Licensing a new product with non-linear contracts

Abstract .  This paper looks at a situation where a licensor owns a patent on a technology that allows the production of a new good. The licensor seeks to license its innovation to a set of producers that differ according to their marginal cost of producing an existing good. We show that the licensor is able to obtain the profit a monopolist would achieve by producing the new good. The equilibrium licensing contract specifies both a fixed fee and a royalty scheme based on the production of a licensee.     

成都创建国家环境保护模范城市的启示

成都市创建国家环境保护模范城市活动进一步改善了城市创业环境和人居环境,全面提升了城市服务功能与综合价值,提高了公众生活质量,使成都市初步走上了环境和经济相互促进,人与自然和谐共生的可持续发展道路,呈现出经济快速发展、环境清洁优美、生态良性循环的良好态势。从成都创建国家环境保护模范城市实践中,我们可以得到以下启示:创建国家环境保护模范城市是构建和谐社会,落实科学发展观,全面建设小康社会,提高城市综合实力与城市竞争力的前提;创建国家环境保护模范城市必须承担发展经济和保护生态的双重任务,并且需要建立持续增长的投入机制;国家环境保护模范城市建设更需要注重生态型社会的建设。     

Congestion with heterogeneous commuters

We study a congestion model where a continuum of heterogeneous commuters make a binary choice between riding a bus and driving private vehicles for their commutes. Formulating the model as a large game, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a nontrivial Nash equilibrium and analyze how a gasoline tax affects the allocation of commuters between public transportation and private vehicles at the equilibrium. Based on the analysis, we provide a sufficient condition under which a gasoline tax is Pareto improving. We also prove the existence of a socially optimal policy that minimizes the aggregate loss to all commuters.     

Strategic trade policy under asymmetric information with screening

The design of strategic rent-extracting trade policies requires information that may be private, such as the cost structure of an industry or parameters of the demand function. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, the design of these policies is problematic. We propose screening menus consisting of different instruments (tariff vs. quota) designed to solve this informational issue. We first use a simple model that examines a Cournot duopoly between a domestic firm and a foreign firm with linear demand and cost functions, with both firms supplying a homogeneous good on the domestic market. In this scenario, if the government does not have information regarding the demand parameter, which is known by both firms, a menu consisting of a rent-extracting tariff for a low demand parameter and a rent-extracting quota for a high demand parameter maximizes the government's objective function. This menu leads the domestic firm to reveal private information. We then generalize this framework to a scenario with imperfect information regarding the firms' marginal cost. Finally, we discuss the issue of quotas generating public revenues and study the case of a menu consisting of a tariff and a free quota.     

Donor Altruism and the Transfer Paradox in an Overlapping Generations Model

This paper examines the transfer problem between two countries when a donor exhibits altruistic utility toward a recipient in a one‐sector overlapping generations model. We demonstrate that if the donor has a larger marginal propensity to save than the recipient, the donor's altruism never contributes to donor enrichment irrespective of the degree of the donor's altruism. Donor enrichment occurs only if the donor has a smaller marginal propensity to save and a sufficiently high level of altruism. These findings imply that the altruism of a donor toward a recipient does not necessarily explain the motivation to voluntarily provide a transfer.     

An economic theory of leadership turnover

In an infinite-horizon stochastic model, a coup not only disciplines a dictator's policy towards a group of “kingmakers”, but also enables a kingmaker to become a dictator. Greater competition for the dictator's position, a lower impact of the dictator's policy on the kingmakers, or lower risks of staging a coup raises the benefit of a coup relative to its opportunity cost and so raises the probability of a coup. Since periodic shocks affect the efficacy of the dictator's policy, a bad enough shock makes it too costly for even talented dictators to avert a coup. More talented dictators are able to survive more negative shocks, so the worst shock in a dictator's reign is informative about the probability of a coup. Conditional on the worst shock, the probability of a coup is independent of a dictator's duration in office. The unconditional probability declines with duration.     

A middle income trap in a small open economy: Modeling the Argentinean case

This paper presents a model of the conditions that may lead a small open economy towards a middle income trap. This situation has shown to be pervasive in Latin America. As Argentina is a salient instance of this phenomenon, we develop a stylized model of its economy at the first decades of the XXth century. It consists of a general equilibrium model of an open emerging economy, which is a price-taking primary goods exporter. A growth process is triggered by an increase of commodity prices, due to an upward jump of the world demand of these goods. The economy goes through several phases of growth, starting from a subsistence stage. Once decreasing returns set in, the economy reaches a steady state. Only a sustained high demand of its export products allows the economy to thrive. Otherwise, the economy gets entrapped in a middle income level.     

