficient conditions under which those properties remain true in the economy with the most general form of endowment externalities. Finally, we generalize the above sufficient conditions to derive generic regularity results in the economy with both consumption and endowment externalities.     

Characterization of optima in smooth Pareto economic systems

Simple techniques of calculus and geometry are used to study and characterize the optima of pure exchange economies in which the utility functions are smooth but not necessarily convex. It is also shown how one can reduce the problem of optimizing p functions on the manifold of states to that of maximizing a single function on a submanifold of this space. Two models are described: one in which a person cannot trade to an optimum unless he starts at one; and one in which a person cannot even get near a local Pareto optimum along continuous ‘trade curves’ from most initial distributions. Finally, the set of optima is described for a generic set of utility mappings.     

Geodesics on the equilibrium manifold

We show the existence of a Riemannian metric on the equilibrium manifold such that a minimal geodesic connecting two (sufficiently close) regular equilibria intersects the set of critical equilibria in a finite number of points. This metric represents a solution to the following problem: given two (sufficiently close) regular equilibria, find the shortest path connecting them which encounters the set of critical equilibria in a finite number of points. Furthermore, this metric can be constructed in such a way to agree, outside an arbitrary small neighborhood of the set of critical equilibria, to any given metric with economic meaning.     

Trends and cycles in small open economies: making the case for a general equilibrium approach

Economic research into the causes of business cycles in small open economies is almost always undertaken using a partial equilibrium model. This approach is characterized by two key assumptions. The first is that the world interest rate is unaffected by economic developments in the small open economy, an exogeneity assumption. The second assumption is that this exogenous interest rate combined with domestic productivity is sufficient to describe equilibrium choices. We demonstrate the failure of the second assumption by contrasting general and partial equilibrium approaches to the study of a cross-section of small open economies. In doing so, we provide a method for modeling small open economies in general equilibrium that is no more technically demanding than the small open economy approach while preserving much of the value of the general equilibrium approach.     

Matching models with a conservation law: The existence and global structure of the set of stationary equilibria

We study random matching models where there is a set of infinitely lived agents, and in each period agents are pairwise matched to each other and play a stage game. We investigate the basic structure of equilibria in such models: the existence of equilibria and the global structure of the set of equilibria. Specifically, we focus on models with a conservation law, which typically holds in economies having some assets, such as money. In such models, under certain regularity conditions the set of equilibria is one-dimensional and each connected component of it is a piecewise smooth one-dimensional manifold being homeomorphic to either the unit circle or the unit interval. Moreover, in an endpoint of an interval all agents have the same amount of assets.     

On the structure of the set of fixed price equilibria

Working in the framework suggested by Drèze, this paper studies the number of fixed price equilibria and their continuity with respect to the price system. In an exchange economy, the concept of a rationing scheme is introduced, which specifies how shortages are shared among agents. For given utility functions and a given rationing scheme, under standard assumptions, an existence theorem is recalled, and it is shown that the graph of the equilibrium correspondence, when prices and initial endowments vary, is a piecewise continuously differentiable manifold. Moreover, generically, the number of equilibria for an economy, at given prices, is finite and the set of equilibria varies continuously with the price system and the initial endowments.     

Descending price multi-item auctions

We propose a simultaneous descending price auction mechanism to sell multiple heterogeneous items, each owned by a distinct seller, to a number of buyers. Each buyer has known private valuations on items, and wants at most one item. We show that if the sellers follow a descending price offer procedure and the buyers follow a greedy strategy for accepting the offers, the auction results in a nearly efficient allocation, and terminates close to a competitive equilibrium price vector. The descending price offer strategy of the sellers is close to a Nash equilibrium. However, we show that the buyers are better off waiting in our auction. There is a maximum limit (corresponding to the minimum competitive equilibrium price vector) till which they can wait without running into the risk of not winning any item. If the buyers wait within this limit, the prices can be brought arbitrarily close to a uniquely defined competitive equilibrium price vector.     

Strategy-proof allocation when preferences are single-plateaued

Abstract. We consider private good economies with single-plateaued preferences. A solution selects for each preference profile a non-empty set of allocations. An agent strictly prefers a set of allocations to another set of allocations if and only if he strictly prefers any allocation in the first set to any in the second set according to his single-plateaued preference relation. We characterize the class of sequential-allotment solutions by essentially single-valuedness, Pareto-indifference, and coalitional stragety-proofness. These solutions are the Pareto-indifferent extensions of the solutions studied by Barberà et al. 1997. Received: 9 May 2000 / Accepted: 1 May 2001     

The equilibrium set of infinite dimensional Walrasian economies and the natural projection

The natural projection plays a fundamental role to understand the behavior of the Walrasian economies. In this paper, we extend this method to analyze the behavior of infinite dimensional economies. We introduce the definition of the social equilibrium set, and we show that there exists a bijection between this set and the Walrasian equilibrium set of an infinite dimensional economy. In order to describe the main topological characteristics of both sets, we analyze the main differential characteristics of the excess utility function and then, we extend the method of the natural projection as suggested by Y. Balasko.     

