发展中国家普遍服务义务的经济分析

本文构建一个简单的非对称信息模型,分析发展中国家特定的普遍服务问题。在模型中,政府与垄断企业的非对称信息产生于在农村提供服务的边际成本,最优普遍服务政策可以用两种规制手段即资费和网络投资来实现。本文对区别定价和统一定价两种情形进行了对比分析,得出的结论是：在实施区别定价时,与完全信息相比,不完全信息将提高农村地区的资费水平,并且减小相应的网络覆盖面积;而在实施统一定价时,农村地区的定价可能降低,但这是以网络覆盖面积的减小为代价。模型结果还表明,合谋的成胁会弱化企业的激励。有意思的是,在这两种定价机制下,企业和纳税人这两种不同的利益集团均有同规制者合谋的动机。实际上,纳税人利益集团的存在,强化了规制者和企业之间的防止合谋约束,并且为了减少规制者同纳税人利益集团的合谋收益,即使规制者具有高成本信息,也会使配置结果扭曲。     

发展中国家的普遍服务政策

该文构建非对称信息模型分析普遍服务政策问题,其中政府对企业在农村提供服务的边际成本具有非对称信息.该文对区别定价和统一定价两种情形进行了对比分析.在实施区别定价时,不完全信息将提高农村地区的资费水平,并且降低相应的网络覆盖面积;而在实施统一定价时,农村地区的定价可能降低,但却是以网络覆盖的减少为代价的.该文的政策结论是:在实施普遍服务政策时,需要综合考虑网络投资的激励和用户承受能力.     

Price Caps,Rate of Return Constraints and Universal Service Obligations

This paper evaluates the effects of modifying price cap regulation when firms are allowed to use non-linear tariffs. We consider a stylized network industry and analyze price cap regulation combined with rate of return regulation and with a universal service obligation. While both modifications can increase aggregate welfare by reducing the pricing distortions under price cap regulation, a universal service obligation is welfare superior if the firms profits and the size of its network are held constant.     

垄断竞争的电信业定价策略研究

讨论垄断竞争条件下电信业定价策略,对理解电信运营商的竞争行为、制定电信业竞争政策有重要的意义。本文将呼叫外部性引入模型,考察了呼叫方内部化接听方效用条件下企业定价策略,从而扩展了目前理论内容和结论。研究表明：当呼叫方内部化接听方的效用时,在线性定价条件下,电信运营商仍然会通过提高接入费进行合谋;在非线性定价条件下,由于电信运营商可以利用固定费进行市场份额的争夺,电信运营商不再有利用接入费进行合谋的动机;在基于终接网络的价格歧视条件下,当消费者接听效用接近于呼叫效用时,电信运营商将会通过制定无穷大的呼叫异网价格来获取更大的市场份额,因此网络联接发生了中断。     

Nonlinear Pricing, Redistribution, and Optimal Tax Policy

This paper examines the role of nonlinear pricing by public (or regulated) utilities as a redistributive mechanism in presence of an optimal nonlinear income tax. It models an economy with many types of persons who differ in two unobservable characteristics (earning abilities and tastes). We show that nonlinear pricing does have a redistributive role; it is not a substitute for an ill-designed tax policy. We prove, assuming separable preferences, that a person whose valuation of the public sector output is smaller than the average valuation of the population (all measured at the same consumption bundle) must face a marginal price for the good above its marginal cost. Further assuming that tastes and earning abilities are perfectly correlated, we prove that everyone must face a marginal price for the public sector's output which strictly exceeds its marginal cost if correlation is positive. These properties provide an economic rationale for the provision of "support for low-income consumers" as mandated by the universal service and similar regulatory policies. Finally, we show that with correlated characteristics, implementation can be achieved through two separate functions: a pricing function that depends only on the public sector output and a tax function that depends only on income.     

成本冲击与价格粘性的非对称性——来自中国微观制造业企业的证据

本文在状态依存模型框架内,估计了中国制造业企业价格粘性的非对称性和异质性。结果显示制造业产品的价格粘性具有非对称的特征,同时企业的"异质性"也影响了产品的价格粘性。根据价格粘性理论,存在价格粘性时,货币是"非中性"的,通过调整货币数量能够影响短期内的产出。然而,由于价格粘性的非对称性,在通货膨胀时期,央行为了抑制通胀而采取的紧缩性货币政策将更多地表现为产出减少,而非价格水平下降;相反,为提高产出而实行的扩张性货币政策将更多地表现为价格水平上升,而非产出水平提高。只有通货紧缩时期,价格粘性的非对称性出现反转,扩张性货币政策在短期内才更有效。     

Information transmission and incentives not to price discriminate

This paper analyzes how the pricing policy of an incumbent may signal information not only on the demand level but also on the demand composition. A signalling game with two periods and two players (an established firm and a potential entrant) is considered. The potential entrant has incomplete information on market demand. There exist many sequential equilibria in which the uniform price policy acts as an entry deterrence device by hiding actual market profitability. We can interpret the uniform pricing policy as a rejection of the use of superior information on market demand composition in order to reduce the entrant's expected profits.     

