Demand uncertainty: Exporting delays and exporting failures

This paper presents a model of trade that explains why firms wait to export and why many exporters fail. Firms face uncertain demands that are only realized after the firm enters the destination. The model retools the timing of the resolution of uncertainty found in models with heterogeneity of firm productivity. This retooling addresses several shortcomings. First, the imperfect correlation of demands reconciles the sales variation observed in and across destinations. Second, since demands for the firm's output are correlated across destinations, a firm can use previously realized demands to forecast unknown demands in untested destinations. The option to forecast demands causes firms to delay exporting in order to gather more information about foreign demand. Third, since uncertainty is resolved after entry, many firms enter a destination and then exit after learning that they cannot profit. This prediction reconciles the high rate of exit seen in the first years of exporting. Finally, when faced with multiple destinations to which they can export, many firms will choose to sequentially export in order to slowly learn more about its chances for success in untested markets.     

International mergers: Incentives and welfare

Information asymmetry creates incentives for firms from different countries to merge. To demonstrate this point, we develop a model of international oligopolistic competition under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. We show that when domestic firms but not foreign firms are completely informed of local market demands, information sharing enhances the profitability of a merger between a domestic firm and a foreign firm. We also examine how such a merger affects the non-merging firms' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Quality disclosure in the presence of strategic consumers

Consider a market for short-life products, such as smartphones, where a firm and consumers have asymmetric quality information, the firm sells products in two periods, and consumers make purchase decisions strategically. We investigate when a firm should disclose quality and the interaction between consumers' strategic behavior and the firm's disclosure behavior. We obtain several findings. First, regardless of whether consumers have low or high patience, the firm should disclose quality information if product quality is high and conceal it if product quality is low. However, for products with moderate quality levels, the firm will disclose more quality information to consumers with relatively high or low patience levels than when consumer patience is moderate. Second, firms will disclose less information when consumers behave strategically than when they are myopic. Third, when concealing quality information is an equilibrium, product prices are affected only by disclosure costs and independent of true product quality. Finally, the firm can benefit from consumers' strategic behavior and a higher disclosure cost, but greater patience might be detrimental to consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Impact of personalization and privacy concerns on information disclosure and pricing

Advances in IT have enabled some firms to offer personalized products according to the private information disclosed by consumers, while others are still offering standardized products, which brings about asymmetric competition. For consumers, disclosing private information for personalized products leads to reduced misfit cost as well as privacy loss. To illuminate the impact of consumers' trade-off between the benefit of information disclosure and the associated privacy concerns on firms' asymmetric price competition, we consider a setting where only one firm is capable of product personalization based on consumers' personal information. The capable firm makes a profit from selling the product and monetizing consumers' information. We demonstrate that as the capable firm becomes more adept at personalization, he may raise or lower the price depending on his profit foci, and an improvement in his capability does not always guarantee a higher profit. Counterintuitively, an increase in the unit misfit cost (i.e., greater product differentiation) can, under certain circumstances, intensity price competition, making both firms worse off and leading to higher consumer surplus. We also show that when consumers are more privacy-concerned, there exists an indirect effect that weakens the impact of an increase in price on the monetization of consumers’ information, and hence price competition can be mitigated and both firms can be better off. Furthermore, we demonstrate that product personalization with misfit-reducing effect always increases consumer surplus under the asymmetric competition. Our findings provide firms and policy-makers with great managerial insights.     

Absorptive capacity and R&;D tax policy: Are in-house and external contract R&;D substitutes or complements?

Firms fund research and development (R&;D) to generate commercializable innovations and to increase their ability to understand and absorb knowledge from elsewhere. This dual role and opposed incentive structure of internal R&;D create a significant question for both theory and R&;D policy: Is internal R&;D a complement or substitute for external R&;D? We develop a model and novel technique for empirically estimating R&;D substitution elasticities. We focus on bio-pharmaceutical and software industries in California and Massachusetts, where tax credit rates changed differently over time for the two types of R&;D, creating a natural experiment. The effective tax prices for the two R&;D types differ from type to type, firm to firm, state to state, and year to year. This allows us to examine changes in the composition of firms’ R&;D budgets between in-house R&;D and external basic research when the relative tax prices of each category of research change. We find evidence of a substitute relationship both for a sample comprising exclusively small firms as well as for a more general distribution of firm sizes.     