A dynamic analysis of the differential incidence of capital and labour taxes in a two-class economy

This paper studies a differential incidence model, where a rise in a capital tax is accompanied by a change in a labour tax to hold constant the per capita government revenue, in a two-class growing economy. The major concern is to analyse the conditions necessary for the burden of such a tax substitution to fall solely, partially, or inconsequentially on capitalists or workers. The results obtained indicate that a higher rate of capital tax tends to impose a greater burden on workers.     

冲突管理方式对团队绩效的影响研究

通过实证验证了不同冲突管理方式影响不同类型团队绩效的研究模型与假设,并进行了讨论。采用陈国权（Guoquan Chen,2000）团队绩效以及Rahim和Magner开发的包括整合式、帮助式、支配式、折衷式、逃避式的冲突管理方式的5因子量表,通过有效的问卷调查,应用SPSS进行数据分析,进而验证工作团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈不显著负影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著负影响;并行团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈显著正影响,支配式呈正影响,折衷式呈显著负影响,逃避式呈显著负影响;项目团队中整合式呈显著正影响;帮助式呈不显著负影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著正影响;管理团队中整合式呈显著正影响,帮助式呈不显著正影响,支配式呈不显著正影响,折衷式呈不显著负影响,逃避式呈不显著正影响。     

Is it still economic to build a new coal-fired power plant in the U.S.? A real option analysis

In the U.S., virtually no new coal-fired power plants have been built in recent years. Both industry experts and academics seem to believe that no rational firm will build a new coal-fired plant. Will such a trend continue in the future? To provide insights into this question, we investigate the optimal decision of an electricity company with an irreversible and deferrable opportunity to build either a new coal-fired or natural gas-fired power plant as its new base-load resource. According to our real option analysis, the optimal decision depends on the location. In the case of the eastern U.S., it is optimal to choose a natural gas plant if a firm is given a choice among a new natural gas plant, a new coal plant and deferring the investment. However, contrary to the common sentiment in the industry and academia, building a new coal plant in the western U.S. is still more economical than building a new natural gas plant in the absence of emission pricing. Furthermore, introducing carbon pricing to western U.S. states, as California did, can substantially increase the probability that a firm will optimally choose a natural gas plant over a coal plant.     

Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis

This paper considers the Nash equilibria to a game where a discrete public good is to be provided. Each individual may participate by making a fixed contribution. If a sufficient number of contributions are made, the good is provided. Otherwise, the good is not provided. One variant of the rules allows for contributions to be refunded when the good is not provided. For pure strategies, we find that the Nash equilibria with a refund are a superset of those without a refund. For both rules, the efficient number of players contributing is an equilibrium. For mixed strategies, to every equilibrium without a refund there is a corresponding equilibrium with a refund with a higher number of expected contributors. Mixed strategy equilibria ‘disappear’ as the number of players grows large. Some results reported in the experimental literature are discussed in light of these theoretical results.     

Minimum investment requirement,financial market imperfection and self-fulfilling belief

We develop a model in which a strategic complementarity in saving decisions arises due to a minimum investment requirement and financial market imperfection. We explore the role of self-fulling beliefs in determining the long run dynamics. The model exhibits a wide range of dynamic phenomena such as a poverty trap, a big push and a sunspot equilibrium, depending on the level of financial market imperfection. They account for excessive volatility and a sudden change in the saving rate and its macroeconomic consequences without any shocks to fundamentals.     

On the Second-best Policy of Household's Waste Recycling

This study analyzes the second-best household's waste recycling policy. If we assume the first-best economy with no illegal disposal or transaction costs, then unit pricing, an advance disposal fee and a recycling subsidy are required in order to achieve the social optimum such that both the sum of unit pricing and an advance disposal fee and the sum of unit pricing and a recycling subsidy are equal to the marginal disposal cost. Furthermore, the first-best outcome can also be obtained by a producer take-back requirement system.In the real economy, however, various factors prevent the first-best optimal outcome. In this study we consider two factors, one being the transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or refund) and the other being illegal disposal by the consumer. If a recycling subsidy (or a deposit-refund system) is adopted, a transaction cost associated with it will be generated. Alternatively, if unit pricing is adopted, some of the consumed goods may be disposed of illegally. We show the complete trade-off between unit pricing and a recycling subsidy. In other words, we can not adopt unit pricing and a recycling subsidy simultaneously. As a result, there are three candidates for the second-best policy: unit pricing with an advance disposal fee, a deposit-refund system, and a producer take-back requirement system.Which of these three policies is the second-best policy will depend on the relative magnitude of the price of a recycled good and the marginal transaction cost associated with a recycling subsidy (or the refund in a deposit-refund system). Generally, if the price of a recycled good is positive and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, unit pricing with an advance disposal fee is the second-best policy. However, where the price of a recycled good is negative and the marginal transaction cost is relatively high, a producer take-back requirement system is the second-best policy. Further, where the marginal transaction cost is relatively low, a deposit-refund system is the second-best policy, regardless of whether the price of a recycled good is positive or negative.     

