基于多视角的PFI项目风险评估研究

PFI（Private Finance Initiative）是目前发达国家广泛推行的一种新的民营资本参与公共投资的项目建设管理模式。政府在确定PFI项目的时候,需要考虑众多因素,从不同角度客观论证项目的可行性。这其中,项目的风险是PFI项目决策时必须考虑的问题。PFI项目相对于传统公共项目而言,风险体系的建立、风险评估的方法都会有其特殊性。同样的风险对于不同的主体会产生不同的影响。本文建立了PFI项目的风险评估指标体系,并且在利益相关者分析的基础上,综合三大主要利益相关者——政府公共部门、SPC、使用者（公众）的群体意见,运用基于格栅获取的模糊Borda数方法实现了PFI项目风险的多视角评估。对多个备选PFI项目中进行多视角评估,可实现项目决策的优先排序;对单一项目进行多视角评估,可反映项目的风险水平;最后通过算例验证该方法的可行性、有效性和实用性。PFI模式在我国适逢良好的发展机遇,相关的理论研究正成为热点,风险管理就是其中的一大方面,对此所作的探讨是必须且有意义的。     

Public Sector Banks in India: Rationale and Prerequisites for reform

This paper contributes to the debate on public sector banks by suggesting several rationales for government ownership of banks in India. The paper then proceeds to argue that due to high economic costs, the current public sector banking system is unsustainable. Although a policy of wider private ownership was introduced in the 1990s, it is suggested that there are several prerequisites to be met before such a reform can be more fully implemented. It is argued that these prerequisites arise from the rationales for government ownership, and they include a credible bank regulatory regime, and government promotion of co‐operative banks and credit unions.     

USING COMMERCIAL DISCIPLINE TO IMPROVE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PROCUREMENT: MISPLACED ENTHUSIASM?

Australia, like other democracies, has long sought to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of procurement for national defence. A recent review exhorted Defence procurement managers to exert greater “commercial discipline.” Similar calls have been made in other countries. This paper tests such public sector emulation of commercial practice by comparing the relative effectiveness of procurement via in‐house arrangements; a public procurement agency detached from Defence; and privatized provision. We show that what matters is not public or private ownership but how ownership and management are integrated and what incentive structures are applied. (JEL H44)     

Public or Private Sector Wage Leadership? An International Perspective*

Whether a government acts as a wage leader, placing pressure on private‐sector wages (more open to competition), or whether it plays a passive role and merely follows wage negotiations in the private sector, there are important implications for macroeconomic development, particularly in small open economies and/or countries that are members of a monetary union, such as those of the European Monetary Union. With the notable exception of the case of Sweden, opinion on this issue is still divided. In this paper, we look at public‐ and private‐sector wage interactions from an international perspective (18 OECD countries). We focus on the causal two‐way relationship between public and private wage setting, confirming that the private sector, on the whole, appears to have a stronger influence on the public sector, rather than vice versa. However, we also find evidence of feedback effects from public wage setting, which affect private‐sector wages in a number of countries. When the private sector takes the lead on wages, there are few feedback effects from the public sector, while public wage leadership is typically accompanied by private‐sector feedback effects.     

Private Sector Involvement in Infrastructure Projects

There has been little systematic discussion of the issues associated with private involvement in infrastructure. Analysis of the relative performance of the private and public sector in different phases of infrastructure provision suggests that, in most cases, the private sector will be most efficient in the construction phase but the public sector will be best equipped to handle the risks associated with ownership. The situation is less clear-cut with respect to operation—a mixture in which core operations are undertaken by the public sector owner with peripheral operations being contracted out may be optimal in many cases.     

The influence of ownership on the cost of bus service provision in Switzerland - an empirical illustration

In deregulated transport markets, a firm's ownership status and management system represent an important issue. Property right theory suggests that productivity and performance are higher in the private than in the public sector. In Switzerland, providers of bus transportation are traditionally corporations, though a large part of their equity shares are still held by the public sector (federal government, cantons, municipalities). This paper examines the potential impact of ownership on the cost of bus service provision for a sample of private, public and mixed bus companies in Switzerland. The estimation of a translog cost model has been considered for 34 bus transit companies observed over 5 years (1991–1995). The results only partially confirm that if the private sector holds shares in the company's capital, efficiency is enhanced. In addition, measures of economies of scale and density are derived and discussed within the actual public transport policy.     