Formation of expectations: A model in temporary general equilibrium theory

The paper studies, in a temporary general equilibrium framework, the way expectations of agents can be formed along time through some learning mechanism. One is then faced with a set of coupled equations from which the time evolution of both the state of the economy and the individual expectations have to be derived. Three main results are proven, for an open dense set of economies. First, there actually exists a recurrence which allows to determine, locally around some stationary temporary equilibrium, the time dependant dynamics for the states and the time dependant expectations. Next, sufficient first-order conditions are given for the dynamics and expectations to converge to some limits when time goes to infinity. Last, additional sufficient first-order conditions guarantee that the chosen stationary temporary equilibrium has definite stability properties for the time dependant dynamics.     

Inflation, output, and stock prices: Evidence from two major emerging markets

Research in economics and finance documents a puzzling negative relationship between stock returns and inflation rates in markets of industrialized economies. The present study investigates this relationship for Korea and Mexico. We show that the negative relationship between the real stock returns and unexpected inflation persists after purging inflation of the effects of the real economic activity. Johansen and Juselius cointegration tests verify that the long-run equilibrium between stock prices and general price levels is weak. However, in both economies, stock prices and general price levels seem to show a strong long-run equilibrium with the real economic activity. This paper benefited from the constructive suggestions of an anonymous referee. The remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility. Financial support from the Dr. Robert B. Pamplin, Jr., School of Business Administration, University of Portland, is greatly appreciated.     

Arbitrage and equilibrium in economies with infinitely many commodities

An ‘arbitrage opportunity’ for a class of agents is a commodity bundle that will increase the utility of any of the agents and that has non-positive price. The non-existence of ‘arbitrage opportunities’ is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an economic equilibrium. A bundle is ‘priced by arbitrage’ if there is a unique price that it can command without causing an ‘arbitrage opportunity’ to exist. For economies that have infinitely many commodities, appropriate notions of ‘arbitrage opportunities’ and ‘bundles priced by arbitrage’ depend on the continuity of agents’ preferences. This paper develops these notions, thereby providing a foundation for recent work in financial theory concerning arbitrage in continuous-time models of securities markets.     

Rational expectations equilibrium and the strategic choice of costly information

This paper studies costly information acquisition in one-good production economies when agents acquire private information and prices transmit information. Before asset markets open, agents choose the quality of their private information. After this information stage, agents trade assets in sequentially complete markets taking into account their private information and the information revealed by equilibrium prices (rational expectations equilibrium, (Radner, R., 1979. Rational expectations equilibrium: generic existence and the information revealed by prices, Econometrica 47, 655–678.)). An overall equilibrium in asset and information market is defined as a Nash equilibrium of the information game in which agents’ actions are information choices and their utility payoffs are the ex-ante expected utilities of the corresponding rationale expectations equilibrium. This paper shows that for a generic set of economies parameterized by endowments and productivity shocks, an overall equilibrium in information and asset market (a Nash equilibrium of the induced information game) with costly information acquisition and fully-revealing prices exists. In other words, informational efficiency is in general consistent with costly information acquisition.     

Evolution paths on the equilibrium manifold

In a pure exchange smooth economy with fixed total resources, we define the length between two regular equilibria belonging to the equilibrium manifold as the number of intersection points of the evolution path connecting them with the set of critical equilibria. We show that there exists a minimal path according to this definition of length.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium when all goods are indivisible

This paper investigates an economy where all consumption goods are indivisible at the individual level, but perfectly divisible at the overall level of the economy. In order to facilitate trading of goods, we introduce a perfectly divisible parameter that does not enter into consumer preferences — fiat money. When consumption goods are indivisible, a Walras equilibrium does not necessarily exist. We introduce the rationing equilibrium concept and prove its existence. Unlike the standard Arrow–Debreu model, fiat money can always have a strictly positive price at the rationing equilibrium. In our set up, if the initial endowment of fiat money is dispersed, then a rationing equilibrium is a Walras equilibrium. This result implies the existence of a dividend equilibrium or a Walras equilibrium with slack.