Does informative media commentary reduce politicians' incentives to pander?

Elections sometimes give policy makers incentives to pander, i.e., to implement a policy that voters think is in their best interest, even though the policy maker knows that a different policy is actually better for the voters. Pandering incentives are typically attenuated when voters learn, prior to the election, whether the policy chosen by the incumbent truly was in their best interest. This suggests that the media can improve accountability by reporting to voters information about whether an incumbent made good policy choices. We show that, although media monitoring does sometimes eliminate the incumbent's incentive to pander, in other cases it makes the problem of pandering worse. Furthermore, in some circumstances incumbent incentives are improved when the media acts as a “yes man”—suppressing some information that indicates the policy maker made the wrong choice. We explain these seemingly paradoxical results by focusing on how media commentary affects voters' tendency to apply an asymmetric burden of proof to the incumbent, based on whether she pursues popular or unpopular policies.     

Introduction: Postnational Politics in the European Union

During the Cold War, “buffer” or “bastion” seemed a popular metaphor to describe Turkey. After the Cold War, “bridge,” (and, to some extent, the “crossroad”) metaphor started to dominate the Turkish foreign policy D??course. This article traces the use of “bridge” metaphor in this D??course in the post-Cold War period by the Turkish foreign policy elite. It develops two arguments. First, the word bridge is a “metaphor of vision” combining Turkey's perceived geographical exceptionalism with an identity and a role at the international level. As a “metaphor of vision,” the employment of the word “bridge” highlighted Turkey's liminality and justified some of its foreign policy actions to Eurasia and then to the Middle East. Second, because the bridge metaphor was used in different context to justify different foreign policy choices, its meaning has changed, illustrating that metaphors are not static constructs. It concludes by Say?ng that the continuous use of “bridge” metaphor might reinforce Turkey's “liminality,” placing Turkey in a less classifiable category than the regular “othering” practices.     

WHY DOES A TWO-PARTY SYSTEM EXIST?: A NEW ECONOMIC EXPLANATION*

The purpose of this paper is to present a new economic explanation for why a multiple-party system can endogenously arise as a result of the electoral process. The traditional view on the electoral process (i.e., the median voter theorem) is that political parties that pursue policies in the interest of the median voter are led to a convergence of policies. However, this view cannot explain why either conservative or liberal parties win election in many democratic countries. In order to explain this paradox, the following model considers an economy with three types of parties: conservative, middle, and liberal parties. In the model, the policy of each party is assumed to be time-consistent, so that the policy of the middle party generally leads to suboptimal outcomes for the majority voters. Thus, the “rational” majority voters try to elect the political party whose objective is biased. As a result, the electoral process may lead to a two-party system where both conservative and liberal parties have a chance to win election.     

Inflation,a disease of society

This paper focuses on financing the welfare state expenditures in the UK. It offers a comprehensive analysis of social expenditures and taxes paid by the working population families, and an estimation of the net benefits received by them. While the subsequent analysis of the welfare state and its development primarily concentrates on the British experience, it has a broader application to other OECD countries. The UK as the most egalitarian “liberal market economy,” offers an interesting case for the study of the interaction between the welfare state expansion and economic growth. In terms of her capitalist economic structure, (interaction between market and economy) she is relatively closer to the USA and other Angelo-Saxon (liberal market) economies. In terms of her level of social expenditures, she is much closer to the European “social market economies” than the USA and other more egalitarian “liberal market economies.”     

Alfred Thayer Mahan and American Geopolitics: The Conservatism and Realism of an Imperialist

Debate about the goals of American foreign policy at the end of the twentieth century, especially that thread differentiating “conservative” from “neoconservative” perspectives, might profit by revisiting the debate over American expansion at the end of the nineteenth century. “I am an imperialist,” Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan once remarked, “simply because I am not isolationist.” This paper explores the connection between Mahan's defense of imperialism-often couched in terms of national interest and balance of power- and the norms of American power in world politics. The will-to-power behind American expansion and involvement, a formidable pillar in Mahan's realism, coexisted (often uneasily) with the affirmation of national purpose, a less formidable but still important part of Mahan's idealism. Mahan's strong conservative inclinations in politics were matched by a willingness to employ the tools of realism-particularly traditional diplomatic methods-as a way to uphold historic national goals and moral vision in American foreign policy. Far from seeing an irremediable conflict between the counsels of realism and limited moral gains in foreign policy, Mahan understood that governments are not immune from certain overall constraints. Seldom if ever could American actions abroad be defended by arguing solely for the maintenance or increase of national power.     