Taking marketing strategy risks with seemingly no expected gains

This paper investigates the competitive rationale for firms to invest in marketing activities aiming to enhance valuation and achieve differentiation and competitive advantage, while carrying the strategic risks of causing unintended negative consequences. We build a stylized theoretical model where firms offering similar (homogenous) products are competing by determining their marketing strategy and pricing. Each firm must choose between several marketing activities that have different potentials of enhancing consumers’ product valuations while carrying some risk of lowering consumer valuation if unintended negative outcomes occur. The stochastic nature of marketing implies that (1) even when both firms invest the same amount of money aiming to enhance product valuations by the same level, there will be a variety of (posterior) vertical differentiation scenarios where the consumers could value either firm’s product as better as or worse than the rival’s. (2) The firms may employ marketing activities that do not even lead to gains in consumer product valuation in expectation. The duopoly model analysis indicates that associated with strategic pricing, even such stochastic marketing activities may constitute desirable strategies for two a priori symmetric firms in order to avoid a Bertrand type competition as the benefit from differentiation is found to be significant enough to offset the unintended negative outcomes. The oligopoly model analysis indicates that there is an increased incentive to take marketing risk when there is a greater level of competitive intensity in the marketplace. Preliminary experimental evidence is presented to support the main findings from theoretical model analyses. The paper thus provides important managerial implications for firms contemplating investment in seemingly risky marketing activities.

     

How do firms make money selling digital goods online?

We review research on revenue models used by online firms who offer digital goods. Such goods are non-rival, have near zero marginal cost of production and distribution, low marginal cost of consumer search, and low transaction costs. Additionally, firms can easily observe and measure consumer behavior. We start by asking what consumers can offer in exchange for digital goods. We suggest that consumers can offer their money, personal information, or time. Firms, in turn, can generate revenue by selling digital content, brokering consumer information, or showing advertising. We discuss the firm’s trade-off in choosing between the different revenue streams, such as offering paid content or free content while relying on advertising revenues. We then turn to specific challenges firms face when choosing a revenue model based on either content, information, or advertising. Additionally, we discuss nascent revenue models that combine different revenue streams such as crowdfunding (content and information) or blogs (information and advertising). We conclude with a discussion of opportunities for future research including implications for firms’ revenue models from the increasing importance of the mobile Internet.     

An examination of the investments in U.S. biotechnology firms by foreign and domestic corporate partners

This study examines the characteristics that make start-up biotechnology firms attractive alliance partners. We distinguish between firm specific and location-specific characteristics as well as between foreign and domestic corporate partners. We present and test a longitudinal model of alliance development based on data from 64 public biotechnology firms. The results provide evidence that foreign and domestic alliance capital inflows are driven by different factors. Firm-specific factors explain minimal variance in capital inflows from foreign alliance partners; rather, location-specific factors seem to matter more. The reverse is true for domestic alliance partners. Further, our results suggest that firm size moderates the relationship between location-specific factors and capital inflows from foreign alliance partners such that larger firms benefit more when located in technologically munificent environments.     

Posted price and name-your-own-price in a product line design problem

In this research, we address Name your own price (NYOP) as a mechanism to offer products with transparent, rather than opaque, quality levels. We compare posted price (PP) and NYOP in a product line design problem from a firm’s viewpoint. We first consider the firm offering two vertically differentiated products that each can be priced by NYOP or PP. The quality level of products is considered either as a decision variable or as a fixed predetermined value for the firm. A customer correspondingly decides which product to purchase and if applicable, the bid at NYOP. We characterize both the customer’s and the firm’s decisions under four possible pricing scenarios. The results show that, it is most profitable for the firm to use PP for both products. We then consider if each product is offered by a competitive firm, where quality levels might again be decision variables or fixed. Results show that both competitive firms prefer PP to NYOP when they can create quality differentiation. The firm that offers the product with a lower quality level prefers PP to NYOP for all combinations of fixed quality levels as well. The other firm, with a higher quality level, also usually prefers PP to NYOP; However, it can be better off using NYOP when fixed quality levels are large and close enough to each other. In this case, the preference of NYOP over PP increases as customers’ willingness to pay enhances.     