Universal Service and Entry: The Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints

Universal service objectives are pervasive in telecommunications, and have gained new relevance after the introduction of competition in many markets. Despite their policy relevance, little work has been done allowing for a thorough discussion of instruments designed to achieve universal service objectives under competition. We intend to fill this gap, and disaggregate the problem into interacting forms of regulatory intervention such as uniform pricing and coverage constraints. It is shown that these are not competitively neutral and may have far-reaching strategic effects. Under uniform pricing, equilibrium coverage of both incumbent and entrant may be lower than without regulation. These effects depend on which measures are imposed at the same time, thus no single measure can be evaluated in isolation. We also point out that different groups of consumers are affected in different ways, making welfare comparisons difficult.     

THE TREATMENT OF “HOME OWNERSHIP” IN THE CPI*

This paper explores the imputed service price approach to the pricing of the services of consumer-owned-and-used durables in the construction of the consumer price index, using the services of owner-occupied housing as an illustration. A theoretical framework for analyzing this question is first developed. Certain practical problems are then discussed. The conceptual difficulty of constructing an appropriate rate of return on the basis of available data on interest rates and house prices, in the context of inflation, is explored. Two arguments are advanced that statistical agencies ought not to follow the imputed service price approach in pricing the services of owner-occupied dwellings and other consumer durables. On the one hand, nominal interest rates will, in any short period, reflect monetary policy and not any change in the money “rental” of owner-occupied houses. Second, movements in nominal interest rates will also reflect changes in the money price of pure consumption goods, as well as changes in the money price of houses. The argument is extended to other consumer durables and, in the limiting case, to monetary balances, and it is concluded that in all but trivial cases the application of the service price approach leads to price movements of little or no meaning.     

UNIVERSAL ACCESS,PARALLEL TRADE AND INCENTIVES TO INNOVATE

Governments often subsidize poorer groups in society to ensure their access to new drugs. We analyse the optimal income‐based price subsidies in a strategic environment. We show that universal access is less likely to arise when price arbitrage prevents international price discrimination. When this is not the case, under some income ranges, bilateral universal coverage can be supported by equilibrium subsidies together with bilateral partial provision. In such a case, international health policy coordination becomes relevant. We also show that asymmetric universal access to medicines across countries can arise, even when countries are ex ante symmetric, when international price discrimination is possible and governments cannot design subsidies proportional to either income or quality.     

股票价格服从不对称跳跃-扩散过程的期权定价模型

经典期权定价公式B—S模型假设股票价格服从连续的几何布朗运动,然而,经验研究表明股票价格常常发生跳跃式的变化,这主要是由于股市上常出现一些重大的事件导致的。通过对期权市场出现的“隐含波动率微笑”现象进行观察和研究,可以发现引起股票价格上升或者下跌的跳跃式变化往往是不对称的。为简单起见,在假设跳跃幅度服从均匀分布假设前提下,初步建立起股票价格服从不对称跳跃-扩散过程期权定价模型。     

History-based price discrimination and entry in markets with switching costs: A welfare analysis

We analyze history-based price discrimination in an asymmetric industry, where an incumbent, protected by switching costs, faces an entrant who does not have access to information about consumers’ purchase histories. We demonstrate that consumer surplus is higher with uniform pricing than with history-based price discrimination. We find that the entry decision is invariant to whether the incumbent implements history-based pricing or uniform pricing. This implies that the potential abuse of market dominance imposed by history-based price discrimination is exploitation, not exclusion. Finally, we establish that the profit gain to the incumbent from history-based pricing exceeds the associated loss to consumers.     

Pricing and Access under National Competition Policy: The Case of the Natural Gas Pipeline Sector

This paper reviews the development of open access and deregulation of trunk pipeline natural gas transportation in Australia and the United States. It investigates Australian policy developments in the setting of reference tariffs for firm service, but argues that the institutional arrangements for granting third party access, and the pricing of that access on a spot or interruptible basis, are at least as important as tariffs for firm service. The paper concludes that, in the absence of an established pipeline network, pipelines may have little incentive to price their excess capacity efficiently. In this case, attempts to promote an efficient allocative outcome through privatisation and open access in Australia are unlikely to be as successful as they have been in North America.     