The benefits of the reciprocal grantback clause in patent licensing

This paper shows that a reciprocal grantback clause could potentially be a better licensing provision than a one-way type. There are two benefits associated with the use of a reciprocal grantback clause. First, it improves efficiency by reducing the (minimum) contract compatible royalty rate to zero. As a result, the production becomes efficient because both the licensor and the licensee produce at the same marginal cost. Second, a reciprocal grantback clause is a more effective provision than a one-way grantback clause to guarantee the transfer of superior technology, hence it promotes better technology diffusion.     

The stability of decision making in committees: The one-core

We study the stability of decision making in committees. A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either adopted or abandoned in favor of a new proposal after deliberations. If a proposal is abandoned, it is in spite of the committee member who introduced it, who does not cooperate in any effort to defeat it. Shenoy (1980) proposes the one-core as a solution concept for this game, and shows that this solution may be empty. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable policy under the majority rule. This result highlights a trade-off between the size of a committee, the number of competing policy options, and the existence of a stable outcome. Our findings imply a tension between political stability and the existence of a large number of competing interests in democracies.     

Growth,Distribution, and External Constraints: A Post-Kaleckian Model Applied to Brazil

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to analyze whether the Brazilian economy behaved under a wage-led or profit-led regime between 1960 and 2011, considering a Post-Kaleckian model in a context of external constraints. The time span is limited by data availability (i.e., 2011). To answer the question of whether the Brazilian economy works under a wage-led or profit-led regime, we propose a simple Post-Kaleckian model. The model suggests that a profit-led regime is more probable for Brazil. Moreover, a wage-led regime occurs when a balance of payments constrained growth model is taken into consideration. Likewise, the real exchange rate has a positive impact on economic growth through the export channel. This result is a novelty in the recent literature about the relationship between real exchange rate and economic growth within a Post-Kaleckian model. The Brazilian economy was chosen as it is one of the biggest economies in Latin America.     

Optimal size of a residential area within a municipality

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the optimal size of a residential area within a municipality under different market structures. We find that under a private duopoly the optimal size of the residential area depends on the ratio between transportation costs and a negative externality due to congestion. The optimal size is the whole municipality when the ratio is low enough and a small area of the municipality when the ratio is high enough. The transition from a flat residential area to a more compact one is not continuous, so some large-enough residential areas are never optimal. Under a mixed duopoly the transition from a flat residential area to a more compact one is continuous as the ratio increases. By comparing the two cases we find that for intermediate values of this ratio a flat city is optimal for a private duopoly while compact cities emerge under a mixed duopoly.     

A coopetitive model for the green economy

The paper proposes a coopetitive model for the Green Economy. It addresses the issue of the climate change policy and the creation and diffusion of low-carbon technologies. In the present paper the complex construct of coopetition is applied at macroeconomic level. The model, based on Game Theory, enables us to offer a set of possible solutions in a coopetitive context, allowing to find a Pareto solution in a win–win scenario. The model, which is based on the assumption that each country produces a level of output which is determined in a non-cooperative game of Cournot-type and that considers at the same time a coopetitive strategy regarding the low technologies, will suggest a solution that shows the convenience for each country to participate actively to a program of low carbon technologies within a coopetitive framework to address a policy of climate change, thus aiming at balancing the environmental imbalances.     

Commitment and choice of partner in a negotiation with a deadline

This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline. In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and, moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition between the buyers.     

A theory of ethnic diversity and income distribution: A legislative bargaining approach

In this paper, I examine how the two dimensions of income inequality and ethnic diversity affect the formation of political coalitions and the reallocation of income. I construct a legislative bargaining model to analyze when coalitions form along the income dimension and when it forms along the ethnic dimension. The results of the model suggest that the agenda setter selects a partner with a lower aggregate income: a smaller population size and a lower income level. Further, I extend the model from a one-round to a two-round game. The extended model shows that forming an oversized coalition is a possible equilibrium outcome and is consistent with the empirical findings.