Partial privatization and yardstick competition

We analyse the dynamics of public and private sector employment in Bangladesh, using the natural experiment provided by the partial privatization of the jute industry. The public sector had substantial excess employment of workers initially, but this excess was substantially eroded by the end of the period we studied. The extent of erosion differs between white‐collar and manual worker categories, with excess employment persisting only in the former. Our findings suggest that partial privatization increases the efficacy of yardstick competition in the regulation of public firms, because heterogeneous ownership undermines collusion between public sector managers, and also makes excess employment more transparent to the general public.     

ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF PRIVATE LEADERSHIP IN MIXED DUOPOLY

We investigate a mixed duopoly where a state‐owned public enterprise competes against a profit‐maximising private enterprise. We analyse whether private leadership or public leadership is robust in the observable delay game. We find that private leadership is always risk dominant. We also investigate how ownership structure in a public firm affects the equilibrium distribution of roles. We find that the roles are as follows: (1) Cournot, when the degree of privatisation is low, (2) private leadership, when it is middle, (3) both private leadership and public leadership, when it is high. The result implies that private leadership is again more robust.     

Optimal mixed ownership: A contract view

This paper reconsiders the classic issue of whether provision of a public good should be undertaken directly by the government or through private contracting (Hart, Andrei, & Robert, 1997). We consider a third alternative of provision by a mixed ownership firm. We assume that this mixed ownership firm provides the government principal with a combination of the contracting problems it faces in the two more extreme alternatives. We show that full government ownership and provision is never optimal and that frequently the mixed firm undertakes intermediate investments that also prove welfare superior to fully private contracting. These results carry over to an extension in which the agent is presumed to be a foreigner.     

也谈所有制结构问题

通过对国有企业深层次矛盾的分析 ,说明了现阶段我国发展非公有制经济的必要性。文章认为 ,搞活国有企业必须让非公有制经济参股 ,国有资产比重的下降并没有否定公有制的主体地位。     

Bertrand versus Cournot competition in a downstream mixed oligopoly with foreign ownership

Focusing on foreign ownership in the private firm, we examine the Cournot-Bertrand comparison in a mixed oligopolistic market with vertical market structure. We have found that if public and private firms were charged with uniform price for their inputs, then Cournot-Bertrand ranking in market outcomes confirms those obtained by Ghosh and Mitra (2010). This implies that under uniform pricing in the upstream sector, the vertical market structure does not have substantial influences on Cournot-Bertrand ranking. However, if discriminatory pricing is adopted, firm's profits, output, and social welfare are often reversed to those obtained from uniform pricing in the upstream sector. Given the closeness of products, if the share of foreign ownership is sufficiently low, social welfare in Cournot competition can exceed that of Bertrand competition, contrasting with the standard welfare ranking that Bertrand welfare is strictly higher than Cournot. This implies that Cournot competition can be more socially desirable than Bertrand in mixed oligopoly with vertical market structure if discriminatory pricing scheme is adopted by foreign upstream monopolists.     

Economic transition and private-sector labor: Evidence from urban China

This paper studies the transition of labor from the state sector to the infant private sector in urban China. We examine the impact of the first wave of housing reforms, which untied access to housing in urban areas from working for the state sector. We find that the reform significantly increased private housing ownership and private-sector employment, and reduced private-sector wages. The housing reform had no effect on unemployment or self-employment.     