中国医疗服务市场中的信息不对称程度测算

本文构建了一个医疗服务市场上信息不对称程度的测度模型,并基于"中国健康与营养调查"(CHNS)中微观个体调查数据,对医疗服务市场上医患双方的信息程度及其对最终的医疗服务价格的影响效应进行了实证测度。研究结果表明:(1)医患双方所掌握的信息因素对最终医疗服务价格的形成具有重要影响,同时医生相对于患者掌握着更多的信息并具有更强的议价能力;(2)几乎所有的患者都将被迫接受一个高于公正基准价格的价格,平均而言达成的医疗服务价格相对于公正的基准价格要高出26.61%;(3)年度效应分析发现,1989—2006年,各年度的医疗服务市场价格大致都高于公正基准价格26%左右,换言之,改革开放以来中国的医疗服务体制改革,并未有效起到解决"看病难、看病贵"的作用;(4)患者在城乡因素、医疗保险、工作状况、年龄以及受教育程度等因素上的异质性,对医患双方最终价格的作用是有限的。本文的政策含义是:强调通过引进竞争,强化市场机制在医疗服务市场中调节作用的改革思路,是否适合中国值得反思。解决现实中普遍存在的医疗服务价格虚高问题,回归医疗服务的公益性,需要政府更多地参与其中,并有效发挥价格规制、市场监管以及外部性矫正等功能。     

Foreign direct investment,input prices,and host country welfare

This paper analyzes a multinational firm’s foreign direct investment decision, through either greenfield investment or cross‐border merger and acquisition, into a host country with an input monopoly that adopts either uniform pricing or discriminatory pricing. The optimal foreign entry mode could differ under each pricing policy. Under Cournot competition, firms’ technological gap and the initial local market structure are critical to the choice of foreign entry mode, whereas product substitutability is important under Bertrand competition. In the presence of foreign entry, this paper also examines the welfare effects of input price discrimination for the host country.     

Asymmetric output-gap effects in Phillips Curve and mark-up pricing models: Evidence for the US and the UK

A number of studies have found an asymmetric response of consumer price index inflation to the output gap in the US in simple Phillips curve models. We consider whether there are similar asymmetries in mark‐up pricing models, that is, whether the mark‐up over producers' costs also depends upon the sign of the (adjusted) output gap. The robustness of our findings to the price series is assessed, and also whether price‐output responses in the UK are asymmetric.     

An explanation for the price puzzle: Asymmetric information and expectation dynamics

Using theoretical and empirical analyses, this paper shows that the expectation dynamics induced by information asymmetry between the Central Bank (CB) and the public can cause the price puzzle. The signalling and learning dynamics between the CB and a representative private-sector agent under asymmetric information is investigated. Inflation positively reacts to contractionary monetary policy because the change in the interest rate is perceived as a signal of the CB’s private information about higher future inflation and output by the public. The empirical section of the paper validates this theoretical argument using a VAR specification about the US economy. Besides providing an explanation for the price puzzle, the results of this paper has practical implications about transparency and monetary policy. The theoretical and empirical findings indicate that asymmetric information causes significant frictions in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. These frictions induce short-run undesired effects like increase in expected inflation and actual inflation as a response to contractionary monetary policy which is identified as “the price puzzle”.     

Equity, Efficiency and Financial Viability: Public-Utility Pricing with Special Reference to Water Supply

The pricing and investment policies of a public enterprise should be designed to achieve efficiency since equity is better pursued by general policy regarding income distribution. Short-run marginal-cost pricing does not generally lead to long-term deficit, but may involve price and surplus/deficit cycles for the case with lumpy investments and growing demand, where the price increases with demand but is reduced with capacity expansion. Taking account of the extra costs of government revenue collection and the likely average price/cost ratio in the economy, the third-best pricing policy is likely to result in long-term surplus, making the objectives of equity, efficiency and financial viability much more consistent with each other than is generally believed. This is particularly true for water with historically increasing costs of additional sources of supply.     

Tacit Collusion and Non–uniform Prices

This article examines the possibility of building a tacit agreement between price–setters that yields non–uniform pricing. It is shown that firms with market power may restrict competition not only by alternating between periods of high prices and low prices (Green and Porter (1984), Rotemberg and Saloner (1986)), but also by always charging different prices and taking turns in being the monopolist. In contrast with the existing literature, price variability is not due to imperfect monitoring, stochastic demand or short–run pricing rigidity but it is a pure supply side effect. The author provides the necessary conditions to have collusion with non–uniform pricing, and shows that the latter dominates a fixed price solution. In terms of competition policy this result confirms that no price parallelism is not, per se , a signal of no collusion.     

Intraday trade in dealership markets

We develop and test a structural asymmetric information transaction model to characterize the price impact of information when markets are thin. Since orders are accepted individually, the model allows for transaction costs and brokerage fees. Equilibrium demands mixed entry strategies on the part of potentially informed traders. Estimation of the structural parameters is performed using a maximum likelihood procedure on NYSE data. The structural model is rejected primarily because the nonlinear restrictions do not allow for sufficient correlation between price movements and pricing errors. This leads to unreasonably low estimates of the probability of informed trade relative to an unrestricted alternative. The price impact of information is found to be positive and significant, but economically small. This is because although the amount of private information is substantial, the quality of the information signals is poor, particularly in the middle of the trading day. Informed agents do not trade small quantities, which suggests that their ability to divide orders is limited by transaction costs.