战略性经营者激励选择与国际市场份额竞争

本文首先用具有线性需求和规模收益不变生产技术的Cournot双头模型来刻画国际市场份额竞争。指出 ,如果参与国际竞争的本国企业是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,那么 ,无论竞争对手是否是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,本国企业所有者总是有积极性操纵经营者的激励 ,特别的 ,在只有本国企业作出单边激励选择的情况下 ,这种操纵可以使本国企业生产Stackelberg领先者产量成为可以置信的承诺。它在这里所起到的作用是与出口补贴在战略性贸易政策分析中所起到的作用相一致的。如果考虑到从过去的GATT到现在的WTO都规定政府不得以任何形式参与国际竞争 ,这个结论就更有趣了。因为无须政府帮助 ,本国企业所有者凭借自身的力量就能实现有利于本国企业的竞争结果。这种民间对政府的替代是有意义的。在双边激励选择的情况下 ,两国企业陷入了“囚徒困境”。本国企业只有诉诸于本国政府对国际市场的干预 ,才能重新获得Stackelberg领先者的地位 ;但与对它的传统理解相比 ,这种地位已然弱化。最后 ,我们还证明 ,根据相当一般的条件 ,所有者决定的最优经营者激励只与竞争类型 (数量竞争还是价格竞争 )有关 ,而与企业的产品类型 (替代品还是互补品 )无关。     

WHY SMALL GROUPS AND LOW INCOME SECTORS OBTAIN SUBSIDIES: THE “ALTRUISTIC” SIDE OF A “SELF-INTERESTED” GOVERNMENT*

We develop a model of political support seeking politicians and support supplying voters. Based on Downs' original formulation, the framework yields endogenous political weights with both liberal and conservative properties. Our model reconciles the apparent contradiction between models of self-interested politicians and of governments motivated by social concerns. We show that the “altruistic” aspect of government behavior is consistent with its “self-interested” behavior. We determine that the Olson-Becker pressure group model is not unique. An increase in deadweight costs reduces the equilibrium subsidy. Smaller groups receive a larger per capita subsidy. These results are consistent with Becker's model.     

Regional economic growth disparities: A political economy perspective

Regional differences in economic growth have been observed within many countries. Our story emphasises three region-specific factors driving growth—capital, labour and political factors. Conditional on differences in production factor (i.e., labour and capital) variations across democratic states, what role do differences in underlying “political factors” across regions play in accounting for regional growth disparities? We build a political economy model of endogenous growth where regions have the same political institutions, but experience different (and estimable) distributions over voter political biases (i.e., our “political factors”). In our model, political factors affect regional productivity as a consequence of politico-economic equilibrium. We discipline our regional growth accounting exercises by calibrating/estimating each model to American state-level economic and political-survey data. We show that the capital factor is the predominant driving force behind growth in American states. Nevertheless, regional variations in distributions of voter's political biases also account a great deal for regional growth disparities. We also evaluate how much politics would have distorted agents' welfare and regional growth, were regional economies given the opportunity to live under an efficient social planner's allocation system; and, if agents were to live under the same democratic system but where all voters have equal voting influence.     

Pro‐social leadership under authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is regarded as being unaccountable for people's needs, but few studies have documented how authoritarian countries balance their policy goals. China is known to use a promotion system to incentivize local leaders to develop the economy, while neglecting social spending. This paper documents that more leaders having a liberal arts background have been promoted as top provincial leaders. After carefully ruling out other channels, we provide evidence that the shift of top provincial leaders’ college educational backgrounds from science/technology to liberal arts/social science has increased fiscal expenditure shares on science, education, culture and public health and cut economic construction expenditures accordingly. The finding is mainly driven by the post‐1994 period, when local leaders had stronger incentives for economic growth. This indicates that Chinese top authorities are promoting more pro‐social local leaders when providing pro‐growth incentives in general.     