Determinants of Bribery in Asian Firms: Evidence from the World Business Environment Survey

While it is widely believed that bribery is ubiquitous among Asian firms, few studies have offered systematic evidence of such activities, and the dynamics of bribery in Asian firms have not been well understood. The research reported here used World Business Environment Survey data to examine some distinct characteristics of bribery in Asian firms and to empirically test 10 hypotheses on determinants of bribery. We find that firm characteristics such as firm size, growth rate, and corporate governance are important determinants of bribery activities at the firm level, and that Asian firms are more likely to bribe when faced with fierce market competition, corrupted court systems, convoluted licensing requirements, nontransparent interpretation of laws and regulations, inefficient government service delivery, and high taxes.     

Contingent effects of firm and employee reputations on professional advice adoption

Applying resource-based theory and signaling theory, we argue that firm and employee reputations affect consumer adoption of advice offered by professional service providers, and these effects are contingent on contextual variables. Our study on brokerage reports in Singapore supports our arguments. We show that reliance on firm (employee) reputation when adopting advice is higher (lower) if the evaluation of an entity is an initial rather than a repeated one. Also, reliance on employee reputation increases with stronger recommendation or when the entity has a business relationship with the advice-giving firm. These findings have implications for advice-giving firms and policy makers.     

Asymmetric information and corporate derivatives use

We investigate the relationship between derivatives use and the extent of asymmetric information faced by the firm. Using alternative analyst forecast proxies for asymmetric information, we find evidence that both the use of derivatives and the extent of derivatives usage is associated with lower asymmetric information. Specifically, for firms using derivatives (notably currency derivatives) we find that analysts' earnings forecasts have significantly greater accuracy and lower dispersion. These findings support the conjectures of DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) and Breeden and Viswanathan (1998) who argue that hedging reduces noise related to exogenous factors and hence decreases the level of asymmetric information regarding a firm's earnings. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 22: 241–267, 2002     

Vertical differentiation in oligopoly and license fees when outside innovator can enter the market: Two‐step auction

When an outside innovating firm has a technology to produce a higher quality good than the good produced at present, it can sell licenses of its technology to incumbent firms, or enter the market and at the same time sell licenses, or enter the market without license. We examine the definitions of license fee in such a situation in an oligopoly with three firms under vertical product differentiation, one outside innovating firm and two incumbent firms, considering threat by entry of the innovating firm using a two‐step auction. We show that in the case of uniform distribution of consumers' taste parameter and zero cost when the quality improvement (the difference between the quality of the high‐quality good and the quality of the low‐quality good) is small (or large), the two‐step auction is (or is not) credible, and license to two firms without entry strategy (or entry without license strategy) is optimal depending on credibility of the two‐step auction.     

Firm-level comparative advantage

We study the consequences of heterogeneity in factor intensity on firm performance. We present a standard Heckscher–Ohlin model augmented with factor intensity differences across firms within a country–industry pair. We show that for any two firms, each of whose capital intensity is, for instance, one percent above (below) its respective country–industry average, the relative marginal cost of the firm in the capital-intensive industry of the capital-abundant country is lower (higher) than that of the other firm. Our empirical analysis, conducted using data for a large panel of European firms, supports this prediction. These results provide a novel approach to the verification of the Heckscher–Ohlin theory and new evidence on its validity.     

Entrepreneurs' Personal Values,Compensation, and High Growth Firm Performance

We tested whether high growth firms' performance is related to the number of benefits offered and/or the values of the entrepreneur. Using data from the 2007 top 500 fastest growing entrepreneurial firms in America, we discovered that entrepreneurs' values do not relate to the total number of benefits offered, meaning the mediation model does not exist and lending strength to the argument that entrepreneurs' values greatly influence the success of a new venture. However, the total benefits offered are positively related to firm performance. We determine that the entrepreneurs' values and the total benefits offered are instrumental to firm performance.     

