Optimal grouping of commodities for indirect taxation

Indirect taxes contribute to a sizeable part of government revenues around the world. Typically there are few different tax rates, and the goods are partitioned into classes associated with each rate. The present paper studies how to group the goods in these few classes. We take as given the number of tax rates and study the optimal aggregation (or classification) of commodities of the fiscal authority in a second best setup. The results are illustrated on data from the United Kingdom.     

Optimal nonlinear income taxation with a finite population

In the standard optimal income taxation problem, tax payments depend only on each consumer's own actions. Piketty [J. Econ. Theory 61 (1993) 23-41] shows that, if one individual's tax schedule depends on others’ actions and the government knows the exact ability distribution, it can implement any undistorted allocation as the unique revelation game outcome. If some individuals misreveal their types, Piketty's mechanism may assign infeasible allocations. We require that tax schedules must balance the government budget for every possible vector of revelations. When individuals reveal their type by simple announcements, all undistorted allocations can be still implemented, even with off-equilibrium feasibility constraints.     

Optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing

This paper examines a two-period model of optimal nonlinear income taxation with learning-by-doing, in which second-period wages are an increasing function of first-period labour supply. We consider the cases when the government can and cannot commit to its second-period tax policy. In both cases, the canonical Mirrlees/Stiglitz results regarding optimal marginal tax rates generally no longer apply. In particular, if the government cannot commit and each consumer's skill-type is revealed, it is optimal to distort the high-skill type's labour supply downwards through a positive marginal tax rate to relax an incentive-compatibility constraint. Our analysis therefore identifies a setting in which a positive marginal tax rate on the highest-skill individual can be justified, despite its depressing effect on both labour supply and wages.     

Optimal top marginal tax rates under income splitting for couples

This paper provides formulas for optimal top marginal tax rates when couples are taxed according to income splitting between spouses, consumption is taxed, and the skill distribution is unbounded. Optimal top marginal income tax rates are computed for Germany using a dataset that includes the tax returns of all German top taxpayers. We find that the optimal top marginal tax rate converges to about 2/3 and convergence obtains at income levels that are substantially higher than those currently subject to the actual top tax rate.     

Optimal pollution taxation in a Cournot duopoly

It is well known that the optimal pollution tax in a competitive industry is equal to the marginal damage inflicted by the pollution. It has also been shown that the optimal pollution tax on a monopoly is less than the marginal damage. In this paper, I derive the optimal pollution tax for a Cournot duopoly. If firms have different production costs, the optimal tax rate may exceed the marginal damage. This is so because the tax may be an effective instrument for allocating production from the less to the more efficient firm. It is also shown that, if one firm has a positive most preferred pollution tax, the sum of consumer and producer surpluses will be declining in the tax at this level.     

Optimal income taxation with a stationarity constraint in a dynamic stochastic economy

We consider the optimal nonlinear income taxation problem in a dynamic, stochastic environment when the government cannot change the tax rule as uncertainty resolves. Due to such a stationarity constraint, our taxation problem is reduced to a static one over an expanded type space that incorporates type evolution. We strengthen the argument in the static model that the zero top marginal tax rate result is of little practical importance because it only applies to the top of the expanded type space. If the maximal type increases over time, the person with top ability in any period but the last has a positive marginal tax rate.     

Optimal nonlinear income taxation with productive government expenditure

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with a production externality and nonlinear income taxation, and uses it to examine how the fiscal authority devises its nonlinear tax structure from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. It is found that, in the Barro (1990) model, Pareto optimality can be achieved if both policy instruments for the tax scalar and the extent of the tax progressivity/regressivity are set optimally.     

Optimal linear taxation of polluting oligopolists

A linear ad valorem tax can induce homogeneous oligopolists to produce at socially optimal levels, achieving the first-best allocation, in the presence of external costs that vary exogenously with aggregate output. The optimal tax rate is independent of private cost functions and thus reduces informational requirements on the regulator. Alternatively, if the regulator knows marginal private costs but not the pattern of firms' conduct or the slope of the demand curve, an iterative implementation of the tax is possible. Both blockaded and endogenous entry are considered, as is strategic behavior by firms toward the regulator.The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System. The author is grateful to Paul Calem for helpful discussions and to two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

Optimal redistributive taxation with both extensive and intensive responses

We study optimal income taxation when labor supply reacts along the intensive and extensive margins. Individuals are heterogeneous across two unobserved dimensions: their skill and disutility of participation. We develop a new method to analytically derive conditions under which optimal marginal tax rates are non-negative everywhere. It is typically optimal to provide a distinct level of transfer to the non-employed and to workers with negligible earnings. Numerical simulations illustrate these properties for the US. We also apply our method to sign output distortions in other adverse selection frameworks with random participation, namely the monopoly nonlinear pricing and the regulatory monopoly problems.     

Macroeconomic effects of an indirect tax substitution

We study an indirect tax reform in a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition for both the Cournot and the Free entry equilibria. We show that it is possible to attain a positive balanced budget multiplier by means of a substitution of specific by ad valorem taxation. Moreover, although any tax substitution causes higher prices and the flow up of firms in the long-run, the Free entry equilibrium output can increase with respect to that of the Cournot equilibrium. Finally, in contrast with the partial equilibrium, welfare decreasing tax reforms are likely to occur even when the balanced budget multiplier is positive.      