The twilight of the setter? Public school budgets in a time of institutional change

We use a policy change that occurred in Oregon in the late 1980s to re‐visit the budget‐maximizing agenda setter theory of local public expenditure. Prior to 1987, Oregon school districts held operating levy elections with an exogenous, often zero or very low, spending reversion. From 1987 through 1990, districts experienced a “safety net” regime where the reversion was at least the previous year's nominal spending. We find that the “safety net” sharply limited the agenda setter's ability to use the reversion as a threat to obtain voter approval of relatively large expenditures.     

“Interest Rate Trap”, or Why Does the Central Bank Keep the Policy Rate Too Low for Too Long?

In this paper, we provide a framework for modeling one risk‐taking channel of monetary policy, the mechanism whereby financial intermediaries' incentives for liquidity transformation are affected by the central bank's reaction to a financial crisis. The anticipation of the central bank's reaction to liquidity stress gives banks incentives to invest in excessive liquidity transformation, triggering an “interest rate trap” – the economy will remain stuck in a long‐lasting period of suboptimal, low interest rate equilibrium. We demonstrate that interest rate policy as a financial stabilizer is dynamically inconsistent, and the constrained efficient outcome can be implemented by imposing ex ante liquidity requirements.     

Preventing bank panics: The role of the regulator's preferences

How do the preferences of a banking authority affect its decision making in periods of distress and thus financial stability? We study this question in a version of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) with a monopolistic bank and a time-consistent policy response by a banking authority. We show that limited commitment on the part of the banking authority may induce fragility but the banking authority's incentives are also an important determining factor in the degree of financial stability. In particular, under a simple suspension scheme, delegating a banking authority who places sufficient weight on a banker's welfare acts as a commitment device and prevents runs, in analogy with how a Rogoff (1985) “conservative” central banker helps reduce inflation bias. In contrast, once interventions take the form of payment rescheduling, the scope for the bank's susceptibility to a panic increases should the banking authority put more weight on monopoly rents. Identifying such an aspect of vulnerability suggests that appointing a banking authority whose objective function deviates from that of depositors may have unintended consequences.     

Does corruption rule the auditor's soul? Examining the auditors' attitude toward accepting corruption behaviors

This study investigates individual auditors' attitudes toward various corrupt behaviors in Palestine, an underexplored context. We examine the perception and determinants of auditors toward corruption and introduce the link between gender, job position, exposure to other cultures, age, and level of education as factors affecting attitudes toward corruption perception. Our findings reveal that auditors' perception of corruption differs across corrupt behaviors. In most surveyed behaviors, age is negatively associated with acceptance of corruption, and female auditors exhibit a higher attitude toward accepting corruption across various forms. Additionally, the auditor's position and outside education significantly impact their attitude toward accepting corruption. Our work fills an existing literature gap and provides valuable information for targeted regulators and professional bodies aiming to reduce corruption.     

Toward a “constitution” for behavioral policy-making

Behavioral policy interventions aimed at redirecting individuals’ behavior toward optimal choices are characterized by an important issue which is often overlooked: the lack of an instrument to define what “optimal” means. If agents are subject to behavioral biases leading them to make “wrong” choices, the policy-maker can no longer rely on the revealed preferences approach (e.g., what people choose is what people prefer) for defining a welfare criterion. In this article, we reiterate the argument put forward by some scholars that choosing a suitable welfare criterion once the link between observed choices and individuals’ preferences is broken becomes a problematic task. We review the state of the art in the literature and the possible approaches proposed to overcome the problem, concluding that a solution has not yet been reached. Moreover, we argue that the lack of an established welfare criterion characterizing behavioral policy-making could pave the way to government wanting to restrict individual freedom. In the absence of any legislative constraint for the executive, stating that what individuals choose is not what they prefer in principle justifies any freedom-reducing government intervention, since choices can be arbitrarily labeled “sub-optimal” or “welfare-reducing.” To avoid this risk without turning down the potential of behavioral policy-making, we propose that an independent committee establishes ex ante procedural rules and domains where behavioral policy-making can be implemented. The article suggests some possible examples of normative provisions characterizing this constitution-type document, such as the selective identification of the only sectors where behavioral policies could be effectively applied, the periodic evaluation of policy effects, and the use of sunset clauses.     