Regulating Providers' Reimbursement in a Mixed Market for Health Care

Hospitals can be reimbursed for their costs in many ways. Several authors have investigated the effects of these reimbursement rules on physician incentives and, therefore, on the quantity of services provided to patients. A form of (linear) cost-sharing tends to emerge as the socially efficient reimbursement policy. We present a model of hospital reimbursement, based on Ellis and McGuire (1986). The new feature is that physicians can supply private health care services to a patient, as well as public sector ones; a common institutional arrangement in many health care systems. We investigate the optimal public sector reimbursement rule given that private market incentives must now be taken into account. Public sector cost-sharing remains socially efficient, but it is generally non-linear: the precise details depend on whether public and private services are substitutes or complements and on the degree of social efficiency achieved in the private sector. Other reimbursement schemes exhibit optimality properties not present in Ellis and McGuire's work.     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

GOVERNMENT‐MANDATED DISCRIMINATORY POLICIES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*

We study an economy with private and public sectors in which workers invest in imperfectly observable skills that are important to the private sector but not to the public sector. Government regulation allows native majority workers to be employed in the public sector with positive probability while excluding the minority from it. We show that even when the public sector offers the highest wage rate, it is still possible that the discriminated group is, on average, economically more successful. The widening Chinese/Malay wage gap in Malaysia since the adoption of its New Economic Policy in 1970 supports our model.     

Lack of commitment to future privatization policies may lead to worst welfare outcome

We investigate the welfare consequences of a lack of commitment to future privatization policies. The government implements a privatization policy after the competition structure is determined by the entry of private firms. We find that in an equilibrium, the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) a public firm if private firms expect that the government fully privatizes (nationalizes) the public firm. This is because an increase in the number of firms entering a market increases the government's incentive to privatize the public firm, which mitigates future competition and stimulates entries. The full-privatization equilibrium is the worst privatization policy among all possible (either equilibrium or non-equilibrium) privatization policies for welfare because it causes excessive market entry of private firms. Partial commitment of a minimal public ownership share may mitigate this problem.     

Stochastic Cost Frontier and Inefficiency Estimates of Public and Private Universities: Does Government Matter?

Stochastic frontier analysis is used to estimate operating cost inefficiencies of public and private non-profit universities in the U.S. while also accounting for the possible effects arising from differences in the degree of government ownership. Using panel data for four academic years, 2005?C2009, inefficiencies are estimated under two model specifications. Results indicate that public universities are more cost efficient when environmental factors influence cost frontiers but private universities are the cost efficient institutions when those factors are determinants of inefficiency. Increased government funding does matter and increases private sector inefficiency but offers some efficiency improvements among public universities. Following the global financial crisis, there is evidence indicating a considerable slowdown in the inefficiency growth among both public and private universities.     

Incentive Mechanism Design for Production Economies with Both Private and Public Ownerships

In this paper we deal with the problem of incentive mechanism design which yields efficient allocations for general mixed ownership economies when preferences, individual endowments, and coalition patterns among individuals are unknown to the planner. We do so by doubly implementing the proportional solution for economies with any number of private sector and public sector commodities and any number of individuals as well as the coexistence of privately and publicly owned firms with general convex production possibility sets. Furthermore, the mechanisms work not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D61, D71, D82.     

The impact of private vs. public ownership on the level and structure of employment

We examine the effects of private vs. public ownership on the level and structure of employment using uncommonly rich data on the population of Portuguese firms from 1991 to 2009. We find that private ownership is associated with sizeable job losses. This occurs whether we consider privatizations or nationalizations, and the relationship tends to be stronger in the presence of foreign capital. We also find some evidence that private ownership is associated with higher skill utilization, particularly following privatizations and when foreign investment is present. The estimated job losses associated with private ownership are consistent with a theory in which the shift in ownership increases the degree of profit orientation and leads to lower job security.     

Firm growth and productivity in Belarus: New empirical evidence from the machine building industry

Using a unique dataset comprising information for (up to) 153 firms in the machine building sector in Belarus, we investigate the determinants of firm growth for an economy where state ownership of enterprises is widespread. We use panel data models based on generalizations of Gibrat’s law, total factor productivity estimates and matching methods to assess the differences in firm growth between private and state-controlled firms. Our results indicate that labor hoarding and soft budget constraints play a particularly important role in explaining differences in performance between these two groups of firms.