Optimal linear income taxation with general equilibrium effects on wages

The paper argues that the endogeneity of wages may make a considerable difference to optimal linear tax rates. In this case there is not only the usual direct redistribution via the fiscal system but also the general equilibrium redistribution due to the change in wages. Depending on the elasticity of substitution of the production function and the labour supply elasticities these may be reinforcing or opposing. It is shown that the general equilibrium effect may plausibly outweigh the direct effect so that net redistribution to the lower paid involves a wage subsidy financed by a lump-sum tax.     

Equity,efficiency, and the structure of indirect taxation

Optimal tax formulae are derived and optimal tax rates calculated for the case where there are many consumers, an income tax is impossible and the government has to trade off efficiency in order to improve the real distribution of income. Consistent aggregation assumptions are used to permit the derivation of simple tax rules depending only on the behaviour of the average consumer and of a socially representative consumer. Calculations for the U.K. in 1972 show how subsidies and taxes vary with the government's revenue requirement and with the degree of egalitarianism in the social welfare function.     

Implicit social preferences in the Norwegian system of indirect taxation

The revelation of implicit social preferences is a fresh field of econometrics. In this paper the theoretical setting is a model of optimal indirect taxation. A parametric preference function is specified, which makes it possible to separate and quantify three different effects. First, it provides a condensed quantitative measure of the degree of income inequality aversion. Second, a set of parameters evaluate external social costs induced by the consumption of certain commodities. Finally, the function allows estimation of implicit equivalent income scales. The authors consider the results as a source of information about an important part of Norwegian tax policy.     

Optimal taxation in a stochastic economy: A Cobb–Douglas example

Optimal linear and two-piece linear taxes are calculated in two-period economies in which individuals face uncertainty about their ability to work in the second period. These second-best insurance/redistribution programs are compared with first-best economies, equilibria without government intervention, and analogous determinate economies having the same ex post production possibilities. The calculations point out ways in which economies with individual uncertainty differ from those without it.     

Environmental taxation for environmental regulation and fiscal policy: An analysis of a Clinton-type BTU tax

This paper provides an empirical study of energy taxes for achieving environmental and fiscal policy objectives. Based on an energy tax structured like Clinton's 1993 BTU tax proposal, we demonstrate that the optimal tax will be higher the greater the environmental costs associated with energy consumption and the larger the economic distortions associated with alternative revenue-raising policies. Greater environmental damages and higher revenue-raising costs also have a fiscal policy implication; they shift the least-cost tax mix for raising additional revenue toward energy taxes and away from conventional tax alternatives.The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of two anonymous referees, who provided very helpful feedback. We also wish to acknowledge outstanding research assistance from Tracy Terry of the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University Bloomington. Of course, the results and conclusions of the paper are the authors' exclusively.     

A contest with the taxman - the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources

We develop a moral hazard model with auditing where both the principal and the agent can influence the probability that the true state of nature is verified. This setting is widely applicable for situations where fraudulent reporting with costly state verification takes place. However, we use the framework to investigate tax evasion. We model tax evasion as a concealment-detection contest between the taxpayer and the authority. We show that higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the contest. Additionally, we find conditions under which a government should enforce incentive compatible auditing in order to reduce wasted resources.     

Equalization of true gift and estate tax rates

The paper sets out to show that persons included under the U.S. Federal Estate Tax equalize true gift and estate tax rates, and thereby minimize their transfer taxes. True tax rate formulas are derived which take into account the preferential treatment of unrealized gains in estates under the Federal income tax. A comparison is drawn between shares of unrealized capital gains predicted from true tax rate equalization and shares estimated from stock-price data. The two are found to be quite similar.     

The effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income: a panel study of the 1988 tax flattening in Canada

Federal tax reform in 1988 flattened the Canadian personal income tax schedule, changing the marginal tax rates for many individuals. Using methods similar to those applied by Auten and Carroll [Rev. Econ. 81(4) (1999) 681] in the study of the effects of the 1986 U.S. Tax Reform Act, we estimate the responsiveness of income to changes in taxes to be substantially smaller in Canada. However we find evidence of a much higher response in self-employment income, in the labor income of seniors and from those with high incomes.     

The determinants of municipal tax rates in British Columbia

In this paper we study the regional pattern of municipal business property tax rates in the province of British Columbia. Reduced-form tax-setting equations produce some evidence that municipal governments respond to tax changes in neighbouring jurisdictions. A joint investigation of the determinants of tax base and municipal taxation decisions, however, reveals that it is difficult to interpret this response as arising primarily out of competition over tax base. There is also some evidence that municipal tax rates are sensitive to taxes set on the same base by super-municipal bodies. JEL Classification: C33, H71
Les déterminants des taux d'imposition municipale en Colombie Britannique. Dans ce mémoire, les auteurs étudient le pattern régional des taux d'imposition municipale sur la propriété foncière commerciale dans la province de la Colombie Britannique. On montre à l'aide d'un modèle en forme réduite d'équations de définition des taux d'imposition que les gouvernements municipaux réagissent aux changements dans les taux d'imposition dans leur voisinage. Cependant, un examen conjoint des déterminants de la base d'imposition et des décisions municipales montre qu'il est difficile d'interpréter cette réaction comme émanant d'une concurrence fiscale. On montre aussi que les taux d'imposition municipale sont sensibles aux niveaux de fiscalité imposés sur la même base par les autorités supra-municipales.