The effect of exogenous product familiarity on endogenous consumer search

When a consumer is familiar with one product but not its competitor, she is faced with a decision: either buy what she knows, or engage in search to learn more. When search is costly, competing firms may attempt to encourage or discourage search by adjusting prices. In this paper we consider how competitive dynamics between two quality differentiated firms are affected if one product enjoys a familiarity advantage. Familiarity is defined as a consumer’s ex-ante knowledge of fit for a particular product. An increase in the level of familiarity for one product allows a firm to charge higher prices since there are more consumers with information on that product relative to the competition. We call this the direct effect of familiarity. However, an increase in familiarity also has an indirect effect, since it gives the rival firm a stronger incentive to decrease price in order to encourage searching, in turn increasing overall competition. The effect of familiarity on profits depends on the magnitudes of these effects, and it is moderated by the level of quality differentiation between products. For very high or very low levels of differentiation, the results are relatively straightforward. However, when the level of differentiation is moderate, the results are more nuanced, with the higher-quality firm realizing higher profits from more familiarity, even if it must lower prices due to the indirect effect. We also find that, contrary to conventional wisdom, overall competition may be higher when firms are more quality differentiated. This is driven by the fact that higher quality differences bolster the indirect effect, with a lower quality firm providing deeper price cuts to counter increased familiarity of a high quality rival. We conclude by examining how changes in the cost of searching impact equilibrium outcomes.

     

Direct effect of advertising spending on firm value: Moderating role of financial analyst coverage

Previous research distinguishes between direct and indirect effects of advertising spending on firm value. This research focuses on the direct effect of advertising based on the spillover and signaling effect of advertising. Both effects are the result of increased public information flow about the firm created by advertising. Another source of public information flow about firms is information produced by financial analysts. We hypothesize that the direct effect of advertising on firm value will be stronger for firms not covered by financial analysts than for those that are covered because investors may rely on information flow from financial analysts for covered firms and rely on information flow from advertising in the absence of analyst coverage. Using financial and accounting databases for publicly traded firms for a period from 1975 to 2015, we test this hypothesis and find empirical evidence for the moderating role of analyst coverage in the relationship between advertising spending and firm value.     

Impact of actual service provider failure on the satisfaction with aggregator

The purpose of the paper is to investigate the impact of the failure caused by the actual service provider on consumer satisfaction with the aggregator firm, where the aggregator firm works as a bridge between the consumers and the actual service providers using technology, resources, information etc., thus reducing the information search cost, process-related costs, and quality risks for the consumers. We have applied retrospective experience sampling to collect data and used structural equation modeling to validate the conceptual model of the study. We found that people consider the actual service provider’s failure as the aggregator firm’s responsibility when the attributional factors (control and stability) are strong. Moreover, when consumers perceive that the aggregator firm is responsible, they will ask for less punishment of the actual service provider and more monetary compensation. Additionally, severity of the failure increases the consumer’s recovery expectations. However, the sense of power of the consumers leads to increasing expectations of punishment of actual service provider and decreasing expectations of monetary compensation. Lastly, the actual monetary compensation or actual punishment of the service provider leads to higher level of satisfaction for the consumers. We discussed the implications of the results in the light of relationship management and service recovery design of aggregator firms.     

Demand forecast information sharing in the competitive online and traditional retailers

An important strategic issue for retailing business managers to study is the information strategy. In this paper, we develop a profit-maximization model to investigate the benefits of demand forecast information sharing for the competitive online and traditional retailers with the consideration of the compatibility of the product with online marketing. Both retailers use a Bertrand model to compete. We analyze and compare two scenarios: (1) when forecast information is not shared between the online and traditional retailers; (2) when forecast information is shared between the online and traditional retailers. Our results show that both the online and traditional retailers will be better off from information sharing. Especially when the channel forecast is less accurate, the product is more compatible with online marketing, and the market is more volatile, both retailers will profit more. Based on our results, optimal strategies are derived and probable paths of future research are identified.     

How Does Web Personalization Create Value for Online Retailers? Lower Cash Flow Volatility or Enhanced Cash Flows

This study examines the performance consequences of web personalization (WP), a type of personalization in which web content is personalized and recommendations are offered based on customer preferences. Despite the growing popularity of personalization, there is a dearth of research at the firm level on whether and how web personalization creates shareholder value. We develop and test a conceptual model that proposes that the impact of WP on shareholder value is mediated by (1) cash flow volatility and (2) premium price. The hypotheses are tested based on 603 firm-quarter observations spanning 80 firms over six years in the online financial services industry. The results suggest that while WP lowers the volatility of cash flows, it only enables firms to charge premium prices when online trust is high. Additional tests reveal that the reduction in cash flow volatility is because of lower churn as opposed to acquiring new customers or greater cross-buying. Finally, online trust positively moderates the relationships between WP and cash flow volatility and price premia. Practical implications of the findings are discussed.