Improved Mutual Fund Investment Choice Architecture

Two choice architecture interventions were explored to debias investors' irrational preference for mutual funds with high past returns rather than funds with low fees. A simple choice task was used involving a direct trade-off between maximizing past returns and minimizing fees. In the first intervention, warning investors that “Some people invest based on past performance, but funds with low fees have the highest future results” was more effective than 3 other disclosure statements, including the U.S. financial regulator's, “Past performance does not guarantee future results.” The second intervention involved converting mutual fund annual percentage fees into a 10-year dollar cost equivalent. This intervention also improved investors' fee sensitivity, and remained effective even as past returns increased. Financially literate participants were surprisingly more likely to irrationally maximize past returns in their investment choices.     

CAREER CONCERNS,MATCHING, AND OPTIMAL DISCLOSURE POLICY*

Raiders may suffer from information disadvantage since the current employer is often better informed about his workers' quality. When workers have career concerns and matching influences productivity, the initial employer can strategically disclose information to influence incentives and matching efficiency. Long‐term complete contracts induce full disclosure when raiders are perfectly competitive. The optimal short‐term contract induces full disclosure if raiders are perfectly competitive, and the workers are risk neutral and are not liquidity constrained. These conditions are not only sufficient but also “almost necessary” for full disclosure. Partial disclosure may be optimal if any of these conditions is relaxed.     

The impact of “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation” policy on SMEs’ innovation: Using quasi-natural experiments

This study presents an in-depth investigation of the impact of “Mass Entrepreneurship and Innovation” (MEI) policy on small and medium-sized enterprises’ (SMEs’) innovation using the propensity score matching–difference-in-difference method. The MEI policy's R&D subsidies are found to generate a positive effect on SMEs’ innovation. Although R&D subsidies have no significant impact on SMEs’ strategic innovation, they can promote substantial innovation and establish a solid microfoundation for China's high-quality development. Compared with R&D subsidies, tax incentives in the MEI policy cannot encourage SMEs to innovate and may even have a negative impact on SMEs’ innovation.     

Price Level Determinacy under a Pure Interest Rate Peg

In this article we reexamine a famous result by T. J. Sargent and N. Wallace (1975, Journal of Political Economy83, 241–254) according to which a “pure interest rate peg” leads to nominal price indeterminacy. We use P. Weil's (1991, International Economic Review32, 37–53) generalization of the Sidrauski–Brock model, where arrival of new “generations” of infinitely lived agents is allowed, and we obtain the following results: (i) Nominal indeterminacy holds in the traditional Sidrauski–Brock framework; (ii) This nominal indeterminacy disappears as soon as new generations arrive in time, via some rigorous version of Patinkin's “real balance effect”; (iii) A multiplicity of solutions may still remain, but full determinacy occurs in some cases, depending notably on fiscal policy or the distribution of endowments in time. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E4, E5     

政府创新补贴对中国工业自有研发支出的影响研究 ——基于空间计量模型

从空间关联视角再审视政府创新补贴的效应,并基于2001—2017年我国省际面板数据,运用空间面板模型分析了政府创新补贴对中国工业自有研发支出的影响。结果表明,政府创新补贴显著激励了本省市工业自有研发支出,同时,也正向影响相邻省市工业自有研发支出。在控制了内生性问题后,该结论依然成立。另外,在不同所有制和创新水平下,政府创新补贴对工业自有研发支出的空间影响效果存在差异。根据研究结论,本文提出加大政府创新补贴力度并充分考虑溢出效应、融合政府激励和市场驱动以及营造支持成功创新的环境等4项政策建议。     

THE ENDOWMENT EFFECT AS BLESSING

We study the idea that seemingly unrelated behavioral biases can coevolve if they jointly compensate for the errors that any one of them would give rise to in isolation. We suggest that the “endowment effect” and the “winner's curse” could have jointly survived natural selection together. We develop a new family of “hybrid‐replicator” dynamics. Under such dynamics, biases survive in the population for a long period of time even if they only partially compensate for each other and despite the fact that the rational type's payoff is strictly larger than the payoffs